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ABSTRACT 
 
Automation and San Francisco Class “B” Longshoremen:  Power, Race, and Workplace 
Democracy, 1958-1981 
 
By 
 
Seonghee Lim 
 
This dissertation studies the meaning of workplace democracy by examining San 
Francisco Class B Longshoremen whose status came into existence in 1958 as part of the 
automation and containerization plan agreed upon by the waterfront employers and the 
International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU).  The B-men who toiled 
at the point of production as second class workers in this transitional period were in a unique 
position to see problems emerging from the mechanization plan and understand the 
exploitive nature of new work processes that arose from the abandonment of the old work 
rules.  Although the main motivation for the waterfront employers and the longshoremen’s 
union behind the recruitment of B-men was to create a flexible but disciplined labor force 
that would make a smooth transition to automation, by organizing themselves for equal 
status and better working conditions, the B-men challenged the roles imposed upon them.  
By focusing on the black longshoremen who disproportionally filled the ranks of B-men and 
who lost their jobs without just cause and subsequently organized various actions for their 
reinstatement, this study provides a lens for viewing structural racism in the process of 
ix 
 
automation and demonstrates the irrepressible self-activism of working people for respect, 
equality, and control over their working conditions.   
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Introduction 
 
In 1958, Willie Jenkins, Jr., a 22-year-old black man, heard the news that the San 
Francisco waterfront was hiring a large number of new longshoremen for the first time since 
1948.  Jenkins had been working as a ship scaler for the past couple of years, but he was 
familiar with “Frisco” longshoremen’s work culture because his father had been a fulltime 
longshoreman and a member of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s 
Union (ILWU) Local 10 since the Second World War.  Willie J. Hurst, Jr., another young 
black man in San Francisco, also learned about the recruitment.  His father had suffered 
from a heart attack that year and Hurst had just taken over his father’s warehouse job to help 
out the household economy.  His father encouraged him to apply for the longshore job, 
instead of maintaining his current warehouse work.  
The waterfront had been known in Bay Area black communities as a favorable place 
to work.  Since the 1934 strike, the members of Local 10 democratically shared job 
opportunities through the union hiring hall.  They had also established several formal and 
informal work rules by which they could work at their own pace and make a choice on when, 
with whom, and what cargo to work.  For black men, who had been historically 
discriminated against in many workplaces, the longshoremen’s dispatching system and their 
work culture provided them with a great sense of democracy and freedom, as well as 
economic stability, if they obtained fully-registered status.  Because a significant number of 
black men had been able to enter the industry during the war era and eventually became 
fully-registered men, the local had a reputation for having a high percentage of black 
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members.  Many black longshoremen were revered in their communities for their 
involvement in promoting equal opportunities and rights for black people in the workplace 
and the larger society.  
After going through formal application processes and physical examinations, both 
Jenkins and Hurst were admitted as Class B Longshoremen (or “B-men”) and began to work 
in the summer of 1959.  Among the 743 B-men hired, about 60 percent were young black 
men, a substantial portion of whom had been born in the Southern states but had moved to 
the Bay Area during the Second World War.  Like Hurst, many black men had been 
warehousemen before getting the B-men job.  Like Jenkins, many of them had 
longshoremen relatives in Local 10.  Jenkins understood that B-men, like partially-registered 
men in the past, were dispatched to jobs that were unfilled by fully registered men (or “A-
men”) and lacked the union’s full membership privileges.  Nevertheless, he believed that he 
would enjoy, just as his father had, the same union privileges and job security in a very near 
future.     
What the B-men did not expect, however, was that more rigid requirements would be 
imposed upon them than had ever been imposed on any previous group of partially 
registered men.  More importantly, soon after they got their jobs, the union began to 
abandon jobsite work rules that the longshoremen had established through militant actions 
during the late 1930s in order to make their work processes and working conditions fairer 
and more humane.  As the work rules were eliminated, rank-and-file workers’ power to 
exercise control over their work processes became diminished.  Besides, the local 
membership no longer had authority to make a final decision on registration. In 1961, a 
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coastwise union body informed the B-men that their promotion to fully registered status 
would not happen anytime soon. 
After four years of enduring hardships stemming from his inferior position, newly 
adopted work rules controlled by the employers, and more onerous working conditions, 
Jenkins received a letter indicating that he would no longer be registered as a longshoreman.  
He was not alone.  Eighty one other B-men also lost their registration status along with him, 
and Hurst was one of them.  A majority of them believed that they were unjustly 
deregistered and decided to band together to fight to get their jobs back.  They subsequently 
formed the “Longshore Jobs Defense Committee” (LJDC) and organized various actions to 
be reinstated, including legal battles.  Jenkins and Hurst dedicated themselves to the cause 
and played a significant role in maintaining the spirit of the movement by serving as 
members of the LJDC’s steering committee. 
What follows here is the largely forgotten history of the B-men like Jenkins and 
Hurst who began to toil at San Francisco Bay Area ports in 1959 and who, upon being 
deregistered in 1963, organized a struggle in order to clear their names and get their jobs 
back -- a struggle that lasted for eighteen years.  This study of the creation of B Class 
longshoremen, the B-men’s working conditions, the process of registration, and the 
deregistered men’s struggle for justice significantly contribute to an understanding of the 
history of how the transition to automation and containerization influenced power relations 
on the West Coast waterfront and how workers themselves perceived and resisted these 
changes.   
The creation of a unique status of B-men paralleled a plan to introduce 
mechanization on the waterfront.  By the late 1950s, top officers of the West Coast 
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longshoremen’s union believed that mechanization and containerization were inevitable and 
decided to cooperate with the employers’ plan to introduce new technological methods of 
operation.  In return, the union received monetary benefits.  In anticipating a reduction in the 
future workforce, the ILWU agreed to create a new category of B-men whom the employers 
aimed to use as a flexible but available labor force during the transitional period to 
mechanization.  Moreover, the union agreed to remove formal work rules, such as “gear 
priority” and “sling-load limits,” and repressed rank-and-file workers from practicing 
customary rules like “four-on and four-off,” by which workers set their own pace of work 
and thus restricted the management from unilaterally imposing upon them exploitative 
measures and dangerous speed ups. 
The B-men’s work experiences between 1959 and 1963 reveal a great deal about the 
employers’ underlying motivation for insisting on bringing automation to the workplace.  As 
soon as the union removed the tradition work rules, the employers increased productivity, 
not by introducing new machinery, but rather by overloading man-operated slings, reducing 
the basic gang size, and forcing the men to accept inhumane speed-ups.  In other words, 
even though the employers had claimed that machines were needed for “economic 
efficiency,” their fundamental impulse was to take over from rank-and-file workers the 
power to control how operations should be done.   
This study also presents the workers’ recognition of the drastic transformations in 
their work culture and power relations.  The B-men, who did the bulk of the hold work that 
was most impacted by the work rule changes, faced far more hardships than A-men working 
on the deck or dock.  B-men thus sensed most sharply the feeling of losing their control over 
the work process.  Nevertheless, they lacked official means to express their sense of 
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injustice and change the conditions because they were excluded from the decision-making 
processes of the union.  
The struggle of the B-men thus contributes to the understanding of how the 
anticipation and the collaboration of a labor union amidst technological changes affected not 
only working conditions but also union democracy.  The meaning of union democracy 
cannot be separated from worker power on the jobsite, as well as internal participatory and 
procedural matters.  West Coast rank-and-file longshoremen had established a culture of 
solidarity through organizing jobsite actions during and after the 1934 strike.  Their union 
was widely known as one of the most radical and militant labor organizations.  Nevertheless, 
it is important to examine how the union’s traditions changed overtime, under what 
circumstances the changes occurred, and how different generations of longshoremen felt 
about and found meanings in union democracy.  Without these observations, to correctly 
locate the story of the B-men in the history of the ILWU and to assess how the deregistered 
B-men felt about what happened to them and why they thought that the ILWU violated its 
ideals of union democracy would prove difficult, if not entirely impossible.   
The story of the B-men proves that the initial intention of the employers and top 
union officers in creating their status-- a vulnerable but disciplined labor force to buffer the 
transition to automation -- did not work smoothly and generated much resistance among the 
B-men.  Quitting the job permanently, being “unavailable,” and refusing to work “as 
directed” were among the various forms of their workplace resistance.1  They also organized 
                                                 
1
 Many scholars have studied subtle forms of resistance of working people and their significance in 
impacting power structure and this study is influenced especially by the following works:  W. E. B. Du Bois, 
Black Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and company, 1935) ;  George P. Rawick, From Sundown 
to Sunup (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1972); Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1983);  Robin D. G. Kelley, Race Rebels (New York: The Free Press, 
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themselves to collectively solve their grievances and improve their working conditions by 
electing their own representatives and sending them to local union executive board meetings.  
The case of the ILWU B-men thus demonstrates that workers’ self activism for justice 
cannot be easily repressed. 
A study of the B-men also provides an important lens to understand the intersectional 
dimension of race, class, and gender.  A large number of black men had entered the industry 
during the Second World War and had managed to become fully-registered men in Local 10. 
They paved the way for many younger black men once again to be recruited in 1959.  Due to 
the masculine nature of work, the strong tradition of worker control over the production 
process, a relatively high wage standard to support their families, a job on the waterfront 
provided a unique opportunity for black working-class men.  Moreover, longshoremen 
enjoyed male social bonding while at work, because traditional longshore operations 
demanded workers’ good teamwork and an intimate partnership.  Those who were not 
dispatched for the day when there was no more work available often socialized among 
themselves by playing cards in the hall or by going out to a nearby bar where they mingled 
with seamen, teamsters, and various other workers.    
Nevertheless, the San Francisco local was an exception in terms of keeping a large 
number of black members.  Moreover, both times when black men entered the industry, 
more hardship was imposed upon them due to the war production effort in the case of the 
first generation of black longshoremen and in the name of automation in the case of the B-
men in the early 1960s.  Although the dispatching system provided equal opportunity to all 
                                                                                                                                                      
1994);Tara Hunter, To Joy My Freedom (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 1997); and 
Stephanie M. H. Camp, Closer to Freedom (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
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members regardless of their race and ethnicity, partnership and socialization rarely took 
place across racial lines.  Furthermore, the eighty-five percent of the deregistered men in 
1963 were black men who subsequently had difficulties finding another decent job, like 
many other inner city black men who experienced several times higher jobless rates than 
their white counterparts.  The life stories of many black Longshore Jobs Defense Committee 
(LJDC) members before, during, and after working as B-men provide a shared history of 
how black working people suffered, survived, and resisted structural racism. 
Even though both generations of black longshoremen had a shared experience of 
oppressive social practices as black working-class men, the interviews of a substantial 
number of black LJDC members uncover that a tension existed among them because of their 
different statuses and their different attitudes toward newly adopted methods of work.  Many 
LJDC members believed that they were fired because they had protested against the 
mechanization and modernization agreement and had defied orders from their superiors.  For 
them, older black longshoremen were too submissive to Harry Bridges who had been a 
perennial president of the ILWU since its formation and who received much credit for the 
local’s admitting a large number of black men in the 1940s.  They saw these older men’s 
attitudes as not being manly enough.  They resented the older black men for not organizing a 
strong opposition to their layoffs.  The intergenerational tension demonstrates how the 
mechanization and modernization scheme played a role in forming a complex consciousness 
about masculinity, worker solidarity, and ethnic unity.   
Despite facing financial hardship, Longshore Jobs Defense Committee members 
sustained their struggle for almost two decades by pulling together each one’s meager 
resources and taking their legal case all the way to the United States Supreme Court.  The B-
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men’s legal strategy was to prove that the union violated its “duty of fair representation.”  
They also complained that the union and the employers’ association, the Pacific Maritime 
Association, breached the contract when they had fired the B-men.  A union’s duty of fair 
representation was a judge-made concept that had been contested and redefined over and 
over in courts since the 1944 Steele case.  The B-men’s case travelled a long and convoluted 
journey from a district court, to an appellate court, and to the U.S. Supreme Court, and then 
returned to the district court for a trial and went through appeals again to the higher courts.  
A study of the B-men’s case shows how the workers and the union contested what 
constituted a union’s unfair representation and how the union and the employers attempted 
to maneuver through the legal system to get the case dismissed or defeated.   
The B-men’s struggle exemplified the resilience and resourcefulness of marginalized 
people who have produced invaluable knowledge about the world through their organizing 
activities.  During the long convoluted course of struggle, they developed a new alternative 
vision about democracy, law, society, and worker solidarity beyond racial divisions.  Their 
struggle thus presented an invaluable lesson about how people transform themselves in the 
process of organizing actions to change their social conditions.  Their internal relations 
prefigured a new community in which human relationships are built upon care and 
cooperation, rather than upon exploitation and competition.    
Historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot in his Silencing the Past: Power and the Production 
of History points out that “any historical narrative is a particular bundle of silences” because 
“differential exercise of power” in the process of history production “makes some narratives 
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possible and silences others.”2  In other words, a power structure necessarily affects history 
production in various phases, such as creating and gathering facts and interpreting them.  
Power, however, “does not enter the story once and for all, but at different times and from 
different angles.”3  For that reason, Trouillot emphasizes that not all silences are equal and 
thus restoring differently silenced voices cannot be done in the same manner but requires 
various procedures accordingly.  Trouillot’s teaching is especially relevant to this study.   
Although many scholarly books have been written about the work cultures of 
longshoremen at various ports and about their respective unions, only a few of them have 
examined the working conditions of B-men on the West Coast, in general, and even fewer 
have investigated the deregistered B-men’s struggle in depth.  Regarding studies about San 
Francisco longshoremen, as historian Robert W. Cherny points out, many have focused on 
the 1930s, especially the 1934 strike, and on Harry Bridges who remained in the most 
powerful position in the ILWU for forty years.
4
  In this way, the B-men’s voices were 
silenced not only by their waterfront employers and their union during their eighteen-year 
struggle, but also by historians who have largely focused on the most visible and dramatic 
people and events in ILWU history. 
But the B-men’s story has not been completely suppressed.  Stanley (“Stan”) L. Weir 
who was one of the deregistered B-men and who was elected to a co-chair of the LJDC 
                                                 
2
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon, 1995), 
pp. 25-27. 
3
 Ibid., pp 28-29. 
4
 Robert W. Cherny, “Longshoremen of San Francisco Bay, 1849-1960” in Dock Workers: International 
Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970, ed. Sam Davies et al (Aldershot, England: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2000), p. 102.  Charles P. Larrowe’s Harry Bridges: The Rise and Fall of Radical Labor 
in the U.S. is a biography of Harry Bridges, but it discusses the controversy between Bridges and the B-men in 
one of its later chapters.  Larrowe might have been motivated to do so because he was gathering information 
for the book and writing it during the 1960s when the controversy over the B-men’s case was on-going and 
also because he had some correspondence with Weir.  See Charles P. Larrowe, Harry Bridges: The Rise and 
Fall of Radical Labor in the U.S. (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1972), pp. 356-7. 
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wrote three short articles regarding the B-men’s case for the magazine New Politics between 
1964 and 1969.
5
  Subsequently in the early 1970s, Weir wrote about San Francisco 
longshore culture of the time period in his master’s thesis.6  In the 1980s, he wrote an essay 
about the B-men’s eighteen-year struggle, which was published posthumously in Singlejack 
Solidarity.
7
  He also wrote a 62-page affidavit in 1965 submitted to a district court 
explaining what had happened to him personally while working as a B-man.  Needless to 
say, all of Weir’s accounts on how the events unfolded, along with his arguments regarding 
how the B-men’s case should be understood, contribute to this study as valuable sources.   
Nevertheless, Weir’s social position as a white man and as a person who became an 
academic in the 1970s was very different from that of most other LJDC members and 
especially that of the black members who constituted 90 percent of the group and who did 
not have a lot of opportunities to get their voices heard.  For that reason, this study 
recognizes that another layer of voices could be silenced if it were to focus exclusively on 
Weir’s narrative and interpretation.   
Fortunately, E. Randall Keeney interviewed about thirty five black LJDC members 
in the late 1970s and left the recordings of the interviews behind for historians to study.  
They told about their work lives on the waterfront as well as their multi-year struggle for 
reinstatement.  They offered illuminating opinions about society, racism, union democracy, 
and the legal system.  Although Keeney was a white woman, she was a long-time friend of 
                                                 
5
 Stan Weir, “The ILWU: A Case Study of Bureaucracy,” New Politics, Vol. III,  No. 1, (Winter, 1964):  
“The ILWU: A Case Study of Bureaucracy -- II,” New Politics, Vol. III,  No. 2, (Summer, 1964): 62-65, “The 
Retreat of Harry Bridges,” New Politics, Vol. VIII (Winter, 1969), 62-67. 
6
 Weir, “A Study of the Work Culture of San Francisco Longshoremen” (M.A. Thesis, (M.A. Theses, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1974). 
7
 Weir, “New Technology” in Singlejack Solidarity ed. George Lipsitz (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 39-67. 
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Weir’s and an artist activist who drew illustrations for his 1964 articles about the B-men.  
Weir thought that many black men were not only eager to tell their stories, but they also saw 
Keeney not as an outside “reporter” but as a sympathetic supporter.8  In a letter to Keeney, 
Weir expressed his surprise when he listened to an interview of one of the men because he 
learned things about the person that otherwise he would never have known.  In Weir’s mind, 
the men would not have talked about the things that they said in the interviews to one 
another.  This remark demonstrates the significance of Keeney’s interviews in recovering 
some of the voices that otherwise might have been lost.   
According to historian Alessandro Portelli, oral history tells us “less about events 
than about their meaning.” 9 It is not that oral history does not have factual validity.  But the 
unique element of oral sources is that they tell us “not just what people did, but what they 
wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did.”10  For 
that reason, one’s narrative tells more about himself than about the content of the narrative 
itself.  This approach is especially useful in using the B-men’s interviews.  Because many 
years passed since being fired, they did not remember the exact year of a particular event 
that happened on the waterfront.  But the interviews present their interpretations about what 
happened and the meanings of the life choices that they made.  Moreover, the timing of the 
interviews tells us a lot about the interviewees, individually and collectively.  Because the 
interviews were conducted when their struggle had been going on for 13 to16 years but not 
concluded yet, they contained the past (what had happened), the present (how the event and 
                                                 
8
 Weir to Keeney, November 2, 1976, BANC #85-169, Box 2, Folder 1,Bancroft Library, University of 
California, Berkeley, California. 
9
 Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 50. 
10
 Ibid. 
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its aftermath had shaped their lives), and the future (what they hoped for and expected to 
become) that affected their present choices.
11
   
Because they organized a long and collective struggle, the B-men left more sources 
behind for historians to understand the work conditions under which they toiled than did the 
union.  However, they were not the only B-men who worked on the San Francisco Bay 
waterfront.  Between 1963 and 1969, Local 10 recruited a total of 2,000 more B-men at four 
different times.  Although these B-men did not leave behind their voices regarding their 
working conditions, this study attempts to reconstruct some aspects of their work lives based 
on the local’s announcements for B-men or discussions about them in its weekly Longshore 
Bulletin newsletters.  This study thus expands its interest beyond the deregistered B-men to 
an understanding of broader impact of the Second Mechanization and Modernization 
Agreement in the late 1960s and West Coast longshoremen’s resistance to the agreement, 
which culminated in the 1971-1972 coastwise strike. 
Without examining the traditional work culture and work rules that the West Coast 
longshoremen had established and practiced on their jobsites since the late 1930s, it would 
be impossible to understand the B-men’s sense of disempowerment while working in a 
transitional period when the traditional rules were repressed, but not completely gone, and 
when new rules were introduced, but not yet firmly settled.  Moreover, an investigation of 
how San Francisco longshoremen had dealt with registration and deregistration before the 
1960s is necessary to comprehend why the deregistered B-men felt unfairly treated 
                                                 
11
 To be sure, the limitation of the interviews in deconstructing further silenced voices also needs to be 
acknowledged.  A couple of members had already passed away.  Some could not be easily reached because 
they were “half lost to ‘the street’,” as Weir expressed in his letter to Keeney, meaning that they were, in 
dismay, and had fallen into drugs or alcohol.  The fact that Keeney was Weir’s friend worked as an advantage 
for the black men to open up their minds, but it also could have worked as a disadvantage in terms of 
accurately measuring the dynamics between the black members and Weir. 
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regarding what happened in their promotion processes and eventual deregistration.  This 
study thus begins with an examination of these traditions and explores the meanings of 
workplace and union democracy in Chapter 1.  
The meanings of union democracy and worker solidarity, however, cannot be 
adequately conceptualized unless the dimension of race is considered.  Chapter 2 examines 
black longshoremen in San Francisco before 1959, their positions within the union, and their 
relationship with white longshoremen.  It also attempts to illustrate how black longshoremen 
felt about racial relations and how they negotiated their way in an unwelcoming 
environment.  Knowledge about this prior generation of black longshoremen explains not 
only how a large number of black men were recruited as B-men in 1959 but also a lot about 
the lives of the new black B-men themselves.   
The waterfront employers’ effort to destroy rank-and-file power at the point of 
production never stopped, but it gathered momentum in the mid-1950s when top ILWU 
officers also agreed that using jobsite actions to resolve workers’ grievances should be 
stopped.  By the late 1950s, the union officers decided to move along with the employers’ 
plan to bring automation and share a portion of the savings gained from introducing the new 
machinery.  Most importantly, in early 1959, they hired over 1,000 Class B Longshoremen 
and in January 1961, they signed the first Mechanization and Modernization Agreement.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the process of negotiations between the employers and the ILWU and 
examines what motivated union officers to adopt the path that they did. 
Chapter 4 finally introduces the San Francisco B-men who began to work in 1959 
and examines their working conditions and positions within the union between 1959 and 
1962.  Most of the personal information about the B-men comes from the filled-out 
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questionnaires and recorded oral interviews of about forty five deregistered B-men, among 
whom 90 percent were black.  Consequently, most individuals discussed in this chapter were 
black longshoremen.  Otherwise, a man’s racial or ethnic background is specifically 
addressed.   
The promotion process, the deregistration of 82 B-men, and the formation of the 
Longshore Jobs Defense Committee (LJDC) are discussed in Chapter 5.  Because the LJDC 
members’ legal case in the federal courts spanned the years from 1964 to 1981, the ups and 
downs of the George R. Williams et al. v. the Pacific Maritime Association et al. case are 
covered in several different chapters, namely Chapter 6, 9, and 10, although Chapter 6 is 
entirely devoted to the legal matters that occurred between 1965 and 1969.  Chapter 9 pays 
special attention to what happened to many individual B-men after deregistration, how they 
defined the meanings of their struggle, union democracy, race and class, and how their 
collective struggle transformed their lives during the long and difficult course of the battle 
for justice.   
Chapter 7, 8, and 10 explain how the waterfront had been transformed during the 
same time span as a result of the two consecutive Mechanization and Modernization 
Agreements and discuss how longshoremen organized various forms of resistance, including 
the 134-day long strike in 1971-1972.  In discussing how the work culture and human 
relations had been changed due to automation and containerization by the end of the 1970s, 
Chapter 10 attempts to evaluate the conventional perception that containerization benefited 
consumers and the economy.  
Ultimately, the B-men could neither clear their names nor go back to the waterfront.  
Nor could the West Coast longshoremen regain their power even after they conducted the 
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longest strike in history of the waterfront.  By the late 1970s, mechanization and 
containerization were firmly established and the number of A-men was cut to two-thirds of 
what it had been in 1970.  No longer were large numbers of B-men needed and thus the 
coastwise number of B-men was down to less than a couple of hundred in 1977.   
Even though both the B-men and the longshoremen lost their battles, this study 
avoids any “condescending” attitude toward “the loser” in history from the viewpoint of 
“posterity,” as British historian E. P. Thompson warns us.  He reminds us that the 
aspirations of historical actors were valid in terms of their own experiences, even when they 
seem backward looking from the standpoint of today’s generation.12  The B-men lived 
through this transitional time period in which the future was not only unclear, but its 
direction might well be changed depending upon their actions.  At the moment, they were 
making history that had not yet been completed.  Moreover, their position as “the loser” 
does not diminish the value of the knowledge and lessons that they produced in the process 
of organizing their struggle.  And finally, a study about how rank-and-file workers organized 
actions to establish the rules that determined the conditions of their work may yet have great 
significance in our era of rapid technological and organizational change. 
 
                                                 
12
 E. P. Thompson, The Making of The English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 12-
13. 
16 
 
Chapter 1 
“[A]n injury to one is an injury to all”:  Work Culture on the San Francisco 
Waterfront, 1934 -1942 
 
During the 1930s, the West Coast longshoremen established new democratic 
institutions and practices on the waterfront.  After the 1934 strike, they created the union 
hiring hall where annually-elected union dispatchers rather than their bosses allocated jobs 
offering the first opportunity to work to those who had worked the fewest hours in the past.  
This system of job sharing by rotating their turns at work became known as the “Low-Man-
Out” system.  By continuously organizing a myriad of collective actions on the job, they put 
in place several work rules that not only created more humane, fairer, and safer working 
conditions but also gave them direct control over the nature, pace, and purpose of the work 
processes.  Their spirit of establishing a distinctive form of workplace democracy was also 
shown in their effort to build a rank-and-file oriented union, the International 
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) that adopted the motto, “an injury to 
one is an injury to all,” introduced by the Knights of Labor in the 19th century and popularly 
used by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in the early 20
th
 century.
1
 
This chapter examines how longshoremen built these new institutions and work rules 
in San Francisco.  While it is important to understand what motivated the longshoremen to 
pursue these policies, it is equally vital to recognize that in the process of organizing 
collective actions the workers generated more than tangible rules and policies.  They shared 
                                                 
1
 Regarding the origin of the motto, see Priscilla Murolo & A. B. Chitty, From the Folks Who Brought you 
the Weekend (New York: the New Press, 2001), p. 122;  and William D. Haywood, The Biography of Big Bill 
Haywood (New York: International Publisher, 1929), p. 186. 
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knowledge about how to build worker power and preserve traditions of worker solidarity.  
These ideas and traditions cannot be easily measured quantitatively, but they proved 
decisive in establishing a form of worker control at the point of production that lasted for a 
quarter of a century in the ports along the West Coast, generating and maintaining a long 
lasting culture of working class resistance that influenced other parts of the work force.   
An examination of the history of the “registration” processes among San Francisco 
longshore workers from 1934 to the early 1950s is crucial to understanding how the union 
attempted to cope with the industry’s continuing problem of unpredictability of the amount 
of work under an economic system that set the limits to the implementation of the workers’ 
equalitarian vision.  In order to buffer the problem, ILWU San Francisco Local 10, 
representing longshoremen working numerous ports in the Bay Area, agreed with the 
employers to create three different categories of longshoremen.  “Fully-registered” men, 
whose number remained more or less about 3,800 until the Second World War, enjoyed 
equal job opportunities, job security, and the right to fully participate in union affairs as 
members.  “Permit” men, who were partially registered and who picked up work after all 
available fully-registered men were dispatched, did not have the same privilege.  “Casual” 
men, who did not have any registration status, were recruited on a need basis and had no job 
security.   
Moreover, when workload was too low for all fully-registered men to earn wages at a 
decent level, union officers often recommended a decrease in membership by deregistering 
some members based on seniority.  Nevertheless, internal debates over deregistration reveal 
that rank-and-file members were willing to share economic hardship, rather than let some of 
their colleagues be deregistered.  They argued that deregistration of some workers would 
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generate only a little more money for the remaining members, while creating a tremendous 
hardship for those who got fired – an option that they refuse to willingly accept.  A study of 
deregistration processes thus uncovers a valuable lesson that when workers establish 
democratic institutions that empower them on the jobsite, they could develop a vision for a 
new set of human relations in production. 
 
1. Democracy in the Hiring Process: Equalizing Work Opportunities and Job Security 
Between 1934 and 1939, West Coast longshoremen created a new work culture.  One 
of the unprecedented and most democratic policies that they implemented was to equalize 
work opportunities on the waterfront based on a rotation system.  As soon as they won a 
centralized hiring hall in each port city as a result of the 1934 strike, they developed a 
structure by which a registered longshoreman would report to the hiring hall for work and 
get a job after those who had worked fewer hours than he had were dispatched.  Before 
examining in detail the method that the San Francisco longshoremen established for this 
equalitarian vision to work, it is necessary to briefly examine the history of previous hiring 
systems.
2
  The idea of equalizing work opportunities by rotating turns at work mainly 
stemmed from the longshoremen’s shared knowledge about the problems incurred during 
the previous decades under the old system known as the “shape up” and their experiences 
with it in different types of hiring halls. 
                                                 
2
 This study focuses narrowly and briefly on the employment practices before 1934.  For more detailed 
history of San Francisco longshoremen, see R. C. Francis, “The History of Labor on the San Francisco 
Waterfront” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1934) and Frederic Claire Chiles, “War on the 
Waterfront: The Struggles of the San Francisco Longshoremen, 1851-1934” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
California, 1981).  
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The term “shape up” originated from a description of how a large number of men 
lined themselves up on or near a pier each day to get a job.  But it signified something 
deeper than that.  During the early 20
th
 century, hiring was done on the street near a pier by 
the hiring foremen of different stevedoring companies who selected the necessary number of 
men for each day’s operations.  When a hiring foreman appeared around 8 am, 
longshoremen, who had been waiting for the moment from as early as six in the morning, 
shaped themselves in a semi-circle, surrounding the foreman who picked out those whom he 
needed.  Shape-ups were repeated during the morning until foremen from different 
stevedoring companies filled up needed positions.  The men who were not selected in the 
morning shape-ups often remained on the pier during the day, hoping to get a replacement 
position, or came back in the evening and shaped themselves up again to be picked out for 
night work.  Harry Bridges, who began to work in 1922 as a San Francisco longshoreman, 
conveyed the demeaning aspect of the hiring practice when he stated that the workers were 
“hired off the streets like a bunch of sheep.”3  Moreover, those who got a job were most 
likely expected to pay the hiring foreman some portion of money that they earned from the 
day’s work as a bribe in order to get selected again in a future operation – a corrupt practice 
called “kickbacks.”   
Not all longshoremen, however, went through the shape-up process every day to get 
a job.  Each stevedoring company had a number of longshoremen who steadily worked for 
the company and who were thus called “steady men.”  But due to the nature of the industry 
in which workload from day to day was inconsistent, their work assignments per week and 
                                                 
3
 Charles P. Larrowe, Harry Bridges: The Rise and Fall of Radical Labor in the U.S. (Westport, 
Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1972), p. 8. 
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work hours per shift remained unpredictable, even though they worked for a particular 
company.  When they had a job, they had to work continuously until the loading or 
unloading of the ship was completed.  This meant that they often worked an entire day or 
several days without getting any rest or sleep.
4
  When work was scarce, days could pass by 
without a job.  Or they could join shape-ups in order to find a job with another stevedoring 
company.   In other words, stevedoring companies kept steady men who could be available 
to work anytime convenient for the companies, but they also wanted to keep a large pool of 
men who were looking for a job on the street, rather than hiring them as steady employees, 
in order to accommodate the fluctuation of the amount of work.   
The constant existence of men on the street seeking a job made it possible for the 
employers to speed up the work process and prolong the length of a shift without giving 
workers time to sleep or paying them a bonus for overtime labor.  Men unable to keep up 
with speed ups to complete the shift due to fatigue or an injury could be easily replaced by 
those picked up from the street.  Harry Bridges claimed that employers hired only two men 
to do the work that required eight men to perform under “normal circumstances without any 
pressure” and thus saved costs by forcing the two men to do the job at a merciless pace.5  
Under the circumstances, even though those who steadily worked for a company did not 
have to join the shape up on the street everyday to get a job, their working conditions were 
negatively affected by the shape up system.  For longshoremen, shape up thus meant more 
than the way they lined up to get a job:  it signified a ruthless competition that reduced the 
chance to increase steady employment for a large number of men and all but guaranteed 
                                                 
4
 Lincoln Fairley claims that working straight for thirty six hours was not uncommon for many 
longshoremen during this period.  See Lincoln Fairley, Facing Mechanization: The West Coast Longshore Plan 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), p. 9. 
5
 Larrowe, Harry Bridges, p. 10. 
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inhumane working conditions for all.  It also perpetuated a vicious cycle of increasing the 
power of the hiring foremen, while weakening a chance for workers to build a sense of 
solidarity.
6
   
By the mid-1910s, the idea of establishing “hiring halls” as a solution to improve the 
situation had become prevalent among the West Coast longshoremen.
7
  Through hiring halls, 
they believed that they could stabilize the casual nature of their employment. In 1915, when 
longshoremen at the coast level had organized themselves under the International 
Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), they demanded hiring halls, launched a strike during 
the following year, and shut down the coast for seventy-three days.  Although the strike was 
defeated and the union was weakened, hiring halls were set up in Seattle for the first time on 
the coast.  Nevertheless, the halls were controlled by the employers and were used to 
suppress workers’ attempt to organize their own union.  Seattle longshoremen were asked to 
report to the halls for work, but before they got a job, they were required to present their 
“rustling card,” which showed the history of their union activities.  In doing so, the 
employers could exclude “troublemakers” from being hired.  Historian Charles P. Larrowe 
argues that the workers viewed the hiring halls as little more than “shape-ups with a roof 
over them” and thus they concluded that “decentralizing the hiring process would make 
                                                 
6
 For a “shape-up” system, see Charles P. Larrowe, Shape-up and Hiring hall: A Comparison of Hiring 
Methods and Labor Relations on the New York and Seattle Waterfronts (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1955); and Andrew Bonthius, “Origins of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s 
Union,” Southern California Quarterly, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Winter, 1977), 379-383. 
7
 According to Howard Kimeldorf, workers’ idea of controlling hiring process emerged in 1901 in 
Portland. See Howard Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets?: The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the 
Waterfront (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988), p. 28. 
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blacklisting more difficult” and fought to return the hiring system back to a shape-up on the 
street.
8
   
Immediately after the First World War when the workload was reduced, Seattle 
workers addressed the idea of sharing available jobs by rotating their turns to work and 
launched another strike when the employers rejected their demand.  The idea of a rotational 
hiring practice, according to sociologist Howard Kimeldorf, was rooted in the vision of the a 
“worker-run society” put forward by the members of the Industrial Workers of the World (or 
Wobblies) in the early 20
th
 century.
9
  By the late 1910s, many Wobblies in the West Coast 
states, most of whom had previously worked as seamen or loggers, had set foot on docks.  
They organized direct actions among the longshoremen and built a sense of worker 
solidarity by challenging managerial authority and demanding workers’ control of hiring and 
working processes.  In 1919, Seattle workers made a list of union members and rotated job 
assignments by taking jobs by their sequence on the list.  By doing so, workers weakened 
the employers’ control not only over the hiring process but also over the work process 
because they did not have to worry about being fired for not speeding up – a practice that 
prefigured rotational systems established after the 1934 strike throughout the West Coast.  
Portland longshoremen also established a system similar to that of Seattle workers.
10
 
The workers’ control over the hiring process and their rotational system in job 
assignments was short lived at this time due to a tremendous effort that the employers made 
to eliminate the workers’ institutions and “troublemakers” from the Seattle waterfront in 
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 Larrowe, Shape-up, pp. 89-90.  
9
 Kimeldorf, pp. 27-29. 
10
 Kimeldorf argues that the Wobblies’ influence was especially strong in the Pacific Northwest, such as 
Seattle and Portland, until the early 1920s when their influence shifted into San Pedro.  See Kimeldorf, p. 37. 
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1920 and from Portland docks two years later.
11
  Although the workers failed to achieve the 
goal and their union was almost crushed, Seattle employers soon appropriated some of their 
ideas by establishing a centralized hiring hall and a registration system.  However, under the 
employer-controlled hiring hall system, “company gangs” that worked steadily for particular 
companies still existed and their earnings were higher than those of the gangs constituted 
with non-company men.  Registered men were dispatched more or less on a rotation basis, 
but the registration system was used to “weed out” Wobbly members or labor radicals and 
none but registered men could get work.  Workers thus called the hiring halls “fink halls.”  
A similar kind of fink hall appeared also in Los Angeles and Portland and they were 
operated until the eve of the 1934 strike.
12
    
In 1919 in San Francisco, the employers successfully set up a company union that 
required longshoremen to show their union membership book to get a job, which had a blue 
cover in comparison to the red book of the Industrial Workers of the World.  They 
blacklisted anyone who attempted to replace the company union or the “Blue Book” union, 
as longshoremen called it, with a “real” union or anyone who did not pay his dues to the 
Blue Book union.  Unlike Seattle, Los Angeles, and Portland, during the following decade 
and until the 1934 strike, no fink halls were established but a shape-up method remained as 
the hiring practice.  The Blue Book union did nothing to improve working conditions on the 
                                                 
11
 Kimeldorf, pp. 32-33.  William W. Pilcher’s study shows that the hiring practice in Portland between 
1919 and 1922 differed from that in Seattle.  The ILA gave preference to union members, who constituted only 
about one fourth of the workforce, in the hiring processes.  Most Wobblies did not join the ILA and thus were 
discriminated against.  See William W. Pilcher, The Portland Longshoremen: A Dispersed Urban Community 
(New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), pp. 31-32. 
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 For details about Seattle fink halls, see Larrowe, Shape-up, pp. 91-95.  For Los Angeles fink hall, see 
Kimeldorf, pp. 33-35 and “Interview with Joe Uranga” in Solidarity Stories, p. 73.  In Portland, a corrupt 
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in the hall and expected to get “gifts” from those who got jobs.  See Pilcher, pp. 32-33.  
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waterfront.  Not surprisingly, in 1933 when longshoremen regenerated their effort to 
organize their own union, one of their main demands was to establish union-controlled 
hiring halls.
13
  Another demand was to have a “master” contract agreement that covered all 
longshoremen on the West Coast ports.  They knew that if longshoremen shut down a port, 
ships could be simply diverted to other ports, making the workers’ effort ineffective and thus 
a coastwise unity was necessary.
14
   
In 1934 after organizing an 85-day strike, maritime workers earned the right to 
negotiate and secure a master contract agreement and a centralized hiring hall in each port 
city.
15
  Although the hiring halls were to be operated “jointly” by the both parties through 
Joint Port Labor Relations Committees (“Port Committees”), they became de facto union 
controlled because dispatchers were longshoremen elected annually by union members.
16
  
These halls established a three-shift work day and overtime payment.  More importantly, 
workers decided to implement a rotational hiring system that was similar to what Seattle 
workers had practiced for a short period immediately after the First World War -- a practice 
by which registered longshoremen shared equal opportunities to work.  Anthropologist 
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 of October.  For the “October Award,” see Marvel Keller, Decasualization 
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William W. Pilcher in his study of Portland longshoremen thus states that the 1934 strike 
was much more than a labor dispute.  It was “the revolt of proud and independent men who 
had had to submit to personal humiliation in order to support themselves and their 
families.”17 
The method to share work opportunities that San Francisco longshoremen adopted 
was to dispatch gangs on a rotational basis.  Every longshoreman on the waterfront had 
traditionally worked on each job in a “gang,” a group of men working as a team comprised 
of different skilled categories and job positions, such as hold men, dock men, and winch 
drivers (deck men).  Before the 1934 strike, the basic gang size had been small, but by early 
1935 San Francisco longshoremen successfully increased the minimum size of a gang to 
sixteen and established a number of “permanent” gangs.18  Under the new system, each 
permanent gang consisted of the gang boss, who was elected by his gang members, and 
some core members who decided to work together as a team – freedom that had not existed 
under the previous shape-up hiring system.  In the newly established hiring hall, there was a 
“gang board” on the wall, on which dispatchers recorded each gang’s work hours, job 
assignments, and the dates that the jobs were performed.  Based on the records, dispatchers 
assigned a job first to a gang that accumulated the fewest hours and thus tried to equalize 
work hours among gangs.
19
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 Pilcher, p. 39.  
18
 The demand for an increase in the size of a gang was not new.  According to Kimeldorf, in 1919 San 
Francisco longshoremen had attempted to increase it from twelve to sixteen.  After the 1934 strike, Local 10 
formulated dispatching rules, according to which, the basic gang comprised of one gang boss, two deck men 
(winch drivers), six dock men, six hold men, and one jitney driver. See Kimeldorf, p. 35; and Keller, p.134. 
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 While the “steady men” and “company gang” statuses were eliminated in Seattle and Portland as a result 
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were revived in 1966 when the union signed the second Mechanization and Modernization Agreement.  See 
Chapter 7, below. 
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A substantial number of longshoremen, however, preferred not to join a particular 
permanent gang.  These men were dispatched to gangs that had vacancies or that needed 
extra men.  They also constituted “extra” gangs by themselves, when more gangs were 
needed.  For these men, who were called “extra” or “plug” men, a “plug board” system was 
introduced to rotate work.  Each man was given a small metal plug stamped with his 
registration number and when he was ready for work, he would “plug in” the section of the 
board corresponding to his skill category or job position.  Dispatchers assigned jobs to the 
men by the order that the plugs were put in.  In this way, extra men knew whose turn was 
next.  Some of the detailed rules were revised overtime, but the main structure of the plug-in 
system remained until the early 1950s when a new method was introduced.
20
   
Longshoremen who belonged to a permanent gang had a couple of advantages.  They 
did not have to show up to the hiring hall early in the morning and wait for their turn to get 
dispatched, but instead they checked in with their gang boss regarding the gang’s job 
assignment and went directly to the pier to work.
21
  Because all permanent gangs should be 
available again to work upon completing a job, gang members had a chance to work more 
regularly than plug-in men and thus their average earnings were usually higher than those of 
plug-in men.  For example, Marvel Keller’s study on work hours and earnings of 
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 For example, the sequence to rotate work was re-decided every four-week period until 1938 when the 
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longshoremen during a four-week period in 1937 reveals that gang members worked an  
average of 179-183 hours, while regular men on extra list worked an average of 154 hours.
22
   
Nevertheless, there were a lot of vacancies in gangs, and a large number of men 
preferred remaining as plug men to joining gangs.
23
  For example, in 1937, only 1,697 men 
among 3,782 registered workers remained as regular gang members throughout the period.  
Another 1,367 men shifted their positions between gang membership and extra men, and the 
remaining 718 men worked persistently from the extra list.
24
  One of the main reasons why a 
large number of men wanted to work as plug men was that they had more flexibility to 
choose when and what cargo to work.  They did not have to report to work for several days 
if they decided not to work for awhile.
25
  When they wanted to work, they showed up at the 
hiring hall early in the morning, placed their metal plug on the board, and got dispatched 
when it was their turn.  Because longshoremen always worked as partners, they often made 
an arrangement by which only one of them showed up at the hall, got an assignment for both, 
and called the other to inform him which pier to show up to work.
26
   
Even when a plug man reported to work, showed up at the hall, and was called for 
work, he could refuse a job or “flop” the work for the day.  The system also allowed 
permanent gang members to skip a particular job, if they so desired.  In this case, the gang 
boss via the hiring hall would have to request replacements for the absences.  Although 
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those who flopped a job would be placed at the bottom of the rotation list as a penalty for the 
action and had to forfeit their right to equal job opportunity for a certain period, having a 
choice to refuse a job was an important prerogative that longshoremen desired to keep.
27
  
These aspects indicated that neither earning a lot of money nor precisely equalizing earnings 
among workers per se was the top priority for many longshoremen when they established 
the new hiring practice.
28
  Rather, the rotation system provided them with job security 
without going through a ruthless competition and with an opportunity to arrange their work 
schedules as they wished within certain limitations.     
The rotation system, along with specific dispatching rules and penalties, did not 
appear on any master contract agreements.  Rather, the Port Committee was designated as 
the governing body of the rules.  Having a choice in deciding what job to take appeared 
nowhere in official master contracts or written dispatching rules by the Port Committee, but 
the longshoremen successfully established it within the new hiring system as a tradition.  
When a registration number was called for his turn to work, negotiations frequently occurred 
at the dispatcher’s window.  The worker could ask the dispatcher what choices he had, and 
based on the information, he could select a job.  The reason why they chose the way they did 
varied, according to the accounts told by San Francisco longshoremen.  Some workers 
would take a job based on the location of the pier.  For example, those who lived in Easy 
Bay might take a job that would be performed on one of the East Bay side piers, such as 
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Oakland and Alameda, in order that they could return home more easily after the day’s work 
was over.  Many chose their jobs based on the type of cargo that they had to handle.
29
   
To be sure, those whose accumulated work-hours were lower than others and thus 
were called to the dispatcher’s window earlier than others had more chance to choose their 
preferred job.  But longshoremen believed that in the rotation system they set up, each one’s 
chance to negotiate over a job would also balance out equally over time.  In addition, the 
practice of longshoremen annually electing dispatchers made it difficult, although not 
impossible, for the dispatchers to give easier jobs to their friends.  They could do a favor for 
their friends, technically, but they would have to face the fact that such acts of favoritism 
gave them little chance to be reelected.
30
  
This new hiring and dispatching system provided registered longshoremen with job 
security in a radically different way.  Because no worker was hired by a particular employer, 
even though a longshoreman or an entire gang might be fired by an employer, they would 
lose their wages for the day but not lose their occupation.  They could simply come back to 
the hall next day and be dispatched to another job for another employer or another job for 
the same employer who had fired them the previous day.
31
  Herb Mills, who became a San 
Francisco longshoreman in the early 1960s and wrote later about waterfront work culture, 
pointed out that when workers on the ship witnessed a longshoreman or a gang being fired, 
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they would not work hard on the ship as a protest against the discharge of their fellow 
workers.  Therefore, an employer rarely fired a worker whimsically because of the 
likelihood that a fired man might come back to work for him for a future job and because 
solidarity actions organized by other longshoremen might slow down productivity.
32
  In this 
way, workers had job security, which gave them, in turn, considerable leverage in dealing 
with their employers.  When workers did not have a fear of being permanently fired by the 
employers, they began to bring down ruthless speed-ups, change other inhumane working 
conditions, and build new human relationships among themselves. 
 
2. Democracy on the Jobsite: Worker Control over Work Processes 
The 1934 strike not only created a new kind of hiring hall and hiring practices, but it 
also taught longshoremen a valuable lesson that they could change power structures in their 
workplace through rank-and-file participation in collective direct actions.  Even after the 
strike, longshoremen continuously organized “quickie strikes” and slow-downs to solve their 
grievances and established important work rules by which they could generate fairer work 
processes and safer working conditions.  Gear priority, sling-load limits, and “four-on and 
four-off” practices were some of the important rules that they instituted between 1935 and 
1937.
33
   
Gear priority gave a gang assigned in a particular hold on a ship the right to the hold 
work until it was completed.  In other words, a gang had the right not to be shifted in the 
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middle of loading or unloading a hold to another hold that contained less tonnage or dirtier 
work than the original one.  This rule was designed to prevent favoritism that had been 
prevalent under the shape-up.  The gear priority restriction also enabled longshoremen to 
have more control in their work lives.  When workers knew what their job assignment was – 
what cargo to move and how many days the operation would take to be completed --, they 
could plan how they wanted to perform the work.  Obversely, if they did not know when and 
to what other operations they would be shifted in the middle of one job, the sense of control 
over their work would be considerably diminished. 
The longshoremen also set the standard sling-load weight for each commodity and 
set the maximum weight for a sling load for any commodity at 2,100 pounds.
34
  By placing a 
weight limit on each sling load hoisted in or out of a hold, longshoremen aimed to prevent 
any merciless speed-ups in work processes.  The heavier a sling load was, the longer the 
time it took for workers to load it.  This meant that there was less frequency of hiatus 
between sling loads, resulting in an increase in the speed of the operation.  Besides, if the 
size of the load was large, hold men had to reach higher on the pile of the load.  This kind of 
operation required more difficult and exhausting body movements.
35
  In addition, workers 
tended to force themselves to “meet the hook” or keep up with the speed of the hook coming 
down to lift the sling that they were working on, although the performance would soon 
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physically exhaust them and eventually hurt their health conditions.  By officially placing 
the limits on sling loads, the workers attempted to prevent this kind of inhumane speed-ups. 
Reducing sling loads also stemmed from their concern for safety.
36
  According to a 
report, a large portion of industrial accidents on the waterfront was caused by falling 
objects.
37
  A heavily loaded sling increased a possibility of falling while moving and raised a 
chance for longshoremen to be more severely injured when it fell on them or hit them.  
Moreover, the rule created more longshore jobs:  if a load was larger than the maximum 
limit, the employers had to hire more men to “skim” the pile of the load in order to lower the 
weight.
38
  Sling load limits on various commodities, along with gear priority, soon entered 
into contractual agreements and remained in them until the late 1950s.  
The longshoremen’s desire to control their labor time against the employers’ attempt 
to dehumanize it in the name of “rationalization” was shown the most in their use of a “four-
on and four-off” practice.  The term originated from describing the situation in which four 
hold men took a break, while the other four performed the task at hand, when eight hold men 
worked in the same hold during the same shift.  In other words, hold men divided 
themselves into two rotating teams, rather than all men working continuously, 
simultaneously, and exhaustingly for the entire duration of the shift.  It is important to 
recognize that four-on and four-off practices were never included in any contractual 
agreement, but longshoremen customarily carried them out as a tradition while working in 
the hold which was the actual point of production of the industry and in which employers’ 
constant supervision was impossible.  The employers considered those who were getting rest 
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while others were working as a “redundant” and “unnecessary” labor force and argued that 
they were paying the men more than what they deserved to get.  Not surprisingly, they 
attempted to get rid of this practice whenever possible.
39
 
However, for longshoremen, the rule provided some time to catch their breath and 
regain their strength that was necessary after continuously moving heavy cargo items for a 
certain number of hours.  From the longshoremen’s perspective, the tradition thus was also 
beneficial for productivity in the long run as well as for the workers’ wellbeing.  The 
practice also demonstrated workers’ desire to set their own pace of work and expressed their 
idea that they were not robots but human beings.  According to Reg Theriault, who began to 
work as a longshoreman in San Francisco in 1959 and who wrote about his work 
experiences later in a couple of books, the idea of “rationalization” of labor time was created 
under industrial capitalism, which attempted to “reduce workers to robots” in the name of 
greater productivity, although an “on and off” practice was a universal and centuries-old 
custom among working people.
40
   
Despite the employers’ attempt to get rid of this tradition, due to strong solidarity 
cultivated among workers, the four-on and four-off tradition continued for a long time.  
Experienced foremen or “walking bosses,” as longshoremen called them, knew that forcing 
workers to break from the practice could backfire by slowing down operations and thus 
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generating less productivity.  The following account written by Theriault presented how the 
four-on and four-off rule was maintained on the jobsite.  Theriault and his partner had a job 
in a gang that loaded hundred-pound sacks of rice.  After working hard for an hour and 
feeling thoroughly exhausted, “wet with sweat and panting,” they sat down on some sacks to 
rest, while the two other longshoremen took over the task.  At that moment, a walking boss 
came down to the hold with a young superintendent – a position that was higher than that of 
a walking boss in the official hierarchy.  When the superintendent saw Theriault and his 
partner, he demanded to know, “Why aren’t you working?”  Theriault explained: 
My partner and I, still breathing hard, chose not to reply.  He posed the question 
again.  We continued to ignore him.  All work in the hatch gradually wound down 
and stopped.  The walking boss came over, nodded to my partner and me, and turned 
to the superintendent.  “What’s wrong?” he asked.  “Either these men get up and go 
to work,” the supe [superintendent] said, “or they’re fired.”  My partner and I pulled 
ourselves to our feet, gathered up our jackets, and prepared to leave.   
 
What followed afterward, according to Theriault, was that the walking boss stopped 
them from leaving, took the young superintendent away from the workers, and had a private 
conversation with him.  They could hear the boss telling the superintendent that if the men 
were fired, then the rest of the gang would also walk off -- a situation that not only would 
delay the operation but also would require the hiring of night gangs to finish the work.  
When the superintendent kept insisting that “on and off” should not be accepted, the walking 
boss finally told him, “Goddammit, get up that ladder and leave this gang alone.”  While 
boosting him up the ladder, the walking boss told the gang, “I want this ship loaded out, and 
I don’t want anymore horseshit from this gang.  If we’re not done by six o’clock, I’m going 
35 
 
to fire everybody!”  When he was climbing up the ladder, one of the gang members said, 
“Yes, dear.”41  
  What happened in Theriault’s case not only reveals how workers could wield 
control over their work processes through solidarity actions, but it also shows how 
customary rules were established and enforced on the jobsite by those who had knowledge 
about how the work should be done.  A superintendent, who was hired by a stevedore 
company as an “on-the-job” representative of the company, in Herb Mills’ expression, was 
supposed to have power over workers and walking bosses, but his instructions could be 
ignored if they stemmed merely from contractual provisions and from his lack of knowledge 
about work rules practiced in real operations.
42
   
A walking boss, whose job was to supervise gang bosses in order to make the 
operation smooth, was also hired by a stevedore company.  However, on the West Coast 
waterfront starting in the late 1930s, longshoremen established a system in which a walking 
boss was selected among gang bosses who had been longshoremen for many years in 
various categories of work, and thus walking bosses were well acquainted with actual 
operations.  Moreover, longshoremen institutionalized a tradition in which a gang boss was 
elected to the position by his gang members.
43
  To be elected, gang bosses had to prove that 
they knew not only the work but also “how to work with the men.”  In addition, according to 
Mills, the walking boss had usually “eaten and drunk” or “conversed over cards or 
dominoes” with the men while he had worked as a longshoreman.  As a result, most walking 
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bosses could relate to the men.
44
  Furthermore, they were members of the same union, 
although they belonged to a different local.
45
   
 To be sure, longshoremen and walking bosses could have a disagreement over how 
an operation should be carried on, arguing over who had better knowledge about the work or, 
as in Mills’ expression, which side was “stupid.”  Each operation, especially in loading a 
ship, was a unique process – no operations were identical -- and thus a gang had to figure 
out each time how to load different kinds, shapes, and sizes of cargo in a particular hold on a 
particular ship.   Calculating and recording what items should be loaded in a particular hold 
was a ship clerk’s job, but loading and stowing them was the gang’s job.  The gang boss 
would look at the items and touch them in order to get a “real sense” of the cargo assigned to 
the gang.  By pressing down on them to see if they were stable, steady, or loose, the gang 
boss had to figure out which items should be stowed at the bottom or on the top.  Then, gang 
members loaded and stowed the items steadily and tightly inside the hold in order that the 
cargo would not be crushed down while the ship traveled on the ocean.  In order to do so, 
they used their intelligence, experiences, and skills. Due to the fact that they dealt with 
different cargoes in each operation, an improvisation was a necessary ingredient of the 
work.
46
 
All operations required good team work as well as workers’ initiative, ingenuity, and 
skills.  According to Sydney Roger, who worked as a ship clerk in the 1950s in San 
Francisco, workers considered “a good longshoreman” as one who made the load easier for 
everyone in the gang by performing his part of the work.  Roger used to observe how gang 
                                                 
44
 Mills, The San Francisco Waterfront Labor/Management Relations, pp. 6-11. 
45
 San Francisco walking bosses were organized under ILWU Local 91. 
46
 Mills, The San Francisco Waterfront Labor/Management Relations, pp. 22-23; and Roger, Interview 
Transcript, p. 568. 
37 
 
members on the dock, who were usually older and experienced members, worked together 
without telling each other what to do but by “talking and grunting to each other” as they 
maneuvered the cargo.
47
  In other words, because they had worked for years together, they 
could communicate with each other how work should be done without long conversations 
but with short expressions.  Due to the dangerous nature of the job, they had to watch out for 
each one’s life and safety and a sense of trust was absolutely necessary.  When an operation 
was done, longshoremen shared a feeling of “pride” in their collective performance of the 
work.  Stanly L. Weir, who began to work as a longshoreman on San Francisco waterfront in 
1959, expressed how longshoremen built a sense of partnership and group solidarity: 
Due to the unique nature of longshore work during the movement of break-bulk 
cargoes, it is difficult for bosses to stop the creation of deep-seated work 
relationships.  Work eight to ten hours alongside another human lifting 135-160 
pound coffee sacks, even heavier crates, or building interlocking tiers of canned 
goods cases, and in that coordinated motion of the two people an emotional bond is 
made.  This is the joint pride that they can “put out a day’s work” with some style, 
and the sense of being jointly exploited.
48
   
 
For that reason, if a walking boss disagreed with their way of performing the job, a dispute 
between the two sides would likely arise.  Nevertheless, Mills pointed out that this kind of 
dispute rarely ended up in a work stoppage. 
The significance of disputes between workers and managerial supervisors, for 
whatever reasons the disputes occurred, rests upon the West Coast longshoremen’s 
capability of openly defying an order of a superior.  They could slow down an operation or 
organize a work stoppage because they had cultivated a culture of resistance and solidarity 
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as well as their control over the hiring process.
49
  Organizing a range of collective direct 
actions that could provide workers with a sense of collective empowerment was crucial to 
building the culture.  However small the action might be, it could create a deeper and long 
lasting impact.  The process of organizing a meaningful collective action could be, therefore, 
a time and space for workers to teach and learn how they could sustain worker control on the 
jobsite.  For example, San Francisco longshoreman Asher Harer remembered how workers 
felt empowered when a gang had united in a dispute over “lunchboxes” at a naval base 
during the Second World War. 
When Harer and his gang members were assigned to a ship at the naval base, their 
lunchboxes were inspected at the gate of the base.  But when they were boarding the ship, 
they were told by a young Marine that their lunchboxes must be left on the dock.  The first 
couple of men complied with the order, but one of the men, Ernie, defied it.  When the 
Marine ordered Ernie to stand back and let others go, Ernie didn’t stand back but moved 
forward, opened his lunchbox “under the guard’s nose” and said:  
Look! Coffee, sandwiches, a banana and a piece of cake.  No bomb.  What’s wrong 
with you guys?  Do you think I’m going to walk all the way out here on my coffee 
break?  In the rain?  I don’t get it.  The war’s been going on for over a year, and you 
just discovered our lunchboxes are a “threat to national security”? 
 
The next man, who was Ernie’s partner, sided with Ernie and said in a loud voice, “I’m with 
Ernie. . . . If he won’t go with his lunchbox, neither will I.”  Hearing the voice, another man 
shouted, “I’m with you!  Let’s all go back to the hall!”  At this point, those who had already 
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surrendered their lunchboxes retrieved them and all men joined the action.  What happened 
afterwards was similar to what happened to Reg Theriault’s gang in the four-on and four-off 
incident.  After their walking boss had a private conversation with Navy officers, they were 
called back to board the ship with their lunchboxes.  Harer described how workers felt about 
what they had done as follows:  
As we walked down the pier, feeling mighty good, one young guy began singing 
“Solidarity Forever.”  Ernie started laughing.  He tapped the guy on the shoulder, and 
said, “Knock it off.  You sing it like a dirge.  It’s a victory song.  We sang it on the 
picket line in 1934, and besides, young feller, maybe they have some brand-new 
security regulation prohibiting union songs on Navy property.  Did you think of 
that?”  Ernie and the thwarted singer were both laughing as they climbed the ships’ 
gangway. 
50
   
 
This “lunchbox incident” provides an insight into how longshoremen cultivated the 
culture of solidarity.  Leaving their lunchboxes outside the ship might have seemed like a 
small thing, a minor irritation, because workers often left the ship for lunch or coffee at a 
nearby café when they worked on a non-military pier.  However, the reason why they were 
ordered to leave their lunchboxes out on the deck, which was for a security purpose, made 
no sense to them.  After all, it was not really about security but about power and control.  
Nevertheless, turning their feelings into an action, especially a collective one, required 
experiences and know how.  When Ernie, who had learned through the 1934 strike how not 
to merely follow the order that made workers feel subordinated, initiated an action, others 
joined him and thus legitimized his resistance.  In doing so, Ernie taught the younger 
stevedores how workers could empower themselves.
51
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Just as Ernie in the lunchbox incident case spoke to the younger worker about the 
1934 strike in reference to the song, “Solidarity Forever,” longshoremen passed on the 
history of their past struggles and solidarity actions to newcomers through stories about the 
hardships of the old days, personal experiences on the docks and during labor disputes, or 
tales about some colorful characters on the waterfront.
52
  They also did so through rituals.  
Each year stories about the 1934 strike were told and retold when the 5
th
 of July or “Bloody 
Thursday” approached -- the date when two workers were killed by police during the strike 
in San Francisco.  On that date each year, they commemorated the strike by organizing a 
parade.  Participating in the parade was an important process for longshoremen to share this 
history and transmit it to newcomers.
53
 
 
3. Democracy in the Union: Rank-and-File Unionism 
The West Coast longshoremen struggled not only to establish democratic rules about 
the hiring and work processes, but they also attempted to build a rank-and-file oriented 
union.  From the outset of the 1934 strike, they had established “strike committees” 
consisting of rank-and-file workers as the designated body to decide strike affairs, rather 
than relying on decisions made by International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) officers.  
Joseph P. Ryan, President of the ILA, attempted to bypass the strike negotiating committee 
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by reaching a settlement with the representatives of the employers’ group, which gave the 
union neither the right to control of the hiring hall nor a coastwise master contract.  Because 
Ryan had enjoyed controlling the union on the East Coast, which had no tradition of having 
a coastwise contract, hiring halls, or a membership referendum, he did not think seriously 
about the West Coast workers’ demands and assured the employers that the deal that they 
made with him would prevail.  West Coast longshoremen proved that he could not have 
been more wrong.  They insisted, first, that any settlement should be voted for by the 
membership to be effective.  Second, they rejected the Ryan negotiated settlement via 
referendum and did the same thing when Ryan intervened in the negotiation process for a 
second time.   
In 1937, when the West Coast longshoremen voted to join the Committee of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO), they disaffiliated themselves from the ILA, and 
reestablished their union as the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union 
(ILWU).
54
  San Francisco Bay Area longshoremen came under the jurisdiction of ILWU 
Local 10.  They constructed a new constitutional structure that was totally different from 
that of the ILA.  Union members annually elected local officers, executive board members, 
and dispatchers.  No one was allowed to hold the same position for more than two 
consecutive years, although he could run again for the same position after going back to 
work for a year as a rank-and-file longshoreman.
55
  Each year, between 70-100 positions 
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including all committeemen positions were open for competition and many people ran for 
them.  For example, during the 1938 election, 70 people competed with each other to get 
elected to 6 dispatcher positions.
56
  Among a lot of officers and committeemen, only several 
were full-time office holders who got paid by the union and their paychecks could not 
exceed more than the earnings of skilled longshoremen.
57
  
At the coast wide level, longshoremen elected delegates from each local to coastal 
caucus meetings in which contract demands were developed and Negotiating Committee 
members were elected.   The contract settlement was submitted to the membership for a 
secret vote before it was signed.  A strike call required approval from 85 percent of the 
membership.  Officials of the International were nominated and elected at the biennial 
conventions and they could be removed by a recall procedure.
58
  In reality, however, Harry 
Bridges, the first president of the International, remained in that position until he retired in 
1977 and he served as the chief negotiator during the entire time.
59
 
Not only did the membership elect officer positions, but it also elected members of 
various committees, such as Publicity, Grievance, Negotiation, Trial, and Investigation 
Committees.  The Publicity Committee published the weekly Longshore Bulletin, a two-
page newsletter, which reported membership meeting attendance levels, what was discussed 
and passed, old and new rules, contracts, and announcements about upcoming membership 
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and committee meetings and elections, as well as other political news.
60
  Because three 
committee members rotated the task of writing the newsletter, each issue often presented the 
political opinions of the member who wrote it, meaning that opinions regarding a particular 
subject matter might not be consistent when it was discussed in different issues by different 
members.  An issue of the Longshore Bulletin claimed that the newsletter was “written by 
Local 10 rank and filers for the benefit of Local 10 rank and filers.”61  This was true in the 
sense that a publicity committee member could freely discuss his opinion on a specific topic 
that might be different from that of many Local 10 officers.  However, some of the 
committee members often held other office positions simultaneously.  Consequently, the 
newsletter reflected union officers’ opinions more frequently than that of many rank-and-file 
members.  
The “Sick Committee” presented an important aspect of the union’s emphasis on 
building the sense of solidarity among workers.  The numbers of sick or injured members 
might have varied at different times, but because of the dangerous nature of their work, a 
substantial number of injured members existed at any given time.
62
  For example, 200 out of 
3,700 registered men were recorded as “sick members” unable to work between April and 
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June in 1938.
63
  Sick Committee members were expected to call longshoremen who could 
not continue to work for a short or long term due to a work-related injury, visit them with 
the Longshore Bulletin or other magazines, and spend some time with them in order to make 
them feel connected with the union and keep them up with the waterfront news.  Any Sick 
Committee member who failed to do so was cited before the Grievance Committee and 
fined $10.  Each week ten to twelve members served on the committee, and all fully-
registered men rotated the job in alphabetical order of their last names.  In this way, each 
member was expected to serve the committee every six years, according to a Longshore 
Bulletin issue.  Up until late 1943, the names of the members who would serve on the 
committee for the coming week were announced in the Longshore Bulletin each week.
64
   
The union’s encouragement of rank and file participation in union affairs was shown 
the most in its effort to hold frequent membership meetings.
65
  Local 10 held regular weekly 
membership meetings at the Coliseum Bowl in San Francisco and each member was 
required to attend at least one meeting each month.  At the outbreak of the Second World 
War, the size of its membership was more or less steady at a level of 3,600 to 4,300 and 
normally over 1,000 members apparently attended each meeting.  An issue of the Local 10 
Longshore Bulletin reported that at one meeting only 650 were present – an attendance that 
was too low to form a quorum.
66
  At a typical meeting, members received reports from 
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officers about hiring hall situations, such as regarding the amount of work and how to 
equalize work hours among the existing members, along with other union business.  
Member also could bring up larger political concerns for a discussion.
67
  They also often 
debated and decided matters regarding registration and deregistration -- matters that were 
among the most controversial issues at membership meetings.     
 
4. Registration: A Double-edged Sword  
The first step of implementing a rotational work system was to decide who was 
eligible for registration.  Right after the 1934 strike in San Francisco, the Port Committee 
suggested that “any man who had worked as a longshoreman at least one year in the three 
years immediately preceding the strike” would be eligible.68  During 1933, nearly 8,000 men 
had worked on the waterfront, and among them about 3,000 men had “regularly” worked.  
Employers, however, wanted to admit to full registration only about 2,500 men, while the 
longshoremen argued for a larger number.  The final decision was to accept all men who had 
worked at any time between January 1933 and May 1934 -- a decision resulting in 
registering 3,877 men.
69
   
The registered men enjoyed job security, shared equal work opportunities by rotating 
among themselves, and were eligible to join permanent gangs.  In the beginning, not all 
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regular workers were union members, but the two categories soon became synonymous, and 
thus they had full rights to participate in union matters, including internal elections and 
membership meetings.  Each one carried his “union book” in which he had to record his 
accumulated work hours.  His book was also used to verify his attendance at union 
membership meetings.  When he attended one, his book was “stamped” accordingly.70   
Although the longshoremen established a new democratic institution of equalizing 
work opportunities among the registered men and jobsite work rules that gave them more 
control of work processes, they could not control the total amount of work and thus old 
problems of unpredictability in available work persisted.  In order to cushion this problem, 
the Port Committee decided to create two other categories of longshoremen, “permit” or 
probationary men and “casuals” or social security men, who were recruited to be dispatched 
when there was more work than available registered men could handle.  The registered men 
were then referred to as “regular” men in order to be differentiated from permit and casual 
men who did not get regular job assignments. 
During the first several years, the permit men, as the name indicated, were given a 
“work permit” to perform the work.  Immediately after the 1934 strike, San Francisco 
recruited about 450 permit men and gave each man a special “button” to mark himself as a 
permit man.  However, the number of permit men increased between 1935 and 1936 when 
the industry experienced a labor shortage, and they were given registration numbers and 
recognized as part of the regular labor force.
71
  In 1937, there were over 800 permit men 
who constituted 18 percent of the total number of 4,582 registered men.  Since late 1938, a 
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permit man had his own “book” to keep the record of his accumulated hours, just like a 
regular worker.
72
  These changes happened probably because the employers recognized the 
advantages for them to have a more stable labor pool.  By giving permit men a registered, 
although limited, status, they created a group of men whom they could rely upon when they 
needed more workers than those who were fully registered.   
Permit men were also given priority to have a chance to be promoted to the fully-
registered status after a “probationary” period had passed – a fact that explained why they 
were also called “probationary” men.73  The contract gave the authority of promoting permit 
men to fully-registered status to the Port Committee.  In actuality, the ILWU Local 10 
membership made a decision on the matter at a membership meeting based on the 
recommendation of the union’s investigating committee.  The union then submitted the 
membership’s decision to the Port Committee to get approval from the employers’ 
representatives.
74
  The length of the probationary period for permit men varied in each local, 
but at the 1943 convention, the union decided that a probationary man should be given 
consideration for membership initiation “after a period not to exceed six months” from the 
time when he was accepted as a permit man.  This did not necessarily mean that he would be 
accepted as a member, but at least he had a right to be considered to be promoted after 
working as a permit man for six months.
75
  At the same convention, the ILWU decided to 
levy a per capita tax on permit men. 
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Permit men were non-union workers and thus they could not be involved in the 
union’s decision-making process.  Nevertheless, permit men’s meetings were separately 
held.  They were also required to attend one of the weekly membership meetings each 
month in order for them to get used to procedures and union affairs, even though they did 
not have the right to participate in any discussion or decision-making processes.
76
  Marvel 
Keller in his study points out that the San Francisco local was unique in the sense that no 
other local had a high portion of longshoremen as permit men as Local 10 did and that it 
permit men were closely associated with the union’s force.77  Other locals hired more casual 
men and used permit men not exclusively in longshore work.  The fact that Local 10 gave 
the voting right to the existing permit men in the 1938 National Labor Relations Board 
election for ILWU recognition validates Keller’s point.78   
Few union records can be easily found about casuals who were hired when needed 
but could not expect to be called back.  Because they did not get any registration number, 
they were hired by their Social Security number, and thus they were interchangeably called 
as “social security men.”  Local 10 recruited many of them from “sister” locals, such as the 
warehousemen’s local and scalers’ local.  Members of other maritime unions, such as sailors 
and fishermen, were also good candidates for this category.  The idea behind this decision 
was that because the local could not provide stable and regular jobs for them, the union 
wanted to recruit those who did not have to depend upon longshore work as the only source 
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of their income.  Besides, they were well acquainted with longshore work.  In 1937, there 
were over 1,000 casuals hired in the local.
79
  Casuals were supposed to be hired also through 
the hiring hall.  Nevertheless, there were cases of gang bosses “picking up” a man in a 
nearby café when they were short of a man and when the hiring hall was closed.   
According to a 1938 August issue of the Local 10 Longshore Bulletin, about 3,700 
men were fully registered between April and June in that year and there were about, on the 
average, 400 permit men per month.  Men in both categories paid their share of the cost of 
maintaining the hiring hall and the average monthly earning in these categories was about 
$121.60.
80
  During the same period there were about 1,000 casuals and 180 “visitors” whose 
average earnings were about $22 per month -- a situation suggesting strongly that casuals 
worked only a few hours a week.
81
  Yet their numbers must have fluctuated and, moreover, 
because of an increase in regular membership during the Second World War, few jobs must 
have been offered to casuals after the war, at least not until the Korean War.   
There was another category which was called “car men” who performed loading and 
unloading cargoes from the dock to railroad cars, barges, or trucks or vice versa.
82
  Their 
basic wage rate per hour was lower than that of longshoremen and the work was looked 
down upon as “something to fall back upon” if nothing else was available, and thus it often 
became the job for permit men.
83
  In 1941 the Local 10 membership decided to recruit their 
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sons in this position.
84
  Car men were not allowed to take any longshore work, but if that 
occurred for any reason, then the local decided to give longshore work to those whose 
fathers kept good records during previous strikes.  This decision indicates that the local took 
seriously how members performed union obligations during strikes. 
The inconsistent, unpredictable, and uncontrollable amount of workload not only 
created different categories of men.  It also created a tension among registered men when the 
union attempted to keep a certain level of wages for registered members.  When there was 
not enough work, union officers considered deregistering some of the members based on 
seniority as an option in order to obtain the goal, albeit usually as a last resort.  Within Local 
10, officers recommended to the membership several times between 1938 and 1956 to 
consider deregistering some members or dissolving some permanent gangs.  However, the 
process of making a decision on this sensitive issue never went through smoothly without a 
rigorous discussion that ended every time with Local 10 members rejecting the option of 
deregistering some of their colleagues, except one time in 1945 immediately after the 
Second World War when they had to let go about 850 men, most of whom were black 
workers.  Even at this time, some members attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to pass a 
resolution to reconsider the decision at the next meeting.
85
 
For example, in early 1938, officers had begun discussing the problem of low levels 
of workloads and recommended to the membership to vote to dissolve several gangs.  In this 
way, they anticipated an increase in the earnings of the remaining gangs.  Local 10 members 
subsequently voted for the resolution at a regular meeting.  However, soon after the vote, 
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dissenting members gathered enough signatures to call a special membership meeting in 
which the number of attendees was larger than the regular one where the decision to 
eliminate several gangs had been made.
86
  Opposing members successfully argued that 
reducing the number of gangs would inevitably result in a speed-up system imposed on the 
remaining gangs.  The initial decision was revoked and the dispersed gangs were reinstated.  
In August 1947 when the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited the closed shop, Local 10 
decided to change the existing registration system that had given the “preference of 
employment” to union members.87  Fully registered men thus had been synonymous with 
union men.  In order to avoid any legal action against the policy, the union decided to 
remove the union membership requirement for longshoremen to get fully registered.  This 
entailed what they should do regarding existing permit men who were non-union members.  
The membership decided to promote them to fully registered status.  This resulted in adding 
about 800 more men to the full registration list.
88
   
Unfortunately, due to the recruitment during the Second World War, there were 
already over 6,000 regular longshoremen, and adding 800 more men generated a 
circumstance in which there were too many men for each one to earn a sufficient income.  
Within a couple of months, the membership vigorously discussed once again whether the 
local should lay off some men, but members decided to keep everyone and create twenty 
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more gangs.
89
  When the employers rejected the creation of twenty more gangs, union 
officers in early 1948 recommended deregistration of 500 men -- a proposal that the 
membership again turned down by an overwhelming majority at a well attended meeting.  
The Longshore Bulletin’s following report showed that rank and file workers opposed the 
resolution based on the equalitarian and logical conclusion that laying off five hundred men 
would result in improving only a small improvement in the earnings of the remaining 
workers, while deeply hurting the laid-off men:  
Both old timers and new members alike spoke in the same vein. “Laying off men 
means trying to solve our problems by longer hours and it’s not the union way,’ said 
one Brother, “only the NAM and the big employers want longer hours and the 
elimination of the 40-hour week.”. . . .  One Brother explained how trivial the 
monetary gains for each member would be by laying off 500 members; only 
approximately 3 hours per week, while causing a terrific hardship to those who were 
laid off and at the same time weakening our ranks for the battles ahead.  “By 
equalizing the work opportunity for all members and by eliminating the speedup 
everyone will benefit,” said another speaker, “we should fight for a shorter work 
shift with a corresponding increase in pay.”90 
 
The arguments made by rank-and-file workers could be interpreted to mean that they 
were willing to share suffering, but they rather suggested that if they slowed down their 
work pace or if each gang worked shorter hours but earned higher hourly wages, then they 
would create enough jobs and sufficient earnings for all.  Then, no one would have to 
suffer.
91
  The discussion demonstrated that the new democratic institutions and jobsite 
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practices that rank-and-file workers had created since the 1934 strike enabled them to come 
up with more democratic solutions to the persisting problems arising in a capitalist system.  
This spirit of rank-and-file longshoremen was also shown in early 1950 when workloads 
dwindled and each man worked only about 25 hours per week.  The union formed a three-
man committee to study the problem and recommended that the local had to deregister 40 
gangs.  After a lengthy discussion, the membership overwhelmingly rejected the idea again 
on a standing vote.
92
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Chapter 2 
 “You were kind of a nonperson to them”:  Black Longshoremen and Racial Relations 
in ILWU Local 10, 1934-1958 
 
By the early 1940s, West Coast longshoremen had established an extraordinary level 
of worker control over hiring and work processes.  They had created a strong sense of 
working class solidarity, resulting in a distinctive workplace democracy.  Nevertheless, 
debates over registration and deregistration processes revealed anxieties about not being able 
to create enough earnings or enough jobs for all workers.  An examination of the history of 
black longshoremen and their positions within the ILWU and Local 10, as well as in the 
larger social environment of the time period, adds another complex layer to the meanings of 
democracy and worker solidarity-- a theme that this chapter explores.   
Although black longshoremen worked in San Francisco before the Second World 
War, their numbers remained small until 1943 when the wartime demand for increased labor 
opened up job opportunities for a larger number of black men.  Most of these blacks came 
from the Southern states and encountered a labor union for the first time, but some of them 
had experienced a different kind of unionism on the Gulf Coast waterfront.  The ILWU’s 
adoption of a non-discrimination clause and a job-rotation policy made many black workers 
feel a sense of democratic engagement and empowerment, especially when considering the 
levels of overt racism and racial discrimination that existed in the job market, in the larger 
society, and in many other labor unions during the 1940s and 1950s.   
Yet the newly hired men had to take more dangerous, difficult, and dirty jobs due to 
the war economy and because they entered the industry as permit men.  In addition, the 
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union increasingly became a disciplinary body accommodating the war effort in order to 
meet the demand for greater war production and suppressed many of the informal jobsite 
work rules established in the late 1930s.  Newly hired black men also experienced racial 
tensions at various levels.  A study of the experiences of the WWII generation of black 
longshoremen -- how they felt about racial relations and how they negotiated their way -- is 
valuable in itself.  It is also crucial to understanding why and how a large number of young 
black men entered the local in 1959 when a new hiring opportunity arose.   
 
1. Black Workers in the 1930s and during the Second World War   
According to historian Bruce Nelson, Pacific Coast longshore unions had 
traditionally excluded blacks, unlike the East Coast where black workers had a “secure” but 
“subordinate” place within the union.1  Indeed, in 1930, just 1 percent of longshore workers 
in California were black.
2
  Nelson claims that by the eve of the 1934 strike, about fifty 
blacks had been hired at San Francisco Bay ports, most of whom had been brought in by the 
Luckenbach Steamship Company as strike breakers during the late 1910s.  Among them 
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only a handful was union members.
3
  Nevertheless, they became involved in the 1934 strike 
and joined the union during its formation.  Nelson provides an account from his interview 
with Henry Schmidt, one of the main organizers of the 1934 strike, about how that 
happened: 
Schmidt had gone down to the Luckenbach where most of the regular black 
longshoremen were employed; along with a black union member he had called on 
them to join the strike.  “On the same afternoon or the next day,” he remembered, 
“these Negro brothers came to the then union headquarters at 113 Steuart Street.  I 
can still see them coming up the stairs and entering the premises…. Somebody raised 
the question, ‘Why didn’t you come earlier to join up?’” And they replied, “We 
didn’t know that you wanted us.”4  
 
Harry Bridges also stated the story as follows: 
In 1934, I recall, I went directly to them [black workers].  I said, “Our union means a 
new deal for Negroes.  Stick with us and we’ll stand for your inclusion in industry.”  
Almost without exception, they stuck with us.  They helped us.
5
 
 
The accounts from Schmidt and Bridges seem to validate historian Earl Lewis’s claim that 
black workers were always interested in advancing their labor rights and empowering 
themselves in the workplace, but they took part in union activities only when white workers 
and unions treated them as equal workers.
6
  The black longshoremen’s responses 
demonstrate that they had not joined the union not because they were uninterested in union 
activities, but because they had felt that they were not wanted.      
Nelson claims that white workers’ reaching out to black workers during the strike 
was an “important breakthrough” that “set the tone for the future of race relations on the San 
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Francisco docks.”7  Not only did blacks participate in the strike, but during the late 1930s 
some of them most likely played a vital role in the process of breaking the union away from 
the ILA and building the ILWU.  Manuel Nereu, who had emigrated from the Cape Verde 
Islands in 1919, was one of the few black longshoremen in San Francisco.
8
  His son Frank 
Nereu recalled that his father had been arrested and charged with “having a concealed 
weapon” during the 1934 strike.9  Wiley Nisby came to the Bay Area from Louisiana 
sometime between 1935 and 1939, and thus he could not have participated in the strike.  But 
his son Thomas Nisby remembered that his father had “helped Bridges organize the union 
[ILWU]” and remained as a staunch “union man” until he retired.10  Recollections by black 
longshoremen suggest, but do not prove, that Wiley Nisby might also have been at some 
point a supporter or a member of the Communist Party.
11
  Wiley’s elder brother Charles 
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Nisby also came to San Francisco about the same time and became a longshoreman, but 
little information can be found about him.
12
 
Bill Chester, who in 1969 became the first black vice president of the ILWU, got a 
longshore job in 1938.  His initial intention was to get a job through the Marine Cooks and 
Stewards Union, but while looking for employment, he encountered the Local 10 hiring hall 
where he subsequently was hired.  On the eve of the war, there were about seventy five 
blacks in the local and most of them were not very active in the union.
13
  It was estimated 
that in 1940 blacks constituted approximately about 2 percent of the ILWU Bay Area local 
members – a percentage probably including all blacks in the longshoremen’s, ship scalers’, 
and warehousemen’s locals.14 
The nation’s involvement in the Second World War dramatically changed the ratio 
of blacks in Local 10.  Due to the war’s high demand for a labor force, especially in the 
shipbuilding industry in the Bay Area, labor recruiters, who were mostly hired by 
industrialists, transported a large number of blacks from southern states, predominantly from 
the Gulf Coast states of Texas and Louisiana.  Between 1942 and 1945, more than 50,000 
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blacks moved to the East Bay.  Between 1940 and 1945, the black population in San 
Francisco soared about 650 percent, although the raw numbers and the percentage of the 
city’s black population were still low.15  By mid-1943, migrant blacks constituted about 60 
to 70 percent of the black population of the city.  Due to the sudden increase of the black 
population, a couple of local institutions hired Charles S. Johnson, a black sociology 
professor from Fisk University, to conduct a city survey on blacks and race relations.  
Johnson published in 1944 the result of the survey and his analyses in his The Negro War 
Worker in San Francisco.  According to his study, the shipbuilding industry had hired over 
10,000 blacks between September 1942 and May 1943.
16
  Historian Douglas Henry Daniels 
states that Henry Kaiser brought to his shipyards blacks from all over the South in “one to 
three train loads every day for six months.”17  Next to the shipbuilding industry, government 
jobs were opened to blacks:  The number the total workforce in this category increased 
enormously from 6,259 in September 1942 to 30,160 in May 1943 and the number of black 
workers rose from 156 to 2,684, in the respective years.   
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Even though the number of black workers in the shipyards and in government 
positions considerably rose, Johnson’s study shows that employers in other industries still 
refused to hire blacks.  For example, the third largest employment area was in the 
transportation and communication industries, which hired 24,598 workers in May 1943, but 
only 191 of them were black.  Among 10,030 workers in automobile manufacturing, only 
389 were black.  Johnson thus claims that because black workers were predominantly 
concentrated in a couple of  industries, their livelihood remained precarious, even during the 
economic boom period – a fact that made many of them feel insecure.  Moreover, although 
some workplaces that did not hire blacks before the war opened up some job opportunities to 
black workers, most black workers in these industries were exclusively hired in unskilled 
positions, such as janitorial jobs.
18
  In addition, by assigning blacks to the same shift or a 
certain space, some workplaces practiced de facto racial segregation.  For instance, some 
employers assigned blacks on only the night shift and others hired them as primarily kitchen 
helpers.
19
  Moreover, questionnaires and interviews with employers reveal that most of them 
expressed no commitment to continuing the employment of blacks after the war.
20
 
Many employers who were against hiring black workers in skilled positions often 
claimed that blacks were “not endowed with the capacity to learn and perform skilled 
operations in industry.” 21  However, evidence contradicted this prejudicial claim: about 63 
percent of black workers who migrated into San Francisco possessed a certain level of skills: 
33 percent of them were categorized as skilled workers and another 30 percent was listed as 
semi-skilled workers.  The presence of a high percentage of skilled blacks in the city was as 
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a result of the shipbuilding industry’s effort to recruit skilled workers, whereas some of them 
developed their skills as a result of training after they got the job – an additional aspect that 
demonstrated the falsity of the employers’ racist assumptions.  The existence of a large 
number of skilled blacks in the shipyards, however, did not play a significant role in 
increasing the employment of blacks in skilled jobs in other industries.  Some employers 
justified their policies by stating that the shipyards got the “better type” of blacks who were 
few and thus remaining blacks were the “inferior types” and thus they should not be hired in 
order to “maintain the highest standards.”22  In addition, although blacks at the shipyard had 
a chance to use and develop their skills, a disproportionately large number of them were 
classified as “trainees or retained at the level of journeymen” and thus faced lack of 
opportunities for promotion.   
Labor unions’ discriminatory policies and white workers’ attitudes gave another 
excuse to employers who wished to maintain bigoted practices.  One employer interviewed 
stated that hiring blacks in higher job categories would “invite union trouble and reaction 
from white workers” and thus he was “forced to follow a policy of expediency.”23  The 
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, for example, which represented workers in the 
shipyards where many Bay Area black workers were hired, forced black workers to pay 
union dues, but placed them in lower job categories, put them in auxiliary units, denied them 
membership privileges including voting rights and thus prevented them from participating in 
decision-making processes within the union.  Walter Williams, who was born in Atlanta, 
Georgia, but who grew up in Los Angeles, got a job at a shipyard between 1941 and 1942 in 
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San Pedro under the jurisdiction of the boilermakers’ union.  Although he worked in Los 
Angeles, his story represents what other black workers’ experiences were like with the 
union: 
I went to Cal Ship at San Pedro and learned how to weld…. We had trouble there 
because the AFL Boilermakers, who had jurisdiction, didn’t want blacks in the union.  
They had a race restriction clause in their constitution, and they would not agree to 
let blacks become regular members.  “If you want to work in the shipyards,” they 
said, “you have to be a member of the auxiliary.”24     
 
The union’s discriminatory policies, however, did not continue without black 
workers resistance.  As legal historian Reuel Schiller presents in his discussion about the 
James v. Marinship case, many black workers at the Marinship shipyard in Sausalito refused 
to join the auxiliary unit of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers Local 6.  When 
the employer acquiesced to the union’s request and fired those who were not the union’s 
auxiliary members, black workers walked out of the job in protest, formed a group called the 
“Committee against Segregation and Discrimination,” and filed a lawsuit against the union’s 
policies on segregation and auxiliary.
25
  Black workers in San Pedro also formed a 
committee and brought lawsuits against the union’s policies.  By the time when he worked 
at Cal Ship, Williams had had a lot of experiences with other unions and had been an 
organizer for the CIO Council for a year.  Williams played a leading role in organizing black 
shipyard workers in this process.
26
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Considering policies like those of the boilermakers’ union, not surprisingly, many 
blacks, especially AFL union members, had a negative attitude toward unions.  Among the 
278 black families in San Francisco, with whom Johnson conducted interviews, 65.5 percent 
of their household heads were affiliated with labor unions and most of them worked under 
AFL union jurisdiction.  Although a considerable portion of them expressed that they did not 
favor belonging to their union, a larger percentage expressed that they had no opinion on 
union.
27
  Cleophas Williams, who was born in Arkansas and attended the state’s black land 
grant Agricultural, Mechanical, & Normal College at Pine Bluff, came in 1942 to California 
where he briefly worked as an electrician’s helper at Moore’s Shipyard in Oakland before 
enlisting in the army in the same year.  To get the shipyard job, he had to check in with the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW).  Unlike Walter Williams who 
grew up in Los Angeles and had union experiences before working at Cal Ship, it was the 
first time for Cleophas Williams to encounter a labor union.  He mentioned his experience 
with the IBEW as follows: 
There was discrimination, of course, but things were so much better than where I had 
come from that I appreciated the improvement. The money seemed astronomical at 
close to fifty dollars a week [he had made a dollar and a half a day as an assistant 
maintenance man in a hotel in Texarkana, Arkansas].  The IBEW took my dues 
money and gave me the right to work on a permit.  But they didn’t invite me to any 
union meetings, and I didn’t go to any.28 
 
In matter of fact, a visible portion of black family heads of households had favorable 
attitudes toward unions in general, and especially CIO union members showed positive 
attitudes toward their unions, although their total number was much smaller than AFL 
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members.  By discussing the non-discrimination resolutions that the CIO passed at its 1943 
convention, Johnson opines that the CIO attempted to integrate black workers into the union 
as equals and that the ILWU exemplified its spirit, along with the Marine Cooks and 
Stewards, the United Packing House and Allied Workers, the United Transport Workers, 
and the United Electrical Workers, although he also points out that the issue of promotion 
remained a problem in these unions.
29
  
 The number of black longshoremen in Local 10 also greatly increased during the war 
when San Francisco became one of the major ports embarking war supplies.  According to 
the ILWU Local 10 Bulletin, right before the U.S. entry into the war in December 1941, 
Local 10 had about 4,300 members.
30
  In March 1943, the Bulletin reported that its 
membership dropped down to 3,600 presumably because about 850 longshoremen from the 
local had enlisted in the U.S. military.  But some white longshoremen might have left the 
waterfront for better and easier jobs in the defense industry or a ship yard where there was 
plenty of work.  Although constituting a non-significant number, longshoremen of Japanese 
descent, like Karl Yoneda, had been forced to leave California in 1942 by an executive order 
from President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
31
  The actual number of registered longshoremen at 
the Bay Area ports, however, increased to over 6,000 because Local 10 had accepted 
between 1941 and 1942 about 500 “visitor” longshoremen from San Pedro as well as a large 
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number of new probationary or permit men who were not counted as members.
32
  According 
to the observation of a San Francisco warehouseman, permit men sometimes consisted of 
the 50 percent of longshoremen in an operation.
33
 
No extant record shows how many black longshoremen were hired in 1942, but in 
December, Local 10 Bulletin emphasized for the first time the union’s policy of 
nondiscrimination against blacks – an action that indicates that the presence of many black 
workers on the waterfront probably triggered tensions among longshoremen.  The Bulletin 
stated that more than ever the union’s policy of nondiscrimination against blacks was 
necessary because the union needed to use all the man power that it could get to “fulfill” the 
war effort on the home front.  It explained why many black workers were available for jobs 
on the waterfront by pointing out the long tradition of exclusion of blacks in workplaces.  By 
doing so, the Bulletin seemed to try to explain why Local 10 had many blacks.  It also 
reminded the membership of blacks’ important role in organizing the union.34   
A1943 January issue of the Bulletin published a “fictional conversation” between 
longshoremen, in which one of the men claimed that a Communist plot was afoot to “bring 
in all the colored boys so that they could take over the union.”  In the same month, the 
Bulletin included an announcement specially to “Negro longshoremen” regarding an “all-
colored Port Battalion of the army” was looking for experienced black longshoremen.35  
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These were other markers giving some information about the impact of a larger number of 
blacks on the waterfront.  Historian Albert Broussard claims that about 800 men or one-third 
of the ILWU San Francisco members were black in 1942.
36
  It is unclear, however, how 
many of them were longshore local members, because the estimation most likely included 
black members in all ILWU locals in San Francisco, including the ship scalers and painters’ 
local (ILWU Local 2) and the warehouse workers’ local (Local 6), both of which seemed to 
have accepted many black workers.  According to Johnson’s study, about 1,800 blacks were 
working under the jurisdiction of ILWU Bay Area locals in May 1943.
37
 
Despite the presence of a large number of permit men, Local 10 had not promoted 
most of them to fully-registered status until the spring of 1943.  Some of them thus had been 
working as permit men for over a year.  The reason why the local had not advanced them for 
a long time is unclear, but the difficulty the local had experienced during the prewar period 
when there had not been enough work for all members might have influenced the local’s 
decision in granting membership to a large number of men.
38
  The local’s reluctance to 
accept more men as members must have created a lot of complaints from permit men and 
might have caused some men to quit.  In March 1943, the local finally decided to promote 
100 permit men per month to membership status.
39
  Moreover, in the summer of that year, 
delegates to the ILWU biennial convention discussed what would be the proper length of 
probationary period for permit men.  Some of the delegates, especially from Seattle, feared 
that granting membership positions to a large number of men would create a problem in the 
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future when the war was over.  But a majority of the delegates argued that keeping a large 
number of men in a second class position for a long period would violate the union’s 
principles and decided that within six months of the probationary period, locals should 
consider permit men’s membership initiation.  Although this resolution did not grant permit 
men the right to be promoted by the end of their sixth month of working, it gave them a 
chance to be reviewed to be advanced.  They also decided to give voice to permit men, 
although they still limited permit men’s voting rights.  In addition, the number of permit 
men was included in calculating the international’s per capita tax, meaning that permit men 
were expected to pay a certain amount of membership dues.
40
   
Local 10 recruited thousands of more permit men in 1943 and 1944.  Between April 
and September of 1944, the number of total registered men in Local 10 increased to an 
average of 7,250.
41
  The local promoted 100 permit men per month to fully-registered status 
since the spring of 1943 and thus by mid-1944, Local 10 membership must have reached 
over 5,000.
42
  Many of the permit men were blacks and some hundreds of previous black 
permit men had been accepted to the membership.  According to Thornton’s research, 26 
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percent of the total ILWU members were black in 1943.
43
  It can be assumed that Local 10 
had a higher percentage of blacks than that of total ILWU membership and thus over 2,000 
black longshoremen, including permit men, were working on the waterfront between 1943 
and 1944 (see Figure 2.1, below).  
It is difficult to pinpoint the reason why ILWU Local 10 gave jobs to a large number 
of black men and it is also challenging to know what other ethnic minorities were hired in 
the local.  Ruben Negrete, who was of Mexican descent and who began to work on the Los 
Angeles waterfront in 1944, stated: 
At that time, they wanted anybody.  Most of the boys – what you call the Anglos – 
who had been working as longshoremen took off for jobs at the shipyards or went to 
sea.  Before my time, prior to ’41, I think there was 10 percent of the local that was 
Mexican.  During the war, they were begging the Mexican people to come in.
44
   
 
Although Negrete’s account was about Los Angeles Local 13, it gives an insight to what 
might have transpired in San Francisco Local 10.  For many white men, there were more 
attractive job opportunities than longshoring during the war and thus more spaces and job 
opportunities opened up for ethnic minority men on the waterfront.  Moreover, an 
enormously increased demand for longshoremen in San Francisco must have created a 
condition in which any man who had applied for the job, regardless of their race or ethnicity, 
could have been hired.  How many Latino workers were in Local 10 is unclear.  Although a 
large number of Americans of Asian descent lived in San Francisco, their occupations were 
concentrated in other industries, such as farming, canneries, laundries, and restaurants due to 
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the long history of exclusion and discrimination against them in the larger society.
45
  
Moreover, Americans of Japanese descent had been removed from the area.
46
  These 
circumstances must have created more job opportunities for black men on the waterfront.  In 
addition, the existing black longshoremen might have been the conduit for the influx of 
black men into the local by advocating and publicizing the waterfront job in their black 
communities.
47
   
In the larger urban setting of the era, the majority of black men were employed in 
low-paying non-skilled jobs.  Virtually all black workers were discriminated against in 
promotions in their workplaces.  Many unions excluded them from full membership, such as 
in the case of the Boilermakers Union that collected dues money from black workers in the 
shipyards but placed them in auxiliary units, with no membership privileges.  For these 
reasons, many black longshoremen most likely felt extremely fortunate to get jobs on the 
waterfront and to be accepted as union members after a probationary period.  Being a 
member of ILWU Local 10 meant more than being merely a member of a union.  For a 
black man, it gave him the same opportunity to work as well as the same voting rights on 
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union matters as a white man – equality, freedom, and rights that many transplanted black 
men had rarely, if ever, experienced in the South.
48
  
Willie Jenkins, Sr., who began working on the waterfront in the Bay Area in 1943, 
was born in Louisiana in 1903.  At age 17, he toiled at a saw mill in St. Mary Parish, but he 
worked in Texas during most of the 1920s and 1930s.  The 1940 federal census records 
show his occupation as “ship repairing” in Galveston, Texas, and he had experiences with 
the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) working as a longshoreman or working 
under the union’s jurisdiction at the shipyard.  He mentioned years later that he had paid 
dues to the ILA, but there had been no “real protection.”  Within a year of working at the 
San Francisco Bay ports, he was promoted to be a member of Local 10 and he stayed in the 
job until he retired in 1968.  He stated that the ILWU was the only union that meant 
something to him.
49
   
Jenkins, Sr. had come to California alone, leaving his wife Elnora and his son Willie, 
Jr. and his daughter Eda Mae in St. Mary, Louisiana, but they quickly re-joined him.  Just 
like Jenkins, Sr.’s case, thousands of black men who migrated into the Bay Area were 
married and had children and a majority of them arrived as a family unit or their wives and 
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children followed soon after.
50
  Many black men came to the Bay Area in order not only to 
get away from overt racism and segregation in the South, but also to provide a better living 
for their families.  In his discussion of “race and manhood,” historian Steve Estes points out 
that migration to the North for African American men was “a new path to manhood.”  There 
were multiple ways to understand what constituted the sense of manhood, and providing 
their family members with better living conditions by getting a good and stable job and 
taking “control of their own destinies” were among them.51  The ILWU Local 10’s non-
discrimination policies, its low-man-out system, and the work culture of a higher degree of 
worker control over their work process on the jobsite attracted many black men from the 
South.   
Throughout the war period, the ILWU regularly proclaimed through its official 
weekly newspaper, The Dispatcher, the importance of nondiscrimination regardless of one’s 
race, ethnicity, political ideas, and religious creed.  Housing proved to be one of the most 
difficult issues for black migrants in San Francisco Bay Area, and many black longshoremen 
faced that same problem of housing discrimination.  Local 10 tried to help by providing 
some places for longshoremen to stay temporarily.
52
 
Although the war opened employment opportunities in Local 10 to an 
unprecedentedly large number of black men, it is necessary to look beyond the mere 
presence of numbers in the workplace in order to understand racial relations.  Just as 
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sociologist Charles Johnson points out, promotion practices, segregation patterns, and the 
attitudes of white workers toward blacks, as well as black workers’ working conditions, 
must be examined.53   
While measuring or exactly describing wartime working conditions remains difficult, 
discussions and announcements in the Bulletin give some ideas about life on the waterfront.  
At one of the membership meetings in April 1943, the local president reported that over 
“5,000 men replaced themselves” in the previous month, leaving other men “to work thirty 
or more days or nights without the opportunity to get a day off.” 54  This meant that over half 
of the total longshoremen in the local either came back to the hiring hall after having been 
dispatched to get a replacement for a job that they did not want or did not show up to work 
and thus caused gang bosses to find replacements.  Or it could have meant that an entire 
gang might have refused to work and subsequently was fired and replaced by another gang. 
The newsletter did not discuss why so many men refused to work.  Some of them 
might have simply taken some time-off because they had been overworking since the war.  
While it can be assumed that there was plenty of work, there also were plenty of bad, 
dangerous, or dirty jobs that many men wanted to avoid.  Workers might have refused to 
perform certain jobs based on safety concerns.  There also could have been work control 
issues:  some of the orders that supervisors or military commanders gave the workers might 
have been disagreeable to them and thus they defied them.
55
  Whether due to absenteeism, 
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safety concerns, or work control issues, the fact that 5,000 men during one month refused to 
work demonstrated that many workers resisted the condition of having merely “plenty” jobs. 
The situation also reveals that although they might have supported the union’s war 
effort to prioritize productivity in an abstract way, they did not hesitate to disrupt production 
in order to exert control over the job.
56
  For union officers who mainly focused on creating 
more jobs and thus bringing more earnings to workers, the workers attitudes might seem to 
be contradictory.  But their behavior was consistent, in many ways, with the phenomenon 
whereby many workers preferred working from plug-in boards to joining a permanent gang.  
It will be recalled that plug men position gave them more freedom to choose when to work, 
even though they would earn less than permanent gang members.
57
   
Many new black workers, however, could not easily refuse to work or replace 
themselves.  Newly hired longshoremen had to go through a probationary period as permit 
men who enjoyed less control over when and where they could work and what cargo they 
could load or unload.  Moreover, wartime regulations and disciplines became stricter.  
Before the war, the Port Committee had prevented permit men from working more than 
certain hours.  During the wartime, however, it required them to work at least 40 hours a 
week.
58
  By recruiting thousands of permit men and requiring them to work for long hours, 
the employers and the union hoped to keep up with wartime productivity.  This requirement 
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made it difficult for many new black workers to refuse undesirable jobs that no one else 
wanted to take.   
Moreover, the number of men injured or killed during the war years on the job 
increased.  Reports in the Bulletin after 1943 about the brothers lost as a result of accidents 
were frequent.  As newly hired men, most black men were “hold men,” whose working 
conditions were the most dangerous and thus they had more chances to get injured.  But 
their chance to get prompt medical treatment was lower than that of their white counterparts.  
In January 1943, the Bulletin reported that one black longshoreman who was injured and 
taken to a hospital “was forced to lie at the emergency Hospital for over 6 hours before 
being taken to a room” because private hospitals would not admit blacks to “open wards.”59      
Permit men could leave the waterfront for a better job, but for many black men 
whose job opportunities were concentrated in a couple of industries and among several 
occupations in the larger social setting, leaving the waterfront was not as an easy option as it 
was for white men.  In matter of fact, harsher working conditions must have caused many 
permit men to quit the industry.  Or many might have been laid off as a result of disciplinary 
reprimands for their failure to meet requirements.  For example, the Bulletin announced that 
45 permit men were promoted to regular membership status at a February 1943 membership 
meeting, while 64 permit men had been “dropped” during the same month.  Some of the 
latter, according to the Bulletin, might have been laid off by the union for not following 
directions on rules, but others abandoned their work after being dispatched because they did 
not like it and failed to show up the next day.
60
  When considering that black men had to 
                                                 
59
 ILWU 10 Longshore Bulletin, January 26, 1943.   
60
 ILWU 10 Longshore Bulletin, March 2, 1943. 
75 
 
endure these harsh working conditions, it could be assumed that those who survived and 
became regular members had stronger feelings of pride and a sense of ownership in the 
union.  
Between April and August 1945, when the war theater shifted to the Pacific, the 
nation became concerned with the postwar economy and how to keep up with the wartime 
level of full employment.  Because the war effort was concentrated on defeating the 
Japanese, however, the San Francisco port could not keep up with the war’s demand for 
labor.  In May, Local 10 had 290 regular gangs, but the Bulletin announced that the hiring 
hall was still short of an average of 200 more gangs per day.
61
  It urged longshoremen to 
“take the job without any argument” at the hiring hall window where they were dispatched, 
because dispatchers were overwhelmed with allocating tons of work and finding 
replacements.  The Bulletin also reported problems of “shorthanded gangs,” or gangs that 
were short of one or two men who had walked off the job.  Requesting all shorthanded 
gangs not to leave the jobsite but do the job without the men who were missing, local 
officers advised the members: 
The gang working shorthanded is not expected to keep up with the gang that is full 
and the individual members of the gang are only asked to work at their regular pace 
and take a blow when they need it.  It means making a sacrifice but the better job we 
do and the sooner we finish this war, among other things, the quicker will be the 
return to the [water]front of 800 of our brothers who are now in the front lines and 
who are making some sacrifices of their own.
 62
 
 
Asking the dispatcher about the job description, such as what cargo they would deal 
with, how much each sack would weigh, and at which port the job would be performed, in 
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order to decide whether they would take the job was part of the “freedom” that the West 
Coast longshoremen had enjoyed since the 1934 strike.  How effective the union’s plea to 
sacrifice for the war is not easy to tell, but the frequent discussion of the matter in the 
newsletter signifies that many workers might still have argued over their job assignments at 
the dispatcher’s window and many shorthanded gangs might have continued walking off the 
job.  In June 1945, the Grievance Committee “cracked down on the thirteen men” who 
refused jobs but failed to replace themselves.  Two of them were deregistered and others got 
fined.  The Bulletin reported that the disciplinary actions were necessary in order to keep 
“uninterrupted, efficient production to back the war effort” and to do so, the local needed to 
eliminate “unreliable workers.”63  
   The union suggested that the local should recruit about 3,500 more men to solve the 
shortage of hands.  In addition, the local discussed shortening the probationary period for 
about 1,200 men under the category of permit men.
64
  As the result of the new recruitments 
and promotions, the number of the combination of both regular and permit men rose to 
9,474 in July and thus there were presumably almost 10,000 longshoremen including casuals.  
Although it is unclear how many of them were black, the rate of black employed workers 
increased by 33 percent in the local by 1945 and thus in that year, between 2,500 and 3,300 
black longshoremen, including permit men and casuals, might have been working in Local 
10 (see Figure 2.1 below). 
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There had to have been a lot of concern among members about what would happen 
to the newly recruited men after the war.  Local 10 president James Kearney tried to placate 
his members by arguing that repairing the war destruction would need manpower generally, 
meaning that he was optimistic about the future employment situation.  But he also claimed 
that many people who had come to work on the waterfront would go back to where they 
came from and thus the workforce in the Bay Area would be naturally reduced.  He stated: 
Among the men coming from the southern states, it can be expected that 30 percent 
will return to their homes and families in the south when the war ends.  Frankly, 
these men are unhappy and lonesome and are looking forward to the day when they 
can return to their families, friends, and home.  They believe the higher wages of this 
area cannot compensate for that feeling of strangeness and homesickness that haunts 
the man who has grown deep roots in a particular locality and then finds himself 
uprooted.
65
 
 
Although he did not explicitly state that “the men coming from the southern states” were 
blacks, it seemed that he was referring to black workers and his statement revealed that he 
considered or hoped to have blacks as merely “temporary” members for the duration of the 
war. 
Whether Kearney made these claims in sincerity or made them up to obtain a short 
term goal for recruitment will never be known.  Nevertheless, the result proved Kearney’s 
viewpoint to be either naïve or deceptive.  The workload quickly subsided immediately after 
the war, and already by November, officers recommended laying off 850 men who had been 
hired since June 1945 -- a recommendation that members subsequently accepted at a 
membership meeting.
66
  Two weeks later, members reconsidered the decision because some 
members had submitted a resolution to revoke it, although the decision survived this 
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challenge.
67
  Cleophas Williams stated that almost all who were laid off were black.
68
  
Moreover, there were over a total of 9,500 men working in San Francisco between July and 
August;  however, only about 7,000 remained after the November deregistration of 850.  
This meant, between September and November, not only deregistered 850 men, but over 
1,500 permit men also had to leave the industry.  It can be assume that a lot of them were 
black.  Bruce Nelson estimated that the local had about 2,000 blacks in 1946, which 
comprised 25 percent of Local 10 – a figure that seems to reflect the situation after the 
completion of the layoff.
69
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Figure 2.1: Total longshoremen and the number of blacks in ILWU Local 10 between 1938 and 1958 
Sources:  Local 10 Longshore Bulletin, 1938-1958;  Wytze Gorter and George Herbert Hildebrand’s The 
Pacific Coast Maritime Shipping Industry, 1930-1948, Volume I, (Berkeley: A Joint Publication of the Bureau 
of Business and Economic Research, and Southern section and the Institute of Industrial Relations, Southern 
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Division of University of California, 1952), Table 14, p. 106;  Local 10 Secretary-Treasurer Edgar E. Reite, 
“Active Book Members and Probationary Members from August 1941through March 1946,” April 6, 1946 and 
“ILWU Inter-office Correspondence,” July 9, 1948, Local 10 Membership Lists Files, ILWU Library, San 
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In this graph, the figures between 1938 and 1946 are based on local records and Gorter and Hildebrand’s study, 
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*** Local 10 frequently announced the number of its membership in Longshore Bulletin, which until 1947 
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between 1944 and 1946 probably because the numbers changed each month during the war.  The figures in the 
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2. The Complexity of Racial Relations in the ILWU and Local 10 
Despite the deregistration of 850, mostly black, men, Local 10 and some other Bay 
Area locals still contained a large number of black members in comparison to other unions.  
The ship clerks’ local in the Bay Area (Local 34) did not have many blacks or other racial 
minorities, but membership in the warehouse local (Local 6) and the scalers’ local (Local 2) 
showed a diversity of many groups and a strong presence of blacks, some of whom were 
promoted to leadership and steward positions.  The seriousness of Local 6 committing to 
non-discrimination was shown in a 1945 incident in which the union suspended five 
stewards from its Stockton unit who had stated at a membership meeting that “if the union 
were democratic, it would permit the advocacy of racial discrimination.”  The tension had 
been created because Japanese American former members who returned from concentration 
80 
 
camps had reclaimed their jobs.  The stewards were charged with promoting “race hatred” 
and the trial committee of Local 6 subsequently dealt with the case and recommended the 
disciplinary measure.
70
 
Nevertheless, Bay Area locals were an exception, rather than the norm, in regard to 
accepting black members.  The ILWU had a non-discrimination clause in its constitution, 
had demanded a non-discrimination clause be placed into their contract with the PMA, and 
frequently discussed the non-discrimination issue in The Dispatcher. Yet, exclusion and 
discrimination prevailed in locals in other places with the exception of Hawaii locals that 
was formed in 1946 and consisted of multi-ethnic group of workers in diverse workplaces, 
such as waterfront and sugar and pineapple plantations.
71
   
Anthropologist William W. Pilcher in his study of longshoremen at the Portland port 
documents the discriminatory hiring practices of Local 8 that prevented black men from 
being hired or promoted to tenured positions until the 1960s.
72
  Local 13 in San Pedro also 
had a reputation as a “lily white” Union73  Although the local gave jobs to about 400-500 
blacks by 1945, which increased the ratio of blacks to 10 percent of the membership, the 
reduction of work load immediately after the war forced the local to fire about 500 
longshoremen.  Because the layoff was based on a seniority rule, a majority of those fired 
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were black, just like the situation in Local 10.
74
  When the San Pedro local needed more 
numbers of longshoremen in the late 1940s, the employers wanted to rehire the workers who 
had been fired after the war, but the local preferred hiring workers from other sources and 
resisted the reinstatement of black workers.
75
   
Walter Williams, who was one of the men fired in 1946, remembered that from the 
beginning of his employment in 1943, the local showed its plan that it would not want to 
keep black workers for a longer period when it asked him to sign “a commitment to being 
terminated at the end of the war.” 76  Although there existed overt anti-black sentiment 
among white men, racism was also expressed in subtle ways, such as referring to the drum 
on the winch as the “n----r head,” as Williams recalled.  When black workers organized 
themselves and raised their concern against the 1945 deregistration that affected almost 90 
percent of the black longshoremen in the local, a local union officer called them “a special 
interest group,” as if black workers’ losing their jobs could not be a general concern for all 
members.  While discussing the cause of white longshoremen’s anti-black attitude, Williams 
pointed out that white longshoremen considered blacks as “invaders” because most blacks 
had not been in the union when it had been first organized.   
The San Pedro local had the reputation as the most militant one because in the wake 
of the 1934 strike its members established the strongest tradition of keeping work rules on 
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the jobsites.  The waterfront employers were especially annoyed by the local’s strict practice 
of the principle that all cargo should touch the “skin of the dock.”  For example, any cargo 
arriving on a pallet board by a truck driver should not be directly loaded into a hold, but 
rather unloaded from the board to the dock first.  Then, longshoremen would reload it on 
their own pallet board and hoisted the board into the hold.  The same principle was applied 
to unloading cargo from a ship.  This rule enabled longshoremen and teamsters to keep their 
jurisdictional boundaries as well as their jobs.  From the employers’ perspective, it created 
“unnecessary” jobs because the same procedures were duplicated.  The employers thus 
referred to this practice as “double” or “multiple” handling.  For workers, however, the 
practice generated working class solidarity, and thus by firmly adhering to this rule, San 
Pedro members earned the reputation of being the most militant.  
However, as Williams pointed out, and as historian Bruce Nelson agrees, Local 13 
members’ class consciousness had been formed through white identity because there were 
no black members in the 1934 strike.  Based on this limited notion of class solidarity, white 
longshoremen treated blacks as “others” and justified their exclusionary hiring policies and 
daily practices.  The local often declared that the union was in the forefront of the 
progressive labor movement and it even denounced race hatred in its local Bulletin, but it 
simultaneously restrained black membership, marginalized black workers, and often blamed 
blacks for their “clannish” culture.77   
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Unlike Local 8 and Local 13, Local 10 retained a high percentage of black 
membership after the war (see Figure 2.1 above).
78
  After letting 850 men go in November 
1945, the membership did not further deregister any large number of members, but a slow 
decrease in the regular membership occurred due to natural death or retirement of members 
who were most likely disproportionally white.
79
  The local absorbed over 800 probationary 
men into the regular membership in 1947 when the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited a closed 
shop practice.  Most of them could have been blacks.    
Scholars of the ILWU frequently point out that the San Francisco black community 
gave Harry Bridges much of the credit for the local’s employment of a large number of 
blacks.  Leaders of the black community praised Bridges as “a Godsend among men” 
because he advocated non-discrimination publicly.
80
  Many blacks remembered part of one 
of Bridges’ speeches which was repeatedly cited by many and recalled by Cleophas 
Williams in his interview: 
He [Bridges] made one remark that took him off the fence completely and put him 
on the blacks’ side.  He said that if things reached a point where only two men were 
left on the waterfront, if he had anything say about it, one would be a black man.  So 
that was very clear where he stood.  No vacillating at all.
81
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Bridges, who was elected as the union’s president from its establishment until he 
retired in the 1970s, was the most public figure of the union.  He served as the chief 
negotiator for each contract during his entire time as president, and thus when The 
Dispatcher denounced discrimination based on one’s creed, religion, or race, and when the 
ILWU constitution and contracts had a non-discrimination clause, it is understandable that 
Bridges received credit for it.  Nevertheless, Nelson makes an important point that should be 
considered: 
Bridges’ own commitment to racial equality must be seen in relation to other 
principles he embraced – especially seniority, local autonomy, and a belief in rank-
and-file democracy.  When the practical application of these principles clashed with 
the ideal of racial equality, the ILWU president was compelled to negotiate a course 
that, perhaps necessarily, compromised one principle while upholding another.
82
 
 
For example, Bridges in the late 1940s was not responsible for keeping black 
members in the local.  On the contrary, Bridges had been a strong opponent of the idea of 
“sharing starvation” and thus supported deregistering some members, although he knew that 
deregistration would affect disproportionally blacks because of their low seniority.
83
  Rather, 
rank-and-file members created the condition in which the local’s black members could 
continue to work on the waterfront by overwhelmingly voting down deregistration proposals 
from officers in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
84
 In addition, while Bridges intervened in 
the registration process in Portland’s Local 8 (although not until in 1961) because of its 
discriminatory racial policies, he refused to do so in San Pedro Local 13 when Walter 
Williams came to see him at the ILWU office in San Francisco to ask him to intervene.
85
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Bridges claimed that he would respect the local’s autonomy.  In other words, he would not 
intervene in Local 13’s affair, even though the local maintained racist practices.86   
In this sense, Nelson points out that Bridges’ reputation as a “blacks’ ally” was 
confined to only the San Francisco Bay area.  Moreover, his position on racial issues 
stemmed from larger political calculations.  Bridges needed the local support of Bay Area 
blacks who could wield power as a bloc due to their large number to overshadow his 
political opponents, such as James Kearney who was elected to the Local 10 presidential 
position many times, whereas San Pedro blacks were politically insignificant due to their 
small numbers.  Moreover, because Local 13 had been a stronghold against Bridges’ politics, 
Bridges would not have wanted to upset the local by siding with its black workers.
87
    
The presence of a large number of black men in Local 10, however, does not mean 
that there were no racial tensions among longshoremen in the Bay Area.  Cleophas Williams, 
who began working at the San Francisco port in 1944 after being discharged from the army, 
expressed the racial relationship on the waterfront as follows: 
I didn’t feel any hostility from the white longshoremen, although some were very 
indifferent.  You were kind of a nonperson to them.  They’d walk by and wouldn’t 
speak to you.
88
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White workers’ “personal avoidance,” which made black workers “invisible,” was also 
discussed by Charles S. Johnson who points it out as the most common response in public 
and industrial behavior in dealing with the sudden increase of the black population.
89
  He 
states that lack of communication between two racial societies not only created mutual fears 
and resentments but also reinforced distorted and stereotyped images about blacks.   
Personal avoidance among longshoremen also meant that a white worker would 
rarely work with a black worker as a partner, let alone socialize with black workers outside 
work.  Sydney Roger, who worked in the 1950s as a ship clerk in San Francisco, recalled 
that white and black longshoremen worked well and safely together in a gang, but he stated:  
I am almost sure just by watching where they all went out for lunch and by watching 
their general relationships – I am sure they had few or no social contacts outside of 
the job.  It’s a two-way street.90 
 
In addition, just like their San Pedro Local 13 counterparts, many white longshoremen in 
Local 10 used many racial epithets “quietly” and “covertly,” in the ship clerk’s expression, 
when indicating black members when they were not around.
91
   
Black longshoremen, however, did not quietly accept the status quo.  According to 
Bill Chester, in the 1940s black Local 10 members got together and discussed how to 
improve the situation as a group that he retrospectively likened to that of a black caucus.  He 
mentioned that the task that the group prioritized the most in order to change racial relations 
was to prove to be good union men, as well as good workers: 
It was really about five or six of us at the beginning.  We would get together and talk 
about what should be done to eliminate visual discrimination.  We felt that the 
number one job was that blacks had to prove that they were just as good if not better 
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union men than the whites.  Their performance on the job and at the meetings had to 
be outstanding in going along with policies that were constructive and opposing 
policies that we felt were destructive.
92
 
 
Black members organized various events to educate members and improve racial relations.  
For example, during “Negro History Week” in February 1951, they invited a speaker to 
speak at a membership meeting regarding how black people had contributed to the 
development of the nation.
93
  
Sociologist Kimeldorf points out that a most vocal and political group of black 
members in Local 10 came from the Gulf Coast states.
94
  Indeed, Cleophas Williams 
remembered that some of the most articulate black leaders had been from the Gulf Coast: 
[T]he new black leaders articulated our vision and our hopes very well.  Albert 
James from the Gulf and Johnny Walker from New Orleans were the most vocal.  
They brought their labor background here from their history with the ILA in the Gulf.  
They transferred their skills to the union combats here.  James was so fluent he could 
take an idea and make it visible.  Walker was very courageous, and Bill Chester, a 
new leader then, too, was very methodical.
95
 
 
In the Gulf Coast, black longshoremen had a long history of organizing themselves due to 
their presence in large numbers.  By the early 20
th
 century in New Orleans, black 
longshoremen had established the practices of dividing the work on a fifty-fifty basis 
between blacks and whites and sending an equal number of representations from both black 
and whites to a negotiation table.
96
  In the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, Gulf Coast 
longshoremen had worked under the ILA jurisdiction that had chartered separate locals for 
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blacks and whites.  Kimeldorf claims that those who had belonged to dissident locals of the 
ILA, particularly around the ports of New Orleans and Houston, brought with them to San 
Francisco their experiences in fighting both the Jim Crow segregationist system and the 
“collaborationist politics” of ILA officials.   
Black longshoremen, however, might have experienced their history with ILA in the 
South in many different ways.  For example, Daniel Rosenberg’s study of New Orleans 
longshoremen suggests that despite making no effort to equalize work among longshoremen 
or fight racism, internally and externally, and not withstanding its undemocratic internal 
structure, the ILA unintentionally provided black longshoremen with a space to develop 
their own leadership skills and wield a certain level of work control due to the existence of 
separate locals.  Each local had had its own hiring hall and established its own union 
leadership and both locals had divided workloads more or less equally.  Two locals had 
organized joint meetings at which the chairmanship had been alternated between white and 
black presiding officers.
97
   
Consequently, the relationship between their past experiences and the present 
choices in Local 10 in terms of union activities could not be explained in a predictable way.  
Some of the longshoremen from the Gulf ports might have had more leadership experiences 
and organizing skills than many of the white workers on the West Coast.  Moreover, 
according to a white longshoreman who began to work in 1929 at the Corpus Christi port in 
Texas, and who tried to organize the Maritime Federation of the Gulf Coast, the ILA black 
longshoreman in the mid-1930s was “the aristocrat of black southern labor” and he was 
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“quite conscious of it.”98  But in Local 10, there were very few chances for black men to be 
promoted to top leadership positions, at least not until the 1960s, and this aspect could have 
made them conscious about the limitations of the local and motivated to be more involved in 
union business.
99
  Yet, it could be also true that many blacks from the Gulf Coast waterfront, 
especially those who had been marginalized by their own black local leaders and thus could 
not get enough work for themselves, might not have been happy with the ILA and thus 
greatly appreciated Local 10, as was the case with Willie Jenkins, Sr.
100
   
On the other hand, some of the longshoremen from the South retreated from union 
activities in the ILWU for the same reason.  Eathen Gums, Sr., who came to San Francisco 
from Texas sometime during 1942-1943, had worked as a young adult longshoreman in 
Houston.
101
  According to Eathen Gums, Jr., his father had been active in an ILA local in 
Houston but did not get involved in Local 10 affairs as much as he previously had.  He did 
not explain why, but he recalled that his father used to say that working on the waterfront 
was not as “pretty” as it looked from outside.  The meaning was unclear, but the internal 
workings of union politics could have troubled him. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to know how many blacks had been longshoremen in the 
Gulf Coast ports and a majority of blacks had presumably worked in other industries.  For 
example, Bill Chester grew up in Kansas City, Missouri, and had no longshore 
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experience.
102
  Timothy H. Carter, who came up to Oakland in 1943 and got a longshore job, 
came from a black neighborhood in Burkburnett, a small town just to the north of Wichita 
Falls, Texas.  He previously had worked as a cook and a janitor.  In 1939, he had worked 
“shoveling sand and gravel” on WPA road construction work.  His son, Tim E. Carter, stated 
that his father was dedicated to the ILWU and believed that it was “the strongest union in 
the country.”103  Moreover, there were a small number of black men who had been born 
outside the South.  Charles Richardson was born in Illinois and lived in the Bay Area in the 
1930s, working as a Pullman porter on passenger trains between Oakland and Chicago 
before he became a longshoreman in the 1940s.
104
  
Although black members felt that many white men looked through them, Bill 
Chester stated that blacks found “a group of well-meaning ‘progressive whites’” who 
supported black caucus members’ efforts and endorsed their proposals at membership 
meetings.  Besides, although being elected to top officer positions was difficult for black 
men, quite a few were elected to steward, executive board, and committee positions as well 
as promoted in some International positions later on.  Chester was one of them and as he 
recalled:  
The first leadership job I had within the union in San Francisco was a shop steward 
of the gang on the ship that I worked in.  Then I was elected chairman of the local’s 
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investigating committee, which evaluates men for promotions to different job 
categories.  It also investigates potential new members.  I suppose that where I 
became more known was during the 1948 longshore strike, when I was elected 
chairman of the publicity committee.  In those days, there was a white majority, but I 
got enough white support to get elected.
105
 
 
In 1951, Bridges appointed Chester as the ILWU northern California regional director.   
Chester was also involved in civil rights organizations and other community groups, 
such as the NAACP, and became very well known throughout black communities in the Bay 
Area.  He was also appointed in 1951 West Coast regional director for the National Negro 
Labor Council.  Not many black longshoremen were promoted within the union or were as 
renowned in black communities as Chester, but many of his generation were involved in 
community organizations: Many held NAACP membership as well as leadership positions 
in black churches.  They often sponsored community affairs and made donations to them.  
They also organized actions to promote black employment in other industries, such as 
picketing workplaces where no blacks were hired.
106
   
By the late 1950s, many older members had passed away or retired, while no more 
men had been added to fully registered status since 1948.  They must have been 
disproportionally white men because most black men had been working on the San 
Francisco waterfront since the Second World War.  This generated a condition in which 
blacks constituted over 40 percent of the local’s 4,000 members in 1958.  Black members 
also held various union officer and committeemen positions and were elected even to some 
key offices like business agent, although it would take one more decade to witness the 
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local’s first black president.107  Many black men, having been working on the waterfront for 
over a decade, occupied skilled positions on the deck or the dock.  Because the average age 
of the membership was fifty years and there existed very few partially registered men, a lot 
of hold work that needed physical strength was done by casual men who were recruited from 
sister locals, such as warehousemen’s and scaler’s locals on a need basis.   
In the spring of 1958, Local 10 announced that it would hire new younger 
longshoremen.  Many sons, stepsons, or son-in-laws of union men applied for the job.  
Arthur “Jackie” Hughes, who was a young amateur boxer and who had just gotten married 
to Wiley Nisby’s daughter, remembered how Nisby described the waterfront job:  it was “a 
good job” for a family man.108  By this time, the older black men knew that the ILWU had 
begun negotiating with the employers’ association or the Pacific Maritime Association 
regarding automation.  However, no one was certain what direction the negotiations would 
take and how they would ultimately affect the lives of longshoremen, on the job and off.   
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Chapter 3 
“What management wanted was to channel and confine the off time”:   
The Mechanization & Modernization Agreement and “B-men,” 1956-1960 
 
 
In the late 1950s, the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) and the International 
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) decided to create a new class of 
longshoremen or “Class B” men (B-men).1  The first recruitment began in 1958 and ended 
the following year with over a thousand men having been hired.  Although the union and the 
employers had been hiring casual workers, whose coastwise number reached about 10,000, 
to perform mostly physical hold work that fully registered men could not handle, they 
intended to have a group of longshoremen who were available at any time and who could 
take any jobs that were assigned to them.  This chapter investigates the process of how and 
why the new category of men was created. 
The creation of Class B status was motivated by the employers’ plan to introduce 
mechanization into the waterfront in a near future and made possible by the union’s 
agreement to go along with the plan.  Understanding of how and why a large number of B-
men were recruited in the late 1950s thus entails an examination of early attempts made by 
the waterfront employers to introduce labor-saving methods and how the union had 
responded to them.  The negotiations between the ILWU and the PMA regarding 
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mechanization accelerated in the late-1950s, producing an interim agreement in 1959 and 
the final mechanization and modernization agreement in late 1960.   
A discussion of the negotiations for mechanization in the 1950s and their result 
reveals that increasing economic productivity was not the only intention that the employers 
had in their minds.  Re-establishing their authority and power on the jobsite that had been 
considerably reduced since 1934 was more fundamental to them.  They thus focused on the 
immediate removal of formal and informal work rules that rank-and-file longshoremen had 
established and practiced, such as gear priority, sling-load limits, and the four-on and four-
off pattern.  These rules had functioned more than just to make the longshoremen’s working 
conditions and work processes fairer and less exploitive.  They also had given rank-and-file 
workers at the point of production the power to control their work processes, build broader 
worker solidarity, and keep job security.   
This entails a question why the union’s top officers, including Harry Bridges, 
cooperated with the employers’ plan for automation and elimination of the work rules.  The 
key answers lie in understanding how structural forces, such as the existing collective 
bargaining system and the bureaucratization of the ILWU during the 1950s, influenced the 
officers’ decision. 
 
1. The Prelude to the “Mechanization and Modernization” (M & M) Agreement 
By the mid-1950s, the specter of labor-saving methods devised by new technology 
was not new to the West Coast longshoremen.  The introduction of “lift boards” and “lift 
trucks” in the late 1930s had alarmed the longshoremen, especially in Portland and Los 
Angeles, because using them could eliminate workers on the dock except for lift truck 
95 
 
operators.
2
  Using machinery also disrupted the work rhythm of the gang that longshoremen 
had developed over the years by working together as partners and as a team.
3
  
Longshoremen thus refused to use the lift boards on many occasions, creating disputes with 
employers.  The ILWU did not contest the employers’ right to introduce labor-saving 
devices without discussing them with the union because this prerogative was given to the 
employers by the 1934 Award.  Instead, the union sought “something by way of a share in 
the benefits coming to the industry from technological advances and the adoption of new 
techniques” – a response that foreshadowed how the union would handle negotiations about 
mechanization and modernization in the late 1950s.
4
   
During the negotiations for a new contract in 1940, the union won a provision by 
which it had the right to initiate a new negotiation on longshoremen’s earnings in case of the 
introduction of new labor-saving methods.  Nevertheless, the union never invoked the 
contract clause, even though during the early war period the San Francisco longshoremen 
complained about Matson Navigation Company’s usage of lift boards when loading bags of 
cement.
5
  During the Korean War, members again brought up the issue of the employers’ 
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using labor-saving methods.
6
  Changing the size of packages from small sacks to “bulk” 
cargoes caused an increase in productivity as well as affecting the handling of packages by 
requiring automation.  During the 1950s, longshoremen witnessed more and more bulk 
cargoes of several items, such as grain and sugar, and faced new methods, such as using 
magnets and cranes for loading pig iron.
7
    
The union probably did not invoke the contractual clause because the introduction of 
labor-saving devices in this period did not bring about a reduction in the number of 
longshoremen as a whole and these devices were used for only certain kinds of cargo.  For 
instance, the use of lift jitneys during the Second World War did not generate lay-offs 
because the volume of shipping tonnage was at its peak.  Although there was a reduction in 
the number of longshoremen immediately after the war, using lift jitneys was not generally 
considered as the source of the layoff.  Rather, the ending of the war shipments was thought 
to be the cause of the displacement.
8
  Lincoln Fairley, who was the research director for the 
ILWU between 1946 and 1967, provided a couple of other reasons why the union did not 
bring the contract clause into play.  The union found it difficult to prove that the labor-
saving devices negatively affected workers’ earnings and believed that the union would not 
prevail if cases went to arbitration because arbitrators tended to side with employers in any 
policy introduced in the name of “greater efficiency.” 9   
Since 1948, however, the relationship between the ILWU and the employers began 
to significantly change.  From the 1934 strike until 1948, West Coast longshoremen resisted 
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with militant direct actions any managerial attempt to gain control over their work processes 
and unfair or exploitive working conditions.  The employers responded to them also with a 
contentious manner that aimed to break the union.  This type of behavior, however, 
generated no satisfied results for them.  During the fourteen-year period, they had been 
confronted by the workers with twenty strikes, including four major coastwise scale ones, 
and 1,399 “quickie stoppages.”10  A contemporary scholar used the word “bitterness” in 
order to describe the characteristics of the labor relationship during this period.
11
  After the 
95-day strike in 1948, the employers re-organized their association into the Pacific Maritime 
Association (PMA) and developed a new strategy in dealing with the union.  Their new 
approach was reflected in their hiring of J. Paul St. Sure in 1952 as the president of the new 
organization.  His vision about labor relations presented “open lines of communication” and 
“willingness to give and take across the bargaining table.”12   
The PMA offered substantial financial benefits:  wages were increased and welfare 
and pension systems were institutionalized.
13
  In exchange, the employers wanted disputes 
to be handled through established grievance procedures, not through jobsite actions, such as 
impromptu work-stoppages.  In order to accomplish this goal, the PMA and the ILWU 
established an “instant arbitration” system, by which when a dispute rose on an operation, 
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the area arbitrator would be called immediately to come down to the site and settle the 
problem.  While waiting for the arbitrator to come down to the waterfront, the workers 
involved in the operation were expected to continue to perform the work, rather than to stop 
working, unless the dispute was over safety concerns.
14
  In addition, the union accepted no-
strike and no-work-stoppage clauses in contract agreements.  In 1949, the union also 
allowed machinery to be installed at the San Francisco port in unloading bananas, resulting 
in a large increase in banana tonnage.  In other words, the union provided a more docile 
workforce and cooperated with the employers’ effort to increase productivity.  In return, 
ILWU members received monetary compensation.  
PMA officers’ testimonies on Bridges’s behalf at one of his 1950 deportation 
hearings reflected the employers’ sense of satisfaction with the union’s cooperation and their 
expectation for a more congenial relationship in the future.  Four employer representatives, 
including the then-president of the PMA Oscar W. Pearson, appeared to testify regarding 
“Bridges’ good reputation for truth, honesty, and integrity” in his dealings with the ship 
owners and stevedore companies.
15
  In response, in 1954 when the union celebrated the 
twentieth anniversary of the 1934 strike, a couple of PMA officers were invited as main 
speakers at the union’s banquet.  Sydney Roger, a ship clerk and an editor of The Dispatcher, 
stated later that the event signified a new era in port labor relations:   
[The banquet] was a statement on the sides of both the union and employers that 
despite all the fighting we'd done in the past, we have really now developed such an 
extremely good relationship that we can celebrate twenty years of collective 
bargaining.
16
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In other words, the workers’ militant struggles and working class solidarity was not the main 
focus of the commemoration. 
However, the fact that Bridges and ILWU top officers developed an amicable 
relation with employers did not necessarily mean that rank-and-file workers endorsed the 
agreements made between the employers and their union.  Although the number of quickie 
stoppages declined and no major strike was launched since 1948, longshoremen continued to 
organize various forms of resistance, including impromptu work-stoppages, four-on and 
four-off, and slow-downs.  A 1951 letter written by a PMA officer to Bridges illustrated this 
aspect.  He complained that Los Angeles longshoremen organized job actions, such as 
“knock off [quit], slow-down, or use some other means of harassment,” when they made 
some demands “outside the contract.”17  The PMA officers also recognized that although the 
association advised their members to take a dispute to a officially set body and go through 
formal grievance procedures in order to resolve it, many stevedore companies often gave in 
to the longshoremen’s demands when confronted by workers’ spontaneous direct actions 
because they did not want their ships to be delayed -- a circumstance that longshoremen 
were well aware of. 
By the mid-1950s, the employers were determined to eliminate the informal work 
rules by which longshoremen had wielded jobsite power for over two decades.  Although the 
PMA had enjoyed an increase in the volume of shipping during the Korean War, the tonnage 
and the number of ships covered by the agreement negotiated by the PMA had dropped by 
1955.  After conducting some research, the employers concluded that if they could remove 
longshoremen’s “early quits, late starts, prolonged coffee breaks, failure to use the grievance 
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procedure resulting in illegal stoppages, and the various ‘four on-four off’ abuses,” then they 
could increase profit rates.  The employers especially were determined to eliminate a four-
on and four-off practice, by which gang members divided themselves in two groups and 
rotated their performances during an operation.  For workers, this practice allowed them to 
take some time to catch their breath and regain strength after working relentlessly for a 
certain hours while the others took over the operation.  In this way, workers also set their 
own pace of work.  But for employers, those who were taking “off” were “unnecessary 
men.”18  When the Pacific Maritime Association renewed its interest in how to cut costs and 
promote “efficiency” in the industry in the mid-1950s, the elimination of so-called 
“unnecessary men” was its principal demand.  The employers argued that these rules were in 
violation of contractual agreements and put pressure on the ILWU to secure “performance 
and conformance with the existing agreements.”19  
In 1955, when Bridges was pressured to respond to these issues at a House Special 
Subcommittee hearing, he retorted, “Let’s say we agree.  And again I want to warn 
you….me agreeing here is one thing.  Getting people down there to do the work is another 
thing.”20  In other words, regardless of what ILWU officers might say to the employers, 
these work rules were continuously defended on the jobsites because rank-and-file members 
maintained the power such customary rules conferred upon them.  
Nevertheless, in 1956 when the PMA refused to negotiate with the ILWU unless the 
union got rid of the “objectionable” work rules and removed “unnecessary men,” the union 
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officers tried to persuade the rank and file to comply.  At a March caucus meeting when 
delegates from various ports raised their concerns about new methods being used in the 
handling of cargo, Bridges responded that the longshoremen had indirectly benefited from 
mechanization during the previous years because the resulting higher levels of productivity 
had enabled longshoremen to more easily raise their wage rate.  He thus claimed that the 
longshoremen should continue to pursue a way to gain more “direct benefit” from the result 
of mechanization.
21
  The Coast Labor Relations Joint Committee (Coast Committee) also 
reported to the caucus that the union should concede to the PMA’s demands regarding the 
nonconformance work rules in exchange for a reduction of the work shift from 9 to 8 hours 
without cutbacks in pay – a demand that the union focused on for that year’s contract 
negotiations.  The committee stated: 
If we are to successfully gain a shorter work day now, which perhaps can only be 
accomplished by more readily accepting automation, then we must now reexamine 
our entire approach to this problem…. This might mean a loss on the manning scale 
on some of the present operations, but those losses must be completely overcome by 
the taking back of old work and the picking up of new work….22 
 
The delegates rejected the idea of giving up men on the job, but later that year the 
membership passed a resolution that was similar to what the Committee had 
recommended.
23
  When the negotiations were resumed, however, the PMA continued to 
refuse to discuss the work shift demand unless the union made some progress on the 
conformance issue. 
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During the next year the union took a series steps to concede to the employers on the 
work rules as well as on the further advancement of mechanization.  The Coast Committee 
reported at an October caucus meeting that the mechanization plan would not greatly 
displace workers and that the jobsite direct actions, such as quickie stoppages, must not be 
continued if the union wanted to get further benefits.  The Committee also recommended 
that the caucus should authorize the Committee and some of ILWU officers to pursue 
unofficial negotiations with the employers on the work rule and automation issues.  
Although the negotiations between the ILWU and the PMA in this year again failed and thus 
eventually went to arbitration, Lincoln Fairley claims that Bridges and the International 
came to believe by this time that mechanization was inevitable and that the rank and file 
would have to change their attitude toward the nonconformance work rules.  Fairley thus 
argues that although “it was not until 1959 that PMA developed a successful program to 
crack down on both the local unions and its own companies in order to secure performance 
and conformance,” the 1956 contract negotiations were the “important forerunners of the M 
& M plan.”24   
During the 1958 set of informal negotiations, Bridges showed willingness to reform 
work rules and give employers the right to change “manning scales,” such as the size of the 
basic gang and the number of men needed in each operation.  In return, he demanded that 
the employers retain currently registered men and that the union share the “savings from 
increased productivity” resulting from using any labor saving devices or measures.  In 
pursuing this goal, Bridges decided to limit the discussion about the matter at the caucus 
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meeting by asking the caucus members to allow his informal conversation with the PMA to 
continue -- a proposal that the caucus approved.  The Coast Committee thus kept its 
unofficial negotiations with the PMA regarding how to bring about mechanization and 
establish a “mechanization fund.”25   
 
2. Creating Class “B” Longshoremen, 1958-1959 
In the same year, the top officers of the ILWU made a couple more crucial decisions.  
First, they initiated the idea that the Coast Committee would take over the authority to 
finalize registration and promotion processes.  In the past, the local membership had been in 
charge of making decisions on registration and deregistration, although the Port Joint Labor 
Relations Committee (“Port Committee”) had been formally responsible for it.  This 
decision to centralize power demonstrated the International officers’ determination to work 
with the employers toward mechanization and modernization.  They were negotiating with 
the employers to set up a mechanization fund that would benefit registered men in terms of 
wage guarantees as well as early retirements and thus they needed to control the total 
number of registered men.
26
   
Second, the ILWU and the employers decided to recruit more longshoremen in 
partially-registered status or “Class B” longshoremen (“B-men”) during that year.  By 1958, 
the number of fully-registered men had been slowly reduced based on natural causes – death, 
illness, and retirements – and their average age was 50 years.27  Although the PMA and the 
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ILWU anticipated a decrease in the work force in the future due to mechanized operations, 
the employers needed more workers in the short run.   
The origin of the term “B-men” could be traced back to the late 1940s when the 
union had removed membership as a requirement for longshoremen to become fully-
registered men.
28
  The changes occurred because the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act prohibited the 
closed shop.  The union had eliminated the permit status itself and changed the 
nomenclature: regular men became “registered men” and permit men became “partially-
registered men” or “pool men.”  By doing so, the terminology obliterated the link between 
registration and union membership status.  According to economist Paul T. Hartman, the 
term “pool men” stemmed from the description of “a temporary labor pool of men registered 
and dispatched separately from the experienced, fully registered men.”29  Between 1952 and 
1957, around 1,000 longshoremen, coastwise, had been listed each year under the category 
of partially registered men.
30
  By 1957, the terms “Class A” and “Class B” had emerged to 
differentiate the two different registration categories and thus fully-registered longshoremen 
came to be known as “A-men” and partially-registered men were called “B-men.”   
Between 1958 and 1959, the PMA and the ILWU recruited over a thousand B-men.  
Unlike partially registered men in previous years, newly recruited B-men would not be “a 
temporary labor pool of men.”  Because the employers needed a workforce that was 
“available” whenever necessary, they required B-men to sign up for work or “be available” 
at least 70 percent of each 30 day period, regardless of whether there was available work for 
                                                 
28
 Fairley claims that under the policy, still 99 percent of the registered men were union members.  See 
Fairly, p. 90. 
29
 Paul T. Hartman, p. 35-36. 
30
 Fairley, Appendix II, p. 395, Table 1. 
105 
 
them or not.
31
  This meant, they were partially registered, but they were required to devote 
their time to and schedule their lives around longshore work, more so than fully registered 
workers.   
Even though they were expected to be available for work almost every day, B-men 
would not be eligible for union membership and thus they lacked protections on the jobsite 
as well as privileges that union members had.  They would not be able to participate in 
union’s decision-making processes, although a contract agreement would directly affect 
their working conditions.  Moreover, the ILWU and the PMA decided that they would 
“freeze” the promotion of B-men to fully-registered status for a quite some time, the length 
of which they did not determine at this point.  The decision on the freeze was not publicly 
announced but was informally made between the PMA and ILWU top officers at the 
bargaining table.   
These decisions demonstrated that the PMA and the union wanted a “flexible” but 
“disciplined” labor force that would be needed in this transitional period to greater 
mechanization.  This explained why the employers wanted to hire a large number of B-men, 
rather than recruiting many casuals.  Although there were already about 10,000 casual 
longshoremen coastwise in 1959, their availability could not be easily controlled.
32
   
 
3. The Terms of the Mechanization and Modernization Agreement, 1959-1960    
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In the spring of 1959, the PMA and the ILWU began to formalize the result of their 
unofficial conversations.  The union’s focus was to make the employers agree to establish a 
mechanization fund, while the employers’ main purpose was to remove all the workers’ 
rules and practices restricting further exploitation.  By the summer, new B-men began to 
work on the waterfront, while the employers and the union reached a compromise.  The 
employers decided to accept Bridges’ proposal to establish a “Mechanization and 
Modernization Fund,” putting $ 1.5 million into the fund in that year.33  However, because 
the union insisted that it should share the savings from any increases in productivity 
resulting from mechanization, both sides decided to take some time -- no more than a year -- 
to study the impacts of changes in methods of operation and in work rules.  The employers 
subsequently hired Max D. Kossoris from the San Francisco office of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics to develop a measurement system by which they could estimate how much would 
be a proper share for the union and what manner that they should take to distribute the 
fund.
34
  Meanwhile, the employers were freed to introduce new methods of operations or 
new machines and the union still kept most of contractual restrictive rules in the book.  The 
so-called “interim mechanization agreement” of 1959 was signed.35 
Nevertheless, the union considerably eased gear priority in exchange for establishing 
the mechanization fund and an 8-hour wage guarantee plan.  When the employers agreed to 
pay guaranteed wages for an 8-hour work day, the union gave the employers the right to 
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shift gangs or gang members to other work from their original assignment in order for the 
workers to fulfill an 8-hour shift.  Many older dock men and those with certain physical 
disabilities were protected from being shifted to any ship work.  However, they could be 
dispatched to any other compatible dock work or car work to satisfy 8 hours a day.  Ship 
gangs, on the other hand, could be ordered to do any other ship, dock, or car work to fill out 
a shift.
36
  Employers also had the right to shift ship gangs to another ship in the middle of an 
operation and then order them back to the first ship to finish the job.
37
  This right was 
especially useful for them when the arrival of cargo was delayed or any ship gear was broke 
down in the middle of an operation.  By dispatching the gangs to other jobs and calling them 
back to the original work later, instead of letting the gangs wait for the cargo to arrive or the 
equipment to be fixed, the employers expected to remove the “idle time” of the gangs.  The 
contract allowed them to shift gangs without going through the dispatch hall. 
Union officers also agreed to stop the longshoremen’s four-on and four-off practices.  
In exchange, the workers got two fifteen-minute bathroom “relief” times a day.  The 
provision about the relief period stated: 
The ILWU agrees there shall be specific contract language to prevent the abuse of 
such relief periods or their being used as a subterfuge to operate as a 4-on - 4-gone 
practice , or variations thereof, and to insure that men will observe specified time for 
starting, resuming and finishing work.
38
  
 
The employers thus warned that the longshoremen should not use the relief time for an on-
and-off practice.  However, as Local 10 members soon discussed, without getting a 
replacement for the relief period, avoiding on-and-off was impossible.  In other words, if a 
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couple of men would go to the bathroom, the others would have to take over the operation 
during the period, unless the operation was to stop or a couple of other men were dispatched 
to replace their positions.  Undeniably, the idea that the employers intended to allow a gang 
to stop their performance for the duration of a gang member’s relief time was almost 
inconceivable.  But the provision mentioned nothing about a replacement.
39
  Reg Theriault, 
who began to work in San Francisco as a B-man this year, cogently discussed the matter as 
follows: 
What management wanted was to channel and confine the off time and reduce it, if 
possible, to only half an hour a day, and in this it was somewhat successful, since 
trade union negotiators also consider bargaining sessions as a trading contest and 
they gave up something for those fifteen minute breaks, which the workers, in one 
form or another, already had.
40
 
 
Not only had the 1959 contract agreement explicitly prohibited an on-and-off 
practice, but the PMA had also developed a program to enforce the contract agreement by 
imposing a fine on those employers who tolerated workers’ practicing the custom.41  
Moreover, the employers organized a “collective action” against any gang’s violation of the 
contract by shutting down the entire port.  Although locals tried to fight against the PMA’s 
actions, the International did not oppose PMA actions and even supported them.
42
  In mid-
1960, the PMA found that a “substantial progress” had been made in “conformance and 
performance.”  Max D. Kossoris, then establishing a system of measuring man-hours saved 
due to mechanization, acknowledged that the man hours saved during this period stemmed 
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from the removal of these rules restricting exploitative measures, not from mechanization.
43
  
The employers thus saw a potential in negotiating further with the ILWU to eliminate other 
work rules.  Although the 1959 agreement was scheduled to expire in 1962, the PMA was 
anxious to settle a final deal and eliminate all the work rules immediately.   
After negotiating for five months between May and October in 1960, the two parties 
finalized their negotiations for the Modernization and Mechanization Agreement by 
expanding the core ideas of the 1959 Agreement.  The union would get five million dollars 
each year into the M & M Fund for early retirees, welfare benefits, and the 8-hour guarantee 
plan.  In exchange, it would relax sling-load limits, eliminate multiple handling, and further 
restrict on-and-off and gear priority rules.  The employers agreed to maintain the 1958 fully-
registered workforce and the ILWU decided to recognize the employers’ right to control 
manning scales and work methods.  According to the new rules, the size of the basic gang 
would be reduced to nine.  The union could place a restriction on a method in an operation 
only if the method violated a safety code.   
All the rule changes began to be applied in January 1961 and were to remain 
effective until July 1966.  The M & M Agreement thus, in effect, was five-and-one-half year 
contract.
44
  This meant, the PMA was willing to pay the union a total of $27.5 million to the 
M & M fund during the period.  Including $1.5 million that the PMA had already agreed in 
the previous year to transfer, the fund would amount to a total of $29 million.  However, if 
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longshoremen would be engaged in a work stoppage or fail to comply with new changes, the 
employers could abate their payments by an amount up to $13,650 per day.
45
   
Historian Marc Levinson in his The Box argues that because the M & M Agreement 
was a product of a deliberation between the union and the employers regarding the 
introduction of automation, it constituted one of “the most unusual, and most controversial, 
labor arrangements in the history of American business.”46  Unlike some other unions that 
resisted automation as long as they could, Levinson continues, the ILWU accepted the 
implementation of automation and the employers, in turn, agreed to provide monetary 
compensations.  Levinson claims that it was a wise decision.  For twenty-first century 
observers, who live in a system in which containers and container operations are the 
essential part of the economy, and especially for those who believe in the role of 
technological innovation and entrepreneurship in advancing history, it might be tempting to 
retrospectively conclude that Bridges’s decision was inevitable or forward looking and thus 
prescient and even wise.   
However, by the mid-1950s, containerization had just begun.  Even though several 
attempts had been previously made, Malcolm McLean’s Pan-Atlantic Steamship 
Corporation launched the first domestic container ship in 1956 between Port Newark in New 
Jersey, and Houston, Texas.  Moreover, changes in the methods of handling cargo, 
redesigning containers and ships, and reconstructing port facilities proved necessary to 
accommodate containerization -- a process that took years to achieve.
47
  For that reason, 
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most contemporary economists envisioned that containerization would be costly and thus 
transporting the cargo in traditional unit loads would be more economical for a quite some 
time than investing into containers.  And thus they predicted that containerization would be 
developed slowly. 
On the West Coast, container pioneer Matson did not begin container shipping until 
the summer of 1958, although it had two years earlier conducted meticulous research 
predicting its future success.
48
  Matson built its first container facilities in Alameda in the 
Bay Area and began operations there in early 1959.
49
  Except for Matson, no other 
companies were developing containerization on a large scale.
50
  Considering these 
circumstances, Bridges and other top ILWU officers’ decision made in the mid-1950s did 
not seem to be inevitable and be forced by containerization.  Rather, their decision seemed 
to make the containerization process possible and help the employers eliminate obstacles by 
removing workers’ jobsite rules. 
Some contemporary mainstream newspapers praised the agreement.  For example, a 
Los Angeles Times reporter described the restrictive work rules as an “obsolete” means that 
functioned only to slow down operations.  By mentioning the Los Angeles longshoremen’s 
reputation for organizing frequent and large scale jobsite actions, he predicted that ship 
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owners and stevedoring companies would be the largest beneficiaries of the pact.  He 
announced, “A ‘new epoch’ in waterfront labor relations seems in prospect.”51 
But not all contemporary voices were congruent, although they were not necessarily 
against the agreement.  In reprinting an article originating from San Francisco, the Los 
Angeles Times questioned how the union’s negotiating committee would “sell” the new 
program to the membership.
52
  A New York Times article also pointed out that it would be 
difficult to get the approval from the membership.  It cited PMA officers’ statement that the 
agreement was “a potential bomb.”  Because the program offered job security only for 
registered men, it also raised the issue about the position of casual longshoremen who 
comprised a third of the dockside workforce.
53
  Interestingly, it did not discuss any opinions 
of the B-men who comprised one-seventh of the registered workforce.  Nevertheless, casuals 
and B-men did not have any voting rights and thus they could not affect the decision of the 
union regarding the contract.   
What the newspaper reporters did not know was that since the late 1950s, 
International union officers had been “selling” the core ideas of the agreement through The 
Dispatcher.  The official newspaper of the ILWU had promulgated the notion that the “old” 
ways of dealing with problems would no longer work in facing mechanization and 
containerization.  It also claimed that workers would master the machine and that the work 
process would be easier.  A 1959 issue stated: 
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We don’t have to resist it [mechanization].  We can go along with it.  The question is, 
shall we master the machine, or shall the machine master us?  It will surely master us 
if we pretend it is not there, or that it cannot do some or all the work we now do.  It 
is there, and it can do a lot of our work a lot faster than we can do it, and with a lot 
less pain.
54
 
 
International union officers had urged longshoremen to believe that mechanization would 
open up an opportunity for them to have a better and richer life.
55
  They emphasized that the 
M & M Agreement was a good contract because it assured no layoffs, an earnings guarantee 
plan, no individual speedups, as well as monetary benefits for retirees.
56
  By referring to its 
obtaining $29 million in exchange for automation to “taxing the machine,” the union 
underscored that it was an unprecedented phenomenon.  Top officers of the ILWU argued 
that the contract was the best ever and that it was a historic victory.  By doing so, they made 
it difficult for many members to oppose it.
57
  At the end of 1960, the contract was ratified by 
the coastwise membership in a referendum election. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be overemphasized that almost 3,700 members, or one-third 
of the coastwise membership, voted against the agreement.  This result showed the contract 
to be the least popular among all contracts signed since 1934.
58
  Unlike San Francisco Local 
10 that had a large pool of Bridges’ supporters and in which the membership 
overwhelmingly voted for the contract, Los Angeles Local 13 voted it down by 1,864 vs. 
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1,065.
59
  According to the president of Local 13, the membership had been concerned about 
the displacement of the men on the docks as a result of the agreement.  Moreover, he 
claimed that the mechanization plan would save the shipping companies $50 million a year, 
while the union settled with $5 million.
60
  He thus believed that the agreement would 
eventually benefit the employers, while displacing longshore jobs.  Interestingly, Kossoris 
who had studied the productivity measurement between 1959 and 1960 agreed with the 
opinion.  He pointed out that the wage increase provided by the contract was so small that 
“the longshoremen would, in effect, be the ones – rather than the employers – who would be 
contributing the $5 million per year.”61 
Moreover, all B-men, who were working as hold men and whose coastwise number 
reached about 2,000, could not participate in the referendum due to their non-union member 
status, although their working conditions could be most negatively affected if sling load 
limits were removed, the gang size reduced, and four-on and four-off practices further 
repressed.  On the other hand, the 1934 generation of longshoremen would be benefited the 
most, due to their fully-registered status and their eligibility for the M & M retirement fund.  
According to historian Charles P. Larrowe, many young longshoremen called the M & M 
Agreement “an old man’s contract” and accused Bridges of “paying off his friends who had 
been with him in the old days.”62  In this regard, economist Paul T. Hartman thought it 
ironic that those longshoremen who had led the 1934 strike and established the work rules 
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that governed dockside labor in the 1930s were the same people who in the late 1950s 
abandoned the rules.
63
   
Some explanations are necessary to understand why Bridges and top ILWU officers 
agreed to eliminate the old work rules and accommodate the employers’ efforts to 
mechanize their operations.  Regarding Bridges, his previous handling of registration 
processes and racial issues reveals that his decisions had been often made based on his 
“practical estimations” about what could be more easily achieved than what was perhaps 
right in principle.  He might have thought that obtaining a lot of money from the employers 
when the union could was the most practical strategy.  In addition, he might have been 
looking out for his generation of longshoremen who were becoming eligible for early 
retirements.   
However, certain structural factors cannot be overemphasized.  The transformation 
in the relationship between top union officers and the management since 1948, for one, must 
have attributed to the changes in the officers’ attitudes toward jobsite work rules.  During 
the “New Look” relationship, union officers had exchanged financial gains for channeling 
rank and file jobsite actions into “formal” grievance procedures in resolving disputes.  As 
Betty V. Schneider and Abraham Siegel in their study point out, financial gains without 
many jobsite actions had encouraged “the growth of a more conservative attitude among 
rank-and-file members.”64  This meant that members became dependent upon union officers 
in handling grievances that, in turn, resulted in strengthening a bureaucratic structure.
65
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Historian Stanley Aronowitz thus argues that “the growth of bureaucracy” and “the decline 
of rank-and-file initiative” are “built into the theory and practice of collective bargaining.”66  
Moreover, when union activities were narrowly channeled into a formal collective 
bargaining procedure, it became easier for union negotiators to believe that the power of the 
union stemmed from the management’s acknowledgement of the union as a bargaining 
partner and from their ability as negotiators to obtain some gains at the bargaining table, 
rather than to understand that real union power came from the strength of the rank and file at 
the point of production.  Based on this belief, union officers tended to promote workers’ 
jobsite actions only when these actions were considered to enhance their bargaining power 
at the table and only if they could control the actions.
67
   
For example, in 1959 when the ILWU was negotiating the interim mechanization 
agreement, Los Angeles and Seattle rank-and-file workers continued to organize jobsite 
actions.  The Coast Committee claimed that the locals were weakening the union’s 
bargaining power because their actions would upset the employers.  It thus coerced the 
locals to follow the rules.
68
  In 1960 when the ILWU was negotiating the M & M Agreement, 
Los Angeles workers refused to work on a Matson container ship because they could not 
agree with the reduced manning scale that had just been agreed upon at the coast level and, 
in turn, the employers shut down the port for fourteen days.  The union’s Coast Committee 
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threatened local officers that their actions were “running a serious risk of having 
negotiations cancelled out.”69   
In this system, the union and the employer not only emphasized negotiations at the 
bargaining table but also treated the contract agreement like a sacred deal.  This meant that 
the agreement was often used to regulate workers’ conduct and behavior and set the 
boundaries of what they could do and what they should not do.  Management therefore put 
pressure on union officers to make sure that the workers would not violate the rules.
 70
  
Union officers thus became the company enforcers of the rules, rather than representing the 
workers’ interests.  Theriault’s following discussion about how Local 10’s business agents 
became the enforcer of the “relief period” provision in the 1959 agreement is an insightful 
example.   
Before the rule was placed in the contract, a longshoreman used to go to the restroom 
anytime he wanted and other gang members covered for him.  Despite that, the union 
negotiated to place a provision in the contract allowing workers to have two fifteen-minute 
bathroom breaks – one in the morning and one in the afternoon – in exchange for the 
elimination of on and off practices.  When workers continued going to the bathroom 
whenever they needed, as they had done in the past, the local’s business agent, who got a 
telephone call from the employer, visited the workers with the contract book, showing them 
the provision and telling them that the employers were “perfectly within their rights” when 
they demanded that the workers go to the bathroom no more than twice a day and no longer 
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than fifteen minutes.  In Theriault’s account, an angry worker screamed at the business agent, 
“Why, you dumb son of bitch!  Who do you think you’re supposed to represent?  You’re 
trying to give away our working conditions!”  The business agent also angrily replied, “We 
had a hell of a time getting those breaks put in the contract.  And now you guys aren’t going 
to screw it up!”71   
In addition, the existing collective bargaining system itself was set up in a way that 
high ranking union officers were like “business executives,” as Aronowitz calls them, 
because their accountability was not limited to their union membership but was extended to 
“government agencies, arbitrators, courts of law, and other institutions which play a large 
role in regulating the union’s operations.”72  Moreover, they talked with company 
representatives more often times than with rank-and-file workers.  As a result, union officers 
could have a better understanding of what employers wanted than what workers needed and 
desired.  In this structure, top union officers often shared more commonality with employers 
than with the rank and file.  In this regard, Theriault’s argument on why union officers 
opposed an “on-and-off” practice is instructive: 
. . . whatever their origins, they [top union officers] no longer make their living the 
same way as the men and women under their care. . . . Furthermore, in order to 
divide the work fairly among themselves [in an on-and-off practice,] the workers 
have to organize, and once organized they might throw out their current labor 
leadership and get someone new.
73
 
 
In other words, top union officers did not want workers to be organized to the degree of 
wielding power over the officers in deciding the direction of the union’s activities.   
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Furthermore, even friendship could be built between union negotiators and the 
representatives of management as a result of frequent meetings among themselves while 
having formal and informal negotiations.  In the ILWU and the PMA case, historian 
Larrowe surmised that Bridges promoted the M & M Agreement because he had developed 
by the mid-1950s a friendly relationship with the PMA president J. Paul St. Sure and he did 
not want to damage their good rapport.
74
  Art Winters, one of the San Francisco black B-
men, convincingly stated that union negotiators and PMA representatives might fight against 
each other across the bargaining table, but then, when the meeting was over, they would go 
to a bar, drink and socialize together, freely ask what they would demand next during 
negotiations, and even coach each other about what they should say.  Winters thus pointed 
out that union officers and PMA representatives were in the same “social circle.”  Or more 
accurately, Bridges strove to belong to that circle and once he got “in the power circle,” he 
would go “along with the power.”75 
If the M & M Agreement had been a good one for the longshoremen, as ILWU top 
officers claimed, the waterfront employers would not have been willing to sign it.  
According to the contemporary industrial labor relations scholar Charles Killingsworth, 
employers agreed with the terms because they expected that they would save a lot of money 
from eliminating the restrictive rules, but they doubted that it would be easily measured.  By 
agreeing in advance to pay “lump-sum” but fixed amount money, they believed that they 
were “entitled to delivery of what they had bought.”76  What matters the most, however, was 
not the elimination of the existing rules.  Moreover, to completely eliminate any customs all 
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at once, in any case, would have been impossible. The most significant aspect was that in the 
process of eliminating these rules, the employers obtained unprecedented authority and 
power to decide what rules should be applied, how many men were needed in an operation, 
and how each operation should be done.   
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Chapter 4 
“[L]ike going back to the slavery time”: The Working Conditions of the San Francisco 
B-men, 1959-1962 
 
Immediately after the Second World War, the size of the San Francisco Local 10 
membership remained large.  After the absorption of 800 permit men, almost no more men 
were added to the full registration list until 1958.  Nevertheless, the number of fully 
registered men had gradually decreased due to natural causes.  In February 1958, there 
remained about 4,000 fully-registered men or “A-men.”  If only active members were 
counted, the figure went down below 3,800.
1
  In April 1958, Local 10 placed an 
advertisement in Bay Area newspapers regarding the recruitment of B-men.  By early 1959, 
the selection of B-men was completed after considering application forms, conducting 
interviews in person, and examining the applicants’ physical conditions.2   Over 500 men 
began to work in June and another 200 men were added in August, resulting in a total of 743 
B-men. 
What follows is an attempt to bring back to life the story of the San Francisco B-
men:  who they were, what their expectations were in getting their jobs, how their work 
conditions were transformed under new rules, and how they acted upon to the changes.  
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 The membership of Local 10 in February 1948 was 6,900 and thus between 1948 and 1958, about 3,000 
men had left the local due to death, retirements, etc.  See Local 10 Longshore Bulletin, April 4, 1958; Stanley 
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2
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York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), pp. 61-62. 
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Many B-men had known the reputation of the union for its militancy and its providing job 
security.  However, they did not know their working conditions would soon be changed.  
When they began to work, the employers and the ILWU signed an interim mechanization 
agreement in exchange for a mechanization fund, which relaxed gear priority and prohibited 
four-on and four-off.
3
  Within one and half years, the union and the employers settled the 
Mechanization & Modernization Agreement, which further eliminated longshoremen’s work 
rules, reduced manning scales, and gave the employers the authority to introduce a new 
method in handling the cargo as they wished.  These changes impacted the working 
conditions of San Francisco longshoremen, in general, and the B-men, in particular. 
The uniqueness of San Francisco B-men rests upon their racial composition:  About 
60 percent of the 743 B-men were younger black men.  By the end of 1962, about 200 of B-
men left the industry, resulting in an increase in the percentage of blacks among the 
remaining B-men to over 70 percent.  The mere fact that about 200 B-men left the industry 
during the first three years tells a lot about their working conditions.  But the fact that a lot 
of black men remained reveals that they endured the hardships more so than their white 
counterparts.  Their opportunity to get better jobs outside the waterfront was limited due to 
the degree of racism structured into the fabric of society and most workplaces.  In such 
circumstances, they remained and tried to change their working conditions by organizing 
themselves.  An examination of the limitations imposed upon their lives and the life choices 
that they had made as black men before they took the longshore job provides an insight into 
an understanding of how they survived and resisted on the waterfront as B-men.  
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The B-men’s position in the union demands special attention.  In comparison to 
former permit men, stricter rules were imposed on the new B-men, especially the 70 
percent-availability requirement.  But because they were not union members, they could not 
participate in the official decision-making processes of the union, including union elections, 
contract votes, and making work rules that directly affected their working conditions.  
Although partially registered men had traditionally expected to be promoted to fully 
registered men in about six months, the B-men hired in 1959 remained in the status for years 
and were not sure when their promotion would happen.  Despite or because of that, they 
acted “like a union” by organizing self-activities in order to advance their working 
conditions.  In order to understand their actions, this study pays attention to how the B-men, 
who worked during the transitional period when old ways of working had not been entirely 
wiped out but new ways of working were still uncertain, thought about the meanings of 
power, justice, and democracy.  
 
1. The Profile of San Francisco B-men 
The B-men were a new younger generation of longshoremen whose ages ranged 
between twenty-one and forty.
4
  The U.S. census data and other public records of the B-men 
who filled out questionnaires show that most of them in Local 10 had been born between 
1925 and 1937, meaning that their ages fell between 22 and 34 years old.  Stanley (“Stan”) L. 
Weir, one of the white B-men, was born in 1921 and thus might have been one of the oldest.  
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Born in Los Angeles, he had enlisted in the merchant marine as seaman during the Second 
World War and subsequently worked in many different workplaces, including a General 
Motors auto factory in Oakland.  Johnny Cherry, who was born in 1939 in Mississippi and 
came to San Francisco in 1955, might have been among the youngest.  Being married when 
he was 19 years old, he had been working as a warehouseman in Local 6 and as a casual 
longshoreman for Local 10 for about a year by the time when he got the B-man job.
5
 
Most importantly, approximately 53-60 percent of the B-men or 400-450 men were 
black, resulting in an increase in the overall percentage of black longshoremen in Local 10.
6
  
As Weir points out, the large number of old black longshoremen in Local 10 paved way for 
the presence of a high percentage of black B-men.
7
  Many black B-men had longshoremen 
relatives, such as a father, father-in-law, step father, or uncle.  Thomas Nisby and Eathen 
Gums, Jr., for example, had longshoremen fathers, Wiley Nisby and Eathen Gums, Sr., 
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respectively.  Some of them applied for the job due to the persuasion of their relatives.  But 
others might have applied for the job even without their relatives’ advice because they had 
already been exposed to longshore work culture due to having longshoremen in their 
families.  For example, Fred Hayes’s brother-in-law worked on the waterfront, but Hayes 
got the news from the newspaper advertisement.  Cleo Love, whose father-in-law was a 
longshoreman, also found the job solely via the newspaper.   
In addition, having a longshoreman father did not guarantee getting a longshore job.  
Frank Nereu’s father had been a “1934 man” and Nerue had tried to be his father’s 
replacement when the latter became very sick in late 1940s, but he was told by Bill Chester 
that the union had stopped the practice of automatically giving out “fathers’ books” to their 
sons.  In 1959, Frank Nereu, along with his brother Manuel Nereu, Jr., applied successfully 
for the B-men job by going through the process just as other applicants.
8
 
Just like the previous generation of black longshoremen, many young black workers 
were born and spent their childhood in Southern states, especially Texas, Louisiana, 
Arkansas, and Mississippi.  Many came to California in the 1940s, often following their 
fathers who moved to California to look for a new life.  For example, Timothy Ernest Carter, 
who was born in 1932 in Wichita Falls, Texas, moved to the Bay Area when he was about 
10 years old, following his father, Timothy H. Carter, who had become San Francisco 
longshoremen. Edgar Dunlap was born in Gulfport, Mississippi in 1936.  His father was a 
porter on trains travelling between New Orleans and Chicago.  During the Second World 
War when his father’s work schedule changed to passenger service between Oakland and 
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Chicago, his family members moved to Oakland and he joined his family after staying with 
his grandmother in Mississippi for several more years.
9
   
Their memories about the South had a wide range.  Dunlap remembered Gulfport as 
not a place of “hardcore” segregation where the black community was physically distant 
from the white community:  
It [segregation] did not bother me that much as a child… whites lived in the next 
block or across the street….  It did not bother me to use separate facilities.  I 
accepted it.  My Grandmother and mother explained to me to go to separate facilities.  
I did not ask any questions until I went to high school. 
 
Some of them were very young when they left the South – a fact that was often given as the 
reason why they did not remember the full impact of racial segregation.  Tim Carter, for 
example, stated, “I never recognized prejudice because I was too small.  Nobody was mean 
to me.”  The 1940 U.S. Census listed seven-year-old Tim living with his parents and an 
older sister in a black neighborhood in Burkburnett, a small town just to the north of Wichita 
Falls.  It seems that segregation itself, as well as their ages, might have influenced their ideas 
about racism.  When they were little, they had lived in black segregated communities where 
they had spent their childhood as happy kids without encountering many whites. 
Fred Hayes was born in 1921 in El Dorado, Arkansas, but when he was 17 years old, 
he left Arkansas for Texas where he worked in several different places, including a gas 
station and a bowling alley.
10
  When asked about racism in the South, he stated, “Racism did 
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not apply to us kids much.  I did not grow up with fear as a youngster.” 11  Although he spent 
the first 20 years of his life in Arkansas and Texas, he remembered himself in those days as 
a “kid.”  He constantly looked for a job, but he did not seem to link this aspect of his life to 
racism.  Rather, racism for him seemed to mean overtly violent actions by whites.   
But Art Winters presented a different sentiment.  Born in 1925 in Tennessee, he had 
left the South when he was thirteen years old, but he remembered drinking from segregated 
water fountains, going to an “old broken-down” school, and having to buy his own 
textbooks or get books from his old siblings when white students were provided with brand 
new textbooks.  These things did not make sense to him and he often raised questions 
regarding the problems of inherent in the system of racial segregation. 
For those who were born in the South, their new lives in the Bay Area presented a 
challenge in various ways.  Many said that it was exciting.  Some quickly adjusted.  Carter 
remembered that he was teased a lot at first due to his southern drawl, but he learned quickly 
how to speak “a new language.”  Attempting to cope with hassles from high school 
classmates led “Jackie” Hughes to take up boxing.  He did not like fighting and he wanted to 
be an artist and writer, but he, in his own words, had to “survive.” He jokingly mentioned 
that when he learned how to fight, he became “the baddest nigger on the campus.”  His 
classmates began to respect him.
12
  
Not all young black men came from the South, but a substantial number of black B-
men were born in the Bay Area.  Louis Richardson, whose father was a railroad porter 
before becoming a longshoreman, was born in 1932 in San Francisco and raised in the Bay 
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Area.  Bob Marshall was also born in the city in 1927 to a Colombian-born father and a 
Jamaican-born mother.  Being born in the Bay Area did not shield them from experiencing 
overt and covert racism.  While serving in the Korean War, Richardson became conscious 
about being “a California black” to white solders from southern states, who treated him as “a 
smart nigger, somebody that knew a little more about how to live than a southern black.”13  
Marshall was a brilliant student who passed an entrance exam to the Navy’s pilot program 
when he was only about 15 years old when the Second World War broke out.  But when he 
was about to get into the program, he was told that no blacks would be actually accepted.  
He was told that he could get a job in a dining room, instead, or enlist in the army.  Marshall 
stated that it was “the first time of awakening of what societal discrimination was about.”14 
 Frank and Manuel Nereu, Jr. were also born in San Francisco.  Their parents had 
emigrated from the Cape Verde Islands.  Their father, Manuel Nereu, had worked on the 
waterfront beginning in 1927 until he died in the late 1940s.  He identified himself as 
Portuguese, rather than black, and when Frank was born in California in 1930, he reported 
his son’s racial category as “Caucasian” on the birth certificate, although the 1930 U.S. 
census taker had marked him as “black” on the census.  Frank claimed that he and his family 
considered themselves neither black nor white, but he was labeled a “black Portuguese.”  
Due to the discrepancy between self-identification and the imposed racial identify, Frank 
seemed to become conscious about the race issue.
15
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Like the old generation of black longshoremen, some of the B men had worked in 
many different jobs in the South before they came to California, and even afterwards.  
Working constantly since early age was what Cleo Love also had to do.  He was born in 
1927 in Mississippi.  His father passed away when he was little and his mother moved with 
Cleo and his baby brother into her parents’ house located in an “all-black neighborhood.”  
Love worked as a “bus boy” and dish washer in a restaurant owned by a white man.  He left 
his family when he was 14 years old and came to San Francisco where his uncle and aunt 
lived.  He worked in many different workplaces, including, a horse race track, a car wash, 
Sanford Hospital, and a rental car service.
16
   
Nevertheless, many young black men had different occupational experiences from 
those of the first generation of black longshoremen.  For one, many of them had served in 
the military.  Fred Hayes enlisted in the U.S. army during the Second World War and served 
for three years working as a quartermaster.  Louis Richardson, Edgar Dunlap, and Oliver 
Geeter also enlisted in the armed forces.  Ulysses Hawkins had served in the navy. 
Warehouse work was one of the most prevalent former jobs that black B-men held 
and ship scaling was the next.  After serving in the army, Fred Hayes moved in 1946 to San 
Francisco and worked for 13 years in warehouses.  Many other black B-men had been 
“warehousemen” in the Bay Area and thus were members of ILWU Local 6.  George R. 
Williams who worked as a warehouseman for 11 years was one of them.
17
  Several others, 
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including Willie Jenkins Jr. and Willie Palmer, had worked as ship scalers and members of 
the ILWU Local 2.  Some of the former warehousemen and scalers had performed longshore 
work as casuals.  Tony Melvin, for instance, stated that he began working as a casual in 
1954 and got a fulltime job in the warehouses by 1958.  Johnny Cherry and Ellis Graves also 
mentioned that they had worked on the waterfront as casuals while being members of Local 
6.
18
   
These former warehousemen and ship scalers, especially those who had worked as 
casual longshoremen in Local 10, undoubtedly knew how to do the waterfront job and what 
to expect when they applied for the B-men status.  Former seamen were also familiar with 
the nature of waterfront work and a substantial number of them had applied.  Bill Edwards, 
Bob Marshall, and Mack Hebert had worked on ships under the jurisdiction of the Marine 
Cooks and Stewards Union until the union was dissolved in the mid-1950s.
19
  After that, 
Hebert had worked until 1959 as a ship scaler. 
However, some others had held occupations which had nothing to do with warehouse 
or scaler work.  Reggie Saunders, who grew up in the State of Washington, listed that he had 
once been a “professional basketball player.”  Willie Merritt, who was raised in Oakland, 
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played professional baseball at one time, probably in the mid-1950s.  He quit playing ball 
when he experienced egregious segregation and discriminatory treatment when he played 
class “A” baseball in Florida.  Louis Richardson also played baseball in the “Negro League” 
while a student at Berkeley High School before he enlisted in the army during the Korean 
War.  Both Arthur “Jackie” Hughes and Walter Robinson became well known on the 
waterfront due to their previous careers as boxers.  Hughes had won a Golden Glove as an 
amateur sometime in the 1950s.   
Younger black longshoremen received longer formal education than their older 
counterparts.  Most B-men were high school graduates or had received at least 11 years of 
education.
20
  Exceptions seemed to be some of those who came from the South.  Fred Hayes 
finished only the 7
th
 grade in El Dorado.  Melvin Kennedy, who was born in 1925 and grew 
up in Palestine, Texas, listed that he completed only the 5
th
 grade, although he lived with 
family relatives in New York City for twenty years until he moved to the Bay Area in 1956.  
He never mentioned in his interview the reason why he did not continue his schooling, but it 
might be possible that he constantly had to work.  He reported that he had worked in a Ford 
factory before enlisting in the army during the Korean War.  In the Bay Area, he got a job in 
warehouses until he became a B-man.  Tony Melvin and Theodore Tolliver, both of whom 
grew up in Houston, Texas, finished the 9
th
 and 7
th
 grades, respectively.
21
  According to a 
report published in 1960 by the Division of Fair Employment Practice Division of California 
Department of Industrial Relations, 39 percent of black Californians did not advance in 
                                                 
20
 Pilcher points out that applicants for B-men during the 1960s were required to have a high school 
education.  See Pilcher, pp. 56-62. 
21
 Questionnaires.   It might be possible that they did not write down all the education they received in 
their questionnaires.  For instance, Love indicated in the questionnaires that he finished the 8
th
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Mississippi and did not write down further, but he revealed in his interviews in a passing manner that he 
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school beyond 8
th
 grade.  Among San Franciscans, “non-whites” completed an average of 
10.3 years of schooling.
22
  Compared with this record, the black B-men in Local 10 received 
more formal education than the larger pool of black adults in the area.   
For many working class black men, longshore work was considered a good and 
stable job.  Willie J. Hurst, Jr., who had been working in warehouses for a year after 
finishing his high school education, expressed that “everybody identified working on 
waterfront as making good money.”  His father, who had to stop working due to his heart 
condition at the warehouse where Hurst, Jr., replaced him, was happy when his son got the 
job.
23
  Arthur “Jackie” Hughes, whose future seemed to be promising as a boxer, quit the 
fight to be a longshoreman.  He was twenty four years old when he married 19-year old 
Elvester Nisby in 1958.  His father-in-law, Wiley Nisby, who was a winch driver on the 
waterfront at that time, strongly urged Hughes to apply for the job by telling him that it was 
“a good job for a family man.”  According to Hughes, people had a perception that 
longshoremen would never get fired.
24
   
But being a longshoreman meant more than economic stability.  Being a 
longshoreman was “a status symbol” due to the 1934 strike, just as Tony Melvin claimed.25  
Oliver Geeter recalled that when he got the job, his neighbors in the black community 
instantly respected him.  Sydney Roger, a white man who worked as a ship clerk in San 
Francisco as a member of Local 34 in the 1950s, remembered a story told by a black worker 
who would walk “real slow down the street” in Fillmore, a black neighborhood in San 
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 Negro Californians (San Francisco, California: State of California, Department of Industrial Relations, 
Division of Fair Employment Practices, 1963), pp. 20, 34 
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 Willie Hurst, Interview Transcript, p. 1, Materials Relating to I.L.W.U. Case, Longshoremen – B List, 
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 Hughes, Interview transcript, pp. 9-11. 
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Francisco, with his longshoreman’s clothes on -- stevedore white cap, black jeans, and 
hickory shirt – and a longshoreman’s hook in his back pocket to impress people.  Then, he 
was treated with respect and admiration in the area.  He stated, “I could borrow money from 
the Morris Plan, I could get anything I want because a man in the longshore union was 
considered A-number-one in the Fillmore.”26  On the day when they got their “B-men 
books,” as Stan Weir later recalled, three black guys showed off their books as if they were 
“gold medallions.”  Weir continued, “It was a big deal for these black guys – it was the 
realization of their hopes and dreams.”27    
Although black men constituted a majority of the B-men, there were some Latin 
American descendents among them, although their precise number remains unknown.
28
  
There were also a few Asian Americans:  Larry Yamamoto was one of them.  According to 
his recollection, about six to eight B-men were Americans of Asian descents.
29
  He 
remembered that before he was hired, very few Asian Americans had been working on the 
San Francisco waterfront, and not many had applied in 1958 for the job.
30
  He claimed that 
the number was low because they seldom sought jobs during this time outside their 
respective ethnic communities.  More difficult to measure is how many were Native 
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 The black man, whose nickname was “New York,” was not an actual longshore local member but was a 
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 Weir, Interview, Reel # 41. 
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American descendents.
31
  A couple of black B-men in their interviews reveal their mixed 
ancestry with American Indians.  Ellis Graves’s father was an Indian in Kansas, so was 
Winters’ grandmother in Tennessee. 
It is also difficult to know how many were foreign born.
32
  Mario Vittorio Pietro 
Luppi seemed to be an Italian immigrant, but census and other public records revealed that 
he was born in 1923 in San Joaquin County in California.  At some point in the 1930s, 
however, he left for Italy with his father and received high school and college education 
there.  In 1951 at age 27, he returned to California where he changed his name to “Mario 
Victor Luppi” in 1953 when he married Rose D. Parisi.33  Although he was born in the 
United States and despite attending a medical school in Italy for three years, because he 
grew up and was educated in Italy, before he became a B-man, he held various occupations 
that were typically held by many Italian immigrant working men, such as a butcher and 
garbage man and a worker at a McCormick spaghetti factory.   
 
2.  B-men and the Dispatching System 
When the B-men were hired, they had to learn about the detailed workings of 
dispatch system that the local had adopted since 1951, which proved to be no small task.  
Until that year, longshoremen had been using since 1934 the “plug-in” board system, by 
                                                 
31Joseph “Indian Joe” Morris was a member of the Blackfoot tribe and might have been hired as a B-man 
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which workers had rotated work opportunities by placing their metal “plugs” on the boards 
that were installed on the wall of the hiring hall.  The boards created the sequence of the 
work opportunities among the workers in separate categories of their respective skills or 
status.
34
  In 1951, Local 10 introduced a new method by which longshoremen, when they 
reported to work, wrote down their registration number and accumulated work hours on 
different “sign-in” sheets reflecting their respective categories.  Based on the sign-in sheet 
information, dispatchers made a “master” sheet by writing the registration numbers of the 
workers in the order of their accumulated hours.  Among the men who signed in, those who 
had accumulated lowest work hours would be the first ones to be dispatched, the next lowest 
ones would be the next out, and so on.  The longshoremen referred to this method as the 
“Low-Man-Out” system or “LMO.”35 
The A-men, many of whom held more skilled positions and worked more frequently 
as deck or dock men, had more options in choosing the day’s jobs than B-men at the hiring 
hall because they were dispatched first.  If they chose to skip a day’s work, they could do so 
by not signing in as available for work with the dispatchers at the hall.  Even after signing in, 
they could refuse to take a job if they did not find any work they wanted or by simply not 
showing up.  “Flop” was the term that longshoremen used to describe this kind of action.  If 
they flopped, they had to add a certain amount of hours to their total work hours as a penalty 
-- a process that forfeited their right to be in the “low-man” position.  In addition, they were 
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not allowed to sign in again for 24 hours.  If an A-man was already on a job, he could still 
come back to the hall and call for a replacement, but he would have to pay the same penalty 
as those who flopped.  Nevertheless, there was no risk of losing their status as longshoreman 
because they were required to work only a minimum 800 hours a year – or on the average 
two days a week -- in order to keep their registration status.
36
   
B-men, on the other hand, did most of the hold work, which was the hardest and 
most dangerous job.  They were dispatched after the available A-men had taken their jobs 
and thus B-men had few choices.  In addition, requirements for the B-men had been 
considerably changed from those for previous B-men.
37
  The Port Committee set a rule that 
B-men were “not permitted to volunteer or to choose jobs, but must take the jobs handed or 
assigned to them at the dispatching windows.”38  Even worse was that days could pass by 
without getting any work, but they had to show up at the hiring hall almost every day due to 
the 70-percent availability requirement.  The obligation of being “available” could be 
satisfied if a B-man signed in, showed up to the hall next day, and appeared at the window 
when a dispatcher called his registration number, and performed the assigned job.  It also 
could be satisfied, if he signed in, showed up next day to the hall, but his registration 
number was not called because no more jobs existed.  According to a 1958 memorandum, 
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 Weir, “A Study of the Work Culture of San Francisco Longshoremen,” p. 169. 
37
 For the transformation of their working conditions, see Chapter 3, above. 
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“availability” was defined as “willingness and availability to take any type of work at any 
time” that was offered and “regardless of the duration of the job.”39   
The problem was that during the first year there was not enough work for all B-men 
to make a decent living.  Nevertheless, B-men had to sign in and show up at least five days a 
week in order to keep the 70-percent availability rule.  Charles J. Johnson, one of the B-men, 
described the first year’s working conditions as follows:  
We did the hardest work or we didn’t work at all.  I was given a job one day a week, 
sometimes none at all, even though I reported every morning and remained available 
from 6:30 A.M. until 8:00, when they would O.K. the sign-in board which reported 
you as available for work that day.
40
 
 
Louis Lacy also stated, “When I got the job, my future looked better.  But during the first 
year, we did not get much work.  I resented being a B-man.”   
Coastwise data collected in 1959 showed that a B-man worked for an average of 618 
hours, making only $3,406.  The average earnings of the B-men in 1960 and 1961 did not 
get much better:  They earned only $3,988 and $3,908 during the respective years.
41
  Max D. 
Kossoris, who was hired in 1959 by the PMA to study the longshoremen’s productivity, 
reported that the work hours that both B-men and casual workers performed counted for 
only about 14 percent of all man-hours worked in that year.
42
  The average earnings of Local 
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10 longshoremen might have been slightly higher than those of members of other locals 
because more cargo came to the Bay Area and thus there was more work, but when 
considering that the median income of black males in the San Francisco-Oakland area in 
1959 was $3,694 and that of white males was $ 5,298, both white and black B-men were 
making more or less the median income of the black male in the area.
43
  The A-men’s 
earnings were a different story:  In 1959, A-men worked for an average of 1,668 hours and 
earned $6,087 -- an amount that did not include fringe benefits.
44
   
Because they had to show up almost every day at the hiring hall even when the 
prospect of being dispatched was low, it proved difficult for B-men to hold a second job.  
Moreover, the 1958 rules prohibited B-men from taking any other full-time job and non-
availability could be a cause for deregistration.  In addition, the B-men list was revised 
annually based on availability records of the past year and they were dispatched the next 
year in the order of their availability rate from the highest to lowest.
45
  This indicated that 
through the availability rule, the employers profited from having the “stable” and “flexible” 
workforce, whereas B-men could not control their own work and life schedules.  
Anthropologist William Pilcher, who worked as a longshoreman in Portland and wrote about 
Portland longshore culture, summed up the unequal relationship between A-men and B-men: 
The basis of the hiring system is supposed to be complete equality in work 
opportunity for all longshoremen, but this equality only exists within the status 
categories.  The B-men are very much second-class citizens within the hiring hall 
context, since they do not share equal work opportunity with the A-men.
46
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3.   The impacts of the Changes in Work Rules 
When the B-men applied for the job, they could not have known to what extent their 
working conditions were to be changed from what previous workers had enjoyed since the 
late 1930s.  Although the B-men worked for about one and a half years before the 
Mechanization and Modernization Agreement was submitted for a coastwise referendum, 
they could not participate in the voting process due to their non-union status.  But the 
agreement unprecedentedly changed the working conditions of longshoremen.  The changes, 
however, did not occur due to an introduction of containerization or mechanization.  
Containerization began to be influential only in the late 1960s and became a dominant mode 
of transportation in the 1970s.  By 1963, less than five percent of all general cargo tonnage 
at Pacific coast ports was containerized.
47
  During the early 1960s, changes in manning 
scales – the reduction of the basic gang size and the number of workers in each operation--, 
the relaxation of work rules, and ensuing speed-ups became the means for the employers to 
achieve profits.   
After the 1934 strike, the San Francisco longshoremen had increased the size of the 
basic gang to sixteen, consisting of six hold men, six dock men, two winch drivers, one 
jitney driver, and the gang boss.  When loading, two more hold men had been dispatched, 
while the number of dock men had been reduced to four.   But the M & M Agreement 
reduced the size of the basic gang to only nine by eliminating four dock men, two hold men, 
and a winch driver.  The agreement stated that more men shall be added to the basic gang 
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when cargo was to be hand-handled, the load was “onerous,” or a safety concern was raised.  
But it was the employers who would decide whether more men were needed and they were 
allowed to hire their “own employees” as extra men.48  The contract language, however, was 
unclear about what an “onerous load” meant and who the employers’ own employees were. 
The problem of the reduced gang size for longshoremen was compounded with the 
relaxation of sling load limits.  As soon as the M & M Agreement was ratified in January 
1961, the employers were eager to increase the sling load.  In 1937, the union had set the 
standard for sling load weights for various commodities and no sling could be weigh over 
2,100 pounds.
49
  The M & M Agreement stipulated that if the condition and the method of 
an operation were the same as in 1937, the sling load limitation would remain effective as 
before.  It still kept the old list of commodities and their maximum loads.  But the agreement 
allowed the employers to decide what the load size should be when new commodities were 
handled or a new method was used.
50
  The employers increased the load in many cases by 
arguing that conditions had changed in the operation.  In some cases the sling was 
overloaded up to as much as 4,000 pounds.
51
  This caused numerous disputes between the 
employers and the longshoremen over the meaning of the section of the contract agreement.   
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In February 1961 right after the M & M Agreement had become effective, several 
disputes were already reported in San Francisco over the size of sling loads.
52
  In one case, 
workers complained that when the load was doubled, they could not move it on 4-wheelers 
to the place of stowage unless supplied with more men or machines.  They consequently had 
to “belly pack” the sacks or carry sack by sack, instead of using 4-wheelers.  In another 
incident, workers asked for more men to be dispatched to move a 3,180 pound sling load.  
But, instead, they were told to belly pack 100-pound sacks of rice.  While a business agent 
of the union instructed that each sack should be moved by two men, the employer ordered 
each man to carry a sack by himself.  When the workers refused to follow the employer’s 
direction, they were fired.
53
   
The union protested and wanted to pass a resolution that oversized loads were 
“onerous” to handle and thus more men or machines should be added in handling them.  But 
the employers insisted that the matter should be dealt with case by case through the 
grievance procedure stipulated by the contract and that arbitration decision on a particular 
case should be applied “only to the particular situation on a particular ship” – a demand that 
exploited the situation in which the grievance process dealing with a case could easily take 
as long as several years to resolve.  Indeed, it took three years for the case involving belly 
packing rice sacks to finally reach the Coast Arbitrator.  Moreover, the employers insisted 
that when each case was dealt with, a decision on one case could not influence other 
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overload cases under different occasions and conditions.  This meant that even if the union’s 
opinion prevailed in arbitration in one case, it would be limited to that particular case. 
Employers also argued that they were entitled to choose any size load because the 
new contract agreements gave them power to do so.
54
  Because the provision stated that if 
there was any change in the methods of operations from the 1937 condition, then the 
employers did not have to maintain the sling load limit as listed.  But as Fairley points out, 
no condition could possibly be the exactly same as in 1937 and thus the contract language 
gave the employers “greater freedom than in fact they had.”  For example, employers argued 
that using pallet boards made the condition different and tried to legitimize oversized loads 
when they used pallet boards.  Fairly thus stated that the union ended up preserving less 
power than it had thought to have during negotiations and upon agreeing to the clause.
55
 
The dispute over the size of a sling load continued throughout the first couple of 
years and workers’ general dissatisfaction with the situation could be measured by the 
expression “Bridges’ loads,” which they used to refer to the oversized loads.56  By 1963, 
dissident voices within the union increased significantly.
57
  In response to the workers’ 
complaints, Harry Bridges advised them to agree among themselves to slow down their 
work because the union could do nothing about it and to demand that the employers expedite 
the mechanization process in order to eliminate workers’ physical burdens.  Examining the 
process, economist Hartman wrote in the late 1960s that “the employers, for the most part, 
devoted their effort to trying to squeeze more physical labor from the workforce, rather than 
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innovating or undertaking new investment.”58  Historian Marc Levinson points out the irony 
of the situation in which the roles of the two parties switched:  The union demanded the 
employers expedite the mechanization process, while the employers hesitated to spend 
money on the process.
59
 
In 1959, the ILWU had given up the “on and off” practice in exchange for two 
fifteen-minute bathroom breaks a day.
60
  Disputes over this policy had also begun to occur 
soon after.  San Francisco members raised the question whether the employers would 
dispatch replacements for those who took a bathroom break.  If not, how could workers not 
practice on and off during relief period unless all gang members stopped working?  The 
employers soon claimed that workers were abusing the relief periods.  Workers had 
apparently begun working late or quit early by using a bathroom break at the beginning or 
ending of their shifts.  The employers won an arbitration award ordering that no 
longshoreman be allowed to take a relief time during the first and last hours of each half of a 
work shift.   
However, Local 10 won a case in arbitration regarding a manning scale and on and 
off practice in “reefer hatches” that contained frozen foods.  While employers insisted that 
four hold men ought to work at all times in a reefer hatch, the union successfully argued that 
at least six hold men were needed and a three-on and three-off operation was necessary 
because no man should work in an extremely low temperature all day.  Their argument 
prevailed because it was considered as a health and safety issue.
61
  These disputes 
demonstrated that a contractual work rule change could not be easily implemented without 
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workers’ resistance.  Nevertheless, as San Francisco longshoreman Reg Theriault points out, 
it was much harder for workers to continue on and off because of the reduction of the basic 
gang size.  A fewer number of hold men had to do the same amount of work that had been 
done with eight men and thus the employers virtually prevented the practice.  In Theriault’s 
terse expression, “the bosses won that one.”62  
 
4.   B-men and Working Conditions 
Although complaints were filed and disputes rose regularly, Lincoln Fairley believed 
that many incidents were not protested because a large number of the hold men were either 
B-men or casuals.  The lack of job protection hindered B-men from bringing up many 
complains stemming from the jobsite.  Fairley speculated that many B-men were “anxious 
not to antagonize” the employers who were part of the joint committee making decisions on 
their promotion, yet he also claims that B-men’s complaints might have been limited 
because gang stewards, who usually observed and reported contract violations on the jobsite, 
seldom worked among B-men gangs due to their non-union status.  Fairley also surmises 
that complaints were not filed merely because many B-men were not familiar with the 
content of the contract.
63
  
Moreover, according to Weir, the relaxation of sling load limits and the 
wholehearted effort by employers to eliminate four-on and four-off practices resulted in 
speed-ups that led to the escalation of accident rates.
64
  The 1964 questionnaires revealed 
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that half of those B-men filling out the questionnaires had been injured while working on the 
waterfront between 1959 and 1963.
65
  Most of them listed that their backs, knees, legs, toes, 
elbows, or shoulders had been injured or fractured.  Ellis Graves wrote that he hurt his ribs.  
Ulysses Hawkins stated that his heart was permanently damaged.   Fairley countered the 
argument, but he admitted that accident rates rose in 1960 and 1961.  He claimed that the 
increase in accident rates was not due to the “decline in on-the-job militancy” against speed-
ups but was rather attributed to the increasing proportion of B-men who lacked work 
experience, and had no preliminary training offered to them.
66
  Based on the data and 
Fairley’s arguments, it can be argued that most likely the combination of multiple, but 
related, factors affected the result:  inexperienced and unprotected B-men did the most 
dangerous work during the transitional period when the work rules were changing and the 
work conditions were becoming more precarious and unpredictable – all at a time when the 
union was not prepared to deal with the consequences of the changes in work rules and was 
unwilling to protect a new generation of longshoremen. 
Charles J. Johnson described his working conditions during the early period when no 
training was given to him:  
When I went down there [waterfront], I did not know anything. . . . No training.  It 
was “OJT” (on the job training). . . . They did not give us no teaching. . . . There was 
one man down to the hold and I did not like the man because he hollered at me 
because I did not know [what to do].
67
 
 
                                                 
65
 Questionnaires. 
66
 Fairley, p. 210. 
67
 Bob Birks, Charles J. Johnson, and Reggie Saunders, Interview, Reel #1, October 10, 1978, Materials 
Relating to I.L.W.U. Case, Longshoremen – B List, 1963-84, Phonotape 1623 C, Bancroft Library, Berkeley, 
California.  
 146 
 
Johnson thought that the man, who might have been a walking boss, gang boss, or a winch 
driver, had no excuse for yelling at him because no training was given to him and thus he 
would not just silently take it.  He thus said:  
If I learned how to do it and he hollered at me, then I would take it in consideration, 
but [my attitude was,] “I will do the best I can, but if you do not give me any training, 
then you cannot holler down at me.  What would you try to do to me?” 
 
Johnson stated that it was “like going back to the slavery time” because he felt that the man 
was trying to take manhood away from him.  He continued, “[He treated me] like I was an 
animal… like I was stupid and dumb, but I wasn’t one.”   Johnson was not the only B-man 
who felt that his humanity and adulthood were not respected.  Art Winters stated, “We were 
talked to like children… on the job.”68     
Because of harsh working conditions, lack of enough earnings, and having less 
equality, a substantial number of B-men left the industry.
69
  But many black men endured 
the difficult situation.  There might have been several reasons why more black men 
remained.  For example, chances to get a new job, especially a decent one, for black men 
were more difficult than for their white counterparts due to racial discrimination.  This must 
have influenced their decision to stay on the waterfront.  Nationwide statistics show that 
unemployment rates among white men between 1958 and 1961 were between 5 and 7 
percent, whereas those among black men were twice high.
70
  Younger black men in urban 
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settings of the era experienced more difficulties in getting a good job.
71
  California statistics 
reveal that in 1960 in the San Francisco Bay Area, 55 percent of black working men’s 
occupations were listed as general “laborers,” “operatives and kindred workers,” or “service 
workers.”  In contrast, 50 percent of white male employees were professionals, technical 
workers, craftsmen, and managerial workers.
72
   
In addition, their registered status, although in an inferior one, gave them a sense of 
job security.  Unlike casual workers, they could not be “summarily dismissed from the 
waterfront.” 73  Their expectation that they would be soon promoted to A status also 
encouraged them to stay on the waterfront.  At a 1959 special meeting of all B-men, which 
was compulsory, the union told them that they would work under the 1958 contract and that 
they would be promoted to A-men within six months to one year.
74
   
Moreover, in spite of its difficult nature, hold work gave them some autonomy over 
their work because constant supervision by the bosses was impossible.  Moreover, 
mechanization and automation had not dominated the work processes in almost all 
operations yet.  Hold men thus still enjoyed figuring out and making decisions on how to lift, 
move, and stow various kinds of cargo and performed the work together accordingly.  Their 
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job thus needed initiative, ingenuity, and coordination among hold men, especially between 
partners.
75
  When black men’s job opportunities in the area were largely limited to 
subordinated jobs, including janitors, cooks, and garbage collectors, waterfront work still 
provided black men with a sense of independence, workmanship, and manhood. 
Johnny Cherry, who was just about 20 years old at the time, expressed, “I considered 
myself as a macho man, so I liked the job.  It was exciting.”76  Mack Hebert, who had made 
good amount money as a seaman and owned a house and a car at the time when he applied 
for the job, stated: 
[longshore job was] the only job that I ever had in my life that I can say I loved, 
simply because it was a man’s job.  You used your muscle, you used your body.  
And it wasn’t monotonous, because it wasn’t something that I would do the same 
thing over and over and over.
77
 
 
Tim Carter also mentioned:  
It was really interesting work… because we had to figure out how much we could 
load onto a ship and so forth.  And also because working as a team.  Eight people 
loading -- you got to have a team.  It [working with a partner] was all about 
recognition of what you were supposed to do.  You didn’t want to make your partner 
work more.  You had to equalize the work.
78
 
 
Carter acknowledged that working as partners made longshoreman get to know each other 
extremely well.  And partnership would expand to a group of people who would team up 
together.   
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 Weir’s first partner was Mario V. Luppi, an educated Italian-American who would 
become his lifetime friend.   Bill Edwards soon also became one of Weir’s partners.  Weir 
described Edwards as a worker who was exceptionally good at what he was doing.  Besides, 
he was politically savvy and conscious.  Born around 1920, Edwards went to a navy training 
school during WWII.  As a black man, he joined the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union, 
which was one of the rare interracial unions promoting racial equality and democracy within.  
He quickly became a chief steward and also one of the top officers of the union.  He led the 
1948 strike in the Oakland strike headquarters, and during the Korean War, he was elected 
as the chief dispatcher of the local union.  However, in the mid-1950s, the union faced the 
demise of its existence due to the Taft-Hartley Act and its encouragement for anti-
Communist unions to manipulate NLRB representation elections.  In addition, FBI 
surveillance and a U.S. government “screening” program against “subversive” elements 
among maritime workers virtually prohibited Edwards from continuing the job.  Out of 
maritime work between 1957 and 1958, he managed to find many different jobs.  He was 
always commended as an excellent worker at every worksite and thus he never had any 
difficulty finding one job after another.  Moreover, wherever he worked, he showed his 
skillful performances and thus he was used to working with many white workers.
79
 
 Like Edwards, Weir was a veteran labor activist.   He had been politicized by 
Wobblies he met on a merchant marine ship during the Second World War.  Having 
organized the 1934 strike, the Wobblies taught him the history of and the lessons from 
workers’ self-activities for improving their working conditions and taking control of their 
work processes.  One of the lessons was to never walk away from problems in the workplace 
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because otherwise the bad working conditions would continue and be handed down to 
subsequent workers.  Following their lessons, Weir had been a “red-hot” union steward, 
leading a work-stoppage on a ship, and after leaving the ship he had continued to dedicate 
himself to the cause. 
Nevertheless, Weir stated that by the time when he got the longshore job, he was not 
planning to “proletariatize” workers on the waterfront.  He had not been able to keep a job 
for a long time in the early 1950s because of FBI surveillance and blacklisting, and as a 
consequence, he was, in his words, “completely laid low politically.”  Besides, when his 
second daughter was born, he needed money to support his family.  Moreover, he thought 
that working on the waterfront would give him some free time to reflect and write about 
what he had learned from the Wobblies and what he had done during the 1940s.  As an ex-
seaman, longshore work was what he was familiar with and he worked very hard to be 
recognized as a good worker.  Weir boasted that he and Edwards were both “aces” at work 
and they enjoyed their partnership.   
While describing the days when he partnered with Edwards, Weir conveyed the 
culture on the waterfront in terms of racial relations.  He stated, “I was probably the first 
white guy who teamed up with a black guy.”  Although many black men had been working 
at Bay Area ports since 1940s, white longshoremen had not traditionally partnered with 
them.  The racist notion that black men could not do their work as well as white men might 
have been still prevalent on the waterfront.  Weir recounted that the “old timers” looked at 
him and Edwards and tried to explain why Edwards worked so well by saying “some dog 
with ‘blue eyes’ must have jumped over the fence,” meaning that Edwards was a good 
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worker because somewhere in his family linage there must be some white blood.  Weir, 
however, felt that working with Edwards gave him prestige among black longshoremen.
80
 
Edwards had personally known Bridges and Bill Chester before he got the longshore 
job.  The Marine Cooks and Stewards Union and the ILWU had a close relationship in the 
past.  Both were expelled from the CIO in the early 1950s because their officers refused to 
take oaths required by Taft Hartley Act asserting they were not members of the Communist 
Party.  Edwards was one of the officers in the Marine Cooks and Steward Union who had 
worked strenuously for months to get help from the ILWU to “rescue” the union from its 
being merged into anti-Communist unions in the mid-1950s.  For Edwards, Stalinism meant 
treating black and white workers as equals because he had experienced for the first time in 
his life that kind of environment in the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union.
81
  The union not 
only equally distributed work opportunities among members but also promoted young 
blacks to official positions.  The experiences also helped him shape the idea about what true 
unionism was about.  He and Weir, therefore, shared the idea that B-men should be given 
equal treatment as much as A-men were given.
82
  When B-men were told in 1960 that their 
promotion to A status would be “frozen” for a while, some B-men showed their opposition 
to the policy and became vocal about the problem of the M & M Agreement -- a stance that 
Edwards and Weir wholeheartedly embraced. 
 
5.   B-men and the Union 
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Although the B-men did not have a voice in union meetings due to their non-union 
status, they acted like union members in many ways.  They paid six dollars for their “pro 
rata share,” which was assigned to all longshoremen to pay the costs of operating the hiring 
hall.
83
  Some B-men perceived that their paying a pro rata share gave them some rights that 
union members enjoyed.  Although they could not attend union membership meetings, they 
met among themselves during the first year (once a month) and voted in one of those 
meetings to pay two dollars in order to send ILWU delegates to the union’s biennial 
conventions.
84
  After the first year, the union allowed them to observe from the balcony 
union membership meetings.  In addition, by participating in the “Bloody Thursday” march 
each year, they tried to learn the history of the union and take part in the union’s traditions.  
By doing so, they thought that they were preparing themselves for being “good” 
longshoremen.
85
 
In early 1960, Local 10 began a promotion process of the B-men.  The local wanted 
to promote about 160 B-men to make up for the “natural attribution” of the number of A-
men.
86
  By early 1961, the local had finished the investigation process to select 160 men and 
requested the Coast Committee’s approval for the promotion.87  It also intended to make a 
monthly promotion of a number of B-men equal to the number of those who would 
disappear from the industry due to death and retirement.  However, the coastwise longshore 
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caucus soon affirmed that the Coast Committee and International officers had the authority 
to determine registration processes, although the caucus asked the Committee to consider 
lifting the freeze on the registration.
88
   
The local’s effort to promote B-men during these years was never approved by the 
Coast Committee.  Weir claimed that a lot of B-men felt discontented and their dissenting 
voices continuously grew.  An unidentified B-man stated later how he felt about the freeze 
on promotion: 
I thought it was unfair to make us stay as B-men.  I felt I had spent enough time in B 
and that I was able to do the work of a longshoreman as well as any of the A men.  I 
did not like being in a second class situation. . . . I simply was fed up with the idea 
that I was going to have to continue to be a B man and be shoved around by the A 
men.  I believed it was unfair to give the A men the advantage of being able to 
choose and to not choose to do the heavier and more onerous work and that B-men 
had little opportunity to do the skilled work, which paid more money.  I had been a B 
man since 1959, and so I felt that I should have my share of the easy work. . . . 
89
  
 
As a result, the Local 10 Executive Board decided to ask the B-men to elect three 
representatives and allowed them to be seated at the board’s meetings.90 
The B-men elected Stan Weir, Bill Edwards, and Bob Marshall as their 
representatives, all of whom were veteran labor activists.  Bill Edwards and Bob Marshall 
had known each other for a long time because Marshall had also been active for many years 
in the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union until the union was dissolved in the mid-1950s.  
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Before he joined the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union, Marshall was interested in 
becoming a seaman when his initial dream of becoming a pilot for the U.S. Navy had been 
shattered due to the Navy’s rejection based on his race.  But when he went to the Sailors’ 
Union of the Pacific (SUP), the union told him that it would not take any blacks.  He 
subsequently joined the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union and soon became the primary 
representative of his ship’s union members.91  He became a leading officer during the 1948 
strike.   
Being smart, knowledgeable, articulate, “red,” and “black,” Marshall believed that 
the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union opened young black men’s eyes by teaching the 
principles of democracy.  The union regularly sent books written by Marx and Engels to its 
members -- books that became valuable educational resources for Marshall.
92
  In their 
interviews, Edwards and Marshall showed their vivid memories about how the union had 
instilled the idea of equality via its “rotation” policy.  Unlike the ILWU’s low-man-out 
policy through which men in the same skilled category would share work opportunities to 
make sure the earnings of the members in the category were more or less equal, the Marine 
Cooks and Stewards Union’s rotation policy made sure that members not only shared work 
opportunities, but also rotated their positions in order that members could develop various 
skills and equally share them.  The union’s providing its members with educational and 
work opportunities, various skills, and high positions within the union regardless of their 
skin color demonstrated what true union democracy meant.   
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It is unclear whether the B-men elected Weir, Edwards, and Marshall due to their 
radicalism.  Weir stated that the ILWU attracted radicals who had been kicked out of various 
other unions under McCarthyism, and that longshoremen could figure out who were among 
this category by observing the way they talked and behaved.
93
  He believed that people 
already figured out that he was one of them.  In any case, earning blacks’ support was 
crucial because over 60 percent of the B-men were black.  According to Weir, he received 
the most votes among candidates and got support from both blacks and whites.  Weir 
speculated that his working with black workers had given him a good reputation among 
blacks.   
The B-men thought that having B-men representatives would help vocalize their 
concerns.  Louis Lacy stated,  
When we elected B-men representatives, I thought that we could be heard now.  We 
did not complain, but complaint that can be counted was what we needed.  That was 
what I thought.  We could get to place where our complaints could be heard… 
 
Johnson mentioned that electing B-men representatives and raising their grievances through 
them were exactly what unionism was about.  According to Edwards, the three 
representatives had a clear political idea about B-men and the union:  B-men should be 
represented by the union and given equal rights within it. 
Nevertheless, their expectation of B-men representation never materialized.  Various 
accounts existed among the B-men regarding why the three B-men representatives were 
ultimately discarded from the union.  According to Weir, the very first time they attended 
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the executive board meeting, a couple of board members, namely Tommie Silas and Carl 
Smith, objected to their presence during any discussions other than ones specifically 
regarding B-men.  At the second meeting, the board complained that Bill Edwards had made 
contact with an ILWU lawyer and that Bob Marshall suggested that someone should talk 
with the NLRB on a certain matter.  Weir did not explain these circumstances in detail, but 
Edwards and Marshall might have tried to find a way to advance B-men’s working 
conditions or their union membership status by meeting with a lawyer whom Edwards had 
known before he became a B-man, or by negotiating with the NLRB, in Marshall’s case.  
The board members claimed that these actions were a proof of their disloyalty to the union.  
Weir summed up the entire situation: “We did not have a chance to represent anybody.”94  
At the third meeting, Bill Chester did not want the B-men representatives there and that was 
the end of their presence at board meetings.
95
 
Edwards claimed that the representatives were dismissed because of their radical 
politics, which included demands that B-men should be represented by the union and given 
the equal rights as A-men – a political stance that the union officials did not accept.   
According to Mack Hebert, Bridges “squashed down” the “B-men’s union” because the 
representatives were “too smart” for the union officials.96  It is difficult to pinpoint whose 
account provides the real reason, but in any case, sometime between 1960 and 1962, 
Edwards and Marshall were gone from the waterfront.  Weir in his affidavit submitted in 
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1965 to the court stated that there were threats toward the three representatives:  Tommie 
Silas, one of the Local 10’s business agents, told them that they “were being watched 
continuously” and that they would “be deregistered at the first opportunity that presented 
itself.”97  When Edwards injured his back while loading coffee sacks, He talked with Bill 
Chester about the injury, who subsequently told him to take some time off to recuperate -- 
an offer that Edwards took.  That was the end of Edwards’ longshore work career.  It 
remains unclear why and exactly when Marshall was dismissed.  In Weir’s recollection, the 
two were gone by 1961 and he was the lone surviving representative who could not do 
anything much to represent the B-men and felt that “the axe” was also inevitably going to 
come down on him.
98
  
Although the B-men’s representatives could not improve their positions on the 
waterfront, the B-men’s collective actions, speaking out about the grievances and electing 
their own representatives to make their workplace more equal and democratic, revealed that 
the purpose of creating Class B status by the employers and the ILWU officers had not been 
working out as they had initially intended.  What the employers and the ILWU had in their 
mind in 1958 when they had recruited the B-men was to create a labor force that could be 
available at anytime but that could be also disposable in case automation reduced the 
number of necessary men.  In other words, they had designed to have a pool of workers who 
were disciplined but who were also flexible for the employers’ needs.  They thus had 
informally agreed that they would not promote for a while the B-men to fully-registered 
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status that would give them more privilege and job security.  However, the B-men’s 
activities demonstrate that any effort to control human labor for mere productivity, 
especially in a demeaning way, cannot easily succeed without generating workers’ 
resistance. 
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Chapter 5 
“You cannot conquer people who stick together”: The Formation of the Longshore 
Jobs Defense Committee (LJDC), 1963 – 1964 
 
After working for almost four years, the San Francisco B-men were finally told in 
1963 to prepare for their promotion.  A controversy occurred, however, regarding the 
criteria for, the process of, and the authority for their advancement.  After several months of 
investigations and debates, the union deregistered eighty-two men, while fully registering 
the rest.  A majority of the deregistered B-men, believing that they were unjustly 
deregistered, contested the decision.  They formed the “Longshore Jobs Defense 
Committee” and organized various actions for their reinstatement, including grievance 
appeals, picketing, and legal battles.  This chapter examines the promotion and 
deregistration processes, discusses what motivated the B-men to pursue the course of actions 
that they took, and explores how they organized themselves and what their aspirations were. 
Most deregistered B-men were fired for alleged violations of availability, Low-Man-
Out, and pro-rata dues payment rules.  The specifics of promotion standards were 
unprecedented, but they had not been announced before the spring of 1963 and thus 
surprised the B-men.  When many deregistered B-men appealed their deregistration, the 
Local 10 membership also believed that the criteria were unreasonable and passed a 
resolution that promoted all those who were deregistered for merely violating either Low-
Man-Out or pro-rata payment rules requirements.  Nevertheless, this resolution was never 
acted on -- a result that reflected how much the local membership’s power over promotion 
processes had weakened.   
160 
 
When the deregistered men began to share information and collectively reflect on 
what had transpired during the promotion process, they found various factors to be unjust.  
Some of them insisted that they had not violated any rules.  Some of them had violated some 
of the rules but they had already paid the penalties.  The union had not informed them that 
they could be fired for the infractions when they had occurred.  Moreover, they could not 
have any counsel or union representative on their behalf during the investigation process.  
They considered this lack of due process also unjust.  For these reasons, some of them 
suspected that they were laid off because they had spoken out against the Mechanization & 
Modernization Agreement and its ensuing harsher working conditions.  The importance of 
understanding what the deregistered B-men thought about the fairness of the deregistration 
process and why they were deregistered cannot be overemphasized.  Without understanding 
their thoughts and feelings of injustice, it is difficult to comprehend their determination to 
sustain a a collective effort to get justice for the next eighteen years.   
An examination of the initial stage of the formation of the Longshore Jobs Defense 
Committee (LJDC) tells a lot about not only what the B-men desired to obtain from their 
fight, but also how they wanted to obtain it.  For many men, deregistration meant more than 
merely losing a job and cutting them off from a financial source to sustain their livelihood.  
It hurt them deeply because they were accused as “chiselers and crooks.”  Moreover, they 
felt that they were losing respect from their own black communities and their family 
members.  Clearing their names and restoring respect from the community, therefore, were 
main goals for their battle.  Standing up for what they believed was right itself provided 
them with a sense of dignity.  Moreover, the gathering together of sixty B-men created much 
synergy and enhanced the legitimacy of their struggle.  They decided to invite their wives 
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into the organizing project, reached out to civil and labor rights groups to garner support, 
and participated in actions for social justice, such as the March on Washington in 1963.  In 
the process, they connected their struggle with movements of those oppressed in the larger 
society and enlarged their viewpoint about the world. 
 
1. Deregistration of 82 B-men 
Between 1960 and mid-1963, the total number of registered longshoremen on the 
Pacific Coast had “naturally” been reduced due to deaths, retirements, and injuries. 
Approximately 1,600 longshoremen had retired and an additional 400 men had passed away, 
resulting in a remaining total of 10,686 fully registered longshoremen working on the coast 
in 1963.
1
  The San Francisco Local 10 membership had also shrunk on the average of 
twenty-four men per month for the same reasons.  As a result, there were at least 600 fewer 
A-status men in the local in early 1963 than in 1959.
2
    The number of B-men also 
decreased.  The total coastwise number of B-men declined from 1,962 to 1,593.  On the San 
Francisco Bay waterfront, about 200 longshoremen had left the industry and only about 550 
of the original 743 B-men hired in 1959 remained working.
3
  
During the same period, the membership of Local 10 had made a series of ill-fated 
attempts to promote the B-men.  In early 1960 when Local 10 decided to promote about 15 
B-men per month to make up for the natural attrition of the number of A-men, the 
International intervened and stopped the process by announcing that any promotion process 
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would be “frozen” for a while.4  In 1961, the Local 10 membership split over the promotion 
issue:  a majority endorsed promotion, while those who closely worked with Harry Bridges 
and Bill Chester, such as Tommie Silas, opposed it.  The latter faction argued that the 
promotion would be against the Coast Committee’s decision, and it succeeded in preventing 
the local from taking any action to advance the B-men.
5
   
Nevertheless, as the volume of coastwise total tonnage increased in the 1960s, the 
employers and the union became increasingly aware of labor shortage problems.
6
  In 1962, 
the employers at San Francisco Bay ports reported a shortage of “8,762 gang-days” and the 
union agreed to add more men to the registration rolls.
7
  As a consequence, ILWU officers 
informed the B-men that the “freeze” on their promotion would be lifted soon, and at the end 
of the year the ILWU and the PMA agreed to promote about 1,000 B-men coastwise, 400 of 
whom would be from Local 10.
8
  But the employers insisted that a large number of new B-
men should be recruited to replace them.  As a result, San Francisco Port Labor Relations 
Committee was asked to recruit at least 400 new B-men, while the local’s Investigating 
Committee was instructed to select among the existing B-men those who were qualified for 
A-registration.
9
   
Stanley (“Stan”) Weir received in early 1963 a letter asking him to appear at a 
meeting with the Investigating Committee.  It also informed Weir to bring his “B-man book” 
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in which he, on his own behalf, had recorded his work hours.  At the hearing, John Rutter, a 
committee member, after examining Weir’s book, told Weir that he was clear for promotion 
to full membership.  Rutter noted, however, that Weir had dropped or “chiseled” four hours 
in 1962 – a violation of the low-man-out rule -- although it had been within the allowable 
limitation of 10 hours.  Nevertheless, Rutter’s decision was soon revoked when Tommie 
Silas approached him and handed over a document accusing Weir of chiseling 13 ½ hours.
10
   
“Chiseling” was the term used among longshoremen to describe one’s action of 
deliberately reducing his total amount of work hours in order to be dispatched earlier than he 
could have been with his actual record.  Every longshoreman had his own record book in 
which he kept track of his work hours.  When he signed in for work, he wrote down his 
registration number and the total work hours on a “sign-in” sheet.  Based on the information 
on sign-in sheets, dispatchers determined the order of assigning the day’s jobs: those who 
worked fewest hours were called first.  A common form of chiseling was knowingly writing 
down a lower number on a sign-in sheet than one’s actual accumulated work hours.  To be 
sure, mistakes could happen when a longshoreman miscalculated his total work hours or 
forgot to add “penalty” hours to his total work hours in cases when he failed to show up at 
the hall after sign in or when he replaced himself with another man after he had been 
dispatched.  These mistakes were routinely checked and corrected.  One could commit 
chiseling by deliberately not correcting his mistakes even after they were pointed out. 
Weir, in defense of himself, requested information about specific dates of the 
occurrences of the violation.  He was told by the chairman, Carl Smith, that “as of that 
evening” the committee had changed its procedural rules and no one was permitted to 
                                                 
10
 Weir wrote that the chairman of the evening was Carl Smith.  See Weir, Affidavit, p. 5. 
164 
 
defend himself before the committee on the same day.  Weir was advised that he should go 
to the records checker’s office the following morning.  John Rutter, who was one of the 
records checkers, assured Weir that if he cleared his records the next morning, then he 
would be called back to the committee sometime in the future. 
The following day, Rutter, Weir, and Silas met at the record checker’s office.  Silas 
presented several cases which seemed to show Weir’s violations, but Weir explained that 
these “mistakes” had been made by record keepers who had subsequently corrected them in 
a couple of days after each incident.  At the end of the meeting, Silas admitted that there was 
no evidence that could support the accusation made against Weir and told him to wait for 
another call from the committee.  Weir never got the call or another chance to talk with the 
committee.  He therefore sent a letter to Local 10 president Kearney explaining what 
happened at the committee meeting and at the record checker’s room and asking to be 
allowed to clear his name.  Weir never got a response from Kearney.  In early June, Weir 
contacted several top officers of the union and the PMA who were responsible for the 
deregistration processes.  He sent telegrams to co-chairmen of the Coast Committee, John 
Trupp of the PMA and Bill Chester of ILWU, detailing what happened in his case, but he 
received no response from either of them.  He also sent letters to numerous others, including 
Harry Bridges and Paul St. Sure, the President of the PMA.  Despite all his efforts, he never 
received responses from any of them.
11
   
Meanwhile in March, the Investigating Committee had selected 400 B-men to be 
promoted, and the local urged the Port Labor Relations Committee to finalize the procedure.  
At a membership meeting, some members presented their concerns about “borderline cases 
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caused by mistakes in record checking,” but Bridges assured them that those men would 
have the opportunity for a re-hearing to correct of any mistakes.  At the same time, Bridges 
emphasized that the union needed new B-men who would receive “proper training” to be a 
“qualified contractual work force.”12  In April, the union received applications for new B-
men jobs.  According to The Dispatcher, a one-time small-size advertisement placed in a 
San Francisco newspaper in mid-April resulted in 9,700 application forms submitted by the 
end of the month.  The article in The Dispatcher emphasized that if applicants who missed 
the deadline were included, the figure would be much larger.
13
  The report gave the 
impression that longshore jobs were extremely attractive.  The large number of applications 
might have reflected the economic situation of the time period in which unemployment rates 
were high, especially among black men.
14
   
In May, Local 10 asked existing B-men, who wished to be promoted, to apply for the 
A-status.
15
  At some point during this time the union appointed Asher Harer, one of the A-
men and an experienced record checker, to check the records of about thirty B-men who 
were accused of chiseling.
16
  In the middle of May, about 380 men took the oath to be the 
fully registered union members.
17
  The next day, however, the Coast Labor Relations 
Committee sent to the local a letter announcing that the committee would not approve the 
promotion of B-men until the final determination was made.  The letter did not explain what 
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courses of action still remained under consideration, but it nevertheless designated that all 
the men promoted would be continuously dispatched as B-men.
18
  The 380 former B-men of 
Local 10 were informed that their membership books were printed, but they would not have 
the “contractual rights and responsibilities of fully registered A longshoremen” because of 
the Coast Committee’s decision.19  The final decision came in June when about 450 men 
were promoted and about 90 men were deregistered.
20
   Weir was in the latter group. 
On June 17, 1963, upon receiving a deregistration letter containing no explanation 
why he was deregistered, Weir requested a hearing before the Port Committee – an action 
that was the first step of the appeals procedure specified in the contract.
21
  Hearings were 
subsequently set up for three days between the 9th and the 11
th
 of July for fifty seven men 
who filed appeals.  Weir’s hearing was scheduled for July 11, but he had not been given the 
specific charges that he was accused of – a fact that made it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for him to prepare for his defense at his hearing.  Ironically, his union was 
supposed to represent him at the hearing, but the union was part of the Committee that made 
the decision to discharge him.  He sent a letter to Local 10 president James Kearney asking 
whether the union would represent him, but again he received no response.   Moreover, the 
Port Committee instructed him that he would not be permitted to have any counsel at his 
hearing and would not be allowed to produce witnesses on his behalf.   
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At his hearing on the 11
th
 of July, Weir discovered that the chiseling accusation 
against him was the reason for his deregistration, although he insisted upon his innocence.  
He was told that he could check his record at the records checker’s office and that he could 
appeal the Committee’s decision within ten days, although the actual decision would be 
made in about fourteen days.  Weir felt it absurd for him to make an appeal on the decision 
that was not made yet.  When he went to the records checker’s office, he noticed that this 
time he was accused of chiseling 22 ½ hours.  When he tried to present his own personal 
records to disprove it, the officers not only refused to look at them but also declined to 
produce any collaborating evidence that showed him guilty of 22 ½ hours of chiseling.
22
   
Many Local 10 members apparently disapproved of the Committee’s unprecedented 
decision to deregister the large number of B-men.  The membership historically had voted 
for keeping their members, even when there had not been enough work for all to earn a 
living wage.
23
  On the last day of hearings, a membership meeting was held and members 
overwhelmingly adopted motions by which all B-men who were on appeal and who had not 
been promoted solely because of either a low-man-out violation or pro-rata violation should 
be re-registered and promoted.  The members instructed that the “union side” of the Port 
Committee should take their motions to the Committee and discuss the matter.
24
  The 
membership decision, however, failed to revoke the status of the vast majority of 
deregistered men.  Except for four men, all deregistered statuses remained unchanged.   
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According to the Local 10 Longshore Bulletin, the employers had caused the 
deregistration of the B-men by refusing to consider the proposals adopted at the Local 10 
membership meeting.
25
  While Local 10 officers on the Port Committee argued that the 
disagreements should be resolved by following the process under one section of the contract 
agreement, the employer representatives on the Port Committee insisted that the cases 
should be handled under another section of the agreement.  The Area Committee ordered 
that the Port Committee must resolve the disagreement by following the process under the 
section claimed by the employers.  What happened during the next several days between 
Local 10 officers and PMA officers regarding the issue is not known, but on the 21
st
 of July, 
the Port Committee resolved the disagreement and made its final decision, which confirmed 
the deregistered status of the 82 men. 
The incidents between 1960 and 1963 clearly indicated that the local’s membership 
no longer had the authority to make decisions regarding registration or deregistration.  
Although the contract gave the Port Committee power to make a decision on the matter, in 
reality, the union membership in the past had made decisions on promotions.  The approval 
from PMA representatives on the Port Committee regarding the membership’s decision had 
been the next step, but these decisions were rarely revoked in the 1940s and 1950s.  In the 
1950s, promotions had been rare due to the high number of registered men since the 1940s.
26
  
Moreover, deregistration of a large number of longshoremen had happened only once 
immediately after Second World War when workloads were dramatically reduced.  But the 
1963 deregistration had nothing to do with a decrease in the amount of work because the 
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union was recruiting new B-men, and, as it subsequently turned out, the local would soon 
hire about 700 new B-men.   
Not only did the local membership become a “paper tiger” regarding making rulings 
on registration, its power to make decisions on disbanding a gang also suffered the same fate.  
In March, after the local’s Executive Committee -- not the membership -- disbanded thirty 
two gangs, the Bulletin announced that “anyone not happy with the present method of 
breaking up gangs should make proposals to the membership as how it should be done in the 
future.”27  No follow-up discussions about the decision were reported in Bulletin presumably 
because rank-and-file challenges to how decisions were to be made were either not raised or 
defeated. 
Upon receiving deregistration letters, some of the B-men encountered each other the 
next day on the waterfront and learned that all of them had gotten similar letters that had not 
explicated the reasons for their having been fired.  About thirty of them went together to the 
unemployment insurance office to apply for insurance benefits.  When they learned that the 
PMA had informed the insurance office that the B-men had voluntarily “walked off the job” 
-- information that caused the office to deny them their benefits --, they began to work 
together to find a way to rectify the situation.
28
   
During the July hearing period, the fired B-men had a chance to gather more 
information about what was going on.  After the hearing, about fifty of them found 
themselves altogether again at the records checker’s office when examining their records.  
Some of the B-men subsequently decided to reach out to other deregistered men to gather 
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together and collectively discuss their situation.  Edgar L. Dunlap, who was accused of 
violating pro rata share, remembered how the first meeting of deregistered men was 
organized: 
When I got the [deregistration] letter, I did not know what to do.  But I thought that I 
had to do something.  I knew Stan [Weir] about six months prior to deregistration 
because we had worked together…. We talked when we reviewed our records [at the 
record checker’s office].  He asked me what my problem was and I explained to him.  
We were about fifty people at that time to check the records.  I came home that day 
and I thought that we should do something as a group.  I called Stan… [and 
suggested that] we should do something…maybe try to get guys together.  He said 
that he could do it.  I called several guys and the next day we had a meeting.
29
 
 
The gathering initiated a battle of the deregistered B-men to get their jobs back – a battle 
that no one at that time could possibly have ever envisioned would last over seventeen years. 
 
2.  Reasons for Deregistration: Purging Rebels?  
When some fifty deregistered men first met together, they shared what they were 
accused of based on the information that they received on the 17
th
 of July at the records 
checkers’ office.  They categorized the accusations mostly into three groups: (1) chiseling of 
10 or more hours in any four-week period (Low-Man-Out violation); (2) late pro rata dues 
payment eight or more times (or six or more times with an otherwise blemished record) -- 
dues that all A-men and B-men paid to cover the cost of maintaining the hiring hall; and (3) 
non-availability – failure to be available 70 percent of the time in any 30-day period.  A few 
of them were accused of intoxication.   
Some of the men, especially Weir, argued that the accusations were baseless.  Like 
Weir, Anthony Melvin, Jr., claimed his innocence against the Port Committee’s accusation 
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that he had chiseled twelve hours.
30
  Willie J. Hurst was fired for “drinking,” but he claimed 
that everyone who knew him and who socialized with him knew that he never drank at all.  
According to Weir, during their first year, the entire gang to which Hurst had belonged had 
been dismissed from a task because someone in the gang had been intoxicated.  All gang 
members including Hurst had been suspended for 30 days for the incident, although he had 
not consumed a drop of liquor.
31
  But this record must have been used against him in the 
promotion process. 
Many admitted that they had violated certain rules, but they had already paid what 
they had owed long before deregistration happened.  For example, Timothy (“Tim”) E. 
Carter stated that he had been late two or three times paying his pro rata share, but he had 
paid a one-dollar fine per day until he paid his dues in full.  He recalled that the union had 
never told him that paying late dues would be a hindrance to his promotion in the future.
32
  
Dunlap, who was also given paying late dues as the reason for his deregistration, pointed out 
that he had not been able to pay his dues on time several times because there had not been 
enough jobs for B-men and he had not earned enough to pay off what he owed.  But, like all 
others, he had eventually paid all the dues with fines imposed by faithfully making a late 
payment.  In addition, they had never been told that they would be discharged if they 
violated these rules.  The availability requirement, for instance, had been understood to 
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mean that they had to be available for work 70 percent of the time for the duration of each 
month, but they found out during the investigation period that they should have been 
available at the hiring hall 70 percent of the time during “any” given 30-day period.  The 
standards for deregistration, therefore, had been newly set up during the investigation period 
and then adopted on June 17, 1963, when deregistration was finalized.
33
   This sudden 
change in the standards for promotion had upset B-men in the early stage of the 
investigation.  A Local 10 Bulletin published in March reported that many men had 
expressed their frustration regarding the new standards set by the union by questioning, 
“Why weren’t we told?”34 
Moreover, deregistered B-men claimed that if only those who had a clean record 
could be promoted, then very few longshoremen would have been eligible because most 
longshoremen had violated some rules. When asked whether B-men typically had some 
infractions of the rules, Johnny J. Cherry answered, “Sure, most of them.”  But not all of 
those who had violated the rules were deregistered.  Tim Carter claimed that some B-men 
who had been three to six months behind in paying their dues were unexplainably promoted.  
In matter of fact, longshoremen had a long history of paying late dues and the union had 
tried to get them pay on time by using diverse tactics.
35
  For instance, in the late 1930s, 
union officers had proposed a constitutional amendment to reduce the grace period for late 
dues from 90 days to 30 days -- a proposal that had been subsequently turned down at a 
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membership meeting.
36
  In the 1940s, union officers had hired a “girl” to collect dues inside 
the hiring hall, announcing to the members not to ask her any questions or argue with her 
but just pay their dues directly to her because she was hired to gather dues money and thus 
she would not have had any answers to their questions, nor would she be in a position to 
offer retorts to their arguments.  Whether this tactic had worked well is questionable, but it 
demonstrated the union’s effort to collect dues on time by using whatever means possible, 
even to the extent of bringing femininity into the hiring hall of men.
37
  Placing constant 
announcements in the Bulletin regarding paying dues on time was another demonstration of 
the prevalence of late dues.  Being deregistered after paying all late dues, therefore, did not 
make any sense at all to the B-men.   
Ellis E. Graves was informed that he was discharged for intoxication.  He had been 
indeed accused of intoxication around 1960 and suspended for 30 days for it.  Since then, he 
had not been charged with drinking while working and thus he assumed that the old incident 
had to be the one that caused him to be discharged, but because he had already paid the price 
for the penalty, his discharge seemed to him to be a case of “double jeopardy.”  Regarding 
longshoremen’s drinking habits, Graves expressed that almost all longshoremen drank, just 
as every “fish swims.”  Cleo Love remembered that his father-in-law, who was an A-man, 
had taught him only two rules that he had to worry about: “No fighting and no stealing.”  
Regarding drinking, Love stated that a lot of men drank, but “to get cited for being drunk, 
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you have to be really disturbing to the job.”  Love concluded that he had “never” heard of A-
men getting fired for drinking while working on the waterfront.
38
 
In matter of fact, in 1959 at an orientation meeting, some rules regarding intoxication 
on the job had been presented to the B-men: a thirty-day suspension was the penalty for the 
first occurrence and mandatory deregistration was for the second offense.
39
  The rules had 
been differently applied to A-men:  they could be suspended for fifteen days for the first 
offense, thirty days for the second, and more days of suspension for succeeding offenses, but 
deregistration was not mandatory.  But, just as Love stated, one had to disrupt the work due 
to drinking, rather than merely drinking itself, to be penalized.  Fred Hays had once been 
drunk and fallen asleep in a hold after his work.  When he had woken up, he had found 
himself locked in the hold and the ship had left the port.  He was able to escape three days 
later when longshoremen at the Seattle port had opened the hatch.
40
  Hays, however, was 
never disciplined for the incident probably because the conduct had not disturbed the work 
process at the San Francisco port.  In any case, Graves, as well as Hurst, who were both 
fired for intoxication, had violated the rules only once and thus there was no reason for them 
to be fired under the rules in place at the time of their respective violation.  
If the reasons for their registration did not make sense to them, then what could have 
been the possible underlying reasons?  The B-men quickly discovered that 70 of the 82 
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deregistered men were members of ethnic minority groups – indicating that about 85 percent 
of them were minorities, most of whom were black, but there were, according to Weir, also 
a few “Mexican descendents.”  Nevertheless, the latter quickly left the waterfront after being 
deregistered and thus did not challenge their firing and left no record about themselves.
41
  
Although an overwhelming percentage of deregistered men were black, most black B-men 
did not claim racial discrimination. 
Rather, many B-men speculated that one of the causes of their layoffs was their 
subversive attitudes, including “talking up” to an A-man with whom they worked side by 
side, or disregarding the orders of their superiors.  For example, Tim Carter, as well as 
Arthur “Jackie” Hughes, mentioned that his “talking up to a winch driver” had been the real 
reason for his layoff.  Cherry stated that an argument with a gang boss might have 
something to do with his being fired.  Oliver Geeter had “mouthed off at a dispatcher.”  
Mack Hebert had had an argument with a jitney driver and recalled that he had refused 
Bridges’ loyalist Odell Franklin’s request to get a cup of coffee for him.  Cleo Love recalled 
that he had an argument with a steward because he surreptitiously practiced driving the 
winches during lunch time.  Although he had merely wanted to learn how to operate the 
machine, A-men disapproved of B-men learning how to operate it, and thus he slyly 
practiced it trying not to be noticed – an action that resulted in A-men’s complaints.42   
Many B-men suspected that their “outspoken” personalities, especially opining about 
their working conditions and union matters, might have been the main ground for their 
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having been fired.  Mario V. Luppi, a well-educated Italian American, had confronted Harry 
Bridges regarding why B-men had to wait for a long time to be promoted to the A status.  
Frank Nereu, known as the “black Portuguese,” had “talked back to” Bill Chester, who was 
the chairman of the Joint Coast Labor Relations Committee.  Dunlap had had a prickly 
conversation with Odell Franklin about “Bridges’s pension plan.”  The content of the 
conversation was not mentioned, but it was obvious that Dunlap expressed his disagreement 
with the plan.  Arthur (“Art”) G. Winters believed that his criticism about the M & M 
contract caused his deregistration.  Reginald (“Reggie”) Saunders, a former professional 
basketball player, and Thomas Nisby also described themselves as outspoken people and 
thus were designated as “troublemakers” by “Bridges’s goon squad,” in Mack Hebert’s 
expression, or “Bridges’ hatchet man,” in Willie Hurst’s own term.  Charles J. Johnson 
mentioned, “Some people had little black books and took notes on people’s attitude.” 43   
Willie J. Hurst described Thomas Nisby as “a fighter all the way.”  Nisby used to 
look up things in the “rule book” or “whatever literature he can get his hand on” and then 
tell Hurst what kind of things they could do or could not do under the rules.
44
  His father, 
Wiley Nisby, who was an A-man, often disagreed with his son’s interpretations of certain 
rules and warned Hurst in a jokingly manner that he would get in trouble if he were to hang 
around with Thomas.  But Thomas described the situation differently.  He stated that his 
father was a staunch unionist whom the PMA had tried to get rid of for a long time.  Once it 
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had accused his father of stealing a pineapple from a ship in order to fire him.  Thomas 
believed that upon failing to deregister his father, the PMA decided instead to fire him.
45
 
Some of the B-men had been known for their radical politics.  According to Hurst, 
longshoremen had believed Jackie Hughes to be a Communist because he had been close to 
Archie Brown who was known as Communist.
46
  Hughes and Chris Makaila, who was fired 
at the same time, had discussed politics a lot while working together.  Hughes had been an 
amateur boxer for years and was Wiley Nisby’s son-in-law – fact that made him very 
popular on the waterfront.  Hughes had a beard that made him look like Fidel Castro, and 
thus earned the nickname “Jackie Castro.”  Although being well-liked by many, he also 
made a few enemies due to his left-wing politics and polemical attitude.  Hurst remembered 
that he and other B-men used to enjoy listening to how Hughes and Makaila could “chop” 
the opinions of other longshoremen “to pieces.”47   
Stan Weir was no doubt well known to the longshoremen at the port.  Mack Hebert 
described Weir as a man who “knew more than average person about the industry itself” and 
who knew “how to explain things to a layman” and organize people.48  For these reasons, 
Hebert argued, Bridges feared Weir -- a circumstance that was pointed out by many B-men 
as the actual reason why Weir was fired.  According to Anthony Melvin, people on the 
waterfront had talked about Weir and his previous union activities.  Melvin claimed that 
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“Bridges had to get rid of Stan because he knew that Stan was a leader.”49  Weir himself 
expressed this same belief to historian Charles Larrowe as follows: 
I arranged a meeting of the B-men in 1963. . . for the purpose of presenting their 
grievances to the union.  I was asked to do it by a representative of the international 
union, and the union made it compulsory.  I presented the grievances.  I think I 
alarmed Bridges and the international.  It was the first time they’d heard an articulate, 
well-organized presentation of how the B-men felt about how they’re treated.  I think 
I was a threat in another way, too.  If I were taken into the union, I’d come in with 
five hundred votes.
50
  
   
Weir also documented in his sworn affidavit one incident that happened around late 
1961 or 1962, in which he had encountered hostility from some of A-men who took 
offensive to his having passed around Harvey Swados’ article criticizing the M & M 
Agreement.  They threatened that he would “pay a price for it.”51  Weir claimed that he was 
deregistered because of his opposition to the Agreement and also for his criticism of the 
union.  Most deregistered B-men, according to Weir, were punished due to their support for 
him.  Weir also blamed the “Stalinist” leadership of the union for the firing of the B-men.   
The Hughes’s and Weir’s cases illustrate that “being political” did not necessarily 
mean that they were affiliated with some particular political groups but rather meant that 
they articulated the problems inherent in the M & M Agreement, demanded equality within 
the union, and organized actions to change their working conditions.  To be sure, Weir had 
been affiliated with Trotskiest groups before he got the B-man job and he still used the term 
“Stalinist” to refer to Bridges and his followers, but he used it mostly to describe their 
“undemocratic” style of operating the union.   
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Nevertheless, not all of the B-men identified themselves as outspoken or strongly 
opinionated.  Anthony Melvin, for one, emphasized that he was not “political” at all.  Yet 
some of the B-men, including Melvin, suspected that their close relationship with known 
“troublemakers,” such as Weir, Saunders, Nisby, and Graves, had been the reason why they 
were deregistered.  Melvin Kennedy, for example, stated that he worked with Weir as well 
as Graves, Ulysses Hawkins, and Fred Hayes -- all of whom were deregistered together.  
Hurst pointed out that they not only had worked together but also had socialized together.  
Hurst suspected that he might have been “blacklisted” because he had supported Hughes and 
Makaila’s arguments when they were in a “political conversation” with other longshoremen 
who became irritated when their opinions were challenged.
52
   
Unlike Melvin, Charlie J. Johnson seemed to be upset about the claim that he was 
fired for being a friend with outspoken people.  When asked in a later interview whether he 
“hung around with somebody” who was considered as outspoken, he responded with 
confidence, “Oh, well, ME, myself, you know,” and continued, “They [longshoremen] said, 
‘Not for Reggie Saunders, you would have had your [A-man’s] book’ and I said, ‘I am 
Charlie J.  What do I have to do with Reggie Saunders?’”53  In point of fact, he and Saunders 
had been partners for the entire time working as B-men, but Johnson refused to concede that 
Saunders was responsible for his being deregistered.  Johnson also asserted: 
We did not have any rights.  We did not have any voice, no rights other than work.  
“You do as you were told to do.”  I believe that if you are working and if you do 
your job, then regardless of what you are saying, you are fine. . . . As long as I don’t 
break any laws, I have right to advocate my voice, my opinion, and nobody can hurt 
me. . . .” 
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Such thoughts of having been judged and punished because of the people they were 
friends with or for the political opinions that they expressed had not been in the minds of 
many B-men while on the job.  Rather, they retrospectively suspected that these occasions of 
voicing their opinions were the real reasons for their firing because they could not find any 
other logical explanations.  Some of the accusations against them were groundless and some 
had substance but the penalties for them had been paid.  Moreover, talking back to their 
superiors was, as sociologist David Wellman states, part of the longshoremen’s culture.  No 
one thus had remotely thought that they would be deregistered merely because of their 
outspokenness.  When they received their deregistration letter, many were shocked and 
believed that the decision had to have been made as a mistake.  
In addition, the union’s deregistering a large number of B-men at the time did not 
make much sense because the employers insisted on keeping a considerable number of B-
men as a reserve workforce on the waterfront.  If the Port Committee was about to hire 700 
new B-men and go through the same process of training these new men, then it would have 
been more beneficial to the industry to keep experienced B-men who already knew how to 
perform the work.
54
  If certain B-men had not been qualified to be promoted to the A status, 
then they did not need to have been promoted, but this condition should not have necessarily 
entailed deregistering them.  Historically, even probationary men had never been 
deregistered for not being qualified for promotion.   
Some B-men, such as Thomas Nisby and Alfred L. Straughter, did not even apply for 
promotion in 1963.  Although it remains unclear if they missed the deadline for applying or 
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if they were satisfied with their status as B-men, for whatever reason they did not put their 
names forward.
55
  Nevertheless, they were deregistered along with other B-men who had 
tried to be promoted but were fired instead – an event that did not make much sense to them.  
This circumstance, as well as the process in which they were neither provided with any 
documentation proving the charges leveled against them nor given any chance to clear up 
the charges, further instilled the notion among the deregistered men that the union had 
collaborated with the ship owners to fire them. 
 
3. The Formation of the Longshore Jobs Defense Committee (LJDC) 
Deeper roots of the connectedness among the deregistered B-men are found in their 
shared experiences and socializing activities while working as B-men.  Most of the 
deregistered B-men had known each other because they had worked together as partners or 
gang members.  As Dunlap stated, a B-man had worked with virtually everybody.
56
  The 
“segregation” between A- and B-men in union meetings had also forged a bond among B-
men.  For instance, Eathen Gums, Jr., who had worked at night and had not had a chance to 
work with day-time B-men, knew most B-men anyway because of union meetings at which 
they were required to sit in the balcony of the union hall separately from A-men.  
Socialization among them outside work was a common occurrence.  As Graves stated, B-
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men used to go to “beer halls” and talked about their “B-man situation” after work.  As 
Hurst recalled, they had also mingled together among themselves during the days when they 
had no jobs to perform.  However, as Weir acknowledged, the initial stage of the 
deregistered men’s “self-organizing drive” occurred primarily in the process of fighting to 
get their unemployment insurance payments.   
It will be recalled that upon getting deregistration letters, many B-men had gone 
together the following day to the insurance office.  After a month-long attempt to get 
unemployment insurance benefits, they were still unable to obtain the payments.  After the 
July hearings, as Dunlap explained above, the fired B-men began to organize meetings 
among themselves in order to discuss their situation.  Several of them, including Johnson 
Lee, decided to file complaints to the NLRB, but many others waited for the hearing result.
57
  
Upon receiving the letter from the Port Committee in late July finalizing their deregistration 
without providing any documentation substantiating any of the charges against them, about 
thirty of them gathered at Cleo Love’s house to discuss what they should do next.  A shared 
feeling of having been treated unfairly led them to decide to fight together to get their jobs 
back.  They restructured themselves into a formal organization, which they named 
“Longshore Jobs Defense Committee.”  They set up a steering committee, to which they 
elected Willie Hurst, Jackie Hughes, Willie Jenkins, Art Winters, Stan Weir, and Eathen 
Gums.  The last two became co-chairmen.
58
  Weir, who was forty two years old, was the 
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oldest and the only white man among the steering committee members, whereas Hurst, 
Hughes, and Jenkins were only in their twenties. 
The group’s first step was to file formal notices to the California Unemployment 
Insurance Appeals Board in order to receive unemployment insurance benefits.  Regarding 
the goal to achieve reinstatement as longshoremen, they considered filing complaints to the 
NLRB, just as Johnson Lee and four others had done, but instead they decided to appeal the 
decision to the Port Committee -- a process delineated by the PMA-ILWU contract 
agreement.  Each member sent a formal letter to the Port Committee, requesting the 
Committee to provide proper documentation proving the accusations made against him.  The 
letters stated that they were unjustly discriminated against because the Port Committee had 
judged all B-men not by the same standards and they requested another hearing.  But no one 
received any response from the committee during the ensuing nine months.
59
 
Tim Carter was well acquainted with Johnson Lee, one of the five B-men who filed a 
complaint to the NLRB, because he and Lee had worked together as partners.  When asked 
why he did not join Lee’s group, Carter replied that he had chosen to be part of the LJDC 
because a lot of men were involved in it.  Over fifty people joined the group and the synergy 
that they created had been empowering for the members.  Carter also believed that because 
of the group’s size, it would “get more recognition.”  Moreover, he trusted in many of its 
organizers, such as Weir and Jenkins.  A large number of men sticking together for a 
common cause attracted Oliver Geeter, who was fired for pro-rata and LMO violations.  He 
mentioned, “I had to stick with the others who were fired. . . .You cannot conquer people 
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who stick together.”60  In the beginning of the formation of the LJDC, the members’ morale 
was flying high.  Many B-men believed that they would soon be reinstated.   
In order to file their appeals for unemployment insurance, they looked for an 
attorney, but they soon realized that finding one willing to assist them was a formidable task.  
Willie C. Merritt recalled the advice given by his stepfather, who was a local 10 member, 
that the B-men should forget about trying to select a lawyer in San Francisco because “he 
would be bought off” by the PMA.  Merritt and several other B-men nevertheless made 
numerous ill-fated attempts in the city to find a lawyer.  Some lawyers asked for a certain 
amount of money up front to start the case -- a dollar amount that the workers could not 
afford.
61
  Some labor lawyers refused to take the case because of the reputation of the ILWU.  
Weir described the situation as follows:    
We could not find a pro-union labor law firm that was willing to consider taking our 
case.  None could afford to participate in a suit against a union.  We also found that 
law firms regularly associated with liberal social reform movements could not 
conceive of representing anyone against “a progressive union like the ILWU.”62   
 
After failing to find a lawyer in the Bay Area, LJDC members decided in September to hire 
Sidney Gordon, who had been Weir’s high school friend in Los Angeles.   
Meanwhile, the LJDC contacted the press and publicly announced the unfair 
processes of the B-men’s deregistration.  It stated in a “press release” that the rules had 
suddenly changed in February 1963 and had been subsequently applied arbitrarily, and that 
Local 10 members had tried several times to promote the B-men, but Harry Bridges and the 
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PMA had overruled the membership decisions.  It also pointed out that 85 percent of the 82 
deregistered men were members of minority groups.  Although it did not intend to make any 
claim of racial discrimination, it pointed out that it would be hard for these men to get 
another job due to their minority status in racially discriminatory society.
63
  The press 
release demonstrated the belief of the LJDC members that the Coast Committee and the 
International officers, especially Harry Bridges, had made the decision to fire them.  The 
press release was broadcast by radio and television stations and was reported prominently in 
the San Francisco newspapers.
64
 
Regarding the race issue, Robert E. Birk, one of the deregistered black B-men, 
emphasized that deregistration could not have been motivated by racism because about ten 
white men were also deregistered.
65
  An ILWU internal document reveals that the union was 
prepared to defend itself against accusations of racism by stating that 70 percent of the B-
men who had been promoted were blacks.
66
  Although it might be true that the men were 
fired not directly because of their race, elements of racism were already embedded in many 
aspects of prior events.   
Many black men hired on the waterfront in 1959 felt lucky to have a decently paid, 
respectable, and “manly” job, but because they were hired as B-men, they had to deal with 
harder working conditions, especially during the time of the removal of the old informal 
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rules that had given longshoremen leverage to improve their working conditions, keep their 
job security, and build solidarity among themselves.  Many B-men had been unable to 
endure the conditions and had left the waterfront before 1963, but the records show that a 
much higher percentage of black than white men remained on the job.
67
  They endured 
difficult working conditions for four years -- a period that they had not expected to last that 
long -- only to find out that they had to hurdle over the obstacles contained in unprecedented 
standards for promotion.  In the process, almost one in every five black men was fired.   
Although LJDC members did not consciously related racism to deregistration, Oliver 
Geeter stated that merely being outspoken had not put him in trouble, but that being an 
outspoken black man had exacerbated the problem.  As he expressed it: 
If a black man speaks his mind, then he is crazy. . . but if a black man does what he 
is told, he is fine.  “Don’t stand over me to check out how I do my job” was what I 
told the boss.  I know I got fired because I was too outspoken.
68
 
 
Geeter’s statement reveals how racism and many other aspects in the workplace were not 
separate, but intertwined.  Born in Arkansas in 1934 and taken by his parents to San 
Francisco when he was twelve, Geeter described himself as a former U.S. Marine who 
survived his tour of duty by learning “how to kill anything big enough to shit.”  He stated 
that he did not fear racism because, “Fear is a disease and that disease I do not possess.”  
Nevertheless, as he suspected, black men who did not keep their mouths shut could be seen 
as troublemakers and be disciplined more than their white counterparts.
69
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In addition, although many more black men survived the 1963 deregistration or were 
newly hired as B-men in the 1960s, they were aware that they would have to work with the 
anxiety that their jobs and skills might disappear in the near future due to the coming of 
automation and containerization.  All these aspects demonstrated how the long history of 
racism rooted in the larger society limited their options, even when more economic 
opportunities seemed to open up to them.  
Furthermore, deregistration impacted black men’s lives differently from those of 
white men.  According to historian Steve Estes, the unemployment rate of inner city young 
black men in this period was five times higher than that of young white men.
70
  Historian 
Clarence Lang makes an important link between automation and a high unemployment rate 
among black workers in the larger environment during the era.  By requiring new skills for 
automated operations, employers justified firing semi-skilled workers and transferred the 
jobs to those who were trained as experts of the new skills.  Although they did not use 
“race” as a criterion for the action, this process was “an additional threat” to black workers 
who had gained in semiskilled industrial employment during and after the Second World 
War.  By the early 1960s their jobs were handed over to white workers who occupied skilled 
positions.
71
  Lang states that automation contributed to “a new phase of black working-class 
formation, principally in the form of ‘structural unemployment’.”72 
Under these circumstances, finding another job for a black man proved difficult and 
getting a good job like the one on the waterfront became extremely problematic.  
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Questionnaires filled out in December 1964 by deregistered B-men show that many black B-
men had failed to find a permanent job after being deregistered.
73
  For that reason, many of 
them said that they could not pay their bills on time.  Some of them stated that they could 
not provide their wives or children with proper medical treatment as well as basic financial 
support.
74
   
But for some of the B-men, what was more painful than not finding another job was 
their inability to clear their names.  When asked what major injuries were done to them as a 
result of deregistration, Ulysses Hawkins stated that losing his “reputation” by being 
“classified as a crook and chiseler” was emotionally difficult for him.75  Thomas Nisby also 
stated that he lost his “self respect” due to the record that followed him whenever he applied 
for other jobs.  Manuel Nereu, Jr., bitterly pointed out that it was “a very insulting factor” 
that union officers who fired the B-men by claiming to “clean” the house of all “crooks and 
chiselers” were crooks themselves, but they still kept their jobs and benefits. 
For some B-men, clearing their names was important to get respect not only from the 
general public and their respective black communities, but also from their family members, 
especially their wives.  Several deregistered black men stated that because of the reputation 
of Bridges as “a friend of black people,” their wives did not believe that Bridges could have 
fired them for political reasons.  For instance, Jackie Hughes lamented that his wife, who 
was also Thomas Nisby’s sister, believed that because Bridges was an “ally” of blacks, he 
would never have fired black workers without good reasons.  She thus suspected that 
                                                 
73
 According to Weir, 90 percent of deregistered black men could not get steady jobs.  See Weir, “The 
ILWU: A Case Study in Bureaucracy,” New Politics (Winter, 1964): 28. 
74
 Questionnaire, 1964, Materials relating the Longshore Jobs Defense Committee (LJDC): 1963-84, 
BANC MSS 85/169 C, Box 1, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 
75
 Thomas Nisby, Questionnaires, December 13, 1964, Ulysses Hawkins, Questionnaires, January, 2, 
1965, and Manuel Nereu, Questionnaires, December 15, 1964.  
189 
 
Hughes must have done something wrong to get fired.
76
  Hurst, who was single at the time 
of deregistration, mentioned that B-men’s wives began to support their husbands after the 
men organized themselves and invited their wives to their meetings.  In this way, their wives 
had a chance to communicate with one another.  Mary Knox Weir and Anita F. Gums, as 
well as Winters’s and Jenkins’s wives, became actively engaged in organizing activities by 
helping out at meetings, serving meals, and preparing literature for the public.  Hurst stated: 
Because we had to come up with that money for Gordon [lawyer] and, uh, to have 
literature printed and all that, you know.  The guy’s was, everybody’s morale was up 
and everybody’s chippin’ in;  they tell their wives, well okay.  And what was 
beautiful about it, that, uh, everybody was unemployed, you know, and it was comin’ 
up with the money.  So the wives was with us a hundred percent.
77
   
 
 
Hurst had nothing but praise for Gums, Jr., and Weir as impressive organizers.  The 
LJDC worked strenuously to garner public support and raise funds for its legal expenses, 
and Weir played a central role in the process by writing about the B-men’s case and 
publishing it in New Politics, a socialist magazine.  In 1964, he was also successful in 
getting their narrative out through other leftist magazines including Mallet and Union 
Democracy in Action.   Through his networks with socialist intellectuals and activists, Weir 
received organizational support from the “Workers Defense League (WDL),” a New York 
based group led by socialist intellectuals and civil rights lawyers.  The League had been 
formed in 1936 by Norman Thomas and several other socialists with the initial goal of 
defending individuals who were attacked for their union organizing activities, but its role 
had expanded since then.  It had provided farmers’ and workers’ organizations with legal 
services, and its members had also been involved in the Civil Rights Movement.  In the 
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early 1960s, when labor-civil rights attorneys Rowland Watts and Robert Joseph Pierpont 
held leading positions in the league, it engaged in law suits and actions to defend the rights 
of collective bargaining and free speech of public employees.
78
  
When the league decided to support the B-men, the “LJDC-WDL Defense 
Committee” was formed and Michael Harrington, author of The Other America and 
Chairman of the Socialist Party, along with Bayard Rustin, an organizer for the 1963 March 
on Washington and Director of the A. Philip Randolph Institute, took co-chair positions.  
Many other prominent intellectuals were added to the committee.  Some of them were 
Harvey Swados, Herbert Hill (labor secretary of the NAACP), Normal Hill (national 
secretary of CORE), and Julius Jacobson (editor of New Politics).
79
  Some of them were 
known for their anti-Stalinist critiques.  In a letter to the league’s members, Watts described 
the B-men’s case as “more than just a union democracy” struggle.  Unlike the LJDC’s press 
release, Watts’s letter explicitly expressed that structural racism shaped events from deep 
underneath and claimed that the B-men’s case should be treated also as a civil rights case: 
It involves racial discrimination, but not in a traditional sense.  Harry Bridges is not a 
racist, but when democracy is limited and rights are abridged the first to suffer are 
minority group members.  That is why it is important to the civil rights movement 
and to the labor movement.
80
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One of the pamphlets published by the LJDC-WDL Defense Committee pointed out that 
“even under the best circumstances” decent jobs were difficult for black men to find and 
thus for the deregistered black men, “it was virtually impossible.”81   
In gaining outside support, Toni Melvin remembered, “Being black and young, most 
of us, we didn’t have anyone to turn to, like NAACP or CORE or anything,” because many 
older black longshoremen in union official positions who were loyal to Bridges were 
members of these civil rights and community groups.
82
  Bill Chester, for example, who was 
a regional director of the ILWU, was a renowned member of the NAACP and in the black 
community in the Bay Area.  In early 1964, San Francisco mayor Jack Shelley appointed 
him to a “Mayor’s Commission on Civil Rights.”83  For this reason, civil rights groups 
probably tended to trust Chester and other black union officers, rather than the young black 
B-men.
84
  What Melvin described about the slim chances of deregistered B-men gaining 
support from local chapters of civil rights organization could have been, for the most part, 
true, but the fired B-men obtained support from civil rights attorneys and activists from 
outside the local community, such as Herbert Hill and Bayard Rustin, via the Workers 
Defense League. 
Moreover, under CORE’s auspice, the Longshore Jobs Defense Committee sent two 
men to the March on Washington in August 1963 to represent them.
85
  Gums and Dunlap 
were initially selected by LJDC members to go to Washington, but Gums was sent instead to 
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New York for other reasons, probably to meet some members of the Workers Defense 
League in order to garner external solidarity and funding.  The committee chose Johnson to 
substitute for Gums.  Johnson wrote:  
He [Dunlap] was in charge of the bus from San Francisco to Washington and I was 
his assistant.  The trip taught me that there are people all over the world in a tough 
position: either they are out of jobs or they are discriminated against or they don’t 
have enough education to qualify. . . .
86
 
 
To what extent the B-men had been politically involved in the Black Freedom movement 
before they were deregistered is difficult to assess.  Nevertheless, Johnson’s statement 
demonstrates that the B-men, by organizing collective actions for their reinstatement after 
deregistration, became more politically conscious about social justice issues and broadened 
their ideas as well as actions.    
In May 1964, when the B-men learned that Bridges and PMA President Paul St. Sure 
were invited to speak at a University of California sponsored conference regarding the 
“success” of the Modernization & Mechanization Agreement at a San Francisco hotel, about 
a dozen LJDC members set up a picket line and demonstration in front of it, handing out 
leaflets to passersby.  Their signs read, “Longshoremen were expelled by ILWU,” “Bridges 
and the PMA are keeping us out,” and “Tell The Truth, Mr. Bridges,”  They got the attention 
of the media and four major TV stations gave full coverage to the picket line.  Willie Merritt 
recalled how he tried not to make any negative remarks when being interviewed by a TV 
newsman regarding his opinion about Bridges, because he knew that attacking Bridges 
would be counterproductive.  Years later, he mentioned that he had no hard feelings against 
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Bridges, but he believed that Bridges had made a mistake in the B-men’s case.  But Bridges 
himself, Merritt believed, would never admit to having made a wrong decision, because 
Bridges was a person who could not allow any challenge to his leadership.  Merritt thought 
that Bridges had too much power and that “one man should not rule the union.”  
Nevertheless, he deliberately refused to talk about his personal ideas to the newsman.  On 
the other hand, when a newsman asked Bridges to comment on the picketers and their claim 
that it was unfair for the 82 B-men to be fired after working on the waterfront for four years, 
Bridges disrespectfully answered that the men were “crooks and chiselers [who] should have 
been kicked out after six months [probationary period], but we were lenient and let them 
stay another three and a half years.”87   
In November 1963, hearings before the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals 
Board began but did not end until April of the following year.  The decision of Donald 
Gibson, Referee of the Board, rendered in May -- almost ten months after the initial filing of 
the appeals -- was, nevertheless, a huge victory for the B-men.  Gibson found that some 
dispatchers in the hiring hall had informed many B-men that it had been unnecessary for 
them to sign in to work on Sundays because their chance to get dispatched on Sundays had 
been very slim – a reason why some B-men’s records on work hours did not match with 
those on their books and caused them to appear to violate low-man-out rules.  For example, 
Antonio Cafeterio had been fired for one incident that occurred on a Sunday.  He had signed 
in for the Sunday’s work, but he had not showed up to the hall and thus he missed the job 
assignment when his number had been called.  If this occurrence had happened on any other 
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day of the week, Cafeterio would have added a certain number of hours, as a penalty for 
“flopping,” to his accumulated work hours when he signed in the next day.  But it had 
happened on a Sunday when the penalty had not been required for flopping.  Therefore, 
Cafeterio had not added a certain number of hours, but he had nevertheless been fired for 
that incident.
88
   
Gibson acknowledged the B-men’s claim that they would not have voluntarily quit 
showing up to work, as the PMA had argued, because there was no reason for them to do so.  
In addition, workers could not have expected at the moment of the violation of certain rules 
that they would be fired for the conduct, because such behavior had been previously 
condoned and allowed by the employer and by the union.  Moreover, upon violation, diverse 
forms of penalties were assessed and satisfied, and the workers continued to work thereafter 
-- all of which demonstrated that these violations of the rules could not be invoked as the 
reason to deregister them.  Gibson further pointed out that the “principal party” that would 
be hurt from the workers’ pro rata payment and low-man-out violations had been Local 10, 
not the employers.  But when Local 10 representatives on the Port Committee had demanded 
their reinstatement and promotion to A status, the local proved that the union was never 
“aggrieved” by the B-men’s actions.89  
The victory in the unemployment insurance appeals cases meant more to the B-men 
than merely acquiring the insurance benefits that they sought.  Their hopes for eventually 
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getting their jobs back greatly increased.  Besides, by the end of the hearings before the 
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, fifty four LJDC members had filed a 
law suit in the U.S. District Court for Northern California against the PMA, ILWU, Local 10, 
and several union officers.
90
  The complaint in George R. Williams, et al. v. PMA & ILWU, 
et al. alleged that by discharging the B-men, the PMA and the ILWU broke the collective 
bargaining agreement -- a violation under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 
§301 (a).  The LMRA Section 301, commonly called the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, revised 
the NLRA of 1935 in order that not only employers but also unions could be subject to 
litigation if they breached a contract.  According to the law, unions, as well as employers, 
should be “responsible for their acts and acts of their agents.”91  The B-men also claimed 
that the union violated its “duty of fair representation.”92  The unemployment insurance 
appeals cases thus provided the B-men with not only some form of justice, but also a high 
level of expectation that they would win the district court case and soon be reinstated.   
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Chapter 6 
George R. Williams, et al. v. PMA, et al.:  A Union’s Duty of Fair Representation, 1964 -
1969 
 
The deregistered B-men who had formed the Longshore Jobs Defense Committee 
(LJDC) had filed a lawsuit in 1964 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California against the PMA and the ILWU.  They claimed that both had breached the 
contract agreement by deregistering them.  They also added a complaint against the union 
for violating its duty of fair representation.  A district court judge dismissed the case in a 
summary judgment, but in 1967, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9
th
 Circuit Court returned 
the case to the lower court for trial.  The PMA and the ILWU made unsuccessful attempts to 
reverse the circuit court’s decision by appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court.  This chapter 
examines the arguments made by both camps and the rulings rendered by judges in the 
district and appellate courts.  In order to understand how the B-men’s lawsuit developed, 
discussed here are the pertinent legal precedents showing the origin and evolution of the 
concept of a “union’s duty of fair representation” and the complexity of issues involved in 
fair representation cases. 
The arguments made in the courts demonstrate how the meaning of “fairness” was 
contested by lawyers and judges who attempted to define it within existing legal parameters.  
The B-men’s attorneys claimed that the ILWU had unfairly represented the deregistered B-
men when it had retroactively and arbitrarily applied promotion standards – a conduct that 
had been motivated by several union officers’ hostility and desire to discriminate against the 
B-men.  Their meaning of “fairness” rested upon the B-men’s understanding of the 
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“traditional,” as well as contractual, procedures that the union had historically employed in 
promotion processes.  However, the arguments made by the PMA and the ILWU in the 
district court focused on technical matters, such as whether the district court had jurisdiction 
over the case.  In doing so, they created a situation that hindered the desire of the workers to 
reach the point of contesting the meaning of fairness.  In their arguments in the appellate 
court, the union and the PMA justified the firing of the B-men by claiming that the industry 
needed new criteria to promote the most “qualified men” with the impending turn toward 
mechanization.  They argued in their appeal to the California Supreme Court that the “mere 
discrimination” of treating workers differently should be “insufficient to establish a basis for 
judicial intervention,” and they thus claimed that the court should dismiss the case.   
Although the PMA and the ILWU failed to reverse the decision of the circuit court, 
their appeals dragged the case out for another year.  Moreover, Harry Bridges brought a libel 
suit against over a dozen members of the Workers Defense League.  He accused the 
supporters of the B-men of stating publicly that the B-men’s deregistration had rested upon 
racial discrimination.  Although he dropped the libel case in 1969, his four-and-a-half year 
lawsuit also drained the B-men’s resources and time.  Adding insult to injury, the B-men’s 
first lawyer, Sydney Gordon, made a series of decisions that managed to delay the process 
and acted against them when they fired him.  Jurisdictional challenges, a bogus libel suit, 
and actions by their own attorney added to the difficulties that the B-men had to go through 
in their legal battles.  
 
1. Grievance Appeals  
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Upon receiving a final deregistration letter in July 1963, each Longshore Jobs 
Defense Committee (LJDC) member had sent a letter to the Port Labor Relations Committee 
(Port Committee), in which he had stated,  
I received your letter denying my hearing appeal.  In so doing you consummated an 
action that is discriminatory.  You have not judged all the men involved by the same 
standards.  I appeal your decision and request another hearing as stipulated, where I 
will prove and document this discrimination. 
 
For the ensuing nine months, no LJDC member received an answer.  But after LJDC 
members won their case in the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board in May 
1964, they received notices from the Port Committee, granting them another hearing.
1
  
Sydney Gordon, the LJDC lawyer, suspected that the Port Committee’s setting up another 
hearing at this time was no more than a mere gesture to avoid the legal suit.  He asserted that 
because the committee delayed the hearing for almost a year, it should not be allowed to 
have jurisdiction over his clients’ cases.2  In addition, the committee could not possibly 
provide a fair process because the same individuals who had deregistered the B-men would 
again be judging them.  He got a temporary injunction order against any additional hearings 
and advised the B-men not to appear.   
Moreover, the PMA and the ILWU attempted to frame the B-men’s grievances as 
ones falling under Section 13 of the contract agreement, which prevented any discriminatory 
conduct against a longshoreman based on his membership status, union activism, race, creed, 
national origin, or his political or religious beliefs.  Although the B-men had stated in their 
letters that they had been discriminated against, they had never argued that the 
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discrimination experienced by them fell into any of these categories.  The union and the 
PMA insisted that the B-men’s grievances fell under the discrimination clause probably 
because if a grievance had fallen under the discrimination clause, it had been the grievant’s 
responsibility to file a complaint within ten days of the occurrence of the infraction.
3
  
Moreover, a grievance regarding discrimination was one that could be taken to arbitration by 
the grievant directly at his own expense.  In other words, the grievant did not have to wait 
for the union’s decision to find out whether it would file an appeal of his grievance to 
arbitration.  By insisting upon this, the union and the employer might have wanted to blame 
the B-men for not having pursued their grievance on their own and at their own expense.
4
  
This attitude was revealed in Melvin Kennedy’s hearing before the Port Committee.5  
Against his lawyer’s advice, Melvin Kennedy appeared at the Port Committee 
hearing.  Munter, the PMA lawyer, asked Kennedy if he believed that the committee treated 
him unfairly because of his “membership status.”  Kennedy responded, “Well I’d like to 
explain to you, if I can.”  Ignoring Kennedy’s response, the lawyer changed his question 
asking him if his claim was about discrimination against him because of his activity for or 
against the union.  The PMA lawyer continued, “In other words, that you did something 
against the union or you acted in favor of the union?”  Kennedy responded, “I always 
thought that I acted in favor of the union.”  Munter questioned, “Do you think that had 
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anything to do with your deregistration?”  Kennedy retorted, “About acting in favor of the 
union?”  Kennedy wanted to explain what he really meant by the type of discrimination that 
he claimed, but never got any chance to do so because another PMA lawyer intervened and 
stated that they did not have time to discuss the matter, and if they were to discuss it, they 
should set up another hearing.
6
  Kennedy did not subsequently have another opportunity to 
explain his meaning of discrimination and the Port Committee affirmed his, and other B-
men’s, deregistration.  
In October when the Coast Labor Relations Committee (Coast Committee) called the 
B-men to appear for the appeals hearings, Cleo Love, by heeding his wife’s advice, attended 
his hearing on the 20
th
 of November, although other LJDC members decided not to attend, 
as Gordon instructed.
7
  Harry Bridges, Coast Committee Chair, emphasized that unless 
Love’s grievance was about discrimination under Section 13, the committee had no business 
discussing any other matters.  Nevertheless, the conversation between Love and Bridges at 
the hearing revealed an important aspect about how the union taught them the rules and how 
the B-men perceived them -- a conversation that would provided a piece of crucial evidence 
used by their future lawyer, Arthur Brunwasser.  Bridges asked Love if he recalled the 
instructions given to the B-men at special meetings:  If any B-man did not pay his pro rata 
share, he would be deregistered.  Love’s answer was: 
Yes.  You said that people that didn’t pay it would count against you.  I’m not one of 
the guys that didn’t pay.  But I paid late.  And you didn’t say in any of your talks to 
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us that paying late we could lose our jobs.  You said that people that don’t pay it 
would count against you.
8
 
 
Bridges retorted that being deregistered for a longshoreman was analogous to losing a 
driver’s license for a truck driver when he violated traffic laws.  Love responded: 
Like you say, they lose their license.  They don’t take it away permanently.  They 
may give 30 days suspension.  What they did here [in the B-men’s case] they took 
the job completely with no suspension – no nothing.9  
  
Love’s responses demonstrated that Bridges contradicted himself regarding what the rules 
were and how they were enforced.  Love knew that he had followed the rules and had paid 
penalties commensurate with any infraction of the rules.  He cogently argued that 
permanently deregistering these men who had paid up what they owed was unfair, 
unreasonable, and against the rules as they were instructed to the B-men.   
Despite Love’s reasonable and forceful argument, the hearing did not result in a 
revocation of his deregistered status.  On December 18, the Coast Committee made a final 
decision:  Neither the union nor the PMA had discriminated against the B-men under 
Section 13 in deregistering them -- a decision on grievances that the B-men had never 
claimed.  This ruling did not surprise LJDC members.  It rather confirmed their belief that 
use of internal grievance procedures would be futile in pursuing their reinstatement.  The 
ruling added more reason to make them think that they should pursue their goals through the 
legal system. 
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1. The Concept of “Duty of Fair Representation” and a Debate over Jurisdiction  
Soon after the Coast Committee affirmed the B-men’s deregistration, the B-men 
received favorable news.  Herman Marx, the Trial Examiner for the National Labor 
Relations Board, rendered a decision on Johnson Lee and four other B-men, which validated 
their  complaints.
10
  Marx pointed out that “the explicit promotion standards were adopted 
through a breach of the duty of fair representation” and ordered the workers’ reinstatement 
with back pay and interest.  Encouraged by the examiner’s decision, the LJDC members also 
filed their complaints with the Board.  They were rejected, however, because the “six-
month” statute of limitations had expired.  LJDC members insisted that their complaints 
were submitted within the six-month limitation because only five months had passed since 
the Coast Committee’s decision, which was the actual final decision on their deregistration 
status.  But the Board ruled that they should have filed their cases within six months from 
July, 1963, when the Port Committee had deregistered them.
11
   
Exacerbating the situation for the LJDC at this time was the souring of their 
relationship with their attorney Sydney Gordon.  The complaint submitted to the District 
Court of Northern California in April 1964 and two subsequent amended complaints 
                                                 
10
 The five B-men were: Johnson Lee; James Cagney; Wilbert Howard, Jr.; Adrian McPherson; and 
Kenneth Vierra.  See George R. Williams, et al. vs. Pacific Maritime Association et al., #20,719, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 9
th
 Circuit, Stanley, L. Weir, “Affidavit of Stanley L. Weir in Opposition to 
Motions to Dismiss,” pp, 45-46, sworn in August 11, 1965, Appendix to Irving A. Thau, Francis Heisler, and 
Arthur Brunwasser, “Brief for Appellants,” filed September 12, 1966, NARA [will be subsequently called as 
“Affidavit”];  Stan Weir, Singlejack Solidarity, ed. George Lipsitz (Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2004), p. 357, note #11; and Williams, et al. v. PMA, et al., Civil No. 42284, Judge George B. 
Harris, “Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law,” August 27, 1976, p. 39, Materials Relating to I.L.W.U. 
Case, Longshoremen – B-List, 1963-84, BANC MSS 85/169 C, Box 2, Folder 2, Bancroft Library, Berkeley, 
California.   
11
 The Coast Committee decision was made in December, 1964, and thus LJDC members believed that 
filing a complaint in May, 1965, was within the statute of limitations.  See Thau, Heisler, Brunwasser, “Brief,” 
pp. 26-27 and  “Closing Brief,” pp. 4-5. 
203 
 
submitted in early 1965 were all dismissed for the ambiguity of their claims.
12
  In addition, 
according to Stanley L. Weir, Gordon had submitted the complaints before discussing them 
with LJDC members -- a circumstance suggesting that there had been lack of 
communication or disagreements between Gordon and the members that created tension and 
eventually a breach.  The relationship became more complicated when Gordon filed suit 
against the B-men for fee payments once the men found substitute lawyers with the help of 
the Workers Defense League.  Gordon refused to step down and cooperate with the new 
counsels.  Indeed, he prevented them from getting access to the case files, and the new 
attorneys had to get a court order to obtain the files.
13
   
By the end of June, all but three LJDC members were able to discharge Gordon and 
replace him with Irving A. Thau, Francis Heisler, and Arthur Brunwasser.  Thau was well 
known as a civil liberties and rights attorney in New York City, who got involved in the case 
through the Workers Defense League (WDL).
14
  Because he did not reside in San Francisco, 
Thau looked for an attorney who lived in the city and who could submit briefs and appear at 
the district court.  Through Paul Jacobs, one of the B-men supporters and a member of the 
LJDC-WDL Defense Committee,” he found Brunwasser, a young lawyer in his third year of 
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practice, who had worked as a volunteer attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) in San Francisco.  Jacobs had known Brunwasser when the latter had volunteered 
for a farm workers support group called “Citizens for Farm Labor.”  At the time when 
Brunwasser accepted the co-counsel position in the Williams case, he was told by Thau that 
“all the work would be done in NYC” and his duty would not be intense but would entail 
merely filing papers with the court.  He thus did not anticipate that he would become the 
main attorney for the B-men in the very near future.
15
  Heisler, a seventy-year old lawyer 
who had emigrated from Hungary after the First World War, was well-known for defending 
hundreds of conscientious objectors during the Second World War and the Korean War.  
Thau did not expect Heisler to help much with the litigation, but bringing him on board 
added prestige to the team.
16
     
On June 21, 1965, Thau, Heisler, and Brunwasser submitted a Fourth Amended 
Complaint, which dealt only with fifty-one men, separating them from the three others who 
were still represented by Gordon and whose litigation continued based on the Third 
Amended Complaint.
17
  Because the union was part of joint committees that had made 
decisions on the B-men’s deregistration, the complaint was inevitably made against both the 
PMA and the ILWU.   One of their core arguments was that by deregistering the B-men, the 
union and the employers had breached the collective agreement because nowhere in the 
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agreements were provisions stipulating that B-men would be deregistered due to the 
violations that the B-men were fired for.  One complaint was specifically made against the 
union: the ILWU violated its duty of fair representation by arbitrarily and retroactively 
applying the rules to B-men and also by failing to provide due process and equal protection 
in the process of promotion.  It emphasized several union officers’ hostile discrimination 
against the men deregistered – an aspect demonstrating the union’s failure to perform their 
duty of fair representation.
18
 
Although the B-men thought that they deserved to be reinstated to the A status 
because their peer longshoremen had been already promoted, they lowered their 
expectations and agreed to seek to get back to their B-men status.  But they demanded that 
several individuals, such as Harry Bridges, Bill Chester, and Tommie Silas, who had shown 
hostility toward them and who “conspired” to cause the employer and the union to fire them, 
should be enjoined from being agents of a future promotion process of the B-men after they 
were reinstated.  They also claimed lost wages and damages from the PMA and the ILWU, 
as well as from several individual union officers.  Due to the fact that the Port Committee 
deregistered them, ILWU Local 10 and several Port Committee members were also included 
in the suit as defendants.
19
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In regard to the legal concept of a labor union’s duty of fair representation, the 1944 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. et al. 
established its precedent and authority.  Bester William Steele, a black locomotive fireman, 
had brought a law suit on behalf of his fellow black firemen against both the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and the railroad corporations when the union and the 
corporations amended their contract to eventually eliminate black workers from the industry.  
Black railroad workers, having been excluded from union membership because of their race, 
were neither allowed to participate in the decision-making process of the new contract nor 
notified about the contract changes.  When the contract became effective, their positions 
were replaced by white men junior to them and they were demoted to more difficult jobs 
that were less remunerative.  When the black workers protested and appealed to the union, 
their appeals were ignored.   
Steele and other black firemen filed a complaint into a state court in Alabama in 
early 1942, arguing that the union had a duty to represent all employees, including non-
union workers, impartially and in good faith, but instead it had been hostile to black firemen 
and deliberately discriminated against them.  The black firemen sought an injunction against 
the union and the employers from enforcing the contract as well as against the union from 
purporting to act as the representative of black workers as long as the discrimination 
continued.
20
  In their appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the Jefferson County 
Circuit Court decision that had ruled against the black firemen, holding that the majority of 
the workers in the craft had the right to determine who ought to represent the workers in the 
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unit and that the union, elected by the majority, was given power by the Railway Labor Act 
to negotiate with the employer regarding seniority rules and working conditions “without 
any legal obligation or duty to protect the rights of minorities from discrimination or unfair 
treatment, however gross.”21   
However, in 1944 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Alabama 
Supreme Court by stating that when Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act authorizing a 
labor union to represent the workers in a workplace, it “did not intend to confer plenary 
power upon the union…without imposing on it any duty to protect the minority.”  Because 
black workers were non-members of the union, the authority of the union to represent them 
arose not from black workers’ consent but from “the command of the Act.”  The union thus 
had a fiduciary duty to equally protect the interests of all employees, “regardless of their 
union affiliations or want of them.”  The court asserted that the union’s conduct was in 
violation of a federal statute and that judicial remedies for the black firemen were necessary.  
It granted both injunctive relief and damages.
22
   
The Steele decision set a standard for future cases regarding a union’s duty of fair 
representation.  The union, as an exclusionary body representing all workers in a workplace, 
must “represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without hostile 
discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.”23  However, what constituted a 
union’s “hostile” discriminatory, “partial,” and “arbitrary” conduct had not been squarely 
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constructed.  Rather, the meaning of these words had been contested by workers, unions, 
employers, lawyers, and judges, in the process of interpreting and applying them in each 
case.   
In the B-men’s case -- George R. Williams, et al. v. PMA, et al--, the attorneys for 
the workers found a lot of parallels between the B-men’s situations and those of the black 
locomotive firemen in Steele.  Just like the black locomotive firemen, the B-men were 
excluded from union membership and were precluded from participating in the decision-
making process of negotiating the collective agreement.  The B-men’s lawyers claimed that 
by arbitrarily applying the promotion rules to the B-men and by not providing due process in 
hearings and in appeals, the ILWU had breached its duty of fair representation, let alone 
violating the contract.  They argued that although discrimination against black workers in 
Steele was racially motivated, its basic concept could be extended to all forms of hostile 
discrimination.
24
   
In his 62-page affidavit submitted to the court in order to counter the PMA and 
ILWU’s argument for summary judgment, Weir described how events unfolded between 
1959 and 1963, his involvement in union affairs as a B-men representative, and the 
promotion process.  Weir emphasized how he became a target of the union officers who had 
been waiting for a chance to fire him for his criticism on the Mechanization and 
Modernization Agreement.  His focus was to prove the existence of hostile and 
discriminatory conduct by the union against him and other B-men who had spoken up 
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against the contract.  He also exposed how the promotion process was arbitrary and lacked 
due process.
25
   
Many B-men felt discriminated against because they had worked on the waterfront 
as “second” class workers for a long time and then were deregistered based on unexpected 
standards set in 1963.  They also felt unfairly treated because not all B-men had been judged 
by the same standards.  They had witnessed or heard about some B-men having been 
promoted by paying some amount of money as a bribe.  However, when they formed the 
LJDC, they decided not to talk in public about the unsavory aspect because they did not 
want to harm those who had been promoted.
26
  Without telling the part that bribery of union 
officers had played in the promotion process, they believed that their claim of unfairness 
could still prevail.
27
   
In countering the B-men’s complaint, The ILWU and the PMA argued that the court 
must dismiss the case on three grounds.  First, the court should issue a summary judgment 
because there was “no genuine issue” regarding any material facts and dismiss it in their 
favor because there was no breach of contract.  Second, the duty of fair representation claim 
fell under the National Labor Relations Act and thus had been “preempted” by the National 
Labor Relations Board.   The U.S. District Court, therefore, had no jurisdiction and was 
obligated to dismiss the case.
28
  Third, because the B-men had not exhausted grievance 
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procedures provided by the contract agreement before they filed a law suit, they could not 
seek any remedy from the court.   
The union and PMA’s claim on summary judgment mimicked similar kinds of 
motions that had successfully worked in their favor in the ILWU v. Kuntz (and the PMA v. 
Kuntz) case which the union and the employers had dealt with in the previous year.  In the 
Kuntz case, ship clerks in the Seattle local had filed a suit, accusing the ILWU and the PMA 
of violating their contract agreement regarding the promotion process of Class B clerks.  The 
union and the employers had countered that the clerks did not have any countervailing 
evidence and demanded the judge render a summary judgment.  The trial court did not grant 
their motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9
th
 Circuit reversed the trial court 
decision by agreeing with the union and the PMA.
29
   
In addition, the union and the PMA asserted that they had “modified” or “amended” 
the rules in early 1963 – a conduct that could not constitute a breach of contract.  The B-
men’s complaint, therefore, was made against the “modified contract” itself, rather than 
against a “breach of contract.”  This meant that the B-men failed to prove any contractual 
violations that had been committed by either the union or the employer.  If, in point of fact, 
there had been no breach of contract, then the only issue involved in the case might be the 
duty of fair representation issue.  But, according to the employers and the union, duty of fair 
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representation cases should be treated as “unfair labor practices” that were under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.   
To be sure, unfair labor practice litigation had been generally considered under 
NLRB’s jurisdiction under NLRA Section 8, which stipulated what constituted unfair labor 
practices.  Following the 1953 U.S. Supreme court decision in Garner v. Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs And Helpers Local Union No. 776, the Fourth Court of Appeals of California 
had declared in the 1954 San Diego Building Trades Council, et al. v. Garmon case the 
NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases, and in 1959 the U.S. 
Supreme Court had affirmed it.
30
  These courts gave the “uniformity” of dealing with cases 
and the “expertise” of the Board as the rationale for their rulings.   
However, a union’s breach of duty of fair representation had not been considered 
constituting an activity prohibited by NLRA Section 8.  In other words, the duty of fair 
representation was not traditionally charged under unfair labor practice provisions, and state 
and federal courts had thus heard duty of fair representation cases and made decisions on 
them since the Steele case.  Although the NLRB also had dealt with duty of fair 
representation cases, it had not challenged the concurrent authority of state or federal courts.  
Nevertheless, in the late 1950s in the Miranda Fuel Co. case, the NLRB claimed that duty of 
fair representation cases should be ruled under unfair labor practice codes and the Board 
thus held exclusive jurisdiction over duty of fair representation cases.  This “Miranda 
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doctrine” created an environment in which the debate over duty of fair representation 
became focused on the jurisdictional matter.
31
   
The Miranda Fuel Co. case had begun in 1957 when Michael Lopuch, a truck driver 
for Miranda Fuel Company and a member of the Teamsters, had taken a leave of absence 
with his employer’s permission three days earlier than the designated time on the contract 
agreement.  When he failed to return to his work by the designated date, his union reduced 
his seniority.  The union subsequently uncovered that Lopuch’s late return was due to an 
excused illness, but it still reduced his seniority anyway by insisting that he had taken his 
leave three days early and then demanded that his employer should accept the union’s 
decision on Lopuch’s seniority – a request to which the employer acquiesced.  Lopuch filed 
a complaint to the NLRB.
32
   
NLRB ruled that Lopuch’s leaving work three days early with the employer’s 
permission did not give enough reason for the union to take away his seniority rights under 
the provision of the contract agreement that union referred to.  The set dates for a leave of 
absence in the section were for those who did not have steady employment but wanted to 
take a leave of absence – a category to which Lopuch did not belong – and the section was 
clear that a loss of seniority could occur only for failure to return promptly, not for an early 
departure taken with the permission of the employer.  The Board thus argued that reducing 
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Lopuch’s seniority was an action against the contract.  The NLRB further argued that by 
giving the union exclusive authority over seniority, the contract indirectly encouraged union 
membership – an action that was in violation of NLRA Section 8 stipulating unfair labor 
practice rules.  The Board thus enjoined the union and the employer from delegating 
exclusive control over an employee’s seniority to the union.  By claiming that a breach of 
the duty of fair representation constituted an unfair labor practice over which the Board had 
expertise, the NLRB further declared that the Board had the sole authority over duty of fair 
representation cases.   
Based on the fact that the NLRB’s opinion in the Miranda case disapproved of a 
union’s control over seniority and restricted the scope of union authority, it might have made 
more sense if the Board’s decision had not been popularly cited by unions when sued by 
workers for unfair representation violations.  However, the Board’s claim for its exclusive 
jurisdiction over duty of fair representation cases, or the Miranda doctrine, was frequently 
utilized by unions, including the ILWU in the B-men’s case, to fend off charges against 
them in federal or state courts.   
The effectiveness of the Miranda doctrine was equivocal, however.   In 1962, the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Evening News Association held that a complaint involving 
an unfair labor practice that also violated a collective bargaining agreement did not deprive 
state courts of jurisdiction:  
The authority of the [National Labor Relations] Board to deal with an unfair labor 
practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by 
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[Labor Management Relations Act] § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not 
destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301.
33
 
 
Moreover, the NLRB’s Miranda decision was reversed in 1963 by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which denied the enforcement of the NLRB’s decision.  The 
Circuit Court argued that a union’s unfair representation of certain workers would not 
necessarily constitute an unfair labor practice as long as the union did not encourage or 
discourage union membership, just as an employer’s discrimination against certain 
employees would not be considered as a violation of the unfair labor practice provisions of 
NLRA Section 8, “unless the discrimination was based on union membership or other 
union-connected activities.”34  The Court was unclear about the jurisdictional issue, but it 
did not endorse the “extended” power of the NLRB on duty of fair representation cases.   
The Second Circuit Court’s decision did not stem from its concern for broadening 
workers’ rights or widening the scope of a union’s duty of fair representation.  Rather, its 
decision seemed to be affected by the advancement of the Black Freedom Movement in the 
larger society, but not because the court was supportive of movement.  The judges stated: 
We pause to observe that, against the background of the present nationwide interest 
in discrimination for reasons of race, nationality, color or religion, and the natural 
tendency of human beings to attribute their lack of success to discrimination of one 
kind or another against them, it seems inevitable that the Board would be inundated 
with charges of this character, were we to sustain the ruling of the Board in this 
case.
35
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In other words, the court was concerned that the Miranda doctrine might bring many 
discrimination cases to the NLRB by black workers who had raised their voices louder in 
1963 through direct actions, such as the March on Washington, for equality and fairness as 
citizens, workers, and as human beings.  The judge forcefully proclaimed that the court 
should constrain the power of the NLRB in order to preclude black workers from seeking 
their rights through the law and the Board. 
The “exhaustion” doctrine that the ILWU and the PMA claimed as the third ground 
for the dismissal of the Williams case rested upon their belief that the law required any 
worker to exhaust internal grievance procedures provided by the contract agreement before 
filing a lawsuit.  In other words, the collective bargaining structure had set up its own 
grievance solving procedures based on a contract agreement, which was elevated like a 
constitution governing the relationship between the employer and the workers in the 
workplace.  The court system should respect this system of self-governance.  The PMA and 
the ILWU insisted that after the Coast Committee’s decision, the B-men could have 
appealed their case to arbitration, the final step of the grievance process stipulated by the 
contract, but they had not done so.  This failure to exhaust grievance procedures disqualified 
them to get any remedies from the court. 
The logic of the exhaustion requirement explained what legal historian Reuel 
Schiller calls the “industrial pluralist labor law regime” in which employers and unions 
sought to minimize governmental involvement in their relations.
36
  The regime had been 
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established since the Second World War when the court system largely acknowledged the 
authority of “private” tribunals governing grievance procedures set up by a collective 
bargaining agreement.  Nevertheless, judges often set the conditions for the requirement.  
Moreover, Schiller claims that between 1960 and 1965, another legal regime for regulating 
the workplace emerged, which recognized individual workers the right to pursue their 
grievances in the court system.
37
   
For example, in 1955, the Seventh Circuit Court in Alice M. Anson et al., v. Hiram 
Walker & Sons, Inc sustained the trial court’s dismissal of the case based on the argument 
that the workers who brought the suit had not exhausted internal remedies.  The court held 
that the contract agreement between the workers and the company had “unambiguous” 
words about a grievance process and thus the workers who brought the lawsuit should have 
tried to use the grievance process.  Nevertheless, the court opined that an employee could 
file a complaint to the courts against breach of a contract agreement before exhausting 
internal remedies if the state law did not require him to use up all measures of the grievance 
process stipulated by the contract.  In the Anson case, according to the court, Missouri state 
law required an employee to do so and thus the workers should have done so before they 
came to the court.
38
   
In the B-men’s case, the ILWU and the PMA invoked the U. S. Supreme Court 
decision in Republican Steel Corporation v. Maddox, which had been delivered just several 
months earlier.  According to that decision, individual employees whose grievance arose due 
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to a breach of a contract must attempt to use contract grievance procedures first before they 
take their grievance to the courts.
39
  Although the Court also added that there could be 
exceptions to this rule depending upon the nature of the alleged grievances or how the union 
had handled the grievances, the ILWU and the PMA cited the Maddox decision to argue that 
the B-men had failed to exhaust internal remedies and thus could not take their case to the 
district court. 
On October 8, 1965, Judge George B. Harris granted summary judgment on the 
Fourth Amended Complaint.  The main content of his “Order Dismissing Fourth Amended 
Complaint” was: (1) the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over the alleged wrongful acts; (2) 
the complaint did not prove the existence of a contractual violation; and (3) the B-men failed 
to exhaust the internal grievance procedures.  Consequently, he dismissed the case and by 
doing so, he accepted all the arguments made by the union and the employers.  Two months 
prior to this decision, he had also dismissed the Third Amended Complaint containing the 
arguments of Sydney Gordon who had been representing three B-men.  In dismissing the 
Fourth Amended Complaint, Judge Harris cited a paragraph from his order dismissing the 
Third Amended Complaint by claiming that the basic issues of both cases were identical.
40
 
 
2. Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit Court 
About a month after Harris’s decision in Williams v. PMA was rendered, LJDC 
members heard more discouraging news.  The ILWU and the PMA had appealed the 
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National Labor Relations Board trial examiner’s decision on Johnson Lee’s and four other 
B-men’s cases to the General Counsel of the Board.41  In late November, the General 
Counsel reversed the trial examiner’s ruling.  The Counsel opined that the union and the 
employers did not violate any laws when they modified the standard for promotion because 
the “true purpose or real motivation” was to meet “the industry’s increasing needs for a 
greater number of steady, highly qualified, and responsible longshoremen” – a conduct that 
was “not unreasonable.”42  Deregistering those who failed to qualify for promotion was an 
“incidental or auxiliary side effect” of the process of making necessary adjustments to the 
industry’s needs. 
The General Council’s decision indicated that Council ignored how the promotion 
process had been conducted historically within the union up until the 1960s.  The Council 
merely accepted what the employers and the union had argued about the industry’s demand 
for “qualified workers,” although the criteria used in the promotion process did not directly 
reflect the workers’ job performances, especially when considering that all five men had 
been fired for pro-rata dues violations.  Even though the Council did not rule on the 
Williams case, it was a victory for the ILWU and the PMA who subsequently used the 
decision against the LJDC case. 
In addition, Bridges created a condition making the legal process more difficult and 
complicated for LJDC members.  A couple of months earlier, he had filed a libel suit against 
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fifteen members of the Workers Defense League-LJDC Defense Committee, including 
Bayard Rustin, Herman Benson (editor and publisher of Union Democracy in Action), 
Thomas N. Burbridge (former president of the San Francisco NAACP) and Paul Jacobs
43
  
Bridges claimed that the committee members had damaged his reputation by falsely 
accusing him of conducting racial discrimination in deregistering the B-men.  He sought a 
quarter of a million dollars in damages from the individuals.
44
   
The LJDC members had never claimed racial discrimination, but a letter written by 
Rowland Watts, a head of the Workers Defense League, had contained the phrase that the 
LJDC case involved “racial discrimination, but not in a traditional sense.”  Watts pointed out 
that Harry Bridges was not a racist, but he acknowledged that in the B-men’s situation, 
racial minorities would suffer first and the foremost.
45
  Nevertheless, ILWU officers 
reported in one of their union internal documents that LJDC members had accused the union 
of discriminating against them because they were black.   
The same document, however, presented more than their stance on racial matters.  It 
exposed what really made the ILWU officers upset about the Williams case.  By stating that 
the B-men wanted to “destroy” the whole system of “joint regulation and equalization of 
earnings” on the waterfront, the officers tried to portray the B-men as enemies of the union.   
Moreover, they mentioned that the Workers Defense League members had been known for 
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their championship of civil rights and civil liberties, but they had been “equally well-known 
for their ideological differences with the leadership of ILWU” and thus supporting the B-
men was for them was another “opportunity to attack the ILWU.” 46  In other words, the 
Workers Defense League was a group of socialists who had been looking to find a chance to 
criticize the ILWU whose officers had been known as Communists or their allies.  Bridges 
had never forgotten that Paul Jacobs, one of the accused, had worked as the prosecutor for 
the CIO when it had expelled the ILWU in 1950.
47
 
Sydney Gordon, the former lawyer of the B-men, added another layer of hardship to 
the B-men’s pursuit of getting their jobs back via the legal system.  When LJDC members 
submitted a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 9
th
 Circuit Court, 
Gordon, who had been trying to squash the proceeding of the fifty-one men’s case at the 
district court, continued to intervene in their appeal process at the circuit court.
48
  LJDC 
members thus had to deal simultaneously with Bridges’ libel suit, while preventing Gordon 
from interfering and preparing for the appeal.  Brunwasser volunteered to be the main 
litigator for the libel case, but he also unexpectedly had to prepare for the appeal after Thau 
failed to produce the brief for the B-men to the appellate court after three time extensions 
with a filing deadline a day away.  According to Brunwasser, he felt “compelled to take an 
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active role in both the labor case and the libel case” and, before too long, “the entire 
responsibility of both cases” was on his shoulders.49  By the fall of 1966, their first brief was 
ready to be submitted to the appellate court. 
The B-men’s attorneys refuted the PMA and the ILWU’s claim that the two parties 
had amended the rules in 1963 and thus had not violated the contract when discharging the 
B-men.  According to the contract, the lawyers argued, any rule changes must have been 
spelled out in a written form, but there had been no written rule changes regarding 
deregistration.  They presented as evidence the testimony of John Trupp, a PMA 
representative on the Joint Port Labor Relations Committee, which had been taken before 
the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board in March 1964.  When Sydney 
Gordon, the lawyer of the B-men at the time, had cross-examined Trupp by asking whether 
the “new standard” to select B-men for promotion had been put in writing, Trupp 
acknowledged that it had not been.  He admitted that the matters had been discussed orally 
and that there had been no document posted to the workers informing them about the new 
standard.
50
   
Moreover, even if the PMA and the union had changed the rules, they should not 
have retroactively applied them – an action that was also in violation of the contract and a 
breach of the duty of fair representation.  The B-men did not have any outstanding 
infractions of the rules when they were investigated for promotion, but they were 
deregistered for past violations, the penalties for which they had already paid.  At the time of 
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the occurrence of their violations, they had not been informed that the infractions would 
cause them to be fired.  For that reason, the district court had jurisdiction.   
The PMA and the ILWU submitted separate briefs, but their core arguments were the 
same and they jointly submitted a supplemental brief later on.  The PMA’s brief, 
nevertheless, provided more details about the history of the contract negotiations between 
the ILWU and the PMA since the 1930s and the background information about the 
recruitment of the B-men in 1959.  By doing so, they attempted to justify the power of joint 
labor relations committees in administering the contract, determining registration lists, and 
handling grievances.  They also tried to legitimize deregistration of the B-men as though it 
had been necessary to accommodate changes in the industry – an argument that had been 
presented in the decision made by the General Counsel of the NLRB in Johnson Lee’s case.  
In addition, the PMA, for the first time, submitted as an appendix to its brief a document 
showing the list of infractions that some of the B-men deregistered had violated during the 
four years of their employment.
51
   
The employers and the union continued to focus on jurisdictional matters.  They 
argued that there had been no contractual violation in amending the rules regarding 
promotion.  Without a breach of the contract, they argued, a claim on a union’s unfair 
representation alone could not satisfy the condition required by the Smith decision regarding 
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state or federal courts’ jurisdiction over a fair representation case.  Judge Harris thus had 
made a correct decision when he had dismissed the Williams case.
52
 
However, this ground for the argument that the federal court lacked jurisdiction over 
a union’s duty of fair representation case soon became considerably weakened.  In early 
1967, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its decision on Vaca v. Sipes in which it ruled that 
state or federal courts had jurisdiction over suits alleging a breach of a contract regardless of 
whether the particular breach constituted an unfair labor practice.  The Court emphasized 
that when Congress enacted the NLRA Section 8, which stipulated certain union activities to 
be unfair labor practices, the law “did not intend to oust the courts of their traditional 
jurisdiction to curb arbitrary conduct by an individual employee’s statutory collective 
bargaining representative.”53  In doing so, the court rendered a clearer ruling regarding the 
jurisdictional matter that thus became a landmark case setting a precedent regarding a 
union’s duty of fair representation.  Especially for the B-men’s case, the timing was 
fortuitous because their case remained outstanding at the appellate court.  The ruling 
provided the B-men with better grounds for their arguments and gave them added legitimacy 
in bringing their complaint to a federal court.   
In challenging Judge Harris’ ruling that the B-men should have exhausted the 
grievance procedure and sought internal remedies provided by the contract agreement, the 
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B-men’s lawyers brilliantly presented the actual contract language, which specified the 
conditions under which a grievance could be appealed to arbitration, to prove that the B-men 
had actually exhausted all internal remedies.  According to the contract, if there was a 
disagreement between the union and the PMA within the Coast Committee regarding a 
grievance and how to resolve it, then one of the parties could appeal the case to arbitration.  
However, both parties in the Williams case had agreed to deregister the B-men and there had 
been no disagreement within the Coast Committee.  Under the contract, only the union or 
the PMA, not an aggrieved longshoreman, could file for arbitration.   
A grievant could appeal to arbitration only if his complaint arose from discrimination 
against his membership status, race, creed, national origin, or his political or religious beliefs 
-- a violation of Section 13 of the contract.  The PMA and ILWU had insisted that the B-
men’s grievances arose from this section and thus their grievances should have been 
followed the required internal procedure, but the B-men had never asserted that their case 
fell under the terms of this section.
54
  Consequently, the B-men tried to resolve their 
grievances based on the procedure provided by the contract when they requested hearings 
from the Port Committee.   
However, the union and the PMA took no action for nine months after the B-men 
had appealed to the Port Committee, and in doing so, they virtually prevented the B-men 
from presenting their cases before the National Labor Relations Board.  This process 
showed that the B-men had faithfully followed the contract grievance procedures, but the 
union had refused to assist them.  The Board’s decision to deny their cases due to the statute 
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of limitations was, therefore, equivalent to saying that the B-men should not have waited for 
that long a period in their attempt to exhaust the internal procedures.   
Furthermore, the hearings granted to the B-men by the internal grievance process had 
been “largely a farce” because the B-men had not been given the information about what 
charges had been brought against them and had not been allowed to have been represented 
by counsel.  This demonstrated that the B-men might have had a formal right to seek internal 
remedies, but the remedies had not actually been available for them, especially when the 
union’s actions and inactions were motivated by hostile discrimination against the B-men 
deregistered, just as Weir had pointed out in his affidavit.
55
  The lawyers argued that 
whether the defendants acted in good faith “should be determined after a trial on the 
merits.”56  In addition, the PMA had never provided specifics of the charges brought against 
the deregistered B-men until several months after the Williams case had been commenced.  
The B-men attorneys claimed that this “self-serving nature of the document prepared so long 
after the commencement of this litigation” could have been easily fabricated and thus the 
content of the documents should be subject to cross-examination at a trial.
57
  
Throughout their briefs, the PMA and the ILWU had repeatedly used the term, 
“probationary,” to describe the B-men’s status between 1959 and 1963.  In doing so, they 
left the impression that the B-men’s employment status had been unstable and easily 
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disposable and thus their decision of deregistering the men should not be considered as 
unexpected.  The B-men’s attorneys contested that the B-men were not probationary 
workers and emphasized their “registered” status, although it was a limited one.  They 
argued that the distinctions between A-men and B-men rested not upon their tenure status 
but upon their seniority positions.  Moreover, regarding the PMA and the ILWU claim about 
the industrial need to deregister the men, the B-men’s attorneys pointed out that the labor 
market was not declining at the time of their deregistration.  If the truth had been otherwise, 
then the employers would not have soon afterward hired a large number of new Class B 
Longshoremen.
58
 
On August 28, 1967, the U.S. Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit made its ruling.  By 
referring to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Vaca, Judge Walter L. Pope, who wrote 
the opinion, first ruled that the district court had jurisdiction over the case and thus Judge 
Harris’s dismissal of the case on a jurisdictional basis was wrong.  He also ruled that Judge 
Harris’s decision on summary judgment could not be upheld because factual disputes 
existed between the B-men’s claims and those of defendants.  He continued that none of the 
affidavits submitted by the union and the PMA showed that the B-men could not have 
proven the allegations of their complaint with respect to the union’s failure of fair 
representation.  He stated: 
None of them would serve to show the validity of the so-called new rules by which 
these joint committee purported to de-register the plaintiffs.  None shows that the 
rules have anything to do with deregistration of Class B longshoremen; nor do they 
show that any of the plaintiffs deserved de-registration or that they were properly de-
registered under any rules, valid or invalid.
59
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Instead, the affidavits primarily focused on the claim that the B-men failed to exhaust the 
grievance procedure set forth in the contract.  If the court were to concede, according to 
Pope, that the B-men failed to exhaust the contract grievance procedure, that might warrant 
“a partial” summary judgment in favor of the employer, but that did not mean that it would 
warrant “the broad dismissal as made by the [Judge Harris’s] court,” because the claim had 
nothing to do with the B-men’s complaint made against the union.  Weir’s affidavit showed, 
according to Judge Pope, that there had been “a calculated effort on the part of the union 
representatives” to deregister him through conduct indicating “hostility, malice and bad faith 
on the representatives.”  He continued, “Even if Weir were the only plaintiff who made a 
showing of this character, the complaint should not have been dismissed as against him.”60   
Regarding the conflicting arguments about whether the B-men could pursue the 
internal remedy, the Court found that there were unsatisfactory records of the alleged 
charges regarding which rules they had to follow.  Nevertheless, Judge Pope agreed with the 
B-men that their grievances were not the kind of discrimination described in Section 13.  He 
also pointed out that there was merit in the B-men’s claim that they could not appeal to 
arbitration because the union agreed with the PMA on deregistering the men.  For the reason 
of insufficiency of the record, the appellate court ruled that the summary judgment of Judge 
Harris on this case was in error.  It retuned the case to the district court for a trial in order to 
make further findings.
61
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For the B-men, the appellate court decision seemed to validate their claims, boosting 
their morale and elevating their hope.  Jackie Hughes later expressed:  
The only thing that kept the flick of light burning in this case -- and I feel like that 
there is some justice even if it’s in Mississippi – is that when the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals said, “You guys have a case. . . this case will be looked into.”62 
 
3. The PMA and ILWU’s Appeal and the Bridges’ Libel Case  
A trial for the B-men, however, did not take place for several years to come.  The 
PMA and ILWU did not accept the Circuit Court decision and appealed for a rehearing.  
Although the court merely ordered the lower court to hold a trial for more discovery and 
examination and did not rule on whether the union and the PMA violated the contract or the 
union unfairly represented the B-men, the union and the employers charged that the court 
had incorrectly made a conclusion of law by opining that “so-called new rules” did not 
authorize the deregistration of any longshoremen.
63
   
In addition, the union and the PMA argued that, by ruling against the summary 
judgment, the Circuit Court decision would “do grave and extensive harm to the collective 
bargaining process” by opening the gates of the court system to the masses of workers 
whose grievances should be dealt with based on contract agreements between their unions 
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and their employers.  The PMA argued that the “major issues in such invited litigation 
should be left to the private law and tribunals of industry-union contracts.”64 
Moreover, they continued, “the mere discrimination of treating some men one way 
and others another way” was “insufficient to establish a basis for judicial intervention.”65  
Without proving that a discharge was motivated by “invidious” or “hostile” discrimination 
“within the meaning of these terms” that had been developed in many opinions from the 
Steele decision, a conduct itself of discharging or discriminating against a worker could not 
constitute any legal meaning of discrimination and thus the court system did not have any 
reason to intervene in the decision-making process.
66
 
When the rehearing was denied, the PMA and the union petitioned to the U.S. 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.  In their petition they emphasized that the union had 
informed the B-men when they were hired in 1959 that the rules would be stricter for them – 
a claim that attempted to legitimize the modification of the standards in 1963.  They argued 
that the B-men’s claims aimed to attack provisions of the contract and its “amendments” 
made in 1963, rather than accusing the union and the employers of violating the rules.
67
  Not 
agreeing with a collective bargaining provision, however, could not make a duty of fair 
representation case.  The same principle was applied to a judge or a jury in making a 
decision:  “A breach of the duty of fair representation cannot be established because a judge 
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or jury concludes that he or they would have negotiated a different collective bargaining 
provision.”  They thus pointed out: 
[A] “humanitarian” clause guaranteeing continued employment to unsatisfactory 
workers could militate against the possibility of gaining a substantial wage increase 
for the entire bargaining unit based upon the productivity of their labor.
68
 
 
They acknowledged that the B-men had been in a minority position in the collective 
bargaining unit and who had not benefited from contract agreements.  However, they argued 
that no collective bargaining agreement could satisfy all the workers in a unit.  They claimed 
that the collective bargaining process could not continue to function if the court were 
available to “consider the claims of the almost always present minority that the agreement 
achieved was unsatisfactory to them.”69  
The union and PMA’s arguments demonstrated that the existing collective 
bargaining system aimed to improve efficiency and productivity, rather than to address any 
humanitarian concerns for workers.  A sacrifice of some workers would always occur under 
the system and thus a union should not be accused of violating its duty of fair representation 
when layoffs or other mistreatments toward some workers occurred.  For those who believed 
the reputation of the ILWU as a militant union, the union’s arguments made along with the 
PMA in the court seemed hardly conceivable.  Nevertheless, these arguments reflected how 
the current collective bargaining system created a condition in which the union could easily 
turn into a disciplinary body, participating in perpetuating existing industrial relations and 
power structures.   
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently denied a hearing, their appeal 
nevertheless delayed the process to get to a trial for several months.
70
   Meanwhile, Arthur 
Brunwasser prepared for the libel case.  He interviewed the writers, civil rights activists, and 
intellectuals who supported the B-men via the Workers Defense League and who had been 
accused of libeling Bridges by publicly raising racial issues.  In their personal conversations, 
some of the interviewees had expressed their belief that racism must have been involved in 
the LJDC case because eighty-five percent of the deregistered men were black.
71
  
Nevertheless, they had not publicly called Bridges as a racist at any point and Brunwasser 
was extremely confident that Bridges case could not be successfully prosecuted against his 
clients.   
Moreover, in 1964 the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan had 
set a standard for libel, according to which, if the plaintiff was a public figure in a libel case, 
he must prove the existence of “actual malice” by the publisher in order to recover any 
damages.
72
  In other words, it was not enough for the plaintiff to prove that the statement 
was false.  He had to prove that the publisher had prior knowledge of the falsehood of the 
statement or that it was published with “reckless disregard” for whether or not it was true.  
This set a high standard of burden of proof on the plaintiff who was a public figure.  
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Brunwasser knew that Bridges had no case in making this accusation and actually looked 
forward to a trial.
73
   
Knowing that he could not win the case, Bridges dropped all charges in 1969, on the 
Friday before the trial was set to begin on Monday.
74
  According to San Francisco 
Chronicle, Bridges, while abandoning the law suit, did not take back some of his angry 
words that he had called the Workers Defense League members:  “a real gang of phonies. . . 
enemies of labor.”75  In matter of fact, Bridges frequently characterized those who politically 
disagreed with him as “phonies” (anti-union men) and “enemies of labor.”   Reg Theriault, a 
San Francisco longshoreman, recalled an incident which happened when he briefly stayed in 
the Coos Bay local as a visitor.  Bridges had told the local’s officers that Theriault was “a 
fink, and a phony” and he came to the local to “wreck the union.”  Theriault had spoken out 
in opposition to Bridges’ automation contract, but according to Theriault, he was not even 
one of its staunch opponents, and thus was surprised that Bridges portrayed him in this 
manner.  In his own words, Theriault stated, “I was about the least prominent of the 
longshoremen who came out publicly against [the contract].  If that opposition constituted a 
large pond, I was just about the smallest frog in it.  Not too small for Harry Bridges to let 
slip by, apparently.”76   
Although Bridges dropped the libel case, preparing for the suit had proven costly in 
terms of money, time, and effort to the B-men and the WDL-LJDC Defense Committee.  
According to Weir, the libel action set them back “more than a year’s time,” the B-men had 
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not been able to pay Brunwasser for the past four years, and it took three years for them to 
raise the money necessary for their trial.
77
  In 1969, writing about the libel case, Weir cited 
what Herbert Gold, who in his early age had given support to Bridges during his deportation 
trial, wrote about the libel suit: 
It’s sad that a man who has been persecuted by the government, and defended by 
artists and intellectuals, should have spent his union’s money and many men’s time 
and money in 4½ years of legal persecution of writers, artists, ministers and teachers 
whose offense was that they sought to help a group of longshoremen deprived of 
their jobs.  It’s as if, secure in his power, he wished to imitate bureaucratic tyranny.78 
 
As Brunwasser in his interview with the San Francisco Chronicle pointed out, 
Bridges knew that there was no substance in the suit, but the main purpose of filing it and 
dragged it for over four years was to “keep others from joining the fight for the fired 
longshoremen.”79  It might have deterred some from joining the WDL-LJDC Defense 
Committee, but several individuals had joined the group despite the suit.  Civil Rights 
activist and writer James Baldwin was one of them.
80
  Baldwin had known Weir since their 
young ages when both worked in a New York City restaurant as a waiter and a dishwasher, 
respectively.  In 1969, Baldwin had written a letter to Coretta Scott King, seeking her 
support for the B-men’s battle.  He pointed out that 90 percent of LJDC members were 
blacks, but he described their struggle as one in which whites and blacks were fighting 
together “as workers” -- a step toward society in which racial divisions were overcome and 
no white supremacy existed.    
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Baldwin also wrote to Bridges, vouching for Weir’s character and his honesty and 
asking Bridges to reconsider the union’s decision on the B-men’s deregistration.  He wrote, 
“If [Weir] is anti-progressive and anti-labor, then I am a dues-paying member of the [John] 
Birch society.” 81  His effort did not bring about an immediate result.  Nevertheless, Harvey 
Swados praised him, as well as other newly joined members, for their courage, and 
expressed that their participation encouraged the existing committee members and the B-
men, who were mostly black and “almost forgotten,” and whose employment had been 
denied for far too long.
82
  Over six years had passed since their layoffs.  But as it turned out, 
their legal battle would continue for more than a decade to come. 
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Chapter 7 
“Dancing on a Keg of Dynamite”: The Impact of M & M Agreements, 1966-1971 
 
While the deregistered B-men’s legal battle slowly continued, the West Coast 
longshoremen signed another M & M agreement in 1966.  Under the first agreement, the 
employers had gained a considerable amount of power to constrain formal and informal 
work rules and reduce the size of the basic gang.  Through the second agreement, they 
eliminated further the structure of the basic gang and gained the authority to designate a 
necessary manning scale in each operation.  The most controversial issue in the new 
agreement, however, was Section 9.43 that gave each employer the right to hire men who 
would work particularly for that firm on a steady basis -- longshoremen employees who 
were called “steady men” or “9.43 men.”  By the late 1960s, container vans carried larger 
portions of the total cargo.  Subsequently, jurisdictional matters, such as by whom, where, 
and under what terms the containers should be handled, emerged as another major concern 
for West Coast longshoremen. 
This chapter studies the impact of the M & M agreements by focusing on the debates 
and actions organized over the two most controversial issues, steady men and jurisdiction.  
Internal debates especially over the steady men issue reveal a growing fear among 
longshoremen of losing control over the hiring process, the equalization of work 
opportunities, and their job security.  They also indicate an increasing gap between 
International officers, on one side, and many local officers and rank-and-file workers, on the 
other, over the meaning of the principles that workers had fought for and the values for 
which the union should stand.  By contesting the interpretations of contract provisions and 
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organizing direct actions, Local 10 officers and the rank-and-file resisted the employers’ 
attempts to recruit steady men.     Their struggle grew in the late 1960s, culminating in the 
strike that commenced in 1971. 
An examination of the process of signing a separate, and inferior, contract agreement 
regarding those working in “container freight stations” indicates that although the ILWU 
had given the employers a free pass to bring automation and containerization almost a 
decade ago, the union had not foreseen what would actually happen when containerization 
became more prevalent.  Matson and other employers used a lot of non-longshore workers 
and put pressure on the longshoremen to accept a “supplementary” agreement that provided 
them with lower wages than the coastwise longshore agreement, if longshoremen wanted 
container handling jobs.  Moreover, the supplement gave the employers power to decide 
how many men were needed in each operation and hire their own steady men, if locals did 
not supply enough men from the hiring hall to work on container freight stations.    
Despite the decrease in number of “older” men due to automation-related elimination 
of many dock workers, retirement, and natural death, the employers enjoyed an enormous 
increase in the volume of shipping tonnage up until 1969.  They recruited thousands of new 
B-men between 1963 and 1969 to handle this increased work, resulting in no changes in the 
total coastwise number of registered longshoremen.  In Local 10, the recruits increased the 
percentage of black longshoremen: By 1969, over half of the total number of longshoremen 
was African Americans.  The position of B-men and the local’s struggle against the 
employers’ effort to recruit steady men were linked in many aspects.  In one incident, B-men 
became scapegoats in the battle between the employers and local 10 over the steady men 
issue, when the employers vitiated the union’s decision on the B-men’s promotion as a 
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punishment for the local’s not supplying enough steady men.  In addition, the employers 
attempted to recruit younger men into steady men positions.  After having stayed in B-men 
status for years, newly registered A-men were required to work in the hold for five more 
years.  For them, an offer for a steady men position might have been tempting.  Such 
problems proved that the union decision to agree to a large number of long tenure second-
class workers created further challenges for the longshoremen in their struggle to win 
control of their workplace back from their employers. 
 
1. The Preparation for the Second M & M Agreement  
During the five years under the first Mechanization & Modernization (M & M) 
Agreement, productivity rates in the shipping industry steadily increased.  From 1961 to 
1966, the PMA enjoyed a 40 percent increase in productivity.
1
  According to Paul T. 
Hartman, who in the late 1960s studied the impact of the 1960 M & M Agreement, the most 
important sources of the increase in the early 1960s were the elimination of multiple 
handling on the dock and the abandonment of dock work manning requirements.  
Immediately after the Agreement, employers successfully pressured the union to reduce 
dock work manning to two men and introduced new methods in unloading and loading 
certain goods.  For example, loading of 500-pound bales of cotton in the old days required 
six dock men to tow them by using four-wheelers from the place of rest to the ship’s side, or 
four men to palletize them by using forklifts.  By introducing a newer variety of lift trucks, 
such as a “squeeze lift,” cotton bales were “directly picked up at the place of rest, without 
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requiring pallets, and carried to the hook.”2  In this operation, Hartman emphasized, dock 
men became completely unnecessary.  By 1963, the dock men’s hours had been reduced to 
half of what the ports had used in 1960.
3
  Hartman argued that “nearly all the productivity 
increase associated with dock work must be attributed solely to work-rules abandonment” 
because goods that had been already handled by machinery in 1960 could not have 
generated more productivity if the manning rules had not been changed.
4
 
Despite the reduction of the basic gang size and the elimination of dock men and 
although there were fewer men on the piers where containerization had been introduced, the 
total number of the coastwise registered longshoremen did not decline.  The number of A-
men decreased from 12,700 to 10, 607 between 1959 and 1966, but the increase in the 
number of B-man from 1,000 to 2,600 compensated for the loss.  Moreover, the overall 
man-hours and average earnings of the longshoremen actually rose.
5
  Lincoln Fairley, who 
served as research director of the ILWU until 1967, pointed out that an enormous increase in 
tonnage was the unforeseen but major contributor to the increase in the total man-hours and 
earnings.  Between 1961 and 1966, the amount of cargo handled by the PMA soared from 
eighteen to thirty one million tons.  Although the container tonnage rose from 0.6 to 4.3 
million tons during the same period, it consisted of less than 15 percent of the total cargo.  
This slow development of containerization was another crucial factor that made it possible 
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for the number of the registered men to remain steady.
6
  In other words, according to Fairley, 
the total tonnage increase, rather than the first M & M Agreement, had necessitated the rise 
in man-hours, increased the average earnings of the longshoremen, and maintained the 
number of those employed on the waterfront.
7
   
During the debate over the M & M Agreement, Harry Bridges had persuaded rank-
and-file workers that mechanization would make their work easier.  By 1965, jitneys had 
been used more and more, but this process did not automatically generate the condition in 
which the work became easier.  Fairley pointed out that “work in the hold on break-bulk 
cargo had in some instance become harder” and thus workers were not happy about it.8  For 
example, longshoremen traditionally used “rope” slings when discharging coffee, which 
could be dragged into anywhere inside the hold and placed even on top of coffee sacks.
9
  
When longshoremen loaded twelve sacks, the sling was pulled away by the winch driver and 
placed on a four wheeler by dock workers who subsequently marked the sacks in order to 
indicate to which company warehouse each sack belonged, and they sorted them out 
accordingly by pushing the wheeler around on the dock and putting the sacks away in the 
right place.  San Francisco longshoreman Reg Theriault claimed that loading twelve coffee 
sacks, each of which weighed 154 pounds, into a rope sling in “three piles four high” was 
not that bad a job, if the workers knew what they were doing and if they planned ahead:  
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You were never lifting sacks up more than about waist high.  After you had dug 
down you could usually use low sacks for the bottom if you planned ahead and, 
reaching back, find something higher up to top off the load.
10
 
 
But when jitneys began to do most of the dock work and there were no dock men to 
sort coffee sacks on the pier, pallet boards, instead of rope slings, were sent into the hold, 
and hold men had to sort out sacks before they loaded them onto the pallet boards.  Theriault 
claimed that the new method made operations harder for the hold men.  Unlike a rope sling, 
a pallet board could neither be dragged over sacks of coffee because it would rip the sacks, 
nor could it be pulled by the winch driver after it was loaded at the corner of the hold.  Hold 
men had to move the board out to the square opening of the hatch in order for the winch 
driver to lift it straight up.  In order to move the pallet board loaded with sacks, which could 
easily weigh over 2,000 pounds, hold men had to build a “runway” for it from the place 
where they loaded the sacks to directly underneath the hatch.  According to Theriault, some 
ports used “greased planks,” and some others used heavy “steel rollers” to make these 
runways.  In order to make it easier for them to move the loaded board, the runways were 
typically built to run down toward the underneath of the hatch.  However, another problem 
arose:   
The empty pallet board, when you began loading it, was already somewhere above 
your knees, and you started by stacking the sacks on top of it from there, ending up 
about head high.  Since the coffee was also being sorted on the ship, you were 
constantly skimming off to get [the sacks that had] the same mark.  Most of the sacks 
you lifted came from down around your feet.  Bend down, grab on to a sack, and 
then lift the whole 154 pounds of it all the way up and over.
11
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This process, which made it difficult for the hold men to control their loading movements 
and plan ahead, exhausted them immensely after each operation.  
Moreover, new safety concerns emerged from working with new machines, such as 
conveyors, automatic lifts, and cranes.
12
  A 1965 accident in which a huge marine crane fell 
off its 70-foot-high tower and killed four Local 10 longshoremen and one operating 
engineers’ union member was an example.13  In the same year, another accident injured a 
man on the Matson “van dock” in Alameda.  Both his legs were broken by being caught 
between two tractors.
14
  The emission of carbon monoxide from jitneys, especially used 
where there was no ventilation system, also raised a concern about the issue of the 
longshoremen’s health.15   
To prevent the loss of their control over work processes and the harder and unsafe 
working conditions, rank-and-file workers organized numerous jobsite direct actions, despite 
discouragement by the International and prohibition in the contract.  A legal case brought by 
Los Angeles Local 13 against the PMA and the ILWU in the late 1960s demonstrates that 
work stoppages were continuous, especially among Local 13 members, a majority of whom 
had voted against the 1961 M & M Agreement.
16
  The case began in 1965 when the Los 
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Angeles employers deregistered Pete Velasquez, a “Class A” longshoreman, for organizing 
“illegal” work stoppages a dozen times between 1962 and 1964.  He had then served as a 
night business agent for the local and went back to work as a longshoreman when his term 
expired in 1964.  Velasquez subsequently filed a grievance against the discharge.  When the 
Coast Arbitrator confirmed his deregistration, Local 13 filed a lawsuit against the PMA and 
the ILWU for a breach of the contract agreement.  The local also charged the ILWU for a 
violation of the duty of fair representation because the International decided not to fight his 
deregistration in exchange for the employers’ agreement with the union in another 
arbitration case.
17
  Regardless of the outcome, the lawsuit reveals that rank-and-file workers 
still organized jobsite direct actions in order to defend their working conditions.  It also 
shows that their activism was often sanctioned by local officers. 
Although not acknowledging it publicly, ILWU Secretary-Treasurer Louis Goldblatt 
also expressed his uneasiness about the M & M agreement.  Ironically, he was one of the 
promoters of mechanization when he had worked on publishing the union’s booklet entitled 
Men and Machines in 1963.  The purpose of the book was to encourage the workers and the 
public to support mechanization and modernization.  Nevertheless, he changed his mind 
some time after its publication.  Sydney Roger, who was working as an editor of The 
Dispatcher in the 1960s, overheard Goldblatt surprisingly and privately expressing to Harry 
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Bridges that the M & M was “a sell out.”18  Nevertheless, both the employers and the ILWU 
were ready to renew the basic principles of the M & M Agreement upon its expiration. 
When negotiations began in 1966 for a new contract, the International focused on 
how to increase wages for younger men, who had been most dissatisfied with the first M & 
M agreement, and how to encourage early retirement of older men.
19
  Manning scale, 
however, was the central issue for the employers.  They were willing to pay higher wages 
and make a wage guarantee in exchange for more flexibility in assigning men and further 
eliminating “unnecessary” men by dismantling the basic gang.  In this way, they hoped to 
have the right to transfer longshoremen from dock to ship and from hatch to hatch, as they 
wished.
20
  
Bridges and other ILWU Coast Committee members persuaded caucus delegates to 
agree to the employers’ offer by stating that the union should not “hang onto unnecessary 
men.”  Instead, it should “devote to trying to get more men where they were really needed, 
as in the hold, man-handling oversized loads.”21  Some delegates expressed their fear for the 
future when robots would replace men on the waterfront.  A special issue of the Local 10 
Bulletin about mechanization reflected this thought when it reported how gangs and working 
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men had disappeared from the piers of Matson and other shipping companies that had 
pioneered containerization.  Huge cranes and piles of containers replaced basic gangs, and 
only crane gangs remained.  According to the Bulletin, the Vietnam War and the slow 
development of container operation facilities maintained the overall number of registered 
longshoremen in the local, but this condition would not last long – a situation that it 
described as “dancing on a keg of dynamite.”22   
Nevertheless, the caucus eventually decided to accept the employers’ demand.  The 
new agreement bestowed upon the employers the right to decide the rules regarding what 
constituted “necessary” men by issuing a “T-letter” that would designate when and how 
many men were needed for each operation.
23
  If the operation should be changed during the 
course of the eight hour shift, the employers could change the manning by supplying the 
gang with more men or by “peeling-off” some men from the gang.  The entire unit of a gang 
could be replaced with another gang with an “appropriate” size during the subsequent shift.   
The PMA and the union also agreed to restructure the gang:  “front men” and gang 
bosses were explicitly eliminated as a redundant force.
24
  A greater flexibility was 
anticipated by splitting dock men from the ship gang and shifting them from hatch to hatch 
as the employers directed.
25
  As a result, the distinction among shipmen, dock men, and 
swingmen vanished and all became generally categorized as longshoremen.
26
  In exchange 
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for accepting further robotic operations, the union demanded that the ILWU would have 
jurisdiction on all the work on the dock in order for it to have the upper hand in its rivalry 
with the Teamsters.   
At the end of July 1966, the longshoremen ratified the five year contract that was 
commonly called the Second M & M Agreement.
27
  Nevertheless, thirty eight percent of the 
membership voted against it.  Moreover, three of the four major locals voted it down.  San 
Francisco Local 10, where Bridges had his most fervent supporters, was the only major local 
that voted in favor of the contract.
28
  In comparison with first M & M Agreement which a 
third of the longshoremen had voted against, the current agreement got a higher percentage 
and a larger raw number of negative votes.  Fairley claimed that the contract would have 
been defeated if a second referendum had been called.  Moreover, the number of A-men had 
been reduced to 10,607, while the number of B-men who were disfranchised was 2,617 in 
that year.
29
  Because 3,985 A-men voted against the contract, it stands to reason that if B-
men had been allowed to vote, the result would have been different.
30
  Nevertheless, Bridges 
believed that the agreement was “the best contract ever” and was disturbed by the number of 
the members who turned it down.
31
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2. The “Steady Men” 
During the following years, one part of the agreement, Section 9.43, became one of 
the most controversial provisions generating strong resistance, especially from two big 
locals, San Francisco Local 10 and Los Angeles Local 13.  The section allowed the 
employers to directly hire “skilled mechanical or powered equipment operators without limit 
as to numbers or length of time in steady employment.”32  The employers’ rationale for 
addressing this new hiring practice was that they needed “trained” workers who could run 
sophisticated equipment whenever they were needed.  These “steady men” would be 
assigned to jobs without being dispatched through the hiring hall.  
The desire of waterfront employers to hire a group of workers who would work 
steadily and specifically for each employer was not new.  In San Francisco, before the 1934 
strike, employers had had a steady workforce, although they had also simultaneously used 
the so-called “shape-up” method by which they created pools of vulnerable workers in their 
attempt to meet the demands of the fluctuating labor market in the industry.  This shape-up 
practice had been eliminated after the 1934 strike when the longshoremen established the 
hiring hall through which work opportunities were more or less equally shared among 
registered men.  But the 1934 strike had not immediately ended the San Francisco 
employers’ using steady gangs or steady employees.   The so-called “preferred” gangs 
which continued to be assigned to jobs of particular employers earned more than other gangs, 
although they were dispatched from the hiring hall by union dispatchers who had tried to 
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equalize the earnings among gangs.  Longshoremen finally eliminated the practice in 1939 
through continuous jobsite actions and bargaining negotiations.
33
  
But the desire of the employers to have steady gangs did not disappear.  The 
employers made several ill-fated attempts to revive a steady employee system in the 1940s 
and 1950s.  For example, during the Second World War coastwise employers had demanded 
the right to have steady gangs, although the National War Labor Board, which mediated the 
negotiations between the longshoremen’s union and the waterfront employers, was not 
persuaded by the employers’ reasoning.  In matter of fact, the employers’ unsuccessful 1944 
demands were quite similar to what they would later try to implement through the first and 
second M & M Agreements.  The PMA wanted to have right to shift longshoremen between 
ship and dock in order to eliminate any “idle men.”  The employers also tried to control the 
hiring process by selecting dispatchers through port committees, rather than letting 
longshoremen elect them.
34
  These demands indicated their deeply-rooted desire to control 
hiring practices and discipline the work force – revisions of the work regime that they were 
finally able to implement through the second M & M Agreement after the old work rules 
had been abandoned during the early 1960s.   
In their earlier attempts to have their own steady work force, employers had claimed 
that it would be more “efficient” for them to have such workers because these full time 
employees would soon become familiar with the specialized work carried out by a particular 
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employer.  They had portrayed the hiring hall as a hindrance to increasing efficiency and 
steady men would eliminate the travel time between hiring hall and their workplace.  In the 
1960s, employers added to the earlier reasoning that they needed workers who could operate 
and repair new equipment and machinery on a regular basis.  
Many rank-and-file workers and local officers correctly perceived Section 9.43 of 
the 1966 Agreement as a threat to the hiring hall and its system of equalization of job 
opportunities on a rotation basis – a system that had been established and maintained 
through tenacious struggles since the early 20
th
 century.  When the Taft-Hartley Act 
prohibited the hiring hall in 1947, longshoremen had responded with a 95-day strike, 
successfully forcing the employers to leave the hiring hall under the union’s control.35  
Longshoremen feared that if the employers were allowed to hire skilled steady men outside 
the hiring hall, then the equalization of work opportunity would not be achieved between the 
workers dispatched from the hiring hall and the steady men directly hired by the employers.   
Furthermore, the hiring hall symbolized more than protecting jobs or equalizing 
work opportunities.  Who controlled the process and based on what criteria were the most 
central matters for both parties.  A longshoreman’s promotion in accordance with a seniority 
rule to a different skilled position was conducted under the supervision of the “Promotion 
Committee” – a joint body between the union and the employers.  The employers demanded 
their right to bypass the process and the seniority system that the union had honored.  In one 
of the post-agreement discussions between the two parties, the employers stated their 
position on steady men:  
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. . . while the employer is to seek his steady skilled men first from those skilled men 
presently eligible for dispatched in a skilled category and second from the remainder 
of the workforce, the employer is not obligated to seek such steady men from the 
first group on the basis of seniority but rather on the basis of ability and competence 
as determined by the employer and the employer is not obligated to exhaust the first 
source before moving to the second.” 36   
 
This passage demonstrated the employers’ deep-seated intention to invoke their long lost 
prerogative to select men as they wanted by evoking the buzz words of “competency” and 
“merit.”  For the longshoremen, however, a man’s “competency” in a skilled job could be 
gained through constant internal training programs and thus they demanded employers 
provide more training sessions to men whom the union designated as eligible to be promoted.  
For them, the employers’ plan would foster competition rather than cooperation among the 
men.   
Moreover, many longshoremen had been proud of providing older or disabled 
longshoremen with lighter jobs on the deck or dock as winch or jitney drivers.  This showed 
that they used different criteria from employers regarding who deserved to be in which job 
positions.  San Francisco longshoremen were especially concerned that Section 9.43 was 
unclear about what category of skilled men would be hired as steady men and whether they 
could be shifted among different skilled positions.  If the employers hired steady men to 
drive jitneys and winches, then those who were trained for these positions by the local and 
who were dispatched through the hiring hall would lose their jobs.   
The hiring hall was more than a place for the workers to get job assignments.  It also 
functioned as a space for them to socialize among themselves.  While waiting for their 
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registration numbers to be called from the dispatchers’ window, longshoremen talked with 
each other about all sort of things.  They exchanged knowledge about the waterfront and 
what was going on in the larger society as well as information about individual gangs, jobs, 
and their co-workers.  Many of those who did not get dispatched due to lack of available 
work stayed in the hall, playing cards or doing some other activities together.   Nearby the 
hiring hall, there were bars and restaurants where they could hang out.  For the 
longshoremen, therefore, the existence of steady men would destroy this hiring-hall tradition 
and its ancillary culture that helped them build friendship, human bonding, and working-
class solidarity.   
Workers also knew that when the employers argued that steady men would promote 
“familiarity” and increase “efficiency,” they meant “monotony” and “speed ups” for 
workers.  An increase in “productivity” under this condition thus should be translated into 
more inhumane work processes for longshoremen and more profit for the employers.
37
  The 
ILWU rank and file, therefore, had their own clear understanding of the implications of 
these terms, such as efficiency and productivity.  As in the past, a steady men system would 
divide workers, especially in the period of declining employment, and thus weaken the unity 
within the union.   A delegate to the 1967 longshore caucus meeting pointed out that the 
provision would “take the men from being part of the Union to being subservient to the 
employer.”38  As Charles Larrowe’s study concluded, the fundamental purpose of addressing 
a steady men provision rested upon the employers’ “desire to obtain workers under 
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conditions not unilaterally imposed by the union.”39  In other words, taking back power to 
control the work force was the underlying motivation for the employers, and the 
longshoremen understood it and thus they did not want to easily let the practice enter again 
into the industry.  Not unexpectedly, tension between the two parties soon escalated 
especially in San Francisco and Los Angeles.  
In San Francisco, as soon as the second M & M Agreement was signed, Matson 
hired forty steady men as lift operators.  Local 10 members persuaded the men not to take 
the steady job but to return to the hiring hall to get dispatched along with all other men.  The 
membership insisted that the “skilled men” referred to in Section 9.43 did not include lift 
operators – a claim that would be confirmed later by the union’s Coast Committee members.  
Neither winch drivers nor lift operators but only crane operators, as well as “gearmen” who 
were employed to “build, repair, and handle” stevedore equipment and “coopers” who 
repaired cargo containers, should be categorized as steady men.
40
  The local also argued for 
a policy of “one-man, one-job” in order to prevent the employers from transferring a man to 
and from different skilled jobs.  This “one-man, one-job” demand would be soon adopted 
coastwise at the 1967 caucus meeting.   
Claiming that locals’ preventing workers from being hired as steady men was a 
violation of the contract, the PMA brought the issue to the Coast Arbitrator, who 
subsequently ruled that merely advising men not to take a steady job did not constitute a 
violation of the contract unless direct or indirect “threats, coercion, or penalty” were 
involved.  But when Local 10 officers visited steady men and talked them out of the job, and 
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when Local 13 voted to “stand united” not taking steady jobs, the Coast Arbitrator decided 
that these actions constituted coercion and thus violated his previous award.  Despite the 
award, the employers had a difficult time hiring steady men because of resistance from the 
locals.  The PMA in a report stated that the trouble in hiring steady men stemmed “not from 
the inability of the parties at the Coast level to reach agreement but rather from the inability 
to induce certain of the locals to implement decisions of the Coast parties.”41  This statement 
revealed nothing new when considering the history of the union:  Rank-and-file workers had 
established through jobsite collective actions various work rules that they had thought were 
just, rather than merely accepting what the International had promised the employers at the 
bargaining table.  However, it demonstrated the gap growing between the International and 
the locals regarding the basic principles upon which the union had been built.     
In matter of fact, Bridges told delegates at longshore caucus meetings that “98 
percent of the workers in this country” worked steady and that there was nothing wrong with 
a man working steady.  He argued that the employers in the past had hired steady or 
preferred gangs in order to undermine the union, but the 1966 contract did not have the same 
purpose and thus the members should change their attitude toward it.
42
  For those who had 
never experienced a system by which workers equalized work opportunities on a rotation 
basis and by which workers could make such a decision, although limited, on when and how 
many hours to work, what Bridges stated might have made sense.  However, Bridges’ 
remarks completely contradicted what the West Coast longshoremen had fought for since 
the 1930s – controlling hiring and work opportunities based on the principles of equality and 
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sharing.  For them, eliminating steady employment had been a way for them to achieve the 
goal of controlling their workplace.   
By the spring of 1967, Matson in San Francisco was able to hire twenty nine steady 
men, but the employers had not been able to implement their initial request for 206 steady 
men.  After facing strong resistance from the local, they decided to request only 100 men, 
including the 29 men already working for Matson, although the employers reserved their 
right to ask for 106 additional men after six months of trial with the 100 men.  Because 
Local 10 was still concerned that the steady men would take jobs away from those trained 
by the joint Promotion Committee to be skilled jitney and winch drivers, it requested that the 
employers wait until the completion of the promotion process.  The local also demanded the 
employers agree to the principle of “one man one job.”  If these demands were met, then the 
local would be willing to give the employers the right to employ steady men in different 
positions to fulfill their eight hour guarantee.  When the employers rejected the proposal, the 
local’s officers continued to persuade members not to take steady men jobs because doing so 
would be “against the interest of the union.”43  
 
3. Jurisdiction over “Stuffing and Unstuffing” of Containers 
In addition to the debate over the steady men, by the late 1960s, dissatisfaction rose 
among the rank and file regarding the issue of at what place and by whom containers should 
be handled.  By 1968, the usage of containers had expanded, accompanied by the 
standardization of container sizes, the growth of container terminal facilities, and new 
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container ships.  The size of containerized cargo increased to 6 million tons which meant 
that sixteen percent of the total tonnage handled by the PMA was containerized.
44
  The total 
tonnage handled on the West Coast by the PMA also grew to almost 38 million tons and 
total man-hour input also increased accordingly, although man-hours per ton decreased due 
to the expansion of containerization.  In May 1967, the San Francisco port hired 720 B-men 
and another 400 in 1969.
45
  The 1967 figures showed that coastwise B-men constituted 
about one-fourth of the total registered longshoremen.
46
  Despite the recruitment of more B-
men, several thousand more casual longshoremen were recruited from sister locals in order 
to handle the increased cargo.
47
  
Nevertheless, regarding handling containers, shipping companies hired non-
longshoremen whose wage rates were much lower than those of ILWU longshore local 
members.
48
  Jurisdictional conflicts between the ILWU and the Teamsters regarding loading 
and unloading on the dock had existed long before the commencement of containerization.  
The two unions had set up work boundaries between their respective groups of workers.  For 
example, Teamsters could handle “any load being handled in single lift units,” whereas 
longshoremen could handle “all breakdown of high piles.”49  But violations of the agreement 
had occurred from time to time.  In May 1966, the Bulletin had indignantly reported 
“teamster problems” by claiming, “Teamster Drivers have been coming in to the piers and 
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climbing all over the cargo to peck out what they want before the cargo has been sorted.  
THIS IS IN COMPLETE VIOLATION OF THE CONTRACT, and must be stopped.”50 
With the growth and development of containerization, jurisdictional problems had 
become more complicated.  Rather than giving the work to the men on the docks, steamship 
companies had preferred contracting the work to Teamsters, non-longshoremen, or non-
union workers to man the containers.  For example, Matson containers coming into Alameda 
had used Teamsters to “stuff or unstuff” at a station away from the waterfront.  In Los 
Angeles, Matson had subcontracted handling its containers to a company that hired 
Teamsters just across from the dock.  In Seattle, a non-PMA member company had hired 
ILWU warehouse local members, rather than longshoremen local members, to man its 
containers, creating a tension between the two locals.
51
  For container shipping companies, 
using non-longshoremen meant more than paying lower wages per worker.  They could 
avoid hiring workers in a team of gang as well as eliminating other categories of work on the 
waterfront, such as clerks and walking bosses – men whom the employers considered 
“unnecessary.”   
Fairley claims that the jurisdictional matter had not been discussed during the 1966 
contract negotiations partly because container freight station facilities had been slowly 
developed.  As Marc Levinson discusses in The Box, containerization entailed more than 
merely creating containers.  It needed newly designed ships to carry standardized containers 
that could be stacked high on the decks and in the holds, new equipment, such as cranes, 
tractors, and trailer chassis, and new facilities where the operation occurred – a 
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developmental process that took time and money.
52
  In addition, before the late 1960s, 
containers had not been globally used because very few container facilities and equipment 
had been established outside the United States.  The first transatlantic container service was 
inaugurated only in 1966.  Moreover, the expansion of containerization required an 
“intermodal” transportation system.  If containers could not be carried with inland 
transportation modes, such as railways and roads, containers had to be stuffed and unstuffed 
at the port – an action that would defeat the shippers’ purpose of reducing labor costs on the 
dock.  In the railroad transportation system, “container-on-flatcar” was slowly developed 
due to high costs and regulations.  Not until the 1970s did the intermodal containerization 
became diffused widely inside the United States.
53
  In Europe and elsewhere, it would take 
longer to be established.  
In the summer of 1968, the increase in the volume of containers forced Matson to 
move its container operations from Alameda to Oakland.  When the company opened up a 
vast container complex where the old Oakland Mole had been located, it called the union for 
a negotiation.
54
  Matson proposed that it would hire longshoremen to handle its cargos in 
exchange for their accepting lower wage rates.  In its “T-Letter #135,” Matson announced 
that it would require only one crane operator as the minimum manning for each crane.  The 
number of lashers, whose job was to tie down container vans to the deck, or the number of 
any other categories of longshoremen would be determined based on the employer’s need in 
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each operation.  In addition, the company demanded that workers hired as steady men would 
work “interchangeably on all jobs.”  It also added that no clerks or walking bosses would be 
included in the new work crew.  When the Local 10 executive board, which had jurisdiction 
over Oakland operations, refused to agree to the terms, the Coast Committee called a special 
caucus meeting to determine the union’s proposals for a coastwise container agreement.55   
About 100 delegates from thirty five ILWU locals were sent to the special caucus 
meeting in October.  They wanted all container-handling to be done under the 
longshoremen’s master contract agreement.  However, the Coast Committee reminded them 
that the master contract had given the employers the right not to use longshoremen if the 
work was done outside the dock.  If the demand of the caucus were to become viable, then 
the contract agreement would have to be changed, but the Coast Committee did not believe 
that it would be an easy task to change the Agreement scheduled to expire in 1971.  Rather 
than opening up negotiations to change the contract agreement itself, the Coast committee 
suggested holding new negotiations for a coastwise “container freight station (CFS)” 
supplement.  This supplement would stipulate working conditions for those handling 
containers on the dock – conditions that would be inferior to those under the Pacific Coast 
Longshore Agreement.  In this way, the Coast Committee thought that they would be able to 
bring container work to the dock.
56
   
Most delegates did not support the idea of negotiating a supplementary agreement 
having less favorable terms to the workers than the Coastwise longshore contract agreement.  
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They were concerned that it would create a condition in which the employers would avoid 
giving work to those working under the Coastwise longshore contract.  The Coast 
Committee persuaded the delegates to get a supplementary agreement first and then “fight to 
improve it later.”  The Committee also believed that if longshoremen could not do the 
container work, then at least other ILWU members, such as warehousemen, ought to get the 
job.   
After a couple of weeks of discussion, a compromise was reached:  The caucus 
decided that all container work on the docks would be performed under the master contract 
agreement, but the union would also negotiate a coastwise container terminal contract, 
which would expire on the same date as the Pacific Coast Longshore Agreement.
57
  The 
caucus selected twenty-two negotiating committee members, including several International 
officers, Coast Committee members, local presidents, and some others.  Meanwhile, several 
International officers of the negotiating committee decided to gather more information about 
container work by having a tour of the container yards.
58
   
When the union and the employers could not reach an agreement after four months 
of negotiations, the union called a coastwise stoppage of container work on March 17, 1969, 
and the PMA filed a complaint to the Coast Arbitrator Sam Kagel who subsequently ruled 
that the longshoremen must resume their work on containers.
59
  When the union ignored the 
ruling, the PMA took the case to the U.S. District Court which ruled in favor of the 
employers.  The longshoremen refused to comply with the court order, but the court 
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subpoenaed a number of ILWU officers for a contempt hearing, and the union ordered the 
workers to resume the work.  The stoppage ended in early April.
60
  
In August, the negotiations finally led to an agreement that obligated the employers 
to hire in their container freight stations (CFS) longshoremen from the hiring hall or the 
“Utility Men.”  Each station would be guaranteed to have steady men who consisted of 
registered longshoremen and who would be dispatched from the hiring hall, unless the hall 
could not provide the required number of steady men.  In the latter case, the employer was 
“free to employ workmen of his own choosing.”  The CFS utility men’s wage scales were 
similar to other longshoremen working under the main contract, but they were ineligible to 
receive an 8-hour wage guarantee paid from the M & M fund.  The supplement would expire 
in 1971 as well as the main contract agreement.
61
   
Although the referendum result showed that the majority of longshoremen voted for 
the supplement, a lot of no votes came from large locals.
62
  Moreover, Bridges in his regular 
column in The Dispatcher lamented that there were more numbers of vocal opponents than 
the actual “no” votes.  Many members “in all locals called the agreement bad” but voted for 
it because it would not last long.  Believing that the supplement was a good contract, 
Bridges expressed his distaste toward those who vocally criticized the supplement or voted 
against it.
63
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In January 1970, when the supplement began to take effect, Local 10 discussed a 
new problem.  According to the agreement, an employer who needed “CFS utility men” 
should request the number of men needed five days in advance for each operation from the 
hiring hall.  Then, the union would announce it, receive applications from the registered men 
for the job, and select the required number of men among the applicants.  The agreement, 
however, did not designate how to select the men among the pool of applicants, except that 
A-men should get preference over B-men.
64
  This problem was resolved to a certain degree 
by selecting men based on seniority.  However, if the union did or could not supply enough 
utility men from the hall, the employers hired from outside the hall steady men who could be 
fired or laid off at anytime.  For that reason alone, these steady men were powerless to resist 
speed-ups or harassment, according to an ILWU member who worked as a utility man.
65
  
Moreover, among utility men, a separate seniority system was established, which did not 
precisely mirror the seniority system of the union.
66
  In addition, Fairley pointed out that the 
supplement never fully accomplished its purpose because shipping companies continued 
using Teamsters, non-longshore workers, and other non union workers into the early 1970s.   
 
4. Local 10 and B-men  
After the deregistration of the eighty two B-men in June of 1963, Local 10 had hired 
a large number of longshoremen into B status on four different occasions, reaching a total of 
almost 3,000 B-men between 1959 and 1969 (see Table 7.1 below).  In October 1963, over 
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700 new B-men began to work in the local.  By early 1965, the number of registered men in 
the local was still large, reaching 4,780, but due to the availability of plenty of work, the 
local had to call their sister locals to recruit extra hands.  According to the Bulletin, between 
January and April, a total of 2,800 casuals worked for the local. The records reveal that the 
number in each month was noticeably uneven.
67
  By 1965, the employers applied the 70 
percent availability rule not only to B-men but also to A-men.  When considering that all 
registered longshoremen had to be available for six days a week, unless they were sick or 
injured, the number of available registered men had to be stable, and thus the fluctuation of 
the number of casuals demonstrated that the workload of each month had been 
unpredictable.
68
  By the end of the year, the local recruited several hundred new B-men and 
promoted some of those hired in 1963 to A status.  During the next year, the numbers of A-
men and B-men in Local 10 were estimated to be 2,918 and 985, respectively.
69
      
The union encouraged B-men to attend regular membership meetings, but just as it 
had been for those hired in 1959, the balcony was still the place where they sat separately 
from the A-men.  B-men could get medical and dental insurance benefits, but they were 
eligible only if they maintained 400 hours of work during the first or last 6 months of a 
year.
70
  Due to an increase in using new equipment and machinery, taking “safety training 
classes” became mandatory for the B-men.  Paying the “pro-rate” share for the usage of the 
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hiring hall was still required, but in 1965 they were asked to pay their pro-rata share not 
monthly but semi-annually at a lower rate.
71
   
The traditional low-man-out system continued to be used in dispatching the men.  B-
men were assigned to jobs on a rotation basis from the “Class B Board” after all available A-
men were dispatched.  Before the Second M & M Agreement, the gang boss had reported 
the place, date, the work hours of his gang members -- information that had been used to 
calculate the wages of the members.  But since the breaking up of the basic gang, dock men 
did not work steadily with one gang any longer and were shifted to work from their original 
assignment to any work on docks, cars, or barges.  In order to know whether their wages 
were calculated correctly, responsibility remained with them to remember and report the 
numbers of the gang with which they worked and the date, time, and the place of their job 
assignments each time when they were dispatched and shifted.  B-men suffered the same 
fate as the dock men:  they were not allowed to work steadily with a particular gang, and 
thus they also had to report which gang they worked with each time they were assigned.
72
 
B-men had been traditionally excluded from taking skilled positions.  However, after 
the second M & M Agreement was signed, the PMA introduced more jitneys into the hold 
work.  Because B-men and casuals constituted an overwhelming majority of the hold men, 
the local and the employers decided to get applications from B-men for the position if they 
could not recruit enough A-men for each gang to be equipped with two lift drivers.
73
  The 
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union and the employers jointly provided trainings for those who applied for the “lift driver-
hold man” position, including B-men.   For those who were selected as lift driver-hold men, 
working steadily in the gang was permitted.
74
  In September 1966, the Bulletin reported that 
some B-men who had recently gotten lift work had shown up on the piers prior to 8:00 a.m. 
in order to try out the lifts.  It warned B-men that no longshoremen should begin work prior 
to 8:00 a.m.  This incident demonstrated how anxious B-men were to use this rare 
opportunity to learn the new skill.
75
   
In 1967, there was still plenty of work and thus the local recruited another 700 new 
B-men and promoted in December all who still remained as B-men since 1963 and some of 
those who were hired in 1965.
76
  But the employers brought complaints about the promotion 
and the union’s “unilateral action” in dispatching the promoted men from the Class A Board.  
When Local 10 adamantly stood up for its decision, the employers appealed it to arbitration.  
The Bulletin reported that the membership unanimously passed a motion that “[T]he union 
shall stand 100 percent behind both the 1963 and 1965 ‘B’ men who have been promoted to 
‘A’ membership to see that they remain ‘A’ men and shall be given full registration.”77  The 
local membership resisted for months the employers’ attempt to vitiate its decision, even 
after the port and area arbitrators ruled that the promotions were in violation of the contract.  
But when the employer threatened to take the matter to the court to enforce the arbitrators’ 
decision, the union agreed to negotiate.   
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In June 1968, a special “stop work” membership meeting reported the result of the 
negotiations:  The previous year’s promotions were rescinded.  Instead, the promotion of the 
“1963 men” would start now.  This meant that these men were to be promoted after having 
worked as B-men for five years.  For the “1965 men,” they were turned back to the B-list 
and their promotion process restarted by having an opportunity to apply for A status.  
Among the applicants, twenty five men per each month from the following month would be 
promoted until all eligible men were advanced.  Officers explained that the resolution had 
been reached after hard bargaining because the employers had wanted to turn back the 
registration of even the “1963” B-men and insisted that the industry should retain 25 percent 
of the workforce as B-men.  Local officers tried to maintain the membership decision and 
even pushed further to say that the local would advance all B-men including those who had 
been hired in 1967, but they eventually had to agree to the resolution.  Local 10 President 
Cleophas Williams, the first black president of the local, pointed out that the employers were 
retaliating against the local for its failure to provide enough steady men.
78
  
The Bulletin describes how rank-and-file members responded to the resolution.  
Many claimed that the B-men should have been already advanced and some urged the 
membership to fight further in order to take all B-men including those hired in 1967.  They 
pointed out how rough the B-men’s working conditions had been with the harsher discipline 
and regulations under the M & M programs.  One member suggested that they place a limit 
on weekly hours to provide every man with a fair share of the available work.  This idea 
reflected the rank-and-file workers’ demand for shorter-hour work to create more jobs for 
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more workers -- an idea that had appeared between 1938 and 1951.  However, not all 
members shared the same sentiment.  Some stated that the membership should be consulted 
more in the future by union officers when planning to promote B-men.  Supporting this 
argument, Harry Bridges admonished the members that the local should carefully “plan 
ahead” not to expand the membership.  He emphasized that the program was “not to share 
the starvation” but to make it possible for “all hands to earn a decent living.”79   
The discussion at the meeting indicates that although the local’s membership had lost 
its control over the registration process since the late 1950s, it still tried to exercise as much 
authority as possible.  It also reveals that Bridges continuously opposed any plan to “share 
the starvation.”  More importantly, despite Bridges’s position, the weight of which stemmed 
from his powerful status as the president of the International, many rank-and-file workers 
still supported the idea of equality and were willing to share their resources rather than let 
one group of workers experience hardship more than the other group.  The employers’ initial 
idea behind creating the B status men in 1958 had been to create a pool of workers who 
could be more flexible but also available to the employers.  But what had happened on the 
West Coast waterfront since then demonstrated that creating unequal working conditions 
among workers who had once experienced equality proved to be difficult.  The existence of 
class B-men itself contradicted the union’s decade-long effort to build a sense of solidarity, 
equality, and democracy.   
During the summer and fall of 1968, the local membership and officers were in a 
series of discussions about jurisdictional matters on container handling.  Meanwhile, the 
work load soared tremendously.  During October, a total of 10,000 jobs were farmed out to 
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casual workers.  This created a condition in which the employers decided to allow existing 
B-men to belong to gangs.  During the next summer, the local hired about 600 new B-men to 
work not only on ships but also at container freight stations and promoted any remaining B-
men hired in 1963 and in 1965.  It also prepared to advance those who had been hired in 
1967 in a small number each month.
80
  It is unclear why some of the men hired in 1963 still 
remained as B-men, but they might have been unqualified based on the standards the Port 
Committee had set out or were working on probation.  In any case, the local decided to 
promote all those on probation as well this time, and thus after six years of working as B-
men, they finally advanced to A status. 
Year of 
recruitment 
1959 1963 1965 1967 1969 Total  
The number of 
B-men recruited 
750 700 500 720 600 3,270* 
 
Table 7.1:  The number of B-men recruited between 1959 and 1969  
 
Sources: Local 10 Longshore Bulletin, 1959-1969, ILWU Library, San Francisco. 
* The total number of B-men recruited was much larger than the actual number of B-men who remained on the 
waterfront because many men left the industry and some were deregistered.   
 
The recruitment of the large number of B-men during this decade resulted in an 
increase in the percentage of black men.  In 1969, black longshoremen constituted over 50 
percent of the men working in the local.
81
  By this time, the first generation of black 
longshoremen who had been hired during the Second World War had become eligible to 
retire with full benefits, and thus their numbers might have dwindled to a certain level.  In 
order for black workers to constitute a majority of the work force, a substantially large 
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number of young black men must have been hired during the 1960s – a number that more 
than compensated for the loss of black retirees.  By this time, most B-men hired between 
1959 and 1965 were promoted to fully registered status, changing also the demography of 
the membership itself:  Almost half of the members were younger men and a 
disproportionally large percentage of them were black.  These younger workers would soon 
contribute to the changes in politics of the union, rejecting a continuation of the M & M 
Agreement in 1971 and organizing the longest longshoremen strike ever on the West Coast 
waterfront. 
The Bulletin did not discuss new promotion standards for B-men, but according to 
the research done by Arthur Brunwasser, the lawyer for Longshore Jobs Defense Committee 
members, no B-man had been fired for intoxication for his first offense since deregistration 
of the eighty two B-men in 1963.
82
  Several accounts reported in the Bulletin indicated that 
those who did not pay their pro rata share on time were “pulled off the job whenever they 
were caught up with,” rather than being permanently fired.83  These accounts, however, 
might be indicating only the A-men’s situation.  Because B-men’s pro rata share was 
automatically deducted, there might have been no B-man who would be fired for paying late 
dues.  Regarding LMO, a report from record checkers in 1965 revealed that 35-40 percent of 
the skilled men and 80 percent of non-skilled men were in violation of the rule.
84
  This 
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indicated that the LMO rules were most likely too complicated for many men to adhere to 
them correctly all the time, but apparently, and more importantly, these men were not 
deregistered for the violations.  
Although the total tonnage handled on the West Coast had doubled from 20 million 
tons in 1960 to almost 40 million tons in 1969, it began to dwindle by the end of that year.  
The decrease in the total tonnage, along with the acceleration of containerization, affected 
the man-hours worked by longshoremen, which in 1966 had reached to 26.6 million man-
hours but had fallen under 20 million hours in 1970 and dropped to under 15 million in the 
following year.  The average earnings of the men, especially B-men, also fell.  The average 
earnings of B-men between 1966 and 1969 almost matched those of A-men during the same 
period:  Their average earnings in 1968 reached $8,700.  However, in 1970, they plummeted 
to $5,400.
85
  By this time, containerization and mechanization had considerably impacted 
the waterfront.  In 1969, eighteen percent of all general cargo handled by PMA companies 
was containerized.
86
   
Under the circumstances, the Port Committee agreed in December 1969 to lift the 
70-percent availability requirement that had been imposed on B-men since 1959 in order to 
allow them to get another part-time job to increase their earnings.  In addition, the local 
offered B-men the option to pay their pro-rata shares either monthly or semi-annually.
87
  
Within several months, however, the employers brought to the Port Committee a complaint 
insisting that the availability rule be reinstated.  The union side of the committee reasoned 
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that it was “senseless” to demand availability for B-men when there was little or no work for 
them.  The matter was not resolved and the employers brought it to the Area Labor Relations 
Committee, which subsequently decided that the 70 percent availability rule ought to prevail.  
It ordered that the rule be reinstated as of January 1, 1971.
88
   
 
5. Local 10:  The Negotiations for the Next Contract and Steady men 
Meanwhile in 1970, the ILWU began to prepare for upcoming negotiations for the 
next contract.  The coastwise caucus meeting for an internal discussion was scheduled for 
April 1971, but the longshoremen decided to begin the discussion early in order to give them 
enough time to formulate their demands and negotiate with the PMA.
89
  As a first step, the 
ILWU sent a delegation to New York City to find out how the East Coast longshoremen and 
their union (the ILA) had handled containerization.   
The ILA had faced similar pressure from the employers to facilitate containerization, 
but it had chosen different path from that of ILWU.  In the late 1950s, the union had won the 
establishment of “a container fund to be developed by a royalty on all containers loaded or 
unloaded away from the pier by non-ILA labor.”90  During the first half of the 1960s, the 
union had protested with strikes against the employers’ demand for changing manning 
scales and reducing the gang size.  In 1966, the union had finally decided to reduce the gang 
size in exchange for a wage guarantee plan – a step-by-step reduction that by 1967 led to the 
gang being downsized from twenty to eighteen and then to seventeen.  In 1969, the ILA had 
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made the employers in the New York shipping industry sign a “50-mile radius” provision, 
giving the union the right to handle all the containers originating within the 50-mile radius 
from the port.  Shipping companies had to pay a “container tax” for any container that 
originated within the radius but was stuffed and unstuffed by non ILA members.
91
   
In 1970, when the ILWU “Container Fact-Finding Delegation” visited New York 
City, the delegation found that the 20-man gang was still maintained, despite the reduction 
provision, and no robots were in use.  The delegates also found that the West Coast 
longshoremen had fallen behind the ILA members in terms of wage gains and pension 
increases.
92
  In October at a “preliminary” caucus, the longshoremen were ready to 
discontinue the M & M agreement.  The caucus wanted to get rid of the “T” letter section 
which allowed the employers to establish rules for manning.  The caucus also wanted to roll 
back the steady men provision by insisting on the “one man, one job” rule to prevent a 
steady man from being dispatched to different skilled positions.  It also wanted to adopt the 
ILA’s 50-mile radius rule in order to maintain the union’s jurisdiction over container 
handling.  Bridges emphasized the protection of the current longshoremen, just as he had 
consistently done since the late 1950s, and suggested that the union should demand “no lay-
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offs,” increased pension benefits, and a 40-hour week wage guarantee plan.93  Fairley 
pointed out that for the first time in bargaining history, “ILWU longshoremen were 
following the lead of the ILA rather than setting the pace.”94 
The negotiation began in November 1970.  As had it been in the 1960s, the PMA 
was willing to give monetary benefits – a wage guarantee and pension plans – and also 
offered no lay-offs during the life of the contract.  However, the employers wanted to secure 
as many steady men as they wished and acquire a high level of availability of all workers, 
while encouraging early retirement.  In order to accomplish this task, they tied these issues 
to the wage guarantee offer.  For example, they offered that only those who kept 80 percent 
availability could be eligible for a wage guarantee.   They would increase the pension 
benefits for those whose ages were between sixty two and sixty five and eligible for 
retirement, but if those in this category did not retire, then they would be ineligible for the 
wage guarantee.  The wage guarantee also would not be applied to the members of the local 
that did not provide steady men as required by the employers.  Another drastic measure that 
the employers demanded was their exclusive right to have control over registration.  They 
also wanted to determine the number of the gang required for an operation.
95
  
Although Local 10 had fought strenuously against the employers’ request for steady 
men during the first couple of years of the Second M & M Agreement, by early 1971 the 
employers had 206 steady men.
96
  In approaching new contract negotiations, Local 10 
passed resolutions, which indicated that the local stood firmly against the employers’ control 
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of manning scales.  The local was determined to roll back the provision on steady men or 
“9.43 men,” as Local 10 had called it.  The Bulletin reported that 9.43 men’s work hours 
were far ahead of those of men who were dispatched from the hiring hall.  During the 
previous year, the local had reported that employers had refused to provide information 
about their steady men and that the union had had difficulties not only equalizing work 
opportunities but also tracking down union dues owed by steady men.
97
   
Although the master contract was under negotiations, the Coast Negotiating 
Committee had given each local full authority for the first time since 1956 to negotiate and 
make a final settlement at the port level on eight items, including details on dispatching, 
jurisdiction, and manning scales.
98
  It assured that no coastwise agreement would be 
concluded until all local negotiations were completed.  In its local negotiations, Local 10 
focused on restoring the basic gang, which had been diminished, especially when the 
“robot” gang had been used for container operations.  It demanded a 12-men gang, 
consisting of one gang boss, two deck men, six hold men, two dock men, and one jitney 
driver.  The Bulletin pointed out that this demand was not unreasonable when compared 
with the size of the basic gang in New York, which consisted of seventeen men.  Writing for 
the Bulletin as a longtime Publicity Committee member, Archie Brown also emphasized the 
importance of winning a plan for equalizing the work opportunities between steady men and 
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the others and stated that the union should not agree with any contract that would not 
guarantee it.
99
   
In matter of fact, many rank-and-file workers wanted not merely to equalize the 
work opportunities between steady men and other skilled men, but also to fight to get steady 
men, including “gearmen” and “coopermen,” back to the hiring hall.  The local argued that 
with proper training all men were capable of learning new skills.  The promotion process 
had been providing training sessions for those members who applied to skilled positions and 
thus hiring some workers in skilled positions by bypassing the established promotion 
process was against the union’s principles.  This belief is found in the following statement: 
The union’s goal is to provide men who are eligible for the training or re-training 
necessary for gear and cooper work, rather than that of providing men who the 
employer thinks are “qualified” for such job the day they begin the job.100 
 
This principle was emphatically equalitarian and demonstrated the workers’ belief in human 
capacity to improve skills and knowledge via continuous educational programs.   
Nevertheless, the existence of a large pool of newly hired men in the 1960s, who had 
begun their work as B-men and who would have to wait for many years to be promoted to a 
skilled position, further complicated the steady men issue.  B-men had been forced to agree 
with the terms that they would work as hold men for five more years after their promotion to 
the A status.  For many of them, the employers’ offer for a steady men position could be 
very attractive because the provision made it possible for them to bypass the union’s 
seniority system.  By 1970, the so-called “1959 men,” or those who had been hired in 1959, 
had become eligible for being promoted to other positions than hold work because the 
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mandatory five-year period had expired.  However, most men who had been hired since 
1963 were bound by the promise or still stayed in the B status, and the employers who had 
had a difficult time to get enough steady men from the local might have tried to recruit some 
of these men.   
Local 10 officers claimed that the employers had divided and confused many 
workers by making newly promoted A-men promise to do the hold work for five more years 
and then offer some of them steady men jobs.  Local 10 officers pleaded with the younger 
members not to take the steady men jobs, arguing that it was a “trap” for workers.101  It is 
unclear how many new younger A-men actually took steady men positions by 
circumventing the seniority rule.  Nevertheless, the local’s plea to the younger men 
demonstrated the union’s dilemma in making all their members think that its seniority rule 
was fair when a large number of its members had been working as second class workers for 
a quite long period and then placed in the most difficult and dangerous work for five more 
years. 
Beyond the 9.43 section, the local became vocal against the employers’ usage of a 
“T-letter,” by which they informed the union when, how many and which skilled 
longshoremen were needed on each operation, and thus controlled the manning scales.  The 
Bulletin stated that it was “the most dangerous section in the contract.”102  The local’s 
resolutions also included safety concerns.  The lashing gangs, who worked on container 
ships, had to climb up on top of containers to lash the containers with chains.  The top of the 
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containers were slippery especially when wet and dangerous at night.
103
  According to a 
1970 report, containerization reduced the death rates of longshoremen but it did not reduce 
their chances to be exposed to a hazardous environment.  The Dispatcher quoted an analysis 
done by the Hawaii local regarding the local’s safety situation as followed:   
In a container operation most of the jobs involved continued exposure to hazards – 
falling working near the edge of the container, injury while clamping or lashing the 
container, or injury from moving equipment or falling objects.  The result is that 
while less man-hours are worked, the accident rate for those hours is higher.
104
 
 
Local 10’s demands indicated where most dangers for longshoremen existed:  it asked “non-
slip adhesive” to be applied on top of container vans on the dock as well as “gas and fume 
emitting jitneys” to be removed from the hold.105   
In the spring of 1971, the caucus instructed the coastwise negotiating committee to 
maintain the resolutions that it had passed during the previous fall and reject any 
compromised contract agreement.  But the employers maintained their offer by which they 
would provide a wage guarantee plan only if they exclusively controlled the manning scales 
and for only those who met the availability requirements.  Local 10’s Bulletin claimed that if 
the workers agreed to this demand, then they would “be reduced to nothing more than slaves 
with a big club over their heads labeled guarantee.”106  The Bulletin criticized how the local 
had been “bought out” in 1966 when it had given up the control over manning scales in 
exchange for a 50-cent raise per hour.  It urged members that this time around, they should 
take enough time to think about what demands would be important for them.   
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In early June, the tension between Local 10 and the PMA escalated because of their 
differences on the steady men issue.  The PMA insisted that the local should stop coercing 
steady men to come back to the hall -- an action that violated a 1967 Coast Arbitration 
award --, whereas the union insisted that the equalization of work opportunity between 
steady men and other skilled men dispatched from the hiring hall was the core principle of 
the contract agreement and thus the employers hiring of steady men who had earned more 
than others violated the contract.
107
  As a result, the PMA locked down the San Francisco 
port on June 7 and June 10 and broke off the coastwise negotiations.  The union responded 
to the PMA’s action by filing the case for arbitration and calling for a strike vote.108  In late 
June, ballots were cast: an overwhelm majority voted for the strike.  On the first day of July, 
the 1966 agreement expired.  The West Coast longshoremen shut down the Pacific Coast.
109
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Chapter 8 
“I still have pride and dignity”: the Strike, July 1971- February 1972 
 
On July 2, 1971, the West Coast longshoremen began their strike.  After 100 days of 
picketing, the workers had to go back to work due to a court-ordered “cooling-off” 
injunction.  But they resumed the strike when the eighty-day cooling-off period expired and 
maintained their picket line for thirty four more days.  This chapter examines the 
negotiations between the union and the employers and the evolution of union internal 
discussions regarding setting the priorities for their demands.  For many Local 10 members, 
eliminating Section 9.43 or the “steady men” provision in its entirety from a future contract 
agreement was their central demand, and thus they organized debates and actions to obtain 
this goal.  The settlement of the strike was a disappointment for them because Section 9.43 
still remained in the new contract.   
Nevertheless, strikes are more than an instrument for workers to promote their 
contract demands.  Strikes, as political scientist Josiah Bartlett Lambert points out, are 
“expressive activities” through which the strikers show their defiance and dignity against 
“powerlessness, meaninglessness, and self-estrangement” generated by the profit-driven 
capitalist production process.
1
   The 1971 strike revealed the frustration of rank-and-file 
longshoremen toward M & M Agreements and ensuing structural changes in their work 
regime.  The words and actions of Local 10 members showed their resistance against the 
employers’ increasing power over work rules and hiring processes in the name of 
                                                 
1
 Josiah Bartlett Lambert, “If the Workers Took a Notion”: The Right to Strike and American Political 
Development (Ithaca, New York: ILR Press, 2005), p. 10. 
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“progress.”  They also displayed their dissatisfaction with union top officers for their way of 
dealing with the employers and for their focusing on primarily wage issues.  They showed 
that a sense of dignity stemmed not from merely earning high wages but from standing up 
for what they believed was right.  
Picketing also entails more than an action organized in order to prevent “scabs” from 
getting into their workplace and represents more than an expression of annoyance or a mere 
matter of imposing monetary damages to business owners: A picket line is an arena for 
workers to develop working-class politics and build alternative human relations.  A study of 
Local 10 members’ preparation for the strike and picketing activities demonstrates that 
during the 1971 strike Local 10 longshoremen began to cultivate new relations among A-
men, B-men, and steady men in the process of organizing picketing and other strike-related 
activities.  The longshoremen also built strong ties with pensioners and female family 
members, whose solidarity actions were invaluable in sustaining the strike.   
Although the new 1972 contract was ratified after the 134-day strike, in comparison 
to the voting results in the previous two referenda on the M & M Agreements, a significant 
number of the Local 10 membership voted against it.  The “no-vote” in defiance of Harry 
Bridges’s recommendation to vote for the contract foreshadowed the increasing numbers of 
rank-and-file dissidents against the international.  The demographic changes in the local’s 
membership cannot be ignored in explaining this phenomenon.  Younger men, who had 
been hired since 1959 and who had experienced long periods of working as B-men, 
constituted 70 percent of the membership, and a disproportionate number of them were 
blacks. 
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1. Old Traditions and New Challenges 
Militancy and solidarity among workers do not develop spontaneously.  Nor does 
workers’ knowledge about how to prepare for a possible long-term strike become acquired 
on the spur of the moment.  Rather, their knowledge is derived from their cumulative 
learning experiences in the process of organizing small and large scale collective actions.  
They also learn from the organizing militant actions of people in other workplaces or in the 
larger society.  On the eve of the 1971 strike, the West Coast longshoremen had not 
launched any major coastwise strike since 1948, and a high percentage of them had not 
experienced even the 1948 strike.  Coastwise, about 70 percent of the longshoremen had 
been hired since the 1948 strike and the San Francisco Local 10 membership equaled about 
2,800, among which, about 2,000 men were younger longshoremen who most likely had 
been hired since 1959.
2
  Local 10’s preparation for the 1971 strike demonstrated that the 
union’s deeply rooted traditions and knowledge about organizing a long-term strike had not 
entirely faded away.  Many scholars point out the impact of the civil rights movement on the 
upsurge of young rank-and-file workers’ revolts in many workplaces from mid-1960s to the 
late 1970s.  These great social movements of the era must have also inspired, directly and 
indirectly, the younger longshoremen.
3
 
                                                 
2
 Los Angeles Local 13 reported that only one fourth of its membership had experienced the 1948 strike.  
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Urbana-Champaign, 1974), p. 133, note 2].  In his examination of the strike of GM auto factory workers in 
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As soon as the strike commenced in July 1971, the entire Local 10 membership 
reorganized its structure to prepare for it.  Local offices and the executive board constituted 
the “Strike Committee.”  Several other committees were subsequently formed, such as 
Hiring Hall and Picketing Committees.
4
  The local’s weekly Longshore Bulletin became a 
daily “Local 10 Strike Bulletin” issued by the “Publicity & Information Committee.”5  
According to The Dispatcher, many locals had “bumming committees” for the preparation 
of a long strike.  The role of the committee was to “bum” or solicit food and other items for 
strikers and their families.
6
 
Local 10 turned the basic gang into the basic “picket gang,” with every member 
expected to join or be assigned to a gang to carry out picketing duty during the day from 
7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.  The dispatchers allocated picket duties via the hiring hall.  At night, 
longshoremen organized “motorized” patrols on a rotation basis.  All members received 
“picket cards” and the “Trial Committee” assessed penalties for those who failed to perform 
their picket duty.  In the past, the committee had thoroughly reviewed the records of 
individuals’ picket duty, penalized those who had neglected it, and rewarded those whose 
participation had been impeccable.  For example, individuals’ picketing performances 
                                                                                                                                                      
young workers’ resistance to the increased speed ups and inhumane working conditions, which led to the 
strike.  Stanley Aronowitz, False Promises:  The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness 
(Durham:  Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 22-50.    
4
 Other committees were: Bumming, Longshore Patrol, Finance & Credit, Legal, Commissary; Welfare; 
Clearance; Information & Publicity Committees; and Trial Committees.  Local 10 Strike Bulletin, No. 3, July 
7, 1971.  
5
 The Strike Bulletin was published every day except on weekends in the beginning of the strike.  When 
the strike prolonged, the newsletter was published every other day. 
6
 The Dispatcher, July 30, 1971, p. 4.  
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during the 1934 and 1936 strikes had been a criterion when the local had hired their sons as 
“car men” and occasionally allowed them to do longshore work in the late 1930s.7  
The “Communications Committee,” which was a sub-committee of the Publicity and 
Information Committee, took the role of maintaining night-time communications via phone 
calls among picketers, members, officers, and committee men.
8
  In order to maintain the 
day-time communications between the Strike Committee and pickets at various piers, 
longshoremen used a pay phone located near each port.  A picketer was dispatched to the 
telephone booth, whose role was to answer the phone when it rang and convey the message 
to the picketers on the pier.  Within several days when rank and file workers raised a 
complaint regarding lack of information from the Strike Committee about the negotiation 
situation, the use of “sound trucks” was promised to spread out any news coming from the 
Negotiating Committee.
9
   
Although workers were on strike, the union decided that work on certain cargoes, 
such as military shipments, mail, passenger bags, and perishable items, had to be performed.  
The “Clearance Committee” set up the methods of marking and handling these “cleared” 
cargos to insure that longshoremen could easily recognize them from scabbed cargoes.  The 
“Hiring Hall Committee,” which consisted of existing dispatchers, assigned re-structured 
gangs on a rotation basis to handle the cleared cargoes.  The “Welfare Committee” was set 
up to help the members apply for government welfare provisions, such as food stamps, if 
                                                 
7
 Los Angeles ship clerk’s local (Local 63) used humor to show how the local took the picket duty 
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8
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9
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necessary.  When the PMA refused to pay the strikers their medical and welfare benefits, the 
union took the case to arbitration, but meanwhile, it put up to two million dollars of its own 
money into a fund for the members who needed medical care.
10
 
On the first day of the strike, San Francisco longshoremen brought to their picket 
line a stuffed “PMA” dummy that had “wine bottle” and “psychedelic screw” eyes to poke 
fun at their employers.  Some men brought musical instruments, including guitars and mouth 
organs.
11
  Apparently, the picketing that Los Angeles Local 13 organized was more 
adventurous than other locals.  A dog wearing a sign reading “ILWU on Strike!” walked on 
the Local 13 picket line with the strikers.  Unfortunately, the picketing dog “Rollo” was 
reported missing after several days.  The local operated picket boats conducting a “water 
patrol” picket line displaying the same signs as had Rollo.  Local 13 also made several 
attempts to have a “flying” picket when a couple of men ran boats pulling behind them a 
large size handmade kite that carried an air-borne man and the same sign.  After several 
attempts, one picketer managed to be on the flying kite for forty-five minutes.
12
  Local 13’s 
picketing activities, especially its water patrolling boats, influenced other locals.  Some of 
the members of San Francisco Local 34 (ship clerks’ local) began to organize picketing on 
the Bay Area waters.
13
  
Within several days in San Francisco, the “Posters, Arts, and Activities Committee,” 
another sub-committee of the Publicity and Information Committee, made 1,000 “arm 
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 The Welfare Committee provided medical care from the union treasury for two months (July and 
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bands” for the strikers.  During the second month, the committee prepared “a photographic 
show” to publicize the strike.  The end result that displayed and used objects, such as 
dummies, arm bands, and photographs, proved important in raising a sense of unity and 
militancy among strikers and mobilizing community support.  In addition, the very process 
itself of creating these objects as a group must also be recognized as significant because it 
involved workers in learning and experimenting how to work together not for productivity 
but for working class solidarity. 
Moreover, the strike became a time for the workers to cultivate their hidden talents 
beyond what their employers required them to perform on their jobs.  Their creativity and 
abilities were revealed through diverse picketing activities including marching, singing, 
displaying visual objects, preparing and sharing food, and carrying out various committee 
activities.  For example, Larry Wing, who had been writing for the Local 10 Longshore 
Bulletin as a member of the Publicity Committee, began to draw cartoons in the Local 10 
Strike Bulletin, depicting the relations between the PMA and the ILWU.  As the strike 
developed, his cartoons amused and inspired the workers through humor and satire by 
exposing the hypocrisy and selfishness of the employers.
14
  Some Local 10 longshoremen 
who were known as “skilled fishermen” utilized their skills on the pier by catching fish, 
cleaning, preparing them, and serving them to the strikers.  The Local 10 Strike Bulletin 
expressed, “It does help the morale.”15  At Longview (Washington) Local 21, a “barber” 
longshoreman offered free haircuts to all longshoremen and their family members.  
Developing new skills during the strike was also shown in North Bend (Oregon) Local 12 
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 See, for example: Local 10 Strike Bulletin, No. 6, July 12;  No. 12, July 20;  No. 17, July 28;  No. 21, 
August 6;  No. 22, August 9;  No. 27, August 20;  No. 32, September 1;  No. 40, September 22;  No. 41, 
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where its “hardship committee” offered classes to teach people “how to pick ferns, 
huckleberry, cedar boughs, etc.,” in order for some members to use these skills to make a 
few dollars and help feed their families.
16
 
  By means of the strike, workers not only publicized unjust working conditions and 
expressed their grievances, but also created spaces and times for a deeper and broader sense 
of unity among working people.  Local 10 organized social gatherings to boost the spirit of 
the strikers, their families, and their supporters.  At “family cook-outs,” strikers, their wives 
and children, and friends jointly cooked and enjoyed the time together.  But most 
importantly, old and new wounds among the longshoremen caused by the M & M 
Agreements needed to be healed.  The Local 10 Strike Bulletin stated:  
Obviously we are getting to know each other better.  This strike is going to establish 
a bond between us, our families, and friends that never existed before.  When this 
strike is over, there won’t be any “old timers”, “new men” – there will be only local 
#10 longshoremen.  As for the “B” men who are showing that they too know how to 
fight, we have to see to it that they become fully registered “A” men as quickly as 
possible.
17
 
 
The report in the Bulletin significantly revealed that the longshoremen had been polarized by 
age and status.  Due to the recruitment of younger men during the 1960s, about 50 percent of 
coastwise longshoremen in 1971 were under 44 years old, in comparison to 1958 when only 
35 percent of them had been in that category.
18
  But the division between “old timers” and 
“new men” had not been caused literally by their age differences.  Rather, it arose from their 
different attitudes toward the M & M Agreements that had caused harder working conditions 
for the younger men.  Regarding status, in 1971, coastwise 10,133 men were registered as 
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A-men and 2,144 as B-men.
19
  Local 10, which was still the largest local, had about 2,800 
A-men and over 500 B-men.
20
  The Bulletin reminded the longshoremen to build a sense of 
unity across this status division through reciprocal actions between A-men and B-men, and 
the strike created a chance for them to do so.  
Just as the Bulletin discussed, the longshoremen understood a need to develop a new 
approach to organizing workers because the local had to motivate a large number of B-men 
to join the strike and to participate in picketing -- a situation that had not existed during 
previous strikes.  B-men had been working under difficult conditions that had worsened 
since 1970 when the volume of the cargo had decreased.  The local had lost the battle to 
eliminate the 70 percent availability requirement for B-men and thus getting their trust could 
not be taken for granted.
21
  In May when the local had anticipated the strike, the Bulletin 
acknowledged the hardship that B-men had gone through, but it urged B-men to “stick 
closer than ever” to the hiring hall:  
[W]e are fighting like hell to get you a good hourly guarantee and to keep the Ship 
Owners from dumping you, and most of all if we should go on strike don’t quit 
because if you quit you cannot come back.  A strike really would not mean too much 
to you, because you have been on strike ever since you have been here.
22
  
 
Because a disproportionately larger number of A-men had worked as Class B 
longshoremen, unlike the first group of B-men who had been hired in 1959, the B-men 
during this time might have garnered more empathy from many A-men regarding their 
working conditions as second-class longshoremen.  During the strike, the local offered the 
B-men equal treatment, although it also expected them to perform the same kind of strike 
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duties.  For example, a B-man had not been allowed to work steadily with a gang, but during 
the strike, every B-man was assigned to a gang and was dispatched from the same list as A-
men in working on the cargoes allowed by the Clearance Committee to be loaded and 
unloaded.  In other words, B-men got the same opportunity to choose their work as A-men 
on a rotation basis, although there might not have been much available work and thus few 
options to choose from.  Regarding picket duty, B-men were also asked to assume an equal 
measure of responsibility.   
 The existence of steady men, although smaller in numbers than B-men, was another 
challenge for the local during the strike.  Right before the strike, there had been about a 
couple of hundred steady men, working as gearmen, coopers, crane operators, and other 
skilled positions.
23
  In its negotiations with the employers, the local still maintained that 
skilled men should come back to the hall and that longshoremen should be promoted to 
skilled positions based on a seniority rule set by the Promotion Committee.  Based on this 
logic, the local at the outset of the strike called all the existing steady men to come back to 
the hiring hall in order that all men would be dispatched from the hall based on their 
seniority.
24
    
The expansion of containerization also created a new problem for striking 
longshoremen because the employers could divert their container cargoes to Mexican or 
Canadian ports by trucking them relatively easily to and from the United States.  The ILWU 
members, with the help of Teamster rank-and-file workers, organized actions seeking 
solidarity from Mexican and Canadian port workers.  The Canadian workers voted to 
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boycott handling any cargo diverted from the U.S. West Coast ports and the longshoremen 
and the Teamsters halted the movement of trucks pulling containers in and out of Mexico, 
although they could not do so for the entire duration of the strike.
25
 
Having a large number of retirees or “pensioners” added another new aspect to the 
strike because in previous strikes neither retirees nor a pension system had existed.  Retirees 
were still members of the union and were given voting rights over contracts.
26
  This aspect 
had created a tension between “old timers” and “new men” during the second M & M 
Agreement ratification.
27
   Nevertheless, pensioners played a part in the strike not as a 
liability, but as strength.  Since 1968 when retirees had formed “the Pacific Coast Pensioners 
Association” by bringing together numerous pensioners’ clubs, which functioned as social 
and fraternal societies, they had been involved in activities that promoted social and political 
causes, such as gathering money for labor strikes and fighting for ending the Vietnam War.
28
  
The Association had held its own annual convention, and within a year, the membership 
grew to 4,000.  In the beginning of the strike, the union had asked them to help man the 
picket lines.  Although how many of them were physically able to join the picket line is 
unknown, they nevertheless made an enormous contribution to the strike fund by donating 
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from their own pockets and participating in fund raising activities along with the Women’s 
Auxiliary.
29
   
The first woman longshore worker had been hired in 1965, but the number of female 
workers was extremely small at the time of the 1971 strike.
30
  Local 10 Bulletin never 
mentioned women workers.  Having women longshore workers was a new phenomenon, but 
having the Women’s Auxiliary was not.  The auxiliary, which consisted of the wives, 
mothers, daughters, sisters, and widows of longshoremen and pensioners, had existed for a 
long time and had organized various actions for political, educational, and social welfare 
reforms in the larger community.  During the strike, the auxiliary performed all kinds of 
labor, which was crucial to sustaining the strike, and worked with the Welfare Committee to 
help out longshore families in need.  They operated the soup kitchen and were in charge of 
distributing food supplies.  They also sold strike buttons at various markets and stores in 
order to raise money for the strike fund.
31
  Covering news about coastwise picketing 
activities, The Dispatcher reported how Local 10 began to understand the importance of 
“women power.”  It stated: 
It’s taken a long time for most longshore and clerk locals to pay much attention [to 
the auxiliary], but now it’s becoming clear that women’s auxiliaries up and down the 
coast are really being cheered for doing their thing.
32
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The power of the auxiliaries was demonstrated in one episode when they 
successfully countered a women’s rally mobilized against the strike in Portland, Oregon.  
The incident happened when the strike had entered its third month and the PMA and its 
business allies had mobilized a propaganda narrative about the strike hurting agricultural 
businesses.  Those who mobilized the rally against the strike called their action “Operation 
SWEEP,” which stood for “Simply Women for Ending the Emergency in the Ports.”  The 
group transported women from the farm belt to the waterfront.  They brought “brooms” with 
them, by which they attempted to show a symbolic motion to “sweep the nine weeks’ 
strike.”  But they were unable to assemble more than about sixty women.  To counter them, 
the ILWU women’s auxiliaries organized hundreds of women and their children in support 
of the strike.  Some held such signs as “WHY PICKET HERE?  P.M.A. IS DOWNTOWN” 
and “Ask Pacific Maritime Assoc. Why the Delay?”  With such signs, they pointed at the 
PMA as the party of being responsible for the prolonged strike.  A girl held a sign read, 
“MY DAD Supports ME; I’LL Support MY DAD.”33   After the initial tension, auxiliary 
members invited the women on the other side to have a conversation with them about the 
reasons for the strike.  At the end of the day, some of the women mobilized by the 
“SWEEP” told auxiliary members that they would not have joined the rally if they had been 
more informed about what had been happening to the longshoremen.   
A flood of solidarity messages and actions from local and global community 
supporters also made it possible for the longshoremen to strengthen the strike and maintain 
it for a long period.  ILWU sister locals, various other unions, community groups, 
individuals, stores, and waterfront restaurants donated money and labor and provided other 
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support in kind.
34
  For example, about 150 members of the United Farm Workers 
Organizing Committee brought four truck loads of mixed vegetables, grapes, and 
strawberries to the San Francisco strike headquarters.  The ILWU had supported numerous 
strikes of other workers in the past, including the farm workers’ grape boycott movement in 
the late 1960s.  The farm workers and others now had a chance to return the favor.  The 
“Mexicali Rose” restaurant located near the Oakland port gave a 15 percent discount on 
meals to all strikers and their families.
35
  Workers, especially in transportation industries, in 
numerous foreign countries, including Japan, India, Egypt, New Zealand, Russian, France, 
Bulgaria, also sent solidarity messages.
36
   
 
2. Negotiations on Steady Men 
Although the longshoremen’s spirits were high, the larger political and economic 
environments were much harsher to a labor strike than usual.  By the late 1960s, the U.S. 
economy faced a new challenge.  Globally, the German and Japanese economies had 
recovered from the devastation of the Second World War and their manufacturing goods 
became competitive with those manufactured by their U.S. counterparts, causing the 
devaluation of the dollar.  The U.S. economic structure, which was based on long-term and 
large-scale capital investments in mass production, was especially questioned for its 
precluding flexibility in manufacturing, consumption, and labor markets.  By the late 1960s 
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U.S. corporate productivity and profitability had declined -- a phenomenon that encouraged 
multinational corporations to move their operations to the global south where cheaper labor 
and weaker government regulations existed, resulting in a high rate of unemployment within 
the United States.  The U.S. government lost much control over the international financial 
system, while it increased its spending on military weapons and the Vietnam War, and faced 
fiscal problems.
37
   
Although the economic crisis was mainly caused by the U.S economic system, the 
Nixon administration blamed workers and their fights for a better wage as its main cause.   
In 1970, Nixon had invoked the Economic Stabilization Act and in August 1971, during the 
middle of the longshoremen’s strike, he announced a “freeze” on all prices and wages for 
ninety days and announced that any wage increase afterward would require the approval of a 
“Pay Board.”  During this period, the Nixon Administration had notably failed to help 
Congress pass a bill entitled “the Emergency and Public Interest Protection Act” that would 
have given the President, in his words, “vital new authority” to intervene in “national 
emergency disputes” in the longshore, maritime, trucking, airline, and railroad industries.  If 
enacted, the bill could have authorized the extension of the “cooling-off” period, which had 
been initially institutionalized by the Taft-Hartley Act, from eighty days to six months.  In 
addition, the president asked to be given the power to appoint a “neutral panel” to select “the 
most reasonable offer” from either the employer or the union -- a so-called “final offer 
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selection alternative” that would quickly terminate a labor dispute that otherwise would 
imperil the nation’s “health and safety.”38    
The ILWU resisted the logic of the Economic Stabilization Act by presenting other 
factors than wages, such as the country’s spending on the Vietnam War and its regressive 
tax system, as the real causes of the nation’s economic problems.39  The union also 
challenged the Emergency and Public Interest Protection Act by claiming that, if enacted, it 
would cripple the bargaining power of labor unions because strikes should be ended by a 
rank and file vote, not by an appointed panel.  It also questioned the meaning of “national 
emergency” and whether workers’ strikes in longshore or trucking industries actually 
endangered the nation’s health and safety.   The arguments made in The Dispatcher tried to 
minimize the impact of their strikes by quoting a 1970 study by the Labor Department that 
showed that the impact of prolonged strikes had been minimal.
40
  
Meanwhile, Local 10 struggled to negotiate with the local employers regarding the 
steady men and manning issues.  The union demanded joint control over manning scales – 
the size of the basic gang and the necessary number of men from each job category in each 
operation -- and return of skilled men to the hiring hall.  In order to do so, it contested the 
employers’ meaning of “progress.”  The Local 10 Strike Bulletin claimed: 
The biggest issue really comes down to what we working people are going to accept 
as ‘progress.’  We, like many other workers, are faced with a technological 
revolution of new ‘labor saving’ devices and methods of operation.  This is what our 
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employer means by ‘progress’… but if this ‘progress’ is left unchecked, it will 
simply mean that our employer will line up at the bank with ever bigger profits, 
while we line up at the unemployment and welfare office.
41
 
 
The Bulletin also pointed out how this kind of “progress” that the employers had attempted 
to bring about on the waterfront historically had had a decidedly negative impact on 
minority communities and that the local had to assume the “responsibility” to challenge such 
employer defined progress because a majority of Local 10’s membership consisted of ethnic 
minorities. 
In matter of fact, the percentage of black longshoremen had grown larger due to the 
local’s recruitment of new longshoremen in the 1960s.  By 1970, blacks comprised more 
than half of the local membership.
42
  The waterfront, however, was under transition in the 
name of progress and this large pool of the second generation of black longshoremen 
experienced much harsher working conditions and enjoyed less job security.  This kind of 
phenomenon was not unique to the waterfront.  As the Bulletin correctly pointed out, black 
people in the United States historically suffered from massive unemployment when a 
“technological development,” “progress,” or a “modernization” project had been 
implemented.  It happened in the southern cotton growing states during the 1940s when 
harvesting equipment and mechanization were introduced and displaced many black farmers 
who were poor tenants and sharecroppers.
43
  In the 1950s and 1960s, black workers who had 
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semi-skilled industrial jobs faced another obstacle when employers began to eliminate their 
jobs in the name of automation.
44
   
Despite local 10 members’ determination, negotiations with San Francisco 
waterfront employers proved difficult.  Although the Coast Negotiating Committee had 
given each local the right to negotiate with employers on eight items, including steady men, 
jurisdiction, and manning issues, the PMA members in San Francisco had refused to discuss 
these issues since the beginning of the negotiations.
45
  The employers insisted that these 
items should be discussed exclusively at the coast level -- an inflexible attitude that had been 
a source for break-offs and delays in negotiations before the strike.  When the strike entered 
into its second month, the local membership, which reaffirmed its positions that the new 
contract should do away with Section 9.43 and that the container work should be done on 
the dock by longshoremen, sought to garner support from other locals, as well as the 
International, for their claim that these issues should be discussed in local negotiations.  
Local 10 sent delegates to other locals and asked the International to put pressure on the 
employers at the coastwise level.
46
    
The reason why both parties had been adamant about their positions on who had the 
authority over negotiating steady men provisions seemed to rest upon the fact that Local 10 
had held a stronger position on the elimination of steady men than other locals.  It was easier, 
therefore, for the employers to negotiate the matter with the Coast Negotiating Committee, 
which consisted of International officers and members from different locals.  By the same 
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token, Local 10 must have thought that it would be difficult to pursue its demand at the coast 
level.  The steady men issue had been the problem mostly for large locals, especially Los 
Angeles and San Francisco. 
In matter of fact, a leaflet made and distributed by Portland women’s auxiliary 
presented a different priority of demands than Local 10’s Bulletin.  The leaflet, which was 
printed in order to explain that longshoremen were on strike because their job security and 
livelihoods were at stake, emphasized the monetary aspect of the hardship of the lives of 
longshoremen by stating that while the employers in the shipping industry had received 
subsidies from federal government to build new ships and had made profits from 
containerization, workers had received neither government subsidies nor better wages.  It 
maintained:   
[T]he ILWU does NOT oppose progress.  But our men do insist on a FAIR SHARE 
of the benefits.
47
   
 
 
The leaflet stressed the job protection and wage guarantees for longshoremen, but support 
for B-men and their equal protection, as well as a discussion about problems stemming from 
allowing the employers to have their own steady men, were entirely missing.  It is unclear 
how much the women’s auxiliary leaflet reflected the Portland longshoremen’s opinions.  
Nevertheless, Local 10 might have envisioned a possibility of eliminating the steady men 
position, only if each local had full power to negotiate the matter.  By doing so, the local 
could do away with it at its own ports, even though other locals decided not to. 
At the coast level, the employers maintained their initial positions on contract 
demands.  They were willing to offer a wage guarantee plan only if they controlled the 
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manning scale and continued to enjoy their right to hire steady men.  While reporting this 
situation, the Local 10 Strike Bulletin again emphasized why giving into these demands in 
exchange for wages was a dangerous option for the workers: 
We may get the guarantee and other “goodies” but when they are through, the 
number of men in the industry will be cut to less than half and the guts will be torn 
out of our union.  The way they want it, they’ll be in full control of manning, size of 
gangs, and jurisdiction at the end of the next contract.  They will also be in a position 
to take away the [wage] guarantee simply because we may not then have the strength 
to fight them.  The employers’ plan is to build a “loyal group” of steady men that 
will spell the end of our dispatch hall and equalization of work.
48
 
 
In response to the unyielding position of the Local 10 longshoremen, San Francisco PMA 
members threatened that they would demand the elimination of the hiring hall itself and the 
transformation of all men into steady men.
49
   
In terms of jurisdiction, the union’s coastwise negotiating committee demanded an 
extension of the Container Freight Station (CFS) supplement signed in 1969 with a 
modification.
50
  According to the agreement, the ILWU had jurisdiction over container 
handling on the dock or near the dock and, in turn, ILWU “utility steady men” handling 
containers had accepted lower wages and benefits than those of longshoremen under the 
coastwise contract.  The union demanded to add a “zone concept” or a 50-mile radius plan 
by which the union would have jurisdiction over stuffing and unstuffing containers that 
originated within 50 miles from the port.  The union demanded to impose a “container tax” 
on those originating within the radius but not handled by longshoremen.  The union also 
wanted to eliminate the current wage differences between container and non-container cargo 
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workers.  The PMA refused the ILWU’s demand by announcing its intention to 
acknowledge the jurisdiction of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT).  Taking 
the PMA position into consideration, Bridges suggested to his members that the union might 
have to strengthen its position by seriously thinking about affiliating with either the IBT or 
ILA in order to solve the jurisdictional impasse.  The Strike Strategy Committee, however, 
recommended otherwise, deciding that the union should keep its alliance relationship with 
both unions, rather than affiliating with them.
51
 
When the strike progressed into its third month, repression from the federal 
government grew stronger.  Warning that the strike must end soon, the Nixon administration 
sent a mediator, J. Curtis Counts, the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service.  After sitting in on the negotiations for about two weeks, Counts alerted the parties 
that they should soon expect a Taft-Hartley “cooling-off” injunction, unless they quickly 
settled their negotiations.
52
   
In early October, the coastwise negotiations produced a tentative settlement on 
pensions.  In terms of the manning scale, disagreement still existed about the size of the 
basic gang:  the union demanding no reduction and the PMA demanding the elimination of 
gang bosses.  In terms of jurisdiction, most employers had agreed to acknowledge container 
“zones” or the 50-mile radius plan, but problems remained to be worked out with some 
employers who had a contract agreement with other unions than the ILWU.  The employers 
had offered a wage guarantee plan that included benefits to B-men, although providing B-
men only half of what A-men would get, but they avoided taking liability for any wage 
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guarantees in case of an economic decline.  The wage guarantee policy would also require 
every man to be available “at least 80 percent of the average hours of the men in the local” 
to be eligible to get the guaranteed wage.  Regarding steady men, the committee reported: 
This is a major issue with PMA, and their settlement proposals on wages, guarantee, 
pensions, welfare and containers are contingent upon acceptance by the union of 
PMA’s position on steady men.  The union’s position is that the coast agreement has 
provisions for the employment of steady men, and implementation of those 
provisions must be worked out locally.
53
   
 
In other words, locals did not have authority to negotiate the employment of steady men, but 
they were allowed to discuss only the details of work opportunities between steady men and 
others who were dispatched from the hiring hall. 
Meanwhile, disagreements within the union itself over the priorities of demands and 
strike strategies became noticeable.  Some of the rank-and-file workers believed that the 
union officers cleared too many cargoes and thus the strike did not shut down enough 
operations to be effective.  Local 10 members also went through a serious intramural 
discussion over the direction of how to deal with the steady men issue.  Facing the 
employers’ rejection of any negotiating over steady men and the coast negotiating 
committee’s cooperation with the employers on this issue, the local negotiating committee 
agreed at one point to allow the employers to have the right to hire steady men.  Then, they 
moved the focus of the negotiations to details about steady men provisions and how to 
equalize work hours between steady men and longshoremen dispatched from the hiring hall.  
This decision generated a polarization within the opinions of Local 10’s membership.  One 
side believed that they should continue fighting to get rid of Section 9.43, whereas the other 
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side wanted to go along with the negotiating committee’s plan, because leaving the section 
in the next contract seemed to be already a done deal.  In addition, the latter side tried to 
persuade the former by pointing out the difficulty of garnering sustained support for the 
former’s idea from other locals.  Nevertheless, a majority of the membership must have 
supported the idea of doing away with steady men.  At the end of the debate, the local 
adopted a motion that read, “There shall be no steady gearmen or any other steady men in 
the miscellaneous contract or Port Working Rules in the Port of San Francisco.”54 
On the first day of October when the strike entered its fourth month, 45,000 East 
Coast and Gulf Coast longshoremen also walked out, shutting down the waterfronts of the 
entire nation.  The Nixon administration announced a national emergency and obtained an 
injunction against the West Coast longshore strike under the authority of the Taft-Hartley 
Act, which ordered eighty days of a so-called “cooling-off” period.  The ILWU protested 
that there was no “national health and safety” concern caused by its strike -- a criterion for a 
Taft-Hartley injunction-- because the strike allowed military and many other cargoes to be 
handled.  Nevertheless, the union decided to obey the injunction.  On October 9
th
, 
longshoremen discontinued the strike that had lasted 100 days since July 1
st
.  The injunction 
required that workers resume work under the previous contract, while the employers 
continue negotiations with the union in “good faith.”  If negotiations failed to reach an 
agreement by the 60
th
 day, workers would vote on the employers’ offer that was on the table 
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by that day.  If workers rejected the offer, then they would have the right to resume their 
strike on the 81
st
 day.
55
   
The Nixon administration’s action was not the first time that West Coast 
longshoremen received a Taft-Hartley injunction against their strike.  Their 1948 strike had 
to be postponed because the same kind of cooling-off injunction had been issued several 
hours before the strike had been set to begin.  Back then, when the cooling-off period had 
almost expired and the National Labor Relations Board had set up a polling process to ask 
union members to vote on the employers’ final offer, the union had recommended that the 
membership boycott the voting on the offer that contained virtually nothing to which the 
union had agreed.  The result of the two-day balloting demonstrated the unity of the 
membership:  not a single ballot had been cast coastwise.
56
  When the cooling-off period had 
passed, the longshoremen had launched a strike that shut down the coast for ninety five days.  
In retelling this event, The Dispatcher in 1971 pointed out that using a cooling-off period 
had not worked at all in the past and neither would it work this time around.
57
   
What happened in October 1971 in San Francisco and Los Angeles after the 
longshore workers went back to work demonstrated that The Dispatcher was correct.  In 
spite of the cooling-off period, the battle continued between the employers and the 
longshoremen predictably over the steady men issue.  In Los Angeles, Local 13 had been 
advocating the idea that all men should get dispatched from the hiring hall.  When a 
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stevedore company asked eleven longshoremen who before the strike had worked as steady 
men to work for the company again as steady men, they refused unless they were dispatched 
from the hall.  The employers responded with a lock-out -- an action that ought to have been 
considered a violation of the “cooling-off” injunction.  In San Francisco, Sea Land, one of 
the nation’s first and largest container companies, demanded to have “Their Men” by 
placing an order by name and number of those they wanted to hire as steady men.  When 
these men insisted that they would work only if they were to go through the hiring hall, Sea 
Land also declared a lock-out.
58
   
During the cooling-off period, the workers organized a concerted effort to slow down 
operations, although the union could or did not officially tell them to do so.  In response, 
California Stevedore & Ballast in San Francisco fired gangs for “lack of production.”  Local 
10 protested the company’s action by arguing that there was nothing in the existing contract 
that designated “how much” the gang had to produce and thus firing of the gangs for this 
reason was a clear violation of the contract.  Local 10 Longshore Bulletin claimed that the 
Nixon administration should “crack down” on the employers for violating the Taft-Hartley 
injunction, but the PMA never received any penalties for its lockouts.  Nevertheless, the 
cases went to court, and the PMA and the two locals (Local 10 and Local 13) were declared 
in contempt for violating the injunction.  The judge ruled that the union must not “coerce” 
any individual member not to take a steady man position and also ordered the PMA to 
“cease and desist” from firing gangs or locking out the port during the cooling-off period.59 
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After sixty days passed since the cooling-off period began, the two parties failed to 
reach an agreement.  In mid-December, the longshoremen were asked to vote on the 
employers’ “final” offer, which contained almost the same content as the one that the 
employers had presented right before the issuance of the injunction.  Local 10 officers 
advised the membership to vote “100 percent no” to the proposal.  The Coast Negotiating 
Committee also recommended the same.
60
  Unconventionally, all B-men were allowed to 
take part in the voting.  This aspect suggested that the B-men’s participation in the strike 
was appreciated and necessary to win the battle.   The result showed that an overwhelming 
93 percent of the longshoremen voted against the employers’ proposal.61 
  By rejecting the employers’ final offer, a discussion arose among longshoremen 
regarding the direction of their future actions, such as what items they should negotiate 
further and whether they should resume the strike.  Bridges in his regular column in The 
Dispatcher warned the employers that they must pay more wages if they wanted 
longshoremen to accept any future offer. 
62
  Many Local 10 members, however, had a 
different priority.  They predicted that the employers would respond to the longshoremen’s 
rejection of their recent offer by adding some more incentives as long as they could directly 
hire steady men and control the manning scales.  The Local 10 Longshore Bulletin stated: 
There will be some additional “goodies” – like maybe even a few paid holidays and 
paid drugs.  They will give us most anything as long as we give them all the steady 
                                                 
60
 Local 10 Longshore Bulletin, November 18 and 24,1971; The Dispatcher, December 7, 1971, p. 1. 
61
 The voting was conducted on December 14-15.  Over 1,000 more ballots were cast in this voting than 
those cast in the strike vote in June, probably because B-men were included.  10,072 men voted “No,” and 746 
men voted “Yes.”  The Dispatcher, December 22, 1971, p. 1. 
62
 The Dispatcher, December 7, 1971, p. 2 and December 22, 1971, p 2.  In late November, the Nixon 
administration had gotten an injunction against the ILA strike and East Coast longshoremen had returned to 
work. The Dispatcher, December 7, p. 3. 
303 
 
men they want, control over manning, a bum pension and a farce for a wage 
guarantee – not to speak of standoff on the containers. 
 
  
Local 10 members thus disagreed with Bridges’s claim that longshoremen would accept an 
offer that merely had better wage plans.  The Bulletin pointed out that money items were 
important, but other issues, such as containers, manning, and work guarantee, were “real gut 
issues” that took top priority.  Moreover, unless the steady men issue or Section 9.43 was 
settled to the satisfaction of the membership, the local would “veto” any future offer.63  At a 
stop-work meeting in late December, the membership voted for resuming the strike.
64
  
  
3. The Resumption of the Strike and Its Result  
On January 17, 1972, the West Coast longshoremen resumed their strike and locals 
restructured themselves back to the time of the initial strike and re-established their picket 
duties.
65
  The Strike Bulletin and 50,000 copies of another leaflet distributed at various plant 
gates and shopping centers explained why they resumed the strike.
66
  Nevertheless, about 
two weeks after the strike resumed, the coast negotiating committee announced that a 
tentative contract agreement had been reached.   
It is unclear why the committee decided to make a quick settlement.  It might have 
been because of the government’s pressure:  The U.S. Congress attempted to enact a law by 
which labor strikes would be subject to “compulsory arbitration.”  But many ILWU officers 
might have been satisfied with the settlement because the employers yielded to most of the 
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union’s demands on the wage issue and promised a 36-hour wage guarantee plan.67  In the 
end, for union top officers, the strike was a tool to put pressure on the employers to bargain 
with them regarding more monetary benefits.
68
  Moreover, the PMA agreed to extend the 
Container Freight Station supplement and acknowledged ILWU jurisdiction within 50-miles 
radius from each port.  For the union officers, this seemed to be a good contract for the 
union. 
However, the two parties failed to reach an agreement on many of the “non-
economic” issues and decided to further negotiate them by February 11th.  On February 10th 
they extended the date to May 8, after which all remaining issues would be submitted to the 
Coast Arbitrator for resolution.  Manning scale was one of these items unsolved except for 
eliminating the T-letter procedure.  Regarding the steady men issue, the new contract would 
still include Section 9.43, which allowed the employers to hire steady men.  The only 
restriction on their job descriptions was a prohibition on driving a winch or fork lift under 5-
ton capacity, unless they were ordered to so in order to complete their 8-hour shift.  The 
contract deferred to local negotiations for the method of equalization of hours between 
steady men and other skilled workers dispatched from the hiring hall.  If no agreement was 
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reached at the local level within five days after caucus meeting, then it would be settled by 
the coast arbitrator.   
The discussion at the coastwise caucus meeting, which began on February 12
th
, 
showed that delegates, as well as Coast Negotiating Committee members, were divided 
deeply, albeit not evenly, on whether the settlement was acceptable.  Bridges and a majority 
of Coast Negotiating Committee members recommended the caucus vote for the settlement, 
but three of the committee members expressed their opposition.
69
  Many delegates expressed 
their opposition to the high standard set for being eligible to get the wage guarantee and 
were upset over the union’s failure to fight harder to eliminate steady men provisions.  The 
statement by Shaun Maloney from Seattle Local 19 encapsulated this position:  “There is too 
much ‘availability’ and I am opposed to the continuation of the steady men.”70   
Among the fourteen Local 10 delegates, six of them opposed the proposal and they 
were vocal about the reasons for their opposition.
71
  Larry Wing, in addition to his 
opposition to the steady men provision and the guarantee plan, pointed out the problem of 
voting on a proposal containing many provisions which had not been settled but would be 
decided by the coast arbitrator in the future:  
The guarantee is not meaningful; 9.43 is back in its insidious union-breaking form.  
Local 10 can’t live with this, it’s breaking our union to pieces.  For that reason alone 
I’d have to vote against it.  Also opposed the fact that many disputed items will have 
to be decided by the arbitrator. 
 
                                                 
69
 The three members were: L. L. “Chick” Loveridge, Local 13 (Los Angeles); Mel Banister, Local 21 
(Longview); Don Ronne, Local 8 (Portland). The Dispatcher, February 24, 1972, p. 4. 
70
 Ibid., p. 5. 
71
 Among Local 10 delegates, James Andersen, Harry Bridges, William Chester, Peter Dorskoff, Joe 
Mosely, Robert Rohatch, Carl Smith, and Cleophas Williams voted for the proposal.  Archie Brown, Ron 
Colthirst, Jack Hogan, George Kekai, Dave Littleton, and Larry Wing voted against it.  The Dispatcher, 
February 24, 1972, p. 4. 
306 
 
According to Jack Hogan:  
Job security was the main theme of the 1970 Caucus, and this program does not 
provide additional jobs.  I was instructed by my local to get rid of steady men.  I am 
opposed to the decasualization of this industry. 
 
He also indicated that if Sam Kagel were to be the arbitrator to decide what had not been 
settled between the two parties, then the contract would not be improved because Kagel had 
been part of the current settlement that offered nothing much for the workers.  For Ron 
Colthirst, the proposed contract differed little from what the membership had voted down in 
December before they resumed the strike.  George Kekai’s words represented some rank-
and-file members who were willing to fight further in order to get a better result on steady 
men and manning scales:  
I still have pride and dignity -- I’ll go back to my rank and file with dignity.  I didn’t 
cave-in!  I want to go down fighting!
 72
 
 
At the end of the four day discussion, delegates voted on the contract:  By a majority 
vote, the caucus approved it, although one-fourth of the delegates opposed it.
73
  The contract 
was then submitted to a membership referendum.  Although the union had allowed B-men to 
vote on the strike decision, it excluded them from participating in this referendum.  All 
longshore locals were allotted into several units and each unit was given veto power.  In 
other words, if a unit voted against the proposition, then the proposition would be vetoed.  In 
this case, a second referendum would be called.
74
 
The balloting was conducted for three days between February 17
th
 and 19
th
.  Twenty 
seven percent of Los Angeles Local 13 and twenty nine percent of Local 10 membership 
                                                 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 The result showed that 68 percent of the delegates voted for it and 7 percent abstained.  Ibid., p. 4. 
74
 The Dispatcher, February 11, 1972, p. 5. 
307 
 
opposed the proposal.  A higher percentage of “no” votes came from Portland and Seattle 
locals: 39 percent and 38 percent of the respective local membership rejected it.  Local 21 
(Longview, Oregon) was the only local that overwhelming voted it down with ninety six 
percent of the vote cast.  But Local 21 was not large enough to constitute a unit by itself and 
thus could not wield veto power.
75
  Coastwise, a total of 9,564 ballots were cast, among 
which 6,803 voted for the contract, while 2,761 voted against it, showing a seventy one 
percent approval rate.
76
  Without a veto, there was no need for a second referendum and thus 
the ratified contract would be effective for the next 17 months.  On February 20
th
, 
longshoremen ended their strike and went back to work.  The 134 day strike was the longest 
ever for the West Coast longshoremen.
77
   
The result of Local 10’s votes was significant because the percentage of opponents 
increased a lot since the 1966 contract referendum.
78
  For the first time, more “no” votes 
came from the local than from Local 13 that had been the strongest opponent to the M & M 
Agreements.  The changes in Local 10’s demographic and racial composition must have 
affected the result:  Many younger and black members were discontented with the settlement 
that did not alter much regarding steady men and manning scale issues.   
How satisfactory the new contract would prove to be remained to be seen.  Moreover, 
having a contract was one thing, but how to interpret and implement its provisions on the 
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308 
 
jobsite was another.  Within Local 10, having known that the coastwise contract would not 
have removed Section 9.43 in its entirety, the local negotiating committee before the caucus 
meeting had persuaded the local membership that the local’s position should be changed 
from “no steady men” to “one-man one-job,” and announced that the employers had agreed 
not to employ a steady man in different positions.  Yet the contract had no concrete plan for 
equalizing work hours between workers from the hall and steady men.  The records showed 
that before the strike, 206 steady men had worked an average 43 hours per week, while 
2,870 A-men dispatched from the hiring hall had worked an average of only 29 hours per 
week.  The employers had no intention of reducing the work hours of their steady men.
79
 
In addition, as soon as the workers went back to work, a dispute arose over 
interpreting the steady men job description.  According to the language of Section 9.43 of 
the new contract, “steady skilled men cannot operate winches or fork lifts up to 5-ton 
capacity, except to fill out the 8-hour guarantee.”80  When the employer asked steady men to 
operate lift trucks, the union claimed that “any fork truck with any kind of an attachment” 
should be defined as a fork lift and advised steady men not to operate any of them.  The 
employers insisted that only the one with two forks that went up and down and had the 
master tilts should be defined as a fork lift.  The two parties could not agree on a definition 
and the case went to Coast Arbitrator Sam Kagel.  In the interim of deliberating the case, 
Kagel ordered that steady men should stop collectively resigning from their jobs and that the 
union should not interfere with individual members’ choices.  His interim award indicated 
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 Local 10 Strike Bulletin, Nos. 6 and 9, February 4 and 16, 1972. 
80
 The Dispatcher, February, 11, 1972, p. 5. 
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that not just local officers had tried to prevent steady men from taking fork lift jobs, but 
steady men themselves had refused to do so.
81
      
Although the majority of the Coast Negotiating Committee had recommended the 
membership vote for the contract due to its improvement in so-called “economic” items, in 
reality, the longshoremen never received the wage increases described in the contract that 
they had voted for.  The Nixon Administration’s Pay Board disapproved the deal and 
reduced the first year’s basic hourly wage increase from 75 to 41 cents per hour – more than 
40 percent less than what they had fought for and agreed to.  The Board also put a limit on 
the employers’ liability for a pay guarantee, meaning that if the cost of the guarantee at the 
end of the year was more than the limit, then further wage reductions would follow.  The 
union had made ill-fated attempts to ask the Board to accept the contract deal by placing a 
full page advertisement in major newspapers proclaiming that the wage increase was not 
inflationary but rather compensatory for the increase in productivity for the last dozen years 
since the Modernization and Mechanization plan had begun on the waterfront.  When the 
Pay Board rendered its adverse decision, the ILWU claimed that it had “robbed” the workers.  
The AFL-CIO denounced the Board as a “tool” of big business.82  The ILWU subsequently 
made some more efforts to get the wages as promised, but it had to eventually accept the 
reduced wage rates.
83
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 Local 10 Longshore Bulletin, February 25, 1972. 
82
 Local 10 Longshore Bulletin, March 3 and 17, 1972; The Dispatcher, March 24, 1972, pp. 1, 7, and 8. 
83
 Upon facing the Pay Board’s decision, the ILWU asked the PMA to put the rescinded money into an 
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In addition, the 36-hour week wage guarantee was not only complicated to calculate, 
but also difficult to acquire because of its strict requirements.  For example, if an A-man 
worked for 36 hours or more for his first week when the program started, the guarantee did 
not affect him, but extra hours beyond 36 hours would be added to his next week’s work 
hour total.  If he worked less than 36 hours during the second week, but his total work hours 
after adding the extra hours from the previous week became 36 hours, then he was ineligible 
for a wage guarantee for that week.  In this way, an individual’s work hours were carried 
over and accumulated for a 26-week period.  During this period if this man’s work hours 
during any week were less than 36 hours and there were no accumulated extra hours, then he 
might be eligible for getting wages for the difference between his total hours and 36 hours, 
only if his accumulated total paid hours were 80 percent of “the average accumulated total 
paid hours per man for the A-men in his local.”   
The wage guarantee was thus meaningless for those who worked less than 80 percent 
of the average hours.  In terms of calculating the average paid hours per man in the local, 
those who were paid less than 13 hours in any week would be excluded from the 
calculations -- a method that avoided lowering the average hours of the entire local.  In other 
words, the guarantee plan was inapplicable when there was plenty of work.  Because any 
extra hours that a worker accumulated during a time of abundance of work would cancel out 
a time of scarcity, the guarantee would be also inapplicable when there were fluctuations in 
the amount of work within the given period.
84
   A pamphlet published in October by several 
militant rank-and-file members bluntly summed up the matter by pointing out that no B-man 
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had collected any money on the guarantee plan by far and no A-men had a prospect of 
receiving benefits from it either.
85
  
Moreover, the Container Freight Station (CFS) agreement became controversial 
when non-PMA member shipping companies initiated legal actions against it.  The 
Teamsters protested the loss of their employment opportunities due to the agreement and 
joined legal actions with the shipping companies.
86
  For example, the Port of Seattle filed a 
lawsuit in a federal court, claiming that the contract violated federal anti-trust laws by 
creating disadvantageous conditions for nonmembers of the PMA and thus forced them to 
join the PMA.   In California, International Cargo Services, Inc., which had used Teamsters 
for stuffing and unstuffing its containers, filed a complaint to the National Labor Relations 
Board against the container tax imposed by the contract upon container cargos originating 
within 50-miles radius and handled by non-ILWU longshoremen.  A federal court in Los 
Angeles subsequently declared the container tax illegal in an appeal.
87
   
Furthermore, when California Cartage and two other companies filed an unfair labor 
practice complaint to the NLRB against the Container Freight Station agreement (which the 
Teamsters joined as an intervener), the Board agreed with the plaintiffs that the contract 
violated Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act that made it illegal for a union and 
an employer to enter into any contract controlling the labor relations of another employer.
88
  
In other words, the contract could not be enforced if it prevented non-PMA member 
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 Longshore Victory, October, 1972, p. 3, ILWU Local 10 Publications Misc. “Militant” Bulletins File, 
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companies from employing non-ILWU members, such as the Teamsters.  The Board stated 
that the ILWU had accepted the loss of employment when it had signed the M & M 
Agreement in 1960 – a decision that was a “forward” looking action – and thus if the level 
of employment in the industry had fallen by 1972, then the union ought to think about 
another “progressive” move to resolve the problem, rather than “renewing old wars and 
illegally affecting the rights of other employers and their employees.” As Lincoln Fairly 
points out, the ILWU’s having signed the 1960 M & M agreement was ironically used a 
dozen years later against the union’s effort to preserve container handling jobs for the 
longshoremen.
89
   
Consequently, the aftermath of the contract, which was signed after a long and hard 
struggle, ended up frustrating a lot of longshoremen.  Local 10 Longshore Bulletin captured 
their feelings when it stated, “if we keep losing parts of the contract, to the Pay Board or to 
the courts, we won’t have much left.”90  Although the impacts of the M & M Agreements in 
the late 1960s proved that the ILWU top officers had been shortsighted when they had 
initially signed the agreements, the 1972 contract negotiations demonstrated that the union 
officers continuously focused on getting monetary benefits.  But this time, the mistakes they 
made were readily apparent.  
Despite the utterly disappointing contract, the strike was not a complete failure.  As 
the referendum result had shown, a large number of the new generation of rank-and-file 
workers in Local 10 expressed their disillusionment from the international union’s politics -- 
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an action that foreshadowed a rise of self-activism among longshoremen.  By the end of that 
year, some militant workers in Local 10 began to publish their own newsletter named 
Longshore Victory that aimed to organize longshoremen around radical programs, such as 
job security for all men by shortening work hours and control over the hiring process by 
eliminating steady men.  They also advocated equality among A-men and B-men by 
proposing the promotion of all B-men to fully registered status.
91
   
All these ideas were not new.  The notion of a shorter-hour day had appeared in the 
1940s during debates over whether the local had to deregister some longshoremen for not 
having enough work for all registered men to earn decent wages.
92
  When this idea 
reappeared in the 1970s, it was linked to automation and job security of longshoremen:  
“Our labors produced profits for the employers to invest in equipment (and to pay 
themselves fat salaries) and now they plan to ‘reward’ us by using that equipment to put us 
out of work!  Thanks but no thanks.” 93  The new generation advocated for six-hour day 
work with wages equivalent to what they earned during the 8-hour shift.  In this way, they 
hoped to create more jobs for a larger number of longshoremen.   
The vision of equality among A-men and B-men had been already addressed by the 
first group of B-men themselves in the early 1960s and by some of their A-men supporters.  
Nevertheless, after a dozen years passed, and after the longshoremen began to organize more 
concerted and united effort to reverse the impacts of the M & M Agreements, they could see 
more clearly how the creation of two different classes among them had divided them and 
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had weakened their power in the struggle against their employers.  The rank-and-file 
workers who published Longshore Victory pointed out especially the problem of the 
availability requirements for B-men, which had been utilized by employers to discipline 
workers as well as gain economic benefits only for themselves.  The Longshore Victory 
editorials also acknowledged that the goal of deregistering the eighty two B-men in 1963 
had been to control the remaining men who might otherwise oppose the impact of the M & 
M contract.  By arguing that the PMA would deregister the current B-men using their 
availability records when no more longshoremen were needed on the waterfront, they 
agitated that in order to regain the strength of the rank and file, longshoremen should “smash 
the availability kangaroo court!”94   
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Chapter 9 
“[W]inning the battle is not always the winner”: The Deregistered Men in the Shadow 
of the Law, 1970 – 1979 
 
In the 1970s, the consequences of the M & M Agreements became much more 
visible, especially within the hiring system and the manning scale.  While the resistance of 
West Coast longshoremen to the changes was apparent during the strike, the legal battle of 
the deregistered 1959 B-men also continued.  The trial at the U.S. District Court finally 
began in 1974, almost eleven years after their deregistration, and the decision would not be 
rendered until another two years had passed.  This chapter studies the further development 
of the George R. Williams v. the PMA case during the trial.  In order to prove that the union 
had violated its duty of fair representation and that the employers had breached the contract 
agreement, Arthur Brunwasser, who became the sole litigator for the Longshore Jobs 
Defense Committee (LJDC), decided to focus on showing the “arbitrary” aspect of the 
union’s negotiating the “so-called 1963 new standards” and retroactively applying them to 
the B-men.   
How the prolonged legal case impacted the lives of the deregistered men and how 
they perceived the law and the legal processes are another focus of this chapter.  Many 
LJDC members experienced financial difficulties in supporting their families and suffered 
emotional hardships from not being able to clear their names.  These problems caused 
tensions in their family life and some men went through a separation or divorce from their 
wives.  Despite the financial and emotional distress, they pooled their meager resources 
together to keep their legal battle alive and supported each other by looking out for jobs for 
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those in need.  In the process of organizing their struggle, they created a new community of 
life-time friends and gained better knowledge about how the larger society and the legal 
system functioned. 
An understanding of the perception of black LJDC members about class and race 
issues and their relationships with the older generation of black longshoremen requires 
special attention.   Although LJDC members never claimed that a racial motivation existed 
behind their deregistration, many black men believed that justice had been thwarted and 
delayed because their group consisted of mainly poor black men.  This idea, however, did 
not hinder them from working with whites like Stan Weir.  It also did not make their 
relationship with older black longshoremen less complicated.  Black LJDC members 
resented the failure of the older generation of blacks to organize a concerted action against 
their layoff.  While examining black LJDC members’ relationships with both their white 
cohorts and black elders, this chapter also discusses how they perceived the meaning of 
union democracy.  
 
1. The Trial  
The 1967 decision rendered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9
th
 Circuit Court 
ordered the U.S. District Court to try the B-men’s case, but the actual trial did not begin for 
several years.  Between late 1967 and early 1968, the PMA and ILWU unproductively 
appealed the 9
th
 Circuit Court decision to the California Supreme Court and again to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
1
  The union then requested District Court Judge George B. Harris to strike 
out the B-men’s claims for punitive damages against individual union officials -- a motion 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 6, above. 
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that Judge Harris granted in 1969.  The 9
th
 Circuit Court upheld the Judge Harris’ decision 
on this matter upon the B-men’s appeal.  As a result, the B-men had to drop all claims 
involving punitive damages against individual union officers.
2
   
In early 1970, the pre-trial discovery process finally commenced, but the actual trial 
in Judge Harris’s court did not begin until 1974.  When the first complaint had been filed in 
1964 by Sydney Gordon, who was the initial lawyer for the B-men, it had not contained a 
demand for a jury trial.  The right to a jury trial had thus been waived and the decision was 
to be made solely by the judge.
3
  Now, over a decade later, many B-men plaintiffs as well as 
officers of the union and the PMA, appeared at the court and testified.  The trial itself would 
last over six months.
4
   
Brunwasser, who had become the only litigator for the B-men, and his new co-
counsel, Fred Kurlander, had deposed PMA and union officers, including Harry Bridges and 
Tommie Silas, who had been accused of showing hostile discrimination against the 
deregistered B-men.
5
  Both Bridges and Silas denied that they were guilty of having shown 
any hostile conduct toward Stan Weir or other B-men.  Brunwasser had also deposed 
individuals who could give further information about the rules and union affairs, such as 
Asher Harer, who in 1963 had checked the records on behalf of the B-men accused of low-
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 George R. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Association, No. 23,605. United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.  421 F.2d 1287; 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11173; 73 L.R.R.M. 2333; 62 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 
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4
 From February through July 1974, “live testimony” was presented and approximately “1,000 exhibits 
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5
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man-out violations.  Harer had advocated for promoting all B-men during the years between 
1962 and 1963 and his politics had been more similar to that of Weir’s than that of Bridges’s.  
By the time the trial began, Brunwasser, in order to prove the union’s breach of the duty of 
fair representation, decided to focus on showing the “arbitrary” aspect in the union’s 
negotiating and implementing the “so-called 1963 new standards” and retroactively applying 
them to the B-men, rather than demonstrating the union’s “hostile” discrimination against 
Stan Weir.  Although Brunwasser believed Weir’s claim that he was innocent of what he 
had been accused of, as a lawyer, he could not produce “legally admissible evidence to 
prove” that there had been any “hostile intent” against Weir or, for that matter, against any 
of the other deregistered B-men.
6
   
Brunwasser’s decision rested upon his belief that by 1974, the courts had broadened 
the legal definition of what constituted an “unfair” representation.  In 1944, the U.S. 
Supreme Court had first established a standard for a union’s duty of fair representation in the 
Steele case by stating that a union must represent all workers in the bargaining unit “without 
hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.”7  U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
in the 1967 Vaca case had interpreted the Steele doctrine to mean that if a union’s conduct 
toward a worker whom it represented was “arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith,” then 
the union breached its duty.
8
  In other words, a bad faith or a discriminatory action was not 
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Relating to I.L.W.U. Case, Longshoremen – B List, 1963-84, BANC MSS 85/169C, Box 2, Folder 2, Bancroft 
Library, Berkeley, California; and Brunwasser, Interview with author, September 8, 2014.  
7
 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. et al. No. 45 Supreme Court of the United States, 323 
U.S. 192; 65 S. Ct. 226; 89 L. Ed. 173; 1944 U.S. Lexis 1244; 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (Bna) 381; 9 Lab. Cas. 
(Cch) P51,188; 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. (Cch) P9607; 15 L.R.R.M. 708, December 18, 1944, Decided [323 U.S. 
192, p. 204];  and Chapter 6, above. 
8
 Vaca et al. v. Sipes, Administrator, No. 114, Supreme Court of the United States, 386 U.S. 171; 87 S. Ct. 
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319 
 
required for a union to be found guilty of breaching its duty of fair representation, if its 
conduct was arbitrary.   
By citing Vaca, the U.S. 9
th
 Circuit Court in its 1972 ruling in Retana v. Apartment, 
Motel, Hotel, and Elevator Operators Union, Local 14 also held that a union’s duty should 
be “broad and demanding” and agreed with plaintiff Nora Retana in her suit against her 
union that a union had a duty to explain to the workers in the workplace their rights and a 
responsibility to provide them with the content of the collective bargaining agreement.
9
  The 
Circuit Court judges quoted from the 1957 Conley v. Gibson case and emphasized:  
Collective bargaining is a continuous process. Among other things, it involves day-
to-day adjustments in the contract and other working rules, resolution of new 
problems not covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights 
already secured by the contract. The bargaining representative can no more unfairly 
discriminate in carrying out these functions than it can in negotiating a collective 
agreement. 
 
By doing so, the Circuit Court affirmed that a union must fairly represent the workers not 
only in the process of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement but also in the process 
of administrating and implementing it.
10
   
By utilizing these concepts and arguments, Brunwasser and Kurlander argued that 
the ILWU’s negotiating and implementing the new 1963 standards was arbitrary and that 
their retroactive application was a violation of the duty of fair representation.  No other rules 
had been presented to the B-men during the four years of their employment except the ones 
that had been set in 1958 and had been distributed to them in 1959 at an orientation meeting.  
                                                                                                                                                      
L.R.R.M. 2369, February 27, 1967, Decided. [386 U.S. 17, 1p. 190-193].  For the details of the case, see 
Chapter 6, above. 
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 Ibid., p. 1024.  
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The union had never informed them that they would be deregistered for the infractions that 
they had purportedly committed.  If the union and the PMA had changed the rules in 1963, 
they should have done so by a written document as well as applied the rules prospectively.  
By having retroactively applied the new standards and fired the B-men, they had unfairly 
denied them an opportunity to comply with the new standards. 
More specifically, according to the 1958 rules, those who were charged with 
intoxication could not have been deregistered on their first offense.
11
  In regard to the pro 
rata rules, the B-men’s lawyers proved that the B-men had never been informed that they 
could be deregistered for late payment, other than the $1.00 fine a day.  The B-men provided 
various reasons why they had made late payments.  Some men testified that it was easier for 
them to pay the dues late with a fine, rather having to come back to the San Francisco office 
to pay what they owed after working at an East Bay port.  Some stated that it was easier to 
pay dues by mail, although the dues would have arrived late and thus incurred a fine, rather 
than standing in a long line at the office on the due date.  Apparently, the union hall had 
been often crowded on dues payment dates with hundreds of longshoremen trying to pay 
their dues on time and by doing so, some of them could not work that day while waiting in 
line or could not pay the dues on time and had to pay the fine.  If their late payments would 
have cost them their jobs, the union ought to have informed the B-men about it at the time 
when the infractions had occurred.
12
  John Trupp, a PMA representative on the Port 
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  For the rules distributed on July 10, 1959, see Brunwasser and Kurlander, “Exhibit-N” in Appendix to 
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Committee, even testified that he personally agreed that “the pro rata standard could be 
considered unreasonable.”13 
Moreover, the B-men’s lawyers pointed out that no provisions about pro-rata rates or 
late fees had existed in the contract agreement, except one section designating the Port 
Committee as the body to fix the pro-rata rate.  In reality, the Port Committee had never 
actually set the rate.  When Brunwasser questioned the staff of the PMA about any 
documentation regarding the Port Committee setting the rate, the staff “could not locate any 
notation setting the amount of pro rata or any reference to the manner of making payments, 
to whom the payments should be made, and with what frequency they should be made.”14  
This meant, pro rata rules had been “customarily” or “traditionally” set and enforced by the 
union, not by the contract, and until 1963 there had never been a longshoreman who had 
been fired for paying late dues with imposed fines.  If the union and the PMA wanted to 
deny the traditional way of handling promotion regarding pro rata rules, they also should 
have acknowledged that the ways in which pro rata rates had been assessed and collected 
were clearly in violation of the contract agreement because the contract designated the Port 
Committee, not the union, as the body to set the rates.   
Brunwasser and Kurlander also demonstrated that until 1963, no longshoreman had 
been fired for the first offense on the low-man-out rules.  Moreover, according to the 1959 
rules, only a thirty day suspension should have been imposed for a first offender.
15
  In 
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addition, “sign-in sheets” had been checked routinely (weekly), and mistakes had been 
corrected or penalties had been levied, when a violation had occurred.  The system, which 
had been used since 1951, was a complicated one and honest mistakes had occurred many 
times.
16
  Dispatchers testified that longshoremen had frequently asked them about the rules, 
such as how many hours they should add when they had “flopped.”  Mistakes had also 
occurred when dispatchers had filled in “master dispatch sheets” based on their reading of 
what longshoremen had written down on the sign-in sheets.  Moreover, in his testimony 
Bridges acknowledged that the records had been routinely checked in order to find a 
“pattern” of violation, rather than punishing men for mistakes, so that the union could catch 
those who had intentionally chiseled hours.
17
  For that reason, sign-up sheets had been 
stored only for a short period and then destroyed.  When the deregistered B-men had been at 
the record checkers’ office in July 1963, the sign-up sheets of the period when the alleged 
violations had occurred were no longer available.  Instead, the union and the PMA had 
provided only master dispatch sheets and payroll detail books.  In this way, as Brunwasser 
pointed out, the B-men had not had a chance to disprove the accusations made against them 
because they could not have verified if dispatchers had made mistakes in the process of their 
filling in the master sheet.  In addition, there had not been any means to determine if the 
standard had been applied equally to all B-men. 
Brunwasser called Willie Jenkins, Sr., and Eathen Gums, Sr., as witnesses to testify 
on their sons’ behalf.  By the time of trial, they had retired from their waterfront jobs.  They 
testified about what the rules had been and how they had been applied over the years.   
                                                                                                                                                      
suspensions had been imposed when infractions occurred.  Brunwasser and Kurlander, “Appellants’ Brief,” 
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Brunwasser would later recall that two black longshoremen’s fathers testified in a very 
dignified manner and truly inspired him.  Their testimonies reminded him that the “object of 
the case was to enable their sons to obtain the same dignity in their years of retirement.”18  
Jenkins, Sr., in his interview conducted later in 1977 showed his unwavering loyalty to his 
union and Bridges, even after his son had been deregistered, and it seemed that he went 
through considerable agony between his belief in his union being fair and his son being laid 
off.
19
  After his son had been deregistered, a dispatcher had told him about his son’s late 
payment of pro rata share on two occasions.  He had subsequently realized that each incident 
had occurred when his mother and his brother, respectively, had passed away.  Jenkins, Sr., 
mentioned that if he had known that his son had failed to pay his dues on time because of the 
deaths in the family, he himself would have paid them, because he had wanted his son to 
work within the union that he believed was the best.
20
  
In their defense, the PMA and the ILWU argued that the B-men must have known 
that stricter rules would be applied to them, and they paradoxically used Weir’s deposition 
to prove their claim.  Weir, who had been asserting his innocence of the accusation of 
chiseling, insisted that he had “an absolutely clean record.”  He pointed out that he had been 
very careful not to make any mistake because B-men had been reminded at one point that 
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they should keep their “nose clean.”21  Although Weir’s intention was to prove that he was 
incapable of having violated the low-man-out rules because he had been extremely careful, 
the PMA and the ILWU twisted his testimony to discredit the B-men’s claim that they had 
not been told about the rules.  When most of the B-men insisted that the new rules had not 
been told to them, they did not mean that they had not known any rules or penalties for the 
violations of the rules.  Rather, they meant, as Brunwasser pointed out, that by the rules that 
they had known, deregistration had not been part of the penalties for pro-rata or low-man-
out violations and also for a one-time offense of intoxication.  Nevertheless, according to 
Brunwasser, Weir’s statement that he had known that he had to keep his record clean was 
used negatively for the B-men. 
In refuting the B-men’s claim that they had been informed about the reasons for 
being fired not until the 1963 July hearings, the employers and the union argued that 
although the deregistration letter had not specified why they were fired, they must have 
known what charges had been made against them during the investigation.  The defendants 
presented Asher Harer’s checking low-man-out records as evidence to prove this aspect.  To 
be sure, the B-men had known what they had been accused of, but they had never believed 
that they could be fired based on the accusations.  To the contrary, they had thought that 
they had been cleared on the matter.  Nevertheless, the ILWU and the PMA focused on 
questioning the B-men about whether they had known that Harer had investigated their 
charges. 
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In addition, the attorneys for the defendants brought dispatchers to testify that low-
man-out mistakes had occurred in the process of their reading and rewriting of information 
from sign-in sheets onto master dispatch sheets, but the rate of the occurrence of that kind of 
error had been about only 10 percent.  By doing so, the union and the employers emphasized 
that only a small portion of low-man-out violations had been innocent mistakes made by 
dispatchers and thus the rest of the violation must have been made by longshoremen who 
intentionally reduced their accumulated hours to get dispatched.   
Weir recalled that the most shocking part of the trial was the unexpectedly long 
opening statement by Richard Ernst, a lawyer for the PMA.  It had lasted for four days, 
expounding upon the history of labor relations since the early 20
th
 century between the PMA 
and the ILWU, and how since 1948 a collaborative relationship had been established 
between the two parties.  Ernst argued that the collaboration and the resulting labor peace 
had been important for increasing productivity in the industry and that the judge should rule 
the case for the defendants in order not to disturb this mutual collaboration.
22
  The 
defendants pointed out that with the coming of the mechanization, the industry had needed 
longshoremen who would be “upgraded by training programs so that they could operate the 
new equipment.”  The PMA needed “a cadre of employees” who would be “conscientious 
about their obligations” and who could be “relied upon to be steady and thorough.”  By 
portraying the B-men having been fired for their “misconduct,” the defendants argued that if 
the union had represented them at the Port Committee hearings as if they had been good 
workers, it would have “misrepresented” the truth.  The union officers insisted that they had 
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a “duty to make collective bargaining work,” rather than representing those undeserving of 
registration.
23
 
The attorneys for the union and the PMA continued to claim that the B-men should 
have exhausted the grievance procedure specified by the contract agreement.  They provided 
the 1963 application forms for promotion to Class A status, which listed several conditions 
that the applicants had to agree to follow.  One of the conditions was that any complaints 
that B-men might have regarding the application would be handled under the grievance 
procedure set forth in the contract, which, in turn, should be the “exclusive procedure.”24  
When asked about the application form in their cross-examinations, many B-men plaintiffs 
answered that they did not remember what had been contained in it or they acknowledged 
that they had not paid attention to the fine print when they had signed the form.  Some B-
men mentioned that they did not recall whether they had discussed pursuing the grievance 
machinery after they had sent their letters of appeal to the Port Committee in July 1963.
25
  
The lawyers for the PMA and the union used these statements to show that the B-men had 
neither paid attention to what they had signed  – an aspect that was the B-men’s own fault -- 
nor had any intention to exhaust the internal grievance procedure.   
In response to this claim, Brunwasser and Kurlander maintained that it was the 
defendants, rather than the B-men, who never had an intention to make use of the grievance 
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process when they had unreasonably delayed the B-men’s appeal.  In addition, the grievance 
process could not have continued after the PMA and the union agreed to deregister the men, 
because the contract designated that either party, not a grievant, had authority to initiate an 
appeal to the next level upon having a disagreement.  An exception could be made if a 
grievance had fallen under Section 13 that prohibited any discrimination based on one’s 
religion, political belief, race, or union membership status.
26
  But the B-men had asserted 
that their complaint did not stem from this kind of discrimination.  Apparently, the PMA had 
agreed.  Brunwasser found an internal report submitted by a PMA representative on the Port 
Committee, which stated that the B-men’s appeal had not been a Section 13 complaint, but 
rather the appeal had asserted the “lack of due process” as a form of discrimination.27 
Moreover, the B-men’s attorneys continued to claim that the B-men had not had a 
chance to get a fair hearing when the same people who had fired them had constituted the 
adjudicative body.
28
  As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in early 1974 in Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Company, the exhaustion doctrine could not be categorically applied when 
the union exclusively controlled “the manner and extent to which an individual grievance” 
was put forward because “harmony of interest between the union and the individual 
employee” could not always be presumed.29  Brunwasser provided Bridges’s statement in 
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his deposition in which he had admitted that he had referred to the B-men as “crooks, bums, 
and chiselers.”  For Brunwasser, this statement provided a crucial piece of evidence showing 
that B-men never had a chance to get a fair grievance process when the chairman of the 
Coast Committee had already shown prejudice against the B-men.
30
   
Brunwasser also made a point that the union could not have fairly represented their 
grievance because the union had “an inherent conflict of interest in representing both Class 
A and Class B longshoremen.”31  Creating a large pool of B longshoremen, who had been 
expected to perform the dirtiest work but who had been non-union members without the 
right to influence on the rule-making processes and thus faced stricter rules and penalties, 
and keeping them in that position for four years had benefited A-men.  When some of the 
deregistered B-men challenged the decision, union lawyers could not have given them 
necessary or helpful advice because the lawyers ultimately represented the interest of the 
union, not the interest of the B-men.   
After the six-month trial, both parties submitted a written stipulation of testimony 
and post-trial briefs as well as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law -- a process 
that trudged on for another two years.  On August 27, 1976, Judge Harris finally made his 
decision.  He ruled in favor of the PMA and the union.  He stated that the joint committees 
had power to deregister the B-men for any cause, unless their deregistration constituted a 
violation of discrimination under Section 13.  Because the B-men had not claimed any 
discrimination under Section 13, the union and the PMA had not done anything wrong when 
they deregistered the men.  He went on to state that the union had explained the rules to the 
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B-men and thus the B-men were at fault when they had not paid attention to the rules and 
had subsequently violated them.
32
   
Judge Harris repeatedly stated that the conduct of the union and the PMA had been 
“rational and reasonable.” Whereas all the B-men plaintiffs had been engaged in 
“misconduct” of violating rules and thus had failed to satisfy the promotion standards, the 
purpose of Coast Committee’s setting the 1963 standards had been “reasonable” and the 
standards had been neither in violation of any terms of the collective bargaining contract nor 
in any way had they been retroactive.  He found no discriminatory conduct whatsoever on 
the union’s side.33  Finally, he ruled that the B-men should have exhausted the internal 
remedies before they had filed their complaint to the district court.  They had had a right to 
appeal to the Coast Arbitrator, but they had not done so.  He concluded that for all these 
reasons, the B-men were not entitled to seek relief from his court.  
Just as he had done about eleven years ago when he had ruled against the Fourth 
Amended Complaint of the B-men, Judge Harris’s “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law” accepted virtually everything that the PMA and the union claimed, even without 
giving his reasons why their claims were correct.  In Brunwasser and Kurlander’s expression, 
“the District Court did not write an opinion explaining the rationale behind its decision in 
favor of defendants.  It merely xeroxed defendants’ proposed findings and adopted them as 
its own.”34  Willie Jenkins, Jr., one of the B men, later recalled that he could not believe the 
judge’s decision.  For him, Brunwasser had proved conclusively that ILWU had been unfair 
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to the B-men when it had deregistered them.  For Willie Palmer, Brunwasser’s performances 
and arguments made at the court made him feel good because the truth finally had come out.  
They thus were dumfounded when they heard the judge’s decision.  In effect, Jenkins Jr., 
claimed, “the judge must have believed him [defendants’ attorney] or he was senile, one of 
the two,” but clearly “something was wrong.”35  The B-men decided to appeal once again 
Judge Harris’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit Court -- a process 
that would last another three and a half years. 
 
2. The Law and the Lives of LJDC Members: Building a New Community 
When their struggle for reinstatement had continued for more than a dozen years, 
sustaining their high spirits had not been easy for LJDC members.  In 1976, upon learning 
that the LJDC case was still going on and that Mario Luppi, one of the plaintiffs, was 
leaving the United States to move back to Italy, E. Randall Keeney decided to interview him 
in order that his personal reflections could be saved before he left.  Keeney was a longtime 
friend of Weir’s and an artist activist who had drawn illustrations in Weir’s 1964 articles 
about the B-men – a practice through which she had become familiar with the history of the 
case.  While interviewing Luppi, she “could hear the depth of blocked feelings and 
perceptions” that Luppi had been “wanting to release about what had happened to him.”36  
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Luppi was not alone.  Many other members also presented their emotions – anger, bitterness, 
hurt, and frustration, all of which stemmed from deregistration and ensuing hardship that 
they had gone through.   
During the first couple of years after being deregistered, especially after they had 
won their unemployment insurance appeals in 1964, many members had believed that they 
would soon get their jobs back.  Getting a steady job for this period had been difficult, but 
due to the expectation of returning to the waterfront, some members had not actively sought 
a permanent job in other workplaces.  Willie Hurst recalled that people had met at a “pool 
hall” everyday and talked about the case.  They had thought that they would win it within a 
year, or two years at the most.  On Fridays, they used to hold regular meetings that they 
eagerly looked forward to.
37
   
But when the law suit dragged on for a longer period than they had initially expected, 
they needed to find another job in order to make a living and support their family members.  
Some, especially those who had been able to promptly put their emotions behind them, 
seemed to find another job more quickly than others.  Bill Edwards, who had decided not to 
join the lawsuit, although he was part of the LJDC, found new employment soon after 
deregistration.  He did not reveal why he had not joined the lawsuit, but he mentioned that 
he had never had difficulty finding a job during his entire life because he had been a skillful 
worker.
38
  Edgar Dunlap, who had been active in organizing for the cause of the LJDC, had 
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found a job at a naval weapons station after two or three months of unemployment following 
his deregistration.  He was still working at the same station in the late 1970s.  Answering the 
question how he could have done so, he considered himself “a realist.”  When he and several 
other LJDC members had met lawyers in the beginning and learned that the case could take 
a year or two, he had thought that he could not afford to wait.  He had kept the naval station 
job for a long time because he had decided to focus on his task at hand and told himself, “I 
have this job now, so I have to work on this one.  I got to live.”39 
However, many LJDC members could not find a steady job for many years.  Mario 
Luppi suspected that the ILWU must have given to other unions the list of the men fired.  
For the first several years each time he had gotten a job, he had been told within a week to 
leave.  Whether the ILWU had given a list to other unions or not, having a record of “being 
fired” did not help them build their resumes.  As Ellis Graves stated, “Looking for another 
job meant that the potential new employer would call your last employer.  When they found 
out that you were essentially fired, they would not hire you.”  As he had done before 
working on the waterfront, Fred Hayes looked for and took whatever jobs that he could get: 
“So I shined shoes and I picked beans, tomatoes, apples during 1965-66 and I picked 
cucumbers by taking a farm bus out to the fields, but it was hard work because it was little 
money.”  Willie Palmer expressed, “If you don’t have a job, then you just barely survive.  
When you do have a job, you got all debt paid out.  Sometimes you never catch up.”  Palmer 
felt that after 16 years, he still had not caught up with things, either financially or mentally.
40
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One of the reasons why it was not easy for many B-men to move onto other jobs was 
because they had enjoyed the particularities of the longshore work, such as its requiring 
ingenuity, giving freedom of choosing jobs, and providing decent wages.  Mack Hebert 
repeated over and over how much he loved his longshore work and thus when he had lost 
the job, he felt that he had been lost ever since.
41
  Willie Hurst also mentioned a similar 
sentiment:  
“I was hurt, bitter at what happened and. . . cause I loved the waterfront. . . . different 
job each day; not the same routine. . . . It’s free where you don’t have to answer to 
the boss everyday, and the pay was good. . . . Those three things I lost, when I was 
deregistered.”42 
 
In addition, because of different work styles between a waterfront job and others, many men 
thought that their lives after deregistration had been like starting all over again and adjusting 
to an entire new lifestyle. 
Not being able to get a stable job took a toll on the men’s family lives and some of 
them went through divorces.  In the beginning of the formation of their organization, LJDC 
members had invited their wives to their meetings.  Getting support from their wives would 
be pivotal to sustaining their struggle, but vice versa was also true: one of the purposes of 
their struggle was to regain their wives’ respect.43  However, having not much income but 
spending their meager resources on the legal case created hardship in their marital 
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relationships.  Louis Richardson said that deregistration had put “a lot of pressure” on his 
wife and made him feel “being rejected” and “unworthy.”  Consequently, he had left his 
wife.
44
  
Some B-men who gained unwavering support from their wives seemed to have 
constant, and successful, talks with them.  For instance, Art Winters mentioned that he had 
been able to continue to fight for the cause for these long years only due to his wife’s 
support.  Beyond talking a lot, they even shared reading materials regarding his case.  When 
someone asked about the case, his wife could explain to them what was going on.
45
  Those 
whose wives had their own income seemed to be able to keep their families together.  How 
the B-men coped with this kind of situation was captured in the following statement by 
Leroy Provost’s wife, Ruby, who continued working for twenty-four years and maintained 
the family economy;   
Leroy was ill after he was fired.  He lost a lot of weight.  He had little confidence.  
He is ok now.  It took two years for him to find a new job – an experience that was 
bad for him because he, like all men, took his job very seriously.  He had to count on 
me to earn money.
46
 
 
Not only were families of some members broken up, but some members also lost 
their health, and even their lives.  Mario Luppi’s lung was severely damaged while working 
as a janitor at a slaughter house.  Edward Reed had been killed in an accident in the late 
1960s while crossing a railroad track on his way to work.
47
  Ulysses Hawkins, who had 
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injured his heart while working on the waterfront, passed away sometime in the early 1970s 
when his condition worsened after having been knocked in the head one night on the street 
by a man who stole a little money from him.
48
  George R. Williams, the primary plaintiff of 
the lawsuit, also passed away in 1977 before witnessing the end of the case.
49
   
Several members emphasized the material and financial sides of their loss caused by 
deregistration.  Anthony (“Tony”) Melvin regretted even having quit his previous warehouse 
job to become a B-man in 1959: 
“[If I had not applied for the B-man job but kept my previous job] I’d probably have 
my family, perhaps; have the things in life that I wanted, maybe able to have a home, 
material things, that I wanted.  Like getting down with this job that I went through, I 
went through Hell!”50 
  
Melvin believed that no money (and no job) was the reason why his wife “threw him out” 
and this aspect permeated his viewpoint about what had unfolded in his life.  
By stating that “if we win the case, we’ll be ready to RETIRE,” Melvin expressed his 
frustration over the case taking so long.  He opined that the PMA and the union had delayed 
the case because they knew that the workers had no money to continue to fight.  He 
mentioned:   
“It’s just STALLING tactics.  Even if we WIN they’ll think of something.  This is 
the way the case has been. . . .”51  
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For Melvin, winning seemed hopeless because no one could “beat big business,” no matter 
if all the facts and truth were on his side.  Mack Hebert also expressed that the court and 
society, in general, was like the “cat and mouse game” -- a power structure that never let 
poor fellows win, but drained them of everything that they had.  Therefore, the poor simply 
could not and would not ever win.  In Albert (“Al”) W. Roberts’ opinion, the law was 
applied to “benefit those who wrote the law” and there were so many “legal technicalities” 
and “loopholes” through which law-makers could use it the way they wanted and rig the 
system that made the B-men go through “every court” and “drained” their energies and 
resources.
52
   
Because many LJDC members suffered financial difficulties and some of them 
moved away from the Bay Area, continuously holding frequent meetings and paying legal 
payments had not been easy tasks.  Nevertheless, steering committee members had regularly 
checked up on their members, updated them with news on the case, facilitated the 
participation of the members in legal proceedings such as depositions and testimonies, and 
gathered money for necessary legal expenditures.  When Al Roberts expressed, “I’m amazed 
that we’re still hanging on financially – I don’t see how in the world we made it,” Willie 
Jenkins, Jr., stated:  
This man [Al Roberts], if he didn’t have nothin’, he’d say, “I’m gonna borrow 
somethin’ – and he’s gonna come up with the money. . . and individuals. . . in this 
group. . . will take their last dime and put to what they believe in. . . .
53
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The deregistered men had cultivated their relationship beyond what was necessary 
for keeping the legal case going.  When one found a job, he would look out for other jobless 
members and help them find work.  For instance, when Dunlap had gotten a job at the naval 
weapons station, he had assisted Charlie Johnson and Rhody Adams in getting jobs at the 
same station, although the two men did not stay in the workplace for very long.
54
  When 
Thomas Nisby had taken a job at an army base, he had also looked there for a job for Willie 
Jenkins, Jr.   When Nisby was fired several years later, he joined a Teamster local and 
worked as a driver.  At that time, Willie Hurst, who had worked at the American Can 
Company, lost his job when the company closed its business.  Nisby called Hurst to join the 
same Teamster local.  About two or three years later, Jenkins, Jr., was fired from the army 
base and he subsequently joined Nisby and Hurst at the same Teamster local.  Hurst 
believed that the LJDC possessed a stronger level of “unity” than any other group.55  Art 
Winters agreed that his organization was the “strongest and the best group” because “no 
other group in the world could stick together for sixteen years” and be willing to help each 
other, especially when considering that its members had little money.
56
 
Recalling how the group had started, Willie Jenkins, Jr., stated that the initial 
gathering was something that they had done out of “necessity” to maintain their “sanity.”  
The meaning of “sanity” might be diverse and complex, but Louis Lacy offered one way to 
understand it:  he had felt better after being involved in the LJDC because the group gave 
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him a feeling of “togetherness” when deregistration had devastated him.57  Yet, sense of 
unity had not existed from the outset or among all members.  Nor had they all agreed on the 
legal strategy to get reinstated.  Winters, for instance, related disapprovingly that some 
members, out of spite, had suggested that they go down to the hiring hall and “tear the place 
up.”58  The sense of unity had been thus cultivated over the years among those who had been 
the most involved in organizing effort and other activities.  In order to continue the struggle, 
they had to learn how to deal with each other’s differences. 
Jeremiah Richards’s story tells a lot about why LJDC members stuck together 
despite their differences.  He believed that he had been fired because of his religious 
conviction as a Jehovah’s Witness, although the union and the PMA had accused him of 
chiseling ten hours.  While working as a B-man, he had talked about his religion all the time 
and he had refused some of the union activities that were against his religious practices.  He 
believed that this attitude must have annoyed union officers.  If so, he could have separately 
filed a discrimination grievance under the section 13 of the contract.  Nevertheless, he had 
decided to go along with the LJDC’s legal strategy that their complaints had nothing to do 
with section 13.  Although some of the activities that LJDC organized, such as picketing, did 
not “fit” in his religious principle, he nevertheless believed that all the deregistered men 
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shared “something in common” and they could accomplish the common goal by acting 
together.
59
  
Hurst mentioned that LJDC members learned how to exchange their ideas when 
there were disagreements by letting others freely express their opinions before jumping in 
and shouting at each other.  Melvin and Jenkins, Jr., often clashed with one another because 
of their different approaches.  In Hurst’s view, Melvin could be negative from time to time 
and once it took two years for him to disabuse Melvin of some of his notions.  While talking 
about this subject, Hurst showed that although he had often been at odds with Melvin, he 
became close with him enough to understand his thoughts and lifestyles -- he even talked 
about what time Melvin usually went to bed at night.  His interview revealed how the 
members became intimate in the process of organizing themselves.  When Keeney 
interviewed Melvin in 1977, Hurst joined the interview.   
In matter of fact, Keeney conducted several group interviews and took their photos 
showing the men having an animated discussion among themselves.  All the group 
interviews demonstrated that the fired B-men grew to understand each other very well.  
They laughed together while talking about old days and they even completed each other’s 
sentences.  When Keeney conducted an interview with Ellis Graves, Fred Hayes visited him 
and posed with him for a photograph.  With their arms over each other’s shoulders, Graves 
held in front of them a book entitled “Two Speeches by Malcolm X.”  The photograph tells 
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not only much about their relationships but also about their political ideas, although neither 
of them expounded the subjects in their interviews.
60
 
Although it was a long and difficult journey, many B-men said that they learned a lot 
in the process of organizing for the LJDC and its legal cases.  When asked what he had 
learned, Dunlap answered that “The price of justice is too high,” then he laughed and 
continued, “We learned how to, by being involved and organizing, keep the group 
together. . . . I had to learn it.”61  Ellis Graves especially enumerated legal concepts that he 
had learned: “I was learning something in the process.  Legal ramifications of employer and 
employee, how to deal with double jeopardy, etc. . . .”62  Willie Merritt, who was currently 
the plaintiff in a racial discrimination lawsuit against the Teamsters union, stated that the 
LJDC’s struggle “prepared” him for the battle against the Teamsters, although in this case, 
as the sole plaintiff, he did not have comrades to support each other.  He mentioned, “I now 
know how to talk to lawyers.  In 1963, I had no idea how to talk to lawyers.  I am not just 
after money [in these lawsuits].  I am after getting my rights and regaining my respect.”63 
While disagreeing with Melvin who expressed his regret about even having gotten 
the B-man job in the first place because of all the financial difficulties that he had to go 
through after deregistration, Hurst pointed out that if he had not been deregistered and not 
been involved in the LJDC, he would not have learned “the function of the world.”  In other 
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words, he began to understand and be able to explain how the system sustained itself and 
what its underlying problem was: 
I was looking at it [the situation] not from the financial side, but from the 
KNOWLEDGE side. . . . It was a hell of an experience and a lot of things. . . . being 
involved in the case and being de-registered was a function of the machine.  And 
becoming involved with people that related to it, and could explain it TO me what’s 
happening, instead of being content with 8 to 5 and the home, and the pay check 
each week. . . . to me that’s the problem in the World.64  
 
Art Winters showed a similar attitude: “[being deregistered was] one of the best things that 
could have happened to me, in a sense, because I learned a lot.”65  Organizing collective 
actions to change their situations proved to be a transformative experience for the B-men.   
Those who believed that they had learned a lot also pointed out the importance of the 
process, rather than the result, of their struggle.  Mack Hebert asserted that being involved in 
the LJDC and the legal case made him feel very proud of himself regardless of winning or 
losing because he knew that he had been fighting for an important cause:  
If I don’t even win, I can say that I fought my best.  You see winning the battle is not 
always the winner.
66
   
 
Hurst agreed with Hebert when he mentioned that if they had “sat back” for the past years 
and had done nothing, then they would have allowed the other side to have shown a 
complete contempt for them.  He continued, “If we sit back without trying and say that it is 
not gonna work, then we defeat ourselves.  That is the attitude that the big business wants us 
to have.”67  
                                                 
64
 Anthony Melvin and Willie Hurst, Interview Transcript, p. 4. 
65
 Arthur Winters, Interview Transcript, pp. 3-4, BANC MSS 85/169 c Box 1, Folder 13. 
66
 Mack Hebert, Interview Transcript, p.14. 
67
 Anthony Melvin and Willie Hurst, Interview, Reel #28. 
342 
 
 For Melvin Kennedy, being part of the group of people who tried to articulate their 
ideas and situations was also an important motivation for participating in the struggle.  A 
sense of solidarity encouraged Al Roberts, although he did not expect that B-men would win 
the case:  “since everybody’s willing to try, I’ll stay with ’em.”  When asked what motivated 
him to keep fighting, Lacy answered, “Everyone wants to fight some. . . . And I thought that 
I had a right fight.”  For Cleo Love, the thought that although it might take a long time, truth 
would eventually come out became his motivation for persevering: “I felt that justice was 
out there and that with a good lawyer, we could get it.”68   
Learning a lot about the law and the legal system was possible not only because it 
had been a long and convoluted journey for them, but also because they tried to be in 
constant communication with their attorney.  Art Winters emphasized that members had 
frequently talked with Arthur Brunwasser in order to learn how things were going.
69
  Some 
members mentioned that attending and testifying at the trial had also been educational.  
After having testified, Melvin Kennedy explained that it was the first time for him to present 
himself in a court room.  “It was a good experience for me.”  He felt that afterward he had 
more confidence in speaking in public.  Winters stated that he “felt like learning more about 
law during the last sixteen years than a guy has gone to school for twenty years.”70 
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Not all B-men had been present at the court merely as testifying witnesses.  Jenkins 
recalled one incident in which he, representing the group, had been to the court to ask a 
judge to give them more time to get another attorney.  It had happened during the time 
between the firing of Sydney Gordon and the hiring of new lawyers.  Although over fifteen 
years passed, he remembered the “pretty white shirt,” which he had worn when he went to 
the court house, but which got all wet with his sweat by the time when he arrived – a damp 
shirt that made him conscious of himself in front of the judge.
71
  This incident demonstrated 
the difficult path that the B-men had to go through, but it also symbolized how they survived 
and got stronger. 
Winters believed that Brunwasser was a “right type of person” for them because as 
their lawyer, he had dedicated himself to the cause and was a hard worker.  He opined that 
Brunwasser had done a “tremendous job,” especially when considering that he had only one 
co-counsel to help him read through tons of materials and prepare for the case.  He also 
pointed out that unlike many other attorneys, Brunwasser shared information with the B-
men and let them know the reasons for his approaches and movements.  In addition, because 
Brunwasser had given almost fifteen years of his life to this case, the B-men’s children grew 
up to know him.  In Winters’s opinion, “Brunwasser was one of the greatest attorneys” in 
America.  Agreeing with Winters, Jenkins, Jr., told a story that Brunwasser had previously 
mentioned to him:  Brunwasser had had a dream in which he was a longshoreman.  Jenkins 
jokingly stated, “What a frightening experience that was!”  Winters gave another example 
showing how Brunwasser had become part of the community that the B-men had created:  
He could explain things what the longshoremen had done in the hiring hall in the early 
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1960s, such as “signing-in” and “squaring-off” -- things even some of the deregistered men 
might have forgotten after all the years had passed.
72
 
For Winters, the problem of the court system rested upon judges who spoke from 
their “social standings” or where they had come from -- a place which was different from 
where Winters and other B-men had come from.  Unfortunately, the judge, not the B-men, 
had the authority in making a decision on the case.  Winters believed that although there 
existed laws based on which the B-men could make their case and that Brunwasser had done 
a good job representing them based on the law, Judge Harris ignored the law when he ruled 
in favor of the employers and the union due to his socio-economic and political standings.
73
  
For that reason, he opined that the law was not “pure.”74   
Because their lives had spun in many different directions after all these years, 
continuously pursuing their reinstatement might have seemed at times a little bit unrealistic 
to some outsiders.  But when asked if they would go back to work on the waterfront when 
they won the case, many answered, “Yes.”  Leroy Provost stated that although he was 
already 56 years old (in 1978), he would go back because he loved the waterfront job.  
Winters and Jenkins, Jr., agreed with Provost, but they also pointed out that going back 
would vindicate what they had believed and claimed and thus it would give them some 
psychological “satisfaction,” as well as a material “relief.”75  For Willie Palmer, wining the 
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case would bring some kind of peace in his mind, even though it would never bring back all 
that he had lost, especially his family life that had fallen apart after his deregistration.   
But there were other reasons why many B-men wanted to win the case.  Melvin 
Kennedy, who held a construction job since the late 1960s, mentioned that although he had 
loved the waterfront job and he had “more fun” with that job than he had ever had in his life, 
he did not want to go back because too many years had passed and things would not be the 
same.
76
  He seemed to be content with his current job and new friends.  Nevertheless, he 
hoped to win, if only to ensure that a similar injustice would not happen to other workers.  
Although having a steady construction job like Kennedy, Lacy emphasized that the most 
important thing in his life was going back to the waterfront work.  But like Kennedy, Lacy 
pointed out that their legal case was also important because had they not taken their course 
of action, the next generation of B-men might have gone through the same kind of 
treatment.
77
  
In matter of fact, the next generations of B-men, who had been hired in 1963, 1965, 
1967, and 1969, never went through what the 1959 B-men had to go through.  Since the 
LJDC’s struggle, the Port Committee, not the union, officially adopted a pro rata rule.  The 
rate was reduced by a small amount, although they had to pay it semi-annually and have it 
automatically deducted from their paychecks.
78
  It is unknown whether the new B-men liked 
the new policy, but it is clear that no one could have been penalized or fired for late 
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payments.  No new B-man was ever fired for intoxication for their first offense.  The 10-
hour LMO standard was also extended to sixteen hours.
79
   
 
3. Race and Union Democracy  
Even though several white deregistered B-men were part of the LJDC, some of the 
black members often described their group as “a bunch of blacks.”  Over ninety percent of 
the LJDC members were black and there were only about five white men in the group.  They 
thus must have felt that their battle was mainly a black men’s struggle.  For them, being 
black could not be separately conceived from being unjustly treated workers.  For example, 
Anthony Melvin addressed a lawsuit reported in a newspaper in 1977, which was brought by 
a white man against a bank that had detained him for fifteen minutes by mistake.  The court 
ruled in favor of him and awarded him forty thousand dollars for damages.  By contrasting 
their struggle to this case, Melvin claimed that “it’s hard for some black people to GET 
something,” while it was easy and fast for a white man to get a remedy for being mistreated.  
He continued, “You get to feeling like you really are a second-class citizen.  Or less.  To 
have to go through this bullshit.”80  For Melvin, racism and classism were clearly 
intertwined, working together against poor black workers’ fight for basic justice.   
Mack Hebert drew a relationship between the LJDC case and the history of 
oppression toward black people and their survival and resistance.   Whenever he thought 
about the B-men’s situation after their deregistration, he repeatedly told himself to “be 
patient.”  The “ache” was still there, nevertheless, and all the things that he had experienced 
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deeply hurt him.  However, he believed that what he went through made him stronger, just 
as the long history of racism had made black people stronger.  He eloquently stated:  
You live with an ache so long till it comes to be part of you, and then after you live 
with it so long, say “Hey, I’ve overcome it.  So this is the way it is.  By me being 
black – [I say to myself] it’s no big thing, so what – but deep down self-conscious 
it’s that ache. . . . But if you say, “Hey, let’s forget about it,” it doesn’t hurt anymore.  
And then it builds you, it makes you strong. . . . And this is what all black people 
have.  He has a consolation.  So whatever happens to a black person, you haven’t 
done anything.  You just make him stronger and stronger.”81 
 
 Their oppressive circumstances not only made black people stronger but also helped 
them develop a better understanding of the world and the mindset of white people.
82
  Art 
Winters thought that no white person had to say any racist remarks to him in order to notice 
the existence of racism, because he could sense it when he looked into their eyes.  He used 
to tell himself when he encountered a white man whose eyes signaled racism:  
I been oppressed all my life, man.  I’ll tell you.  You cannot tell me about it, I know 
about it.  It’s something you don’t know about.  I know about your culture but you 
don’t know anything about mine.  I know practically what you’re thinking.  I know 
the things you gonna do before you even do it.  But you don’t know what I’m gonna 
do.
83
 
 
Winters pointed out that even after the civil rights laws were passed in the 1960s, a 
black man still faced difficulties in getting a good job, “no matter how much experiences” 
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he had in the field.  He stated, “Maybe he [employer] don’t like the way you talk, he don’t 
like the way you smile, he don’t like the way you wear your clothes.”  In doing so, Winters 
explained, contemporary employers used not the term “race,” but racial “codes” to avoid 
employing blacks.
84
  Nevertheless, Winters believed racism as something that workers could 
overcome if they were united.  For him, employers provided a little more wages and benefits 
to white workers in order to keep them apart from black workers.  In his expression, 
“because he [employer] know if and when it ever happens that the white and the black 
organize together, he’s got problems.”85   
Willie Jenkins, Jr., who was born in 1936 and grew up in Jeanerette, Louisiana, also 
remembered how Mrs. Martin, the owner of the local flower shop where he had worked as a 
high school student, turned “red” one evening when he sat down to eat dinner with her 
family members at her dining room table – an action that crossed racial and class 
boundaries.
86
  But, he also remembered how he and one of his white friends could not 
understand why they had to be segregated and did not care about each other’s skin color.  
Their parents tried to teach them to follow the rules of segregation, but they kept their 
friendship through their entire lives.  This taught Jenkins, Jr., to believe that people learned 
racism, rather than having been born with it.  Like Winters, Jenkins, Jr., believed that racism 
was neither originated from nor perpetuated by working class people.  Rather, people in 
power had something to do with trying to keep the existing racial order: 
The key factor is that we [working people] must unite.  We must quit looking at one 
another as black and white.  We must look at each other as humans.  Then, only then, 
we can make a social change.
87
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Interviews with some of the black LJDC members illustrates that they embraced a 
similar belief as Jenkins, Jr., when they talked about their relationship with Stan Weir whom 
they had elected to the steering committee and co-chairmanship.  Although Weir was a 
white man, they maintained their brotherly affection and respect toward him for his 
organizing effort and knowledge.  Willie Merritt reflected on how much he had learned and 
transformed himself in the process of organizing for the group’s causes.  He gave much 
credit to Weir for contributing to his transformation.  He admitted that he had not given 
much thought to his rights as a worker before being fired and had had an attitude that he had 
not wanted to do anything that could have jeopardized his job – a way of life that he referred 
to as a “survival” mode.  But after deregistration, he had participated in many activities, 
including picketing and visiting, along with a group of LJDC members, several law firms to 
find a lawyer.  He stated, “I learned much from Stanley Weir, such that I had a right to 
appeal and if I fight, then I might have my rights recognized.  I learned how we were 
misled.”     
Weir’s skills for organizing and knowledge about the world were not the only ones 
that they cherished.  Weir had treated black men as equal co-workers while working on the 
waterfront and built his relationships with them based on common humanity.  For example, 
Weir had willingly paired up with black men as partners and thus challenged the racial 
boundaries customarily set up on the waterfront.  The following story told by Hurst also 
presents some of this aspect.  When Hurst’s father passed away in 1960, Hurst had to leave 
work early for the funeral ceremony.  Weir willingly covered for Hurst in the hold, so that 
he could attend the ceremony.  Hurst remembered that Weir was the only gang member who 
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comforted him for his loss, let alone covering for his absence at work.  Hurst mentioned that 
this incident made him admire Weir as a “beautiful person.”88  Hurst’s narrative exemplifies 
what Jenkins, Jr., had meant:  When black and white workers saw each other as humans, 
they could build interracial working-class solidarity and then, they could bring about 
meaningful social changes.  
How Weir thought about his position in the group is hinted in an anecdote that he 
told in his interview.  It happened in the mid- or late-1960s when about twenty five LJDC 
members met at a church in San Francisco to discuss fundraising.  Fred Hayes had been 
drinking and started to cry while Weir was talking about how to raise money.  Weir and 
group members had known that Hayes used to cry whenever he drank.  But the scene might 
have made outsiders think that Hayes was crying because he was touched by Weir’s speech.  
Weir added that it could have been seen as problematic especially for some of the “vulgar” 
black power advocates of the era.  By telling the incident, Weir revealed that he was not an 
inspirational leader of black members – because he was not the source of Hayes’ crying -- or 
did not expect to be one, but it could be seen in that way from outsiders.  Nevertheless, Weir 
felt that there had been some mixed attitudes among black members toward him: some black 
members seemed to see him “in a religious way,” while others saw him as a white brother 
“who needed their protection” from anything that might harm him.89  In any case, he 
explicitly mentioned that black members understood that he was “not their white leader.” 
To be sure, Weir consistently believed that the underlying motivation of 
deregistration of 82 men rested upon the political differences between undemocratic union 
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officers and himself who challenged their authority.  In order to get rid of him, union 
officers had to frame others and fired them together in order to make the process seem 
apolitical.  Based on this idea, Weir believed that black members had selected him as a 
leader from the onset because they had known that he was innocent and was the central 
reason for their deregistration.  But he also presented another reason why his presence in the 
group might have been a positive thing:  from his point of view, people would not revolt 
merely from their awareness of exploited conditions but they would do so only when “those 
who were part of the establishment started to rebel.”  As a white man, he could be seen by 
black men that he “had every reason to love the establishment,” but the fact that he was with 
them encouraged them to organize fights for a social change.
90
  
Although Weir was explicit about him not being the black members’ “white leader,” 
his interview conveyed a message that he evaluated himself as a highly intelligent leader and 
he enjoyed other’s acknowledgement about it.  He thought that he occupied a different social 
position and lived in a different “subculture” from those of his black counterparts because he 
had more “middle-class connections” than most black members and he had published 
several articles in political journals.
91
  In addition, in the 1970s, Weir became an academic 
worker after briefly having taken a couple of other jobs after being deregistered.
92
  He wrote 
his master’s thesis on San Francisco longshore culture at the University of Illinois.  In the 
late 1970s, he became a research associate at Northern Illinois University.  Although he said 
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that being in academia was not where he wanted to be, a similar choice was not provided to 
black LJDC members.    
The idea that Weir was “not their white leader” was more, in actuality, embraced by 
black members than by Weir.  Although they appreciated Weir for his knowledge, his warm 
heart, and for bringing a lot of energy into the group, several black men considered 
themselves as co-leaders in organizing the LJDC or praised some of the black members for 
their leading roles.  Dunlap, for example, proudly stated that he had initiated the idea of 
assembling the deregistered men when he had run into Weir at the record checkers’ office in 
July 1963.  He had put a lot of labor and time necessary for the group to function, including 
picking up Sydney Gordon, their first lawyer, at the airport whenever the latter flew from 
Los Angeles – a type of labor that was often invisible and thus seldom validated.  Some 
members acknowledged the leadership of Willie Hurst, who made a consistent effort, 
making phone calls and sending letters to members, in order to keep them in the loop.  When 
Jenkins, Jr., stated that Hurst was the most important person for the group because he had 
held it together, Hurst humbly took the praises by attributing whatever achievement he had 
to others’ influence.  He stated that Eathen Gums, Jr., and Willie Jenkins, Jr., had cheered up 
and motivated him whenever his morale was down.
93
 
An examination of black LJDC members’ attitude toward older black longshoremen 
in Local 10 reveals that explaining intergenerational relationships among black men was 
more complicated than their interracial relationship with Weir.  Several black men expressed 
a sense of betrayal toward older blacks for not speaking out for them when they had been 
deregistered.  It will be recalled that a majority of the Local 10 membership had shown their 
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support for the B-men in July 1963 when they had passed a resolution by which the B-men 
should be promoted, although their effort was subsequently defeated by the Area Joint Labor 
Relations Committee.
94
  Nevertheless, many deregistered black B-men had hoped that older 
men would do something more than just passing a resolution.  Leroy Provost, for example, 
was perplexed why Local 10 members had not walked off the job in protest for their 
decision being thwarted and in protection of the B-men’s job security.   
In addition, according to Weir, only a handful of A-men in the local had “publicly” 
spoken against the joint committees’ decisions and very few black men had done so.95  Al 
Roberts, Thomas Nisby, and Willie Jenkins, Jr., stated that some “old timers” either 
encouraged them to give up their fight or avoided talking about the issue.
96
  Some of the 
LJDC members felt that the older generation of black longshoremen had given Bridges 
unwavering support and thus avoided speaking out for the B-men.  For Weir, Bridges should 
not have received all the credit for the local’s having accepting many black workers in the 
1940s.  But the “myth” about Bridges as a friend of blacks survived for over two decades 
and garnered black longshoremen’s uncritical support.97 
Based on his analysis of how black men had to survive racism in the South, Art 
Winters explained why the older blacks supported Bridges.  When he was young, Winters 
had witnessed occasions in which older black men “could not say other than what they were 
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told to say” out of fear of being beaten by whites for no reason.  On the other hand, white 
men who had “helped blacks in any way” had received the support from black communities.  
He remembered what his father used to tell him: “Well… They own the stores, they own the 
trains, they own the cafes, and you have to go to them for jobs…”  Winters maintained that 
the old blacks learned how to “keep their mouth shut.”  
Black LJDC members identified themselves with a younger generation of black men 
who were more educated and would not just acquiesce in what they were told.  Winters 
recalled that he had been already marked as a troublemaker in his young age because he was 
outspoken.  When he was eight or nine years old, he was told that blacks did not need an 
education.  He defied the notion by constantly reading books: 
This guy that my Dad worked for, he used to tell my Dad all the time he says, ‘You 
know, he speaks out quite a bit.  Who’s teaching him?’  This is exactly what he said, 
‘Who’s teaching him?’…. So my Dad would say, ‘Well, all I know is he’s always 
got a book in front of him, that’s all I know.’  So then they tried to find a way to keep 
you out of the school, keep you working, and I didn’t like that.98     
 
What bothered Winters the most seemed not to be the white man’s notion that he had an 
outspoken attitude, but that somebody else had to have taught him how to be recalcitrant – 
an assumption that a black boy was incapable of thinking for himself.   
Mack Hebert also saw differences between the “old timers” and young black men, 
but unlike Winters who believed that old black men’s loyalty had stemmed from their life 
experiences with racism in the South, Hebert opined that old longshoremen were “bought 
out” by Bridges with “retirement money and benefits.”  Young blacks, in contrast, could not 
be counted upon to be purchased by money, Hebert argued.  He saw how Bridges, as the 
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chief negotiator for all contract negotiations, had received credit for any monetary gains that 
contracts had brought about and used it for augmenting his power and old black men’s 
support.  Hebert described his attitude toward Bridges was, “You can buy anything I got, but 
me.  I am not for sale.  That has been a struggle here with me by being black.”99  Hebert’s 
statements suggest that many younger black men embraced a different sense of manliness 
from the older generation.   
However, his last remark also showed that his attitude stemmed from his struggling 
as a black man to keep his humanity against racism -- a struggle that could transcend the 
generational gap between older and younger black men.  In reality, many LJDC members 
stated that their fathers had taught them to stand up for justice and their manhood and thus 
contradicted their description about quiet old black men in the South.  Hebert pointed out 
that his attitude about him being “not for sale” came from his father who had taught him, 
while he was growing up in Louisiana, to stand up for justice and “do not allow anyone to 
put you down.”  Willie Palmer, who grew up in Arkansas, also learned from his father that if 
he saw something that was not right, then he should not hold back, but should speak up right 
away.  His father was a quiet person, but he let others know whenever he thought he was 
right by saying, “I am right about this,” and pursued the way he believed.100 
To be sure, a generational tension was not limited to black men, but it existed on the 
waterfront, generally, because of the M & M Agreement.
101
  Reg Theriault, a white man, 
who had been hired in 1959 as a B-man, recalled that the agreement had changed the way of 
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handling cargoes, especially for hold men, who had been younger men and who had 
constituted about a third of the entire longshoremen but many of whom had not had a voice 
in the decision because of their B-men status.  This change thus strained the generational 
relationship even between father and son.
102
  Indeed, many of the 1959 B-men, including the 
black men who had been deregistered in 1963, had fathers, father-in-laws, stepfathers, or 
uncles who were A-men and thus a generational conflict could easily create a tension among 
family members.
103
   
Nevertheless, when considering that black people had cultivated solidarity within 
their communities because of racism in the larger society, the expectation of black LJDC 
members toward black older men could have been higher than that of their white 
counterparts.  Black people had organized picketing and other direct actions for fair 
employment, and some of the older generation of black longshoremen had been revered for 
their involvement in actions for civil rights.  High expectations among the younger 
generation thus could have made them feel more disappointed and even angrier.  
The lawsuits that LJDC members had filed must have added another dimension to 
the existing tension among older longshoremen and LJDC members.
104
  Weir remembered 
how difficult it was for LJDC members to get support from the local’s rank-and-file 
members because the local was included on the list of defendants and thus if LJDC members 
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won the case, then the local was also responsible for paying a portion of damages and back 
wage payments.
105
  Charles Johnson made it clear that “breaking” the local was not the 
LJDC’s intention when it had filed the suit.  Nor had he and other LJDC members expected 
that the law suit would take as long as it did -- a process that had broken up his and many 
others’ families.106   
By the time of the 1974 trial, a large proportion of Local 10 members were from the 
younger generation hired between 1959 and 1969 and over 70 percent of the membership 
was black.
107
  It is unclear about the level of the tension among the men in different 
generations or between the new local members and LJDC members.  Before the trial, LJDC 
members had sent an “open letter” to the local membership inviting them to come to the 
district court.
108
  They hoped that the longshoremen would come to the trial in order to hear 
their side of the story.  Whether any of the local’s members came to the court to observe the 
case is unknown.  Although some members supported the fired B-men’ reinstatement, few 
members must have welcomed any lawsuit against their union.  One indicator can be found 
in a newsletter published by a group of Local 10 members who criticized Bridges’s 
bureaucratization of the union and the International’s concessionary contracts.109  They 
stated that although they had been fully supported the reinstatement of the deregistered B-
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men, they had demanded the B-men to drop the suit, because they opposed on principle any 
court suits against the union.
110
 
Just as their high expectation for getting black older men’s support disappointed 
them deeply, the reputation of the ILWU as democratic and militant and its solidarity culture 
that had been cultivated during the early period must have created a high hope among the B-
men for ultimate fairness winning out in their promotion process.  As Louis Lacy stated, 
many men had assumed before they had gotten their jobs that “the longshoremen had been 
the fairest people in the world.”111  In 1977, while listening to the stories of many of the 
deregistered B-men about their feelings of betrayal and grievances about lack of democracy 
in the promotion process, Keeney, the interviewer of LJDC members, expressed her opinion 
that waterfront would be a place where only a few people would expect to have democracy.  
Jenkins, Jr., thoughtfully replied: 
Well, that’s probably for the individual who don’t like the waterfront, or don’t have 
any sentiments one way or the other.  We, as individuals who work there, I’m sure 
our feelings toward the waterfront was that it was the greatest thing at that time.  And 
another thing, being black too, and also being able to make the kind of money you 
were making there, you easily support a family.
112
 
   
In other words, only those who did not know about the ILWU and the work culture 
of the West Coast longshoremen would think about democracy on the waterfront in the way 
that Keeney expressed.  For those who had worked there, workers’ control over hiring and 
work process based on a rotation system, which provided job security and a certain level of 
freedom in choosing jobs, had given the men a greater sense of democracy.  The work 
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operation under the old rules had required workers’ ingenuity and team work – an aspect 
that added another layer to their sense of workplace democracy.  In addition, solving their 
grievances through jobsite direct actions had cultivated a culture of resistance and 
solidarity.
113
  More importantly, Jenkins’s statement indicated how the waterfront jobs 
provided black men with the ability to support their families – an economic independence 
that was another crucial side of democracy for black working men.  Because many younger 
black men had expected to enjoy these multiple sides of waterfront democracy when they 
had applied for and obtained the longshore jobs in 1959, the level of their disappointment 
must have been deeper when they had witnessed no jobsite actions by the remaining 
longshoremen in their support. 
Despite, or because of, the union’s policy of exclusion of B-men from union 
membership, they had organized themselves to improve their working conditions, elected 
their own representatives, and thus acted like a real union – actions that they believed had 
cost them their jobs.  Nevertheless, many black men began to think more seriously about the 
representational, as well as procedural, aspects of union democracy during the promotion 
process and afterward.  Luppi, for one, opined that it was not democratic when a group of 
workers in the same workplace did not have the same rights as the other group of workers.  
He also emphasized that having different opinions on the policies of the union should not 
make a permanent division among workers.  Al Roberts found that many labor union 
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officers took personally any criticism that a member might make pertaining to the job and 
thus it was difficult for a member to speak out freely.
114
   
Some LJDC members expressed their disillusionment toward labor unions in general.  
After working in many different industries since his deregistration, Ellis Graves attended 
night school, learned the skills to be a welder, and worked in the shipyards under the 
Boilermakers Union’s jurisdiction.  He claimed that most unions currently were “run by 
employers,” meaning that unions did not challenge the employers’ decisions or their rules.  
He stated, “No way I want to be involved in union politics today.”115  Nevertheless, not all 
men were negative about unions per se.  For Melvin Kennedy, having a union in a 
workplace was still more helpful than not having one.
116
  When Tony Melvin pointed out 
that unions were losing their strength, Hurst described the situation more accurately when he 
claimed that “the rank and file lost a lot of strength.”117   In doing so, Hurst underscored the 
importance of rank-and-file power within a union in creating and maintaining its viability.   
Some of them became “troublemakers” in their workplaces by organizing their co-
workers in a union or speaking out against unjust working conditions.  They challenged the 
lack of respect toward workers and opposed the prejudicial attitudes of supervisors.  Tim 
Carter was in this category.  He attempted to unionize a workplace and was fired for the 
effort.  In another workplace, he was transferred between various departments because he 
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disobeyed an order to make his crew work overtime and was marked as a troublemaker.
118
  
He later took courses at the University of California on labor unions and urban studies and 
served as a chairman of the grievance committee in a workplace.  While working as a 
teamster, Willie Merritt became a shop steward, but he was reluctant to take the position as a 
full-timer because, “I knew much about the grievance situation one had to go through with 
the company and the union and how I could become unpopular in the process.”119  Merritt’s 
statement presented his understanding of a tension in the current collective bargaining 
system and its grievance processes which seldom benefited workers in their efforts to easily 
achieve their goals. 
LJDC members also linked their opinion about Bridges to the issue of union 
democracy.  Many B-men said that they had not had a disgruntled feeling about Bridges 
before they were hired.  Some men said that they had even admired him.  Thomas Nisby had 
known Bridges since he was a boy because of his father, Wiley Nisby, who had known 
Bridges since the late 1930s.  Melvin had always supported Bridges when he had worked as 
a casual longshoreman between 1954 and 1959 and at a warehouse as a member of Local 6 
between 1958 and 1959.  He had thought that “Bridges was the great white god.”   But what 
the B-men had gone through changed their minds.  Carter recalled how Bridges at 
membership meetings had turned a cold face to those who had talked against his opinion, 
tried to shut them up, and refused to recognize them.  Carter embraced the idea that 
everyone was entitled to speak regardless of whether he was right or wrong and that at a 
union meeting everyone should be allowed to have a voice.  By the same token, as Willie 
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Merritt expressed, they embraced the idea that that no one should have too much power in a 
union, however smart and correct he might be.
120
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Chapter 10 
“It’s no fun any longer working on the waterfront”:  The Consequence of Automation 
without Workers’ Control, 1977-1981 
 
In the late 1970s, the deregistered B-men’s case was still outstanding in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 9
th
 Circuit Court.  Many B-men hoped to win the case and thus they 
could go back to longshore work that by far the most interesting job that they had ever had.  
But the waterfront had been considerably transformed due to containerization, and many San 
Francisco longshoremen felt that what once made the job very exciting and attractive had 
been lost.  This chapter studies how containerization and the changes in the mode of 
stevedoring operation impacted the work culture and human relations on the West Coast 
waterfront.  In examining some of the prevalent arguments regarding whether 
containerization benefited the economy and human lives, this study emphasizes that the 
question needs to be framed in terms of who controlled technology and for what purposes, 
rather than discussed in terms of whether technological innovations were either good or bad.  
In 1980, the 9
th
 Circuit Court made its decision on the B-men’s case.  It ruled that the 
trial court was in error when it decided that the B-men could not get a remedy from the court 
system for their failure to exhaust all the grievance procedures stipulated by their contract 
agreement.  Nevertheless, it handed down an ultimate triumph to the employers and the 
union by ruling that firing the B-men had not been illegal.  The detail of the court’s ruling is 
discussed in the last part of this chapter.  Although the B-men appealed the circuit court’s 
364 
 
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, the decision prevailed because when the country’s 
highest court denied a hearing and the 17-year-old case finally came to an end.   
Fundamentally, what had happened to the deregistered B-men for eighteen years was 
related to the subject of how containerization had transformed the waterfront.  They were 
part of the human cost of the automation plan that employers controlled.  By the late 1970s, 
the total number of West Coast longshoremen had been reduced to 8,000 from 13,500.  The 
deregistered B-men were “the first fatalities in an ongoing liquidation,” wrote Stan Weir.1  
Their deregistration was also a result of top union officers’ collaboration with the employers 
in bringing new technology into the waterfront without considering other alternatives by 
which rank and file workers could control technology to strengthen their power at the point 
of production, use it for social goods and human needs, and lessen the exploitation of both 
workers and nature. 
 
1. The Impact of Containerization on the Waterfront by the Late 1970s 
By the late 1970s automation and containerization had dramatically transformed the 
structure of the transportation systems and port operations.  Container facilities with giant 
cranes, container yards, tractors, and other new equipment to handle standardized containers 
had appeared in numerous ports in the United States and Canada.
2
  The standardization of 
the size of containers to 20 and 40 footers, as well as standard latching system, became 
especially important in developing intermodal container transportations by integrating rail 
and road systems with shipping services.  The inland transportation systems further adopted 
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during the next decade new facilities and equipment for larger capacity to carry containers.  
For example, rail cranes were introduced in order to double stack containers on trains, and 
inland container rail terminals were redesigned to use the rail cranes.
3
  The goals were not 
only to reduce ships’ time at ports by turning them around as soon as possible but also to 
decrease in the number of handling containers between the seller and the consumer.
4
  This 
ultimately meant cutting down the usage of port labor as low as possible. 
By the late 1970s, the number of longshoremen and other “off-dock workers in 
transportation and distribution” in New York City dramatically declined.5   Before the 1950s, 
50,000 registered longshoremen had worked at the Port of New York, half of whom had 
been regularly hired.  The number was reduced to 5,000 in late 1970s and to 2,000 during 
the next decade.  Containerization not only brought in changes to longshore operations and 
inland transportation systems, but it also contributed to the transformation of the geography 
of manufacturing.  Between 1967 and 1976, one fourth of the manufacturing plants in the 
New York City moved out of the city.  Although containerization was not the sole factor of 
the deindustrialization of the city, historian Marc Levinson argues that it considerably 
contributed to the phenomenon.
6
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In the short run, longshore work and manufacturing plants did not move far away.  
Container operations were conducted at Port Newark and Port Elizabeth in New Jersey, 
which had been transformed into container freight facilities since the Malcolm McLean’s 
first container ship, Ideal X, had been launched in 1956.  In 1970, the New Jersey ports 
handled almost 40 percent of the country’s total containers.7  Although other container 
facilities had developed by 1972, the New Jersey ports predominated in container handling, 
and in 1977, they still loaded and unloaded one-fourth of the total containers in the nation.  
Levinson claimed that factories that had moved out from New York went to nearby areas in 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, upstate New York, or Connecticut where New Jersey container 
freight facilities were not far away.
8
 
On the West Coast, the Port of San Francisco experienced a similar fate as the New 
York Port, when the Port of Oakland, which possessed wider berthing space and back-up 
area as well as better accessibility to inland transportation, became a major port for container 
handling.  Seattle became another major container handling port when it played a role as the 
center for container traffic to Canada until 1977, after which the British Columbia opened its 
own two container ports.  In 1977, the Seattle and Oakland ports together handled about 20 
percent of the nation’s total containers.  The Los Angeles and Long Beach ports, which 
together handled over 16 percent of total containers in 1977, would become and even larger 
container center during the next decades.
9
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Records indicate that the total volume of cargo handled in West Coast ports in 1977 
rose to 56.5 million tons -- a size larger than ever.
10
  However, the total man-hours worked 
by longshoremen decreased since 1966 – a year when 26.6 million hours had been spent.  
Between 1966 and 1969, the rate of the decrease was slow, but after 1969, the figures 
rapidly declined.  In 1977, only about 12 million man-hours were spent on handling the 
enormously increased volume of cargos.  Before 1960, the total number of longshoremen 
had been around 13,000-13,500, among whom around 1,000 were partially registered 
workers.  By 1971, the number of fully registered men decreased to 10,000, although 2,000 
B-men also worked on docks.  Six years later, the West Coast witnessed the displacement of 
about a third of its longshoremen, even though the productivity index designated more than 
a fivefold increase during the same period.
11
  When the ranks of A-men declined, the PMA 
felt little need for a large number of B-men.  By 1977, the coastwise number of B-men was 
merely 168.
12
  In 1982, according to a San Francisco longshoreman, there were only about 
1,850 members in Local 10.
13
  In the long run, therefore, all West Coast ports witnessed 
dramatic reduction in the number of longshoremen employed.
14
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A 1975 record showed that the volume decreased to 43.2 million from 49.6 million of the previous year.  
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Angeles: U of California, 1979), Appendix, p 396, Table 1A.  
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the 1980s.  Longshoremen had to work as casuals for years to find an opening.  If some made it, they ended up 
working only for 10-15 years before they retire.  See Wayne K. Talley, “Dockworkers, Earnings, 
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(September 2002): p. 455, note # 16. 
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 Herb Mills, “San Francisco Waterfront: a Memoir,” Southwest Economy and Society, 6(2), 1983, p. 10.  
ILWU records on membership statistics show that the total number of registered longshoremen in Local 10 
went down below 2,000 in 1978 and below 1,700 by 1981.  These numbers could be a little bit smaller than the 
actual numbers because they reflected the numbers of men paid their dues, a portion of which was sent to the 
international.  “International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union Per Capita Standing of Locals.” 
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However, the changes in quantity tell merely part of the transformations brought 
about by containerization.  The longshoremen who experienced the traditional mode of 
operation noticed preponderant differences in the quality of work.  For example, Sydney 
Roger who had worked as a ship clerk in the 1950s found that mechanization generated a 
speed-up in longshore work processes:  
No man has a right to ask the employer to allow him time to stop to talk—to shoot 
the breeze—to schmooze. But that was part of the rhythm of ship loading. There was 
always a little bit of time between the hook coming down and up and down and up. 
There was always a little hiatus, a breathing space. Little by little the breathing 
spaces stopped and pretty soon the man who went back and forth on the lift machine 
had very few chances to stop and shoot the breeze for a minute.
15
  
 
Being close with Harry Bridges personally and politically, Roger believed that there was no 
other choice for the union but to take advantage of the employers’ plan to mechanize the 
operations and thus he did not criticize the ILWU’s road to its collaboration on bringing 
automation on the waterfront.  Even so, Roger lamented the alienating aspect of the 
automated work.  Longshore gangs under the old mode of operation, from Roger’s 
experiences and perspective, had been “close-knit” working units, and the entire work 
process necessitated teamwork of the entire gang members.
16
  Herb Mills, who began a 
longshore job in 1963, emphasized how longshoremen had cultivated a sense of community 
                                                                                                                                                      
1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981, ILWU History-Membership Statistics File, ILWU Library, San Francisco, 
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 Roger, Interview Transcription, 1998, p. 567, “A Liberal Journalist On the Air and On the Waterfront: 
Labor and Political Issues, 1932-1990,” Calisphere, University of California, 
http://content.cdlib.org/view?docId=kt1000013q&chunk.id=d0e19147&brand=calisphere&doc.view=entire_te
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because traditional longshore operations required “cooperation” and “a collective 
innovation” of gang members.17 
But containerization broke down the basic gang into only a small number of men.  
Moreover, in a conventional container operation, the crane driver alone loaded and unloaded 
container vans from and onto the ship.  Several lashers aboard the ship tied down the vans to 
the deck:  Some lashers were on the top of the containers, while some were on the deck.  
The distance between the lashers became wider when containers were stacked up one upon 
the other.  Beneath the crane on the dock, there was a constantly moving line of trucks 
towing trailers that carried container vans.  There were only two dock men who positioned 
themselves on either side of the traffic lanes and their job was to free the van from a truck in 
order for the crane driver to lift it away to the ship and cramp down the van being unloaded 
by the crane to the truck, repeating the tasks on each truck in the line.   
When this kind of container operation became dominant, Roger heard many 
longshoremen saying, “It’s no fun any longer working on the waterfront.  The fun is gone.”  
Roger claimed: 
The fun has to do with the men working together.  A sense of camaraderie. . . . Even 
though the work seems easier now, physically, I can assure you will probably find 
more alienated men now with containers than in those days when each man had 
something to do with the cargo itself, and worked in unison with each other.
18
  
 
Some contemporary scholars might claim that the Roger’s account ignored the hard 
and dangerous nature of the traditional longshore work.  Reg Theriault, who began to work 
as a longshore B-man in 1959, admitted that the work under traditional operations was often 
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very hard.  But like Roger, Theriault pointed out that the work made enjoyable because it 
was performed together in gangs.  Gang members, especially partners, kept up conversations 
while moving the cargo around.  Moreover, fun stemmed also from the aspect that the 
workers exercised control over their own pace and work processes.  He thus continued: 
From my first day on the waterfront, I looked forward to going to work.  Most of the 
men I worked with did, too, although most of them were reluctant to admit it and 
would do so only in private.  Not even coffee, bananas, or hides were all that bad if 
you caught a good gang.
 19
 
 
Theriault remembered how container operations changed human relationships among 
longhsoremen as well as their working conditions.  Longshoremen considered lashing down 
vans aboard ship “a bad job.”  Working on top of containers was dangerous, which was 
slippery from the grease or water in a rainy weather, especially during the dark night.  
Moreover, the wire and turnbuckles that a lasher had to carry around to tie vans to the deck 
and connect them together were very heavy.  But the dock work was considered worse.  
Two partners, positioning on either side of the line of moving trucks, moved back and forth 
to release latches from vans or cramp them down.  The distance between the partners and 
their constant motion made it hard for them to talk with each other.  Beeping sounds from 
cranes or straddle trucks were constant in order to alarm the dock men to be aware when 
they made a movement or unloaded a van on the dock.  The noise also hindered them from 
having a conversation.
20
  Herb Mills also pointed out that by the late 1970s, the largest 
container ships needed only 30 men who were distanced from one another, communicating 
by radio from the cab of their machines.  A worker could not know who was on the job with 
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 Reg Theriault, How to Tell When You’re Tired: A brief Examination of Work (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc.), p. 140. 
20
 Theriault, How to Tell When You’re Tired, pp. 143-146. 
371 
 
him.
21
  He thus found that technological development not only displaced workers but also 
isolated the remaining workers, losing a sense of community.   
Moreover, before containerization, longshoremen had directly handled all kinds of 
cargo and had to figure out how to load and stow them.  Learning about where some 
particular cargos came from or where they were heading toward gave them knowledge about 
the places of origin or destination and their cultures.  Roger remembered how fascinating it 
was to see the amount and type and quality of the cargo on the dock.  But when 
containerization developed, longshoremen never saw the cargo.  In Roger’s expression,  
With containerization at full blast you could meet people [longshoremen] who could 
work an entire day and not see the cargo. . . . Every box looks exactly alike.  The 
only difference is a number. . . . The man who drives the tractor, that pulls the 
chassis that has the container on it to the hook where it’s pulled up, all he knows he’s 
got a number. . . . No personality left to the thing.  You have no idea what kind of 
port it came from.  What kind of port it goes to.  You have no idea of the culture of 
the country.  What they eat.  You don’t know any of these things.22  
 
Not only did the methods of operations and human relationships among 
longshoremen change, but containerization also transformed the entire port communities.  
With the abandonment of the San Francisco finger piers, fancy restaurants, boutiques, and 
hotels for tourists and financiers replaced the old restaurants and bars where longshoremen 
used to have meals and mingled with one another.
23
  There were all kinds of workers in the 
port area, such as seamen and teamsters, and thus these restaurants and bars had functioned 
as more than just eating or drinking venues.  They had been where working people 
exchanged information and built class solidarity.  Since containerization, this culture had 
been lost.  At the Port of Oakland where container operations were performed, Theriault 
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pointed out that there were no longer enough longshoremen to sustain even one eating 
establishment on the port.  To get to the nearest restaurant, longshoremen had to drive about 
two to three miles.  Moreover, being exhausted from a container operation, longshoremen 
would rather take a nap during a break, than drive a couple of miles to go to a restaurant.
24
 
 
2. Underlying Motivations for Containerization under Capitalism 
In 1979, Stanley (Stan) L. Weir gave a talk at a conference discussing the impact of 
technological changes in several industries, including longshore and automobile.
25
  His talk 
focused on how the longshore industry had been transformed due to automation and 
containerization.  At the time of the conference, Weir had received a Ph.D. degree, taught 
labor studies classes at the University of Illinois, and launched the “singlejack book” series 
publication.  The publication promoted workers’ authorship as well as their readership 
because singlejack books were written by workers about their own work experiences from 
their unique perspectives and were published in a small pocket size in order for workers to 
be able to carry them conveniently and read them during their break times.  The Longshore 
Jobs Defense Committee’s lawsuit against the PMA and the ILWU was still pending at the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9
th
 Circuit Court because the B-men challenged the trial 
court’s decision delivered in 1976 by Judge George B. Harris.  For Weir, the conference was 
an arena to publicize the B-men’s struggle because what had happened to them could not be 
separately understood from automation and containerization in the industry.   
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Just like Mills and Theriault, Stan Weir emphasized how automation on the 
waterfront had in a devastating impact on the livelihood of West Coast longshoremen, their 
sense of group solidarity, and the entire port community.
26
  For Weir, “finger piers” had 
more than the use value of functioning as the place for longshoremen to perform their jobs.  
They also had an aesthetic value for the community.  He also pointed out how their 
equalitarian practices of low-man-out system had been weakened since the second M & M 
Agreement allowed an employer to hire steady men who worked particularly for him and 
who worked longer hours than other longshoremen dispatched from the hiring hall.   
Weir also reminded how automation wiped out black workers from the workplace.  
He criticized the ILWU top officers for weakening rank-and-file power when they agreed to 
create a large number of B-men and kept them in the second class position with no union 
membership privileges.  Traditionally, the militancy of longshoremen had been produced 
and practiced in the hold, but when B-men, who were working as hold men, did not possess 
power, the union’s militancy became weakened.  By eliminating jobsite work rules, 
international officers also “financed” automation -- an action that Weir claimed was a clear 
indication of class collaboration.
27
  
A challenge to Weir’s talk came from a scholar in a labor studies program, who 
argued that technological developments had brought about some positive aspects.  One 
example was that containerization made it possible for consumers to get fresh foreign foods 
with lower costs.  In response, Weir admitted that some machines had improved the quality 
of living conditions of the masses of people.  One such example would be a Xerox machine, 
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Weir argued, because it had contributed to a wider distribution of books at lower costs.  But 
he reminded the audience of how the machine also displaced workers in the industry.  
Moreover, in the longshore industry, he did not see any positive result from containerization.  
He argued that if U.S. melons were shipped to Japan via containers, the only beneficiaries of 
the trade were the businessmen who got the melons in a speedy mode from the new 
technology and profited from the rapid turn-over time.  
Many contemporary people who believe in an innovative and positive impact of 
technological development especially on consumers might agree with the labor studies 
scholar, rather than with Weir.  For them, Weir’s position might be seen as romanticizing 
the old days and being concerned only about the workers’ situation.  But they often ignore to 
question who benefited the most from the technological innovations and under what 
conditions both workers and consumers could really benefit from them.  Workers and 
consumers, in actuality, could not be dichotomized for the most of the global population. 
Moreover, the ultimate motivations of technological innovations needed to be examined.   
Reg Theriault offered some more insights into how and why automation and 
containerization did not benefit consumers, in general, let alone longshoremen, when he 
discussed how coffee operations had changed over time.   
It will be recalled that when jitneys or forklifts replaced dock workers, the hold men 
began to use “pallet boards,” instead of rope slings, and had to sort out coffee sacks inside 
the hold before they placed the sacks on a pallet in order to make sure that those belonged to 
the same company would be placed onto the same pallet.  Using a pallet board and sorting 
out sacks inside the hold and pushing the loaded board to the place under the hatch in order 
that the board could be lifted by the winch made the hold work much more difficult than 
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under the previous method by which workers grabbed and piled twelve sacks in a rope sling 
without sorting and without pushing the sling.
28
   
Years later, San Francisco longshoremen opened the hatch and found that coffee 
sacks were already palletized before being sent to them.  As Theriault stated it, “The hard 
work had been transferred down to Brazil or Central America somewhere.”29  
Longshoremen at first were not entirely unhappy about not having to palletize sacks inside 
the hold.  However, there was a consequence for getting already palletized cargo.  Jobs at 
San Francisco Bay ports were eliminated and so was the number of longshoremen.  In 
Theriault own words, “employers cut manpower to the bone,” and even when more men 
power was needed in an operation, employers would not add more workers.
30
   
When palletized coffee sacks were shipped into San Francisco and unloaded from 
the ship onto the dock, jitney drivers lifted the pallet boards and stacked them inside the pier.  
Coffee sacks had been jumbled due to the ship’s rolling action on the voyage and thus when 
jitney drivers moved pallet boards, the sacks fell from the boards on to the dock no matter 
how carefully they maneuvered the boards.  Scattered coffee sacks on the dock prevented 
the drivers from continuing to operate the machine.  Theriault, who was a jitney driver at 
this period, remembered that once a walking boss ordered two “hook-on” men to drag the 
fallen sacks and move them to the pier.  Hook-on men’s job requirement was to place the 
sling load onto the dock and thus the men refused the order by insisting that the work was 
not in their job descriptions.  Theriault told the boss that he should request more men from 
the hire hall for the work and the boss subsequently called two more men to perform the 
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work.  Nevertheless, the two additional men could not keep up with the work because they 
had to work against four gangs discharging coffee and there were too many fallen sacks.  
Instead of hiring more workers, the boss ordered Theriault to push the sacks aside with his 
fork lift by using an empty board on his blade.     
When Theriault warned the boss that pushing the sacks with an empty board would 
inevitably tear many sacks, the boss, knowing that the employer would not let him hire any 
more men, told Theriault to go ahead and push the sacks.  Longshoremen could refuse to 
perform their jobs if safety issues were involved, but “protecting cargo” could not be an 
excuse to refuse to work.  A lot of sacks were torn apart, hundreds of pounds of coffee were 
destroyed, and the coffee beans were thrown into the Bay.  Theriault stated: 
At eighty cents a pound, dockside, they could have hired ample men to pick up those 
sacks and still saved money.  But they, the stevedore company, chose not to.  They 
passed the loss onto somewhere else, either back to the ship, to the coffee wholesaler, 
or to some insurance company.  Ultimately, of course to the consumer.
31
 
 
When the coffee began to be carried in containers, coffee beans that had been kept in 
closed container vans began to “sweat” when they arrived near the Bay Area ports due to 
differences in temperature.  The moisture could not escape the tightly closed van and thus 
ruined many beans, especially the top layer of sacks in the van.  Theriault continued: 
We were confronted with the sight of containers parked all over the docks with their 
doors open, drying out.  Much of the coffee was lost, as much as 15 percent, I 
learned later.  A terrible waste, but a waste will be deemed viable by the coffee 
industry, at least in America, evidently.
32
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Theriault’s account demonstrated that employers under the profit-motivated production 
system of capitalism were willing to use technological innovations neither for workers’ 
livelihood nor for consumers.  The system was ultimately wasteful and environmentally 
toxic because the employers would be concerned less with sustainability but more with 
making profits.
33
  The employers’ claim for “efficiency” in their adopting automation and a 
new technology thus actually meant to efficiently reduce any capital invested in labor, rather 
than creating a system that efficiently utilizes resources for human needs and ecological 
sustainability.
34
  
Despite these circumstances, shippers often claimed that containerization benefited 
the economy because goods were less damaged or stolen than with a traditional mode of 
loading and unloading.
35
  However, the amount of goods stolen from longshoremen under 
traditional stevedoring operations had constituted only a small part, in comparison to the 
contemporary situation in which entire containers are easily stolen by organized crime, 
especially when intermodal container transportation systems were developed.
36
  In addition, 
more and more containers were lost at sea when the amount of total containers increased and 
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containerization became a global phenomenon.
37
  Although the number of containers that 
had been lost at sea by the late 1970s is unknown, the industry would soon witness an 
incredibly large number of containers, ranging from several hundreds to several thousands, 
lost at sea each year, adding tens of miles of littered containers annually to the bottom of the 
sea and resulting in an harmful ecological impact.
38
   
Scholars pointed out that one of the reasons why containers fell off decks into the 
ocean was because the industry emphasized “efficiency” over “safety” and made ships turn 
around fast.  Although heavier containers had to be placed on the bottom of the stack of 
containers when they were loaded on a ship and “vessel planners” figured out the optimal 
arrangement of containers, loading containers often began without waiting for all containers 
to arrive at the port in order to reduce the ship’s time at the port.  As a consequence, late 
arriving heavy containers were placed in the highest tiers, resulting in a high risk of the 
collapse of the stack of containers during rough seas and endangering the stability of the 
entire load of containers on the ship.
39
   
Moreover, replacing “semi-automatic” twistlocks of the containers with “fully 
automatic” ones, which required less work by longshoremen on the deck, was considered as 
one of the reasons why containers fell off ships.
40
  Nevertheless, the shipping industry 
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defended that the total volume of containers handled reached to millions, and thus thousands 
of containers lost at sea each year represented only a very small fraction of the total and had 
little impact on the economy.
41
  The employers’ manner of trivializing or hiding the numbers 
of containers lost at sea demonstrated that they would rather take a risk of losing a large 
amount of cargo into the sea than lose a few bottles of whiskey pilfered by workers.  Their 
choices also showed their mindset that they would rather pay higher expenses to insurance 
companies for prospective containers lost at sea than hire a larger number of workers for the 
job to be performed more safely.  They never minded ecological impacts. 
What ultimately motivated the employers to pursue automation, therefore, did not 
rest upon their concerns for benefiting consumers or increasing real efficiency of the 
economy.  Technological innovations were driven by the employers’ desire to increase 
profits for themselves and their shareholders.  But more importantly, as Clarence Lang in his 
study of St. Louis black communities between 1936 and 1975 points out, the main impetus 
for automation stemmed from capitalists’ “political objectives, chiefly the desire to 
discipline a labor movement that had gained strength during the 1930s and 1940s.”42  Labor 
historian Stanley Aronowitz agrees with Lang when he argues that the underlying reason 
beneath the claim of “economic necessity” for technological innovations was to subordinate 
workers and their unions.  For capitalists, bringing about new technology into the workplace 
provided “a chance to reduce workers’ power to determine working conditions and, 
especially, to limit its control over the pace of production.”43 
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In the West Coast longshoremen’s case, it will be recalled that when most of the 
informal and formal work rules that had restricted exploitive measures in the work process 
were removed in the early 1960s, the employers were not in hurry to bring machinery into 
the workplace, although the work became extremely onerous for the workers.
44
  Theriault 
offered another example of how disciplining workers was a chief purpose of instituting 
“relief periods” in exchange for eliminating the four-on and four-off rule during the 
negotiation for the 1959 interim mechanization agreement.  When the union negotiating 
committee agreed to eliminate the rule, the union initially attempted to get two fifteen-
minute “coffee breaks” in exchange, but the employers refused.  But when someone re-
worded the demand to two fifteen-minute “relief periods,” the employers accepted the offer.  
In other words, the two demands were identical in terms of the time they requested, but 
placing the term “coffee break” into the contract was not acceptable to management, 
whereas having a “bathroom break” was.  Theriault cogently pointed out that in doing so, 
management showed its intent to permit “nothing in the working agreement not directly 
connected to production,” except for recognition of “man’s need to answer a call from 
nature.”45   
In hindsight, the ILWU could have responded to the management’s pressure to 
bringing about automation in a different way.  Lincoln Fairley, who had been the research 
director of the ILWU between 1946 and 1967 and who served as a regional arbitrator 
between the union and the PMA after that, admitted later that although he had supported the 
M & M Agreements at the time of the negotiations, he changed his position after witnessing 
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the consequences of the agreements by the late 1970s.  He believed that ILWU top officers 
could have hung on to the restrictive work rules much longer, rather than removed them and 
hurriedly signed the first M & M Agreement in 1960, because once the union gave up the 
work rules, the process was “irreversible.”46   
It is important to question who should control technology in order to make it to be 
truly used to benefit workers, consumers, the economy, and the entire ecological system.  To 
be sure, rank-and-file workers at the point of production must be at the center of any 
decision making body for any development plan because they possessed unique and first-
hand knowledge about how work should be done fairly and humanely.  The case of the 
Australian dock workers’ struggle is instructive in this regard.  When they learned that 
automation would be introduced, rank-and file-workers mastered knowledge about the new 
technology and controlled it under their power for decades.
47
  In the late 1990s when the 
management muscled up to take power away from them, the workers responded it with 
organizing strikes.  The management fired the strikers, hoping to replace them with new 
docile workers, but it soon realized that the workers were in control of the port:  it could not 
locate nearly twelve thousands containers.  The workers had hidden them in resistance.  The 
workers also received solidarity actions from longshoremen in other countries who refused 
to handle any cargo loaded by strike-breakers.  The Australian dock workers’ struggle 
suggests that the West Coast longshoremen’s union could have developed an alternative 
vision in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  The union could have tried to create a means for 
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workers to control the new technology, instead of persuading its members to give up their 
power at the point of production in exchange for some financial benefits.
48
   
 
3. George R. Williams et al. v. the PMA et al.  
While the waterfront work culture had been dramatically transformed, the 
deregistered B-men who had organized the Longshore Jobs Defense Committee continued 
their struggle to get their waterfront jobs back.  To be sure, when they had decided in 1964 
to pursue a legal remedy to be reinstated, they had never envisioned that the process would 
last so long and that the waterfront would be unrecognizably changed.  When the U.S. 
district court ruled against them in 1976, members had decided to fight further by filing an 
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9
th
 Circuit Court -- a process that took another 
three and a half years.   
Judge Harris’s ruling at the trial court can be summarized mainly in two parts.  The 
first part addressed the B-men’s complaints that their employers and the union breached the 
contract agreement when they had negotiated new promotion standards after not having 
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informed the workers in advance about specifics of the criteria for promotion and then 
retroactively applied the new criteria to the workers.  In doing so, they argued, the union 
also violated its duty of fair representation.  Judge Harris held that nothing of that kind of 
arbitrariness was found in either the employers or the union’s decisions or conducts.  
Without giving any explanation of why, he ruled that the purpose of setting the new 
promotion standards was “reasonable” and “appropriate” and no discriminatory conduct was 
found in implementing the standard to the B-men.
49
   
The second part was about the claim made by the employers and the union that the 
B-men should have exhausted the internal grievance procedure stipulated by the contract 
bargaining agreement before they filed their complaint to the court.  Judge Harris upheld the 
claim and ruled that the B-men were disqualified to seek relief from the court because they 
had failed to exhaust the grievance-arbitration procedure of the ILWU-PMA contract, 
according to which, the B-men should have taken their grievances to the Coast Arbitrator 
when they disagree with the Coast Labor Relations Committee (“Coast Committee”)’s 1964 
decision on their appeals.
50
  
By the late 1970s, the scope and definition of a union’s duty of fair representation 
had developed further from the time when the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in the Steele 
case in 1944 and also since the Vaca case in 1967.  The discussions at a 1977 conference on 
the duty of fair representation cases indicated that many workers had brought lawsuits 
against their unions for not representing them fairly in processing or settling their grievances, 
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and the U.S. Supreme Court had broadened the scope of what constituted a union’s duty of 
fair representation by ruling that even a “negligent” handling of a grievance should amount 
to unfair representation.
51
  Moreover, by 1980, several courts had ruled that a complaint 
alleging breach of the duty of fair representation in negotiating a collective bargaining 
agreement would not be subjected to the exhaustion requirement.
52
  Although the decision 
that a union’s negligence could amount to a breach of its duty did not affect the B-men’s 
case, the ruling regarding exhaustion requirement positively influenced it when the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 9
th
 Circuit Court finally delivered its decision on the Williams v. 
PMA case in February 1980.
53
 
The 9
th
 Circuit Court held that Judge Harris’s ruling on the exhaustion issue was in 
error.  The court acknowledged that the labor law, in general, required a union and its 
members to exhaust the exclusive remedies provided in the contract agreement before they 
sought judicial intervention in a case involving a breach of contract.  However, the court 
agreed with the arguments made by the B-men’s attorney in this matter when it stated that 
the B-men had exhausted all available procedure stipulated by the contract because the 
PMA-ILWU contract agreement provided the B-men with no further means to pursue their 
grievances when the Coast Committee unanimously affirmed the Port Committee’s decision.  
The court also agreed with the B-men that their complaint did not fall under the 
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discrimination clause (Section 13) of the contract agreement and thus the B-men did not 
have to follow the grievance procedure stipulated by the section.
54
   
In addition, the B-men alleged that the ILWU breached its duty while negotiating the 
new promotion standards.  Although the B-men’s complaint was not directly about the 
union’s breach of its duty in negotiating contract provisions, the ILWU and the PMA’s 
negotiation on the promotion standards would ultimately be incorporated into their contract 
agreement.  For that reason, the case should be treated as one complaining of a union’s 
breach of its duty in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement and thus the B-men 
should be exempted from the exhaustion requirement, the 9
th
 court ruled.
55
   
Despite their victory on this part of the ruling, the B-men did not achieve an ultimate 
triumph.  The appellate court upheld the other part of Judge Harris’s decision that the union 
made no breach of its duty of fair representation.  According to the ruling, although the 
union participated in creating an inferior class of workers and providing A-men with better 
terms and conditions than B-men, creating and maintaining two class statuses within one 
workplace could not constitute a violation of its duty.  On the contrary, creating the B-men 
status was necessary for the industry and thus by doing so, the union had taken a “good faith 
position.”  Regarding the B-men’s complaint about union’s participating in negotiating new 
promotion standards and implementing them retroactively, the court also held that the union 
did not breach its duty because the B-men should have known that their misconduct would 
have adversely impacted their promotion process.
56
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The court decision portrayed the B-men as unreliable and dishonorable workers 
because they had been cited with several violations in availability, LMO, or pro-rata 
payment rules.  Referring to the NLRB decision on the Johnson Lee case, the court stated 
that those who made a late pro-rata share might not be able to become “conscientious and 
reliable” workers.  For those who were accused of chiseling, the court mentioned that they 
could not convincingly argue that they would “improve the work force.”  For those who did 
not meet availability requirement, the court also agreed with the union and the employers’ 
argument that they would not help the industry’s need for a “steady, permanent work 
force.”57  The court also sustained the argument by the ILWU and the PMA that an 
overwhelming majority of the total number of B-men was able to be promoted and thus the 
82 men’s deregistration was caused by their own fault.  
Moreover, the court ruled against the B-men’s claim that the PMA and the ILWU 
violated the contract agreement when they modified the promotion standards without writing 
them down-- an action that was required by the contract.  The court held that the promotion 
standards were a mere elaboration of the basic terms of the agreement and thus the two 
parties did not have to follow the provision that required them to write down the adopted 
standards.
58
   
In response to the ruling, Arthur Brunwasser, the B-men’s lawyer, and his co-counsel 
Fred Kurlander requested a rehearing.  They argued that the panel of circuit judges 
misconstrued the records and rules when it ruled that there was nothing new about the 1963 
promotion standards.  They re-emphasized that before 1963 no longshoreman had ever been 
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fired for the same reasons that the B-men were fired.  Moreover, by the rules that the B-men 
had received in 1958, the B-men had already paid all the penalties imposed upon them for 
any rule violations.  If the rules had meant differently, then the union’s failing to explain the 
B-men about their rights and duties under the contract was a clear violation of its duty of fair 
representation, as ruled in the Retana case.
59
   
They continued to argue that if the B-men had known that late pro-rate payment, for 
example, could resulted in deregistration, they would not have logically chosen to pay the 
dues late, just as the referee of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board had 
stated in 1964 when he had examined the B-men’s case and had subsequently ruled for the 
B-men based on similar logic.
60
  The B-men’s lawyers cited some of the B-men’s 
testimonies demonstrating their sense of unfairness in their losing their employment.  One 
man stated, “The only thing I have against me where [sic] I did pay was dues and penalties, 
like the Union says.  If you want me to pay the penalties and take my job for that really, I 
don’t think that’s just.”61 
Moreover, the lawyers claimed that the appellate judges failed to consider the fact 
the B-men pursued via their lawsuit the goal to be reinstated as B-men, not as A-men.  Even 
if the B-men were to admit that they were not eligible to become A-men, they did not 
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believe that they should be deregistered, because no rules ever specified the conditions in 
which the B-men could lose their employment.   
As Brunwasser pointed out, the court completely failed to examine whether the B-
men’s past infractions of some rules could have possibly provided the employers and the 
union with enough contractual reasons to discharge them.  In other words, the B-men might 
not have been perfect employees, as the court described, but the fact itself could not have 
justified their deregistration, unless the contract agreement had specified the conditions for 
deregistration or there were historical precedents that could validate the decision.  The court 
ruling also demonstrated how easy it could be for the legal system, and capitalist society, in 
general, to legitimize a sacrifice of a certain number of workers in the process of 
restructuring an industry or the economy in the name of efficiency or progress.  In addition, 
the court decision validated what the employers and the union had argued a dozen years ago 
that a union could not satisfy all the workers in the unit in any case and that a mere act of 
treating a minority number of workers in an inferior way should not constitute unfair 
representation. 
When the appellate court refused to rehear the case, the B-men filed an appeal to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, which would be their last resort.  Several progressive groups that were 
concerned about or organized to promote union democracy submitted amici curiae or 
“friends of the court” briefs in support of the B-men.  These groups were Teamsters for a 
Democratic Union, Independent Skilled Trades Council, Union Women’s Alliance to Gain 
Equality (WAGE), The Bell Wringer, National Labor Law Center of the National Lawyers 
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Guild, and Association for Union Democracy, Inc.
62
  Teamsters for a Democratic Union, a 
caucus within the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), had been established by 
IBT members in the 1970s.  Their amici curiae brief contained arguments that were similar 
to what B-men’s attorney’s had produced, but it further emphasized the aspect that the B-
men had been politically prosecuted due to their dissident voices against some of the union 
officers and their policies -- precisely the argument that Weir had made in his 1965 affidavit. 
Meanwhile, the relationship between Stan Weir and his lawyer Brunwasser began to 
fall apart.  During the initial stage of the lawsuit, Irving Thau had been the main litigator 
whose arguments had been formulated based on Weir’s affidavit claiming the hostile intent 
of several union officers toward him and focusing on the lack of representation of the union 
in the grievance process.  However, while preparing for the trial, Brunwasser had changed 
the angle of his argument to proving the union’s arbitrary conducts in negotiating and 
implementing the new promotion rules.  By doing so, he focused away from showing the 
ILWU’s hostile discrimination against Weir.63  Brunwasser also had argued that the union 
could not possibly have fairly represented the B-men because of its contradictory position 
when it had agreed to create a second class of workers in one workplace.  After the 1980 
appellate court decision, Weir believed that the B-men lost their case because Brunwasser 
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changed “the fundamental basis of argument” by dropping the claim about hostile intent of 
union officers toward him. 
When Brunwasser was preparing a brief for the U.S. Supreme Court, Weir contacted 
Brunwasser and conveyed his desire to discuss any possibility to change the argument in the 
brief to be submitted to the Supreme Court.  When Brunwasser failed to meet with him, 
Weir and other steering committee members sent a letter to Brunwasser and pointed out the 
problem of his having dropped the argument on hostile intent.  They also chastised him for 
failing to meet with them to discuss the content of the brief prepared for the country’s 
highest court: 
We are at a loss to understand your action, shocked.  It is as if you have taken an 
attitude that somehow-someway, we are an enemy. . . . There is no reason why the 
law and legal proceedings should be cloaked in mystery for the people who, while 
they do not practice law, are expected to live by it.  The divorce between the letter of 
the law and the way life is lived is sustained by institutionalized disrespect for “lay 
people”.  Cases are not lawyer property and the law is not designed to give lawyers 
total control over the cases they take.
64
 
 
In response, Brunwasser sent a twenty-one-page letter to the B-men after he 
submitted the brief to the court and explained why he had failed to meet with the steering 
committee members.  For him, he had met most B-men many times during the previous 
fifteen years and had discussed together the strategy of the case.  After the trial was over, no 
new evidence or arguments could be presented other than what had been already presented 
in the lower courts, and thus there was no need for him to meet with his clients at the point 
of writing a brief for the Supreme Court to discuss any new strategy.  Rather, his obligation 
as their lawyer was to do his best in writing the brief and submit it before the deadline.  He 
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expounded that unlike the presentation of oral testimony at trial, the preparation of appellate 
briefs was “exclusively an arena for lawyers.”  He continued: 
It is unfortunate that many aspects of the law are, indeed, “cloaked in mystery,” but 
that is something we have to live with. . .  I did not create the system and I am not 
responsible for it.  My job was to do whatever was possible in your behalf within that 
system.
65
 
 
His letter revealed in detail the underlying reason why he had changed the basis of 
argument.  During his investigation in preparing for the trial, Brunwasser had tried to find 
evidence legally proving the claim that Weir had been a target and the union had fired other 
B-men to get rid of Weir.  When Brunwasser asked the B-men if they knew of any facts 
indicating that Weir had been treated with hostility, they did not remember.  If they did, they 
heard about the situation from Weir.  While deposing several union officers, Brunwasser 
also faced the difficulty of finding legal evidence to accuse them of treating Weir with 
hostility.  In other words, believing what Weir claimed was one thing, but legally proving it 
was entirely another.  As a result, Brunwasser decided to focus on the arbitrariness of the 
union’s conducts to prove breach of its duty of fair representation. He subsequently met with 
a number of his clients including Weir and discussed the strategy with them.   
Brunwasser understood that Weir had contributed to the B-men’s cause in many 
ways, especially in publicizing the case and raising funds.  However, from his position as a 
lawyer whose job was to win the case by using legal arguments, how Weir wanted to handle 
the case made his job not easier.  Weir’s claim that the B-men had known that they had to 
maintain “an absolutely clean record” did not help his legal strategy.  Weir intended to claim 
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his own innocence when he made the remark, but ILWU and PMA lawyers used his 
statement to argue that the B-men had known about the rules and therefore the change in 
penalties had not mislead them in any way.  Brunwasser felt that Weir had attempted to 
“inject himself into the proceedings” during the trial – an action that was not also helpful.66  
Brunwasser honestly stated that Weir had had a “demoralizing effect” on him for a long time. 
Despite the difficulties, Brunwasser claimed that he had not talked about the issue 
earlier because he had tried to focus on the case and also because he found inspiration from 
other B-men who showed their dignity in the course of fight by giving ILWU officers and 
their lawyers, at grievance hearings or during the trial, a hard time because they presented a 
logical reason why deregistering them was unfair – a logic that helped Brunwasser in 
making the case for the B-men.  He especially appreciated how Cleo Love handled Harry 
Bridges at the 1964 Coast Committee hearing.  Brunwasser had incorporated the minutes of 
the hearing into his arguments and into a brief to the appellate court as a compelling piece of 
evidence to prove the case.
67
  He stated, “[I]f we obtain a hearing in the Supreme Court, I 
feel certain that we will owe that success to Cleo Love and the way he handled himself in 
front of the Coast Committee.”68 
Brunwasser believed that his changing the direction of the argument for the case 
made Weir unhappy because he had “ceased to be the central figure in this litigation.”  For 
that reason, Weir’s request to change the basic argument to obtain a hearing from the 
Supreme Court did not appear as a surprise to him.  Moreover, he was convinced that 
although the letter chastising him for failing to meet with the B-men was sent to him by the 
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LJDC steering committee, it must have been originally written by Weir who wanted to 
blame him for losing the case at the trial and in the appellate court.
69
  He did not believe that 
most other B-men would share Weir’s sentiment.  Nevertheless, at the end of the letter, he 
affirmed them that he would do his best for his clients including Weir, if the Supreme Court 
granted review, but he also advised that if they wanted to change their lawyer, then they 
should do so immediately because their lawyer must submit his brief on the merits of the 
case within a short period after the court granted review.  He also informed them about the 
statute of limitations of filing a claim against him for any professional negligence, if they 
felt that he had been guilty of doing so. 
In response to Brunwasser, the LJDC steering committee members sent a letter 
stating that he should not have sent the letter to them because it served “to divide” LJDC 
members.  They expressed that they disagreed with him about Weir being the “disrupter” of 
the case.  They stated, “Stan has been a top positive figure in this case from the first till the 
last.”70  Weir also denied the statement that he had demoralized Brunwasser for a long time.  
He interpreted Brunwasser’s language as inferring that he was guilty of what the union and 
the PMA alleged against him and thus he thought that the letter could damage the case.
71
  
Weir later recalled that since this incident, “[t]he problem between us clients and our 
attorney of record got escalated, very probably without hope of solution, and will ever 
remain a source of grief and loss.”72 
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On January 12, 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court denied to review the case.
73
  Weir 
expressed his and his fellow men’s feelings as followed: “We were finished.  It felt just that 
abrupt.  The case had been a central activity half our adult lives and a period of adjustment 
was forced upon all participants.”74  Weir doubted that they would have filed the lawsuit in 
1964 if they had known that the legal battle would take so many years.  Nevertheless, giving 
up and walking away without a fight had been also unthinkable.  The B-men, therefore, 
expressed a pride in putting up “a good long fight.”75  Although they could not obtain their 
original goals -- clearing their names and getting the jobs back--, they gained and produced 
intangible, but more valuable, things in the process, such as knowledge about the capitalist 
social and legal system and life-long friendships.
76
 
Regarding the B-men’s relationship with Brunwasser, Weir later regretted that it 
ended the way it did.  He acknowledged that Brunwasser deserved more recognition for the 
work that he had put into the case.
77
  Because he had spent almost sixteen years of his life on 
the B-men’s case, Brunwasser vividly remembered it when he was interviewed after thirty 
three years passed.
78
  When asked about the falling-apart of his relationship with the B-men, 
Brunwasser explained that without the letter incident, losing the contact with the B-men 
might have happened anyway, because it was not uncommon for a lawyer to get distanced 
from his former clients after he lost their case.  However, the last letter that LJDC steering 
committee members had sent to him stating their disagreement with him and their sincere 
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support for Weir did not end his relationship with all of his former clients.  Years later, a 
black B-man contacted him and asked him to represent his son in a legal case.
79
  For him, 
this incident validated his belief that despite their hurtful words in the letters, his clients did 
not lose their respect for and their trust in him. 
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Conclusion  
 
 
 Historian Stanley Aronowitz in his “Why Work?” defines “workplace democracy” as 
a process in which all categories of workers participate in setting “production norms,” 
determining “what is to be produced, how much, by whom,” and designating “technologies 
appropriate to ecological, physical, and economic conditions.”1  This kind of democracy 
requires a redesign of the whole political economic structure.  The meanings of labor and 
work in this society would be entirely different from how they are perceived in the current 
system.  This would also entail totally new human relationships.  The West Coast 
longshoremen in the late 1930s did not create this level of workplace democracy.  They did 
not restructure the entire system.  Nor did they take control over what and how much society 
should produce for human needs, let alone acquire power to make decisions regarding how 
much work should be created within the stevedoring industry.  Their registration system 
revealed the inherent limitation of their authority over these aspects.  
Nonetheless, what the longshoremen established prefigures a possibility of this kind 
of workplace democracy.  Their new dispatching system called “Low-Man-Out” proved that 
when rank-and-file workers controlled employment opportunities, they had better ideas 
about how to share available jobs more democratically and equally.  Certainly, the idea of 
sharing work opportunities did not emerge naturally.  It stemmed from their learned 
experiences in a long struggle against their employers’ exploitive policies under shape-ups 
and fink halls in the early 20
th
 century.  Many scholars of the West Coast longshoremen 
have emphasized how the 1934 strike eliminated shape-ups and referred to the process of 
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establishing the new hiring system as “decasualization.”  However, what the longshoremen 
got rid of was not merely shape-ups but also steady men hiring practices that coexisted with 
the former.  The term decasualization, therefore, does not conceptualize the entirety of what 
the longshoremen established in the 1930s.  For the longshoremen, the low-man-out system 
was not about having a steady job, but rather about having a completely different way of 
maintaining job security by means of enacting their vision of equality, enjoying a greater 
sense of freedom, setting up new criteria in employment, and ultimately about having power 
-- who controlled the hiring and work processes.  
The port-wide low-man-out system resulted in not only giving the workers 
considerable leverage in dealing with their employers but also helping them establish several 
important jobsite work rules, such as sling load limits and four-on and four-off.  The 
combination of the new dispatching system and the work rules thus enabled workers to 
control the nature, pace, and the purpose of work.  Many work rules, as well as various 
dispatching rules, were not something printed in the contract agreement.  On the contrary, 
rank-and-file workers enforced the rules as they practiced them.  As San Francisco 
longshoreman Reg Theriault points out, such work rules as “on and off” and “multiple 
handling” could not be “a matter of negotiation in union contracts” from the viewpoint of 
the employers who would never officially allow these rules.  Union negotiators, who 
focused on tangible goods like wages and fringe benefits and did not actually perform the 
work at the point of production, lacked knowledge and imagination to even think about the 
necessity of these rules.
2
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Moreover, the fewer things are spelled out in the contract agreement, the more rank-
and-file workers can exercise control over their work processes in many ways, because a 
labor contract agreement often functions as a rule book that regulates the boundaries of 
workers’ conduct and behavior.  While practicing their own rules, workers can renegotiate 
on the shop floor how the work should be done.  In doing so, workers become the 
embodiment of a union and control the direction of their fate in a constant course of 
organizing direct actions.  In this case, as Aronowitz states, a union stops functioning as an 
“insurance” company but becomes a “community” of workers and exists not for and by a 
contract agreement, but for and based on worker solidarity.
3
 
Indeed, the West Coast longshoremen could practice these work rules only because 
they organized themselves at the point of production.  As Theriault argues, in order to 
practice “on and off,” workers needed to coordinate their actions and cooperate with one 
another.  In the process of practicing these rules, gangs or “informal work groups,” as in 
Stan Weir’s term, wielded power on the jobsite and generated new human relationships and 
a culture of strong worker solidarity, without which they could not have sustained the rules 
for a long time against the employers’ constant attempts to eliminate them.4   
These work rules also demonstrated that the workers possessed better knowledge 
about how the work should be done.  For example, the employers argued that on and off was 
an inefficient practice, slowing down productivity.  However, from the viewpoint of workers 
who actually did the job, on and off was a more efficient, as well as humane, way to do the 
job because in order to perform the work well for a long period, they needed a break to 
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recharge their energy.  Evidently, the employers preferred a labor system like a shape-up, in 
which they could constantly replace workers who quit, who were sick, or who died on the 
job.  Consequently, they discredited worker knowledge about the ways in which human 
working conditions could increase productivity as an excuse to work less.  The employers 
thus coined the term “featherbedding” and called those who were “off” as “unnecessary 
men” in order to create a negative image about an “on and off” practice and then 
embellished their exploitive, inhumane, and unsustainable plan with such language as 
“rationalization” and “modernization.”    
Workers’ desire to humanize their labor time against the management’s effort to 
“rationalize” it and the management’s attempt to discredit workers’ knowledge about 
production can be found in many different workplaces and at different times.  Bill Watson in 
his Counter-planning on the Shop Floor discusses how auto factory workers in the 1960s 
organized concerted and coordinated actions to disrupt the management’s plan to produce a 
motor that was designed without a concern about its utility.  Watson also examines how 
managers claimed a “rational plan” for an inventory work and vitiated workers’ self-activity 
to do the same work in a shorter time period.  As he concludes, the managers’ claim for 
rationalization was ultimately about who had authority over labor time, rather than whose 
plan was more efficient or whether the end-product was actually useful for human lives, not 
to mention ecologically sustainable.
5
 
When the San Francisco longshoremen established new democratic institutions, they 
also developed more equalitarian visions in dealing with registration processes.  Whenever 
there was not enough work and caused union officers to propose that the local should 
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deregister some longshoremen, the membership voted down the proposal, except for one 
case.  Many members argued that deregistering some of their co-workers would create a 
little more wages for the remaining members but a lot of hardship for the deregistered.  
Some of them envisioned that they should fight for shorter-hour day with the same amount 
of paycheck.  By doing so, they would create enough jobs for all and thus no one had to 
suffer.   
For rank and file workers, the idea about shorter work day stemmed from their sense 
of worker solidarity, believing that it would create more jobs for a larger number of working 
people.  Jonathan Cutler in his study about the shorter-hour week demand by Ford auto plant 
workers in Detroit during the 1940s and 1950s also shows that rank-and-file workers often 
focused on job security for a larger pool of workers, whereas their top union officers 
minimized workers’ equalitarian vision underneath the demand and attempted to channel 
their ideas narrowly into wage issues.
6
   
In the longshoremen’s case in the late 1950s, Harry Bridges and top officers of the 
International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) expropriated the idea of 
shorter work day by persuading workers to embrace mechanization.  For example, the 
workers sought 8-hour shifts, instead of current 9-hour ones, without cutbacks in wages, but 
the officers claimed that in order to do so, the longshoremen had to abandon the work rules 
and accept mechanization.  They also argued that the machinery would not only shorten the 
work hours but also make the work easier.  The rank and file’s radical vision of creating 
more jobs for more workers with their idea of shorter-hour work was completely missing in 
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the officers’ arguments.  Not surprisingly, Bridges’s vision was to accommodate the 
management’s plan to reduce the total workforce in a near future.   
The process of the negotiations for the first M & M Agreement and the result proved 
that what the employers fundamentally wanted was to get rid of the “restrictive” work rules 
and take authority away from rank-and-file workers over work processes.  Apparently, the 
ILWU’s high ranking officers also did not like to see workers’ having more power than they 
themselves had and cooperated with the employers’ plan.  They persuaded the rank and file 
that the automation was inevitable and that they should get monetary benefits from it when 
they could.  By the time when the first M & M expired, the employers gained a considerable 
amount of power to decide how many men would be needed and what method should be 
used in each operation. 
To be sure, the work rules did not disappear completely in one day.  Even though the 
1959 interim mechanization agreement prohibited on and off and the 1961 M & M 
Agreement removed most of other remaining rules, workers attempted to continue practicing 
some of the customary rules and organizing slowdowns and quickie strikes.  By the same 
token, the force that weakened rank and file power at the point of production did not emerge 
in one day, but it was growing already in the 1950s when the ILWU encouraged workers to 
use “formal” procedures, not jobsite actions, to solve their grievances and received, in return, 
welfare benefits and higher wage rates.  The bureaucratization of grievance handling and 
focusing on monetary gains through negotiations at the bargaining table unavoidably shifted 
where power resided.  This force was inherent in the collective bargaining system 
established since the 1930s, but it was latent for years and thus invisible when rank and file 
jobsite actions were strong.  Nevertheless, it gained momentum in the late 1950s.   
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Economist Paul T. Hartman saw considerable irony in that Bridges, along with some 
other 1934 generation longshoremen who had contributed to the establishment of the work 
rules in the 1930s, led the decision to abandon the rules twenty five years later.
7
  But the fact 
that Bridges and some of the top union officers had been militant in the 1930s might have 
been one of the reasons why many rank-and-file workers decided to go along with their 
suggestions.  It may be possible for workers to think that because of what Bridges and the 
ILWU had done in the 1930s, they could trust the officers and believe that those who had 
been very militant would not betray them so easily.  However, a weapon used by workers to 
empower themselves at one point could turn into a tool for their employers to dismantle their 
power at another time.  Being aware of this tension could have enabled the longshoremen to 
develop new weapons to empower themselves at different historical moments, rather than to 
keep old ones, believing that the aged weapons would be as sharp as they had been many 
decades ago.   
The 1959 B-men who toiled at the point of production as second class workers in this 
transitional period were in a unique position to see new problems emerging from the M & M 
Agreement.  New methods in handling cargo items affected mostly the B-men’s work 
processes.  For Theriault, who began to work in 1959 as a B-man, coffee handling was the 
best example of these changes.  When hold men were forced to use pallet boards, instead of 
rope slings, and had to sort out coffee sacks before they placed them on the boards, the 
nature of the work dramatically changed.
8
  But it did only for the hold men who actually 
handled the cargo and lifted the weight of the sacks with their own bodies.  Nevertheless, the 
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contract agreement was initiated by ILWU top officers, who did not have to work the coffee 
at all, and was voted for by pensioners and many older and skilled longshoremen, such as 
winch and jitney drivers, whose work processes were never affected much from introducing 
this method.
9
  On the other hand, all B-men working mostly in the hold were not allowed to 
vote.  In other words, those whose work was most affected by new methods and who thus 
were aware of the problems entailed by the new agreement were excluded from the 
decision-making processes.  Theriault’s account provides an insight into what happens when 
decisions are made by those who do not actually work and thus do not possess knowledge 
about how the work should be done in a humane manner. 
Moreover, the B-men understood better than anyone the exploitive nature of new 
work processes that had arisen from the abandonment of the old work rules and the reduced 
manning scale.  By overloading the sling, the employers brought back speed ups to the 
waterfront.  Hold men could not easily organize four-on and four-off any longer because the 
manning scale was cut in half, resulting in having only four men working in the hold in most 
operations.  Besides, the availability requirement imposed upon them and ranking them 
according to their availability records not only prevented them from taking a second job 
even when the waterfront had no jobs for them but also had a disciplinary function. 
The B-men did not take their roles as assigned and their demeaning second class 
status without resistance.  More than a quarter of the original 743 B-men left the waterfront 
permanently within three years.  Many remaining men were cited for not being available as 
required or for refusing to work as directed.  Some of them spoke out against the M & M 
Agreement and defied orders from some of the local union officers who showed an 
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unwavering loyalty to Bridges and his opinions.  But more importantly, they organized 
themselves to improve their conditions.  They elected their representatives and sent them to 
speak for them at some of union executive committee meetings.  Weir, one of the three 
representatives, gave a well-prepared presentation about B-men’s grievances at a union 
meeting.  How the B-men organized themselves prove the uncontainable nature of working 
people’s self activities for justice. 
The organizing activities of remaining B-men were an interracial effort, but it is 
important to recognize that over 60 percent of the original B-men were black workers, and 
when 200 men left the industry, the portion of black men among the remaining men 
increased to over 70 percent, because most of those who had left were white.  The fact that 
the chance to get another job, especially a decent one, in the urban setting of the era for 
black men was several times more difficult than for their white counterparts due to racism 
must have influenced their decision to stay on the waterfront.  As Clarence Lang argues, in 
the name of introducing automation, many industries created “structural unemployment” for 
many black men whose jobs were eliminated or transferred to those who possessed new 
skills to deal with the latest machines.
10
   Although this process did not explicitly exclude 
black men from taking new skilled jobs, a long history of racism created a social structure 
that benefited white men who had more opportunities to receive a higher education to learn 
new skills and possessed more resources to support their educational expenses.  
Nevertheless, by 1960, almost half of the total membership of Local 10 was black 
and its low-man-out system did not discriminate against anyone based on race, although it 
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did so based on status.  But status was one thing that they could overcome.  Many black B-
men expected that they would be promoted soon to fully registered status, and they would 
then enjoy equal treatment.  Moreover, containerization had made a very small impact on 
their work processes by this time and most cargo items had to be moved and stowed by 
longshoremen.  Many hold men still had to figure out together how the work should be done 
and they enjoyed working closely as gang members and partners.  For these reasons, as 
Willie Jenkins, Jr., stated, working on the San Francisco waterfront was “the greatest thing” 
for black men at the time.
11
  Although there was a lot of hardship caused by abandoning the 
work rules, they would have to deal with many different adversities including overt racism 
in other workplaces as blacks.  Therefore, black B-men had a vested interest in changing the 
working conditions by organizing themselves.   
Apparently, the employers and the ILWU fired a disproportionately large number of 
black men in 1963 by setting up unprecedented promotion standards, although the industry 
hired at the same time another large number of new B-men.  Many of the deregistered men 
believed that they were fired because of their outspoken criticism against the M & M 
Agreement or because their insubordinate attitudes toward their superiors.  This suggests 
that more black than white men had defied their roles unilaterally imposed upon them by the 
employers and the union.  Even if one accepts that the B-men were fired for the alleged rule 
violations, the key point changes little, because firing longshoremen for non-availability, 
late union dues payments, and low-man-out violations demonstrated that the employers were 
interested in keeping more disciplined workers.  But another aspect of structural racism 
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could have admittedly been in play.  Low availability rates for a larger number of black men 
could mean that more black workers might have taken a temporary job in another workplace, 
rather than showed up in the hiring hall and waited for a job assignment during the time 
when there was no prospect of getting one, because they could not afford not to work 
another day, although their not showing up in the hall was a violation of the availability rule.  
Regarding late dues payment, as some B-men stated in their interviews, they had to pay bills 
first before they paid their dues.  The dire financial situation of a large number of black men 
in comparison with white men reflects a long history of racial discrimination. 
Nevertheless, when racial equality in the workplace was mainly gauged by the 
number of blacks employed in the industry, these aspects were never translated into 
understanding black B-men’s lives in racial terms.  The course of the deregistered men’s 
struggle reveals that the local’s high percentage of black membership, which had attracted 
many black B-men in the first place, did not function as a strength in their battle for clearing 
their names and getting their jobs back.  Bridges used the fact to defend himself from any 
implication of racism in deregistering many blacks.  Because many black community 
members and even some of their own family members believed that Bridges had been the 
main contributor to the recruitment of many black men in the local in the 1940s and that he 
would not fire black men for no reason, garnering a unified support from local black 
communities and their family members was also difficult for the B-men.   
Some black B-men tried to make sense out of this situation by claiming their having 
a different sense of manliness, which could be read as a subversive and outspoken manner, 
from that of their elders.  However, a careful listening to the B-men’s interviews reveals that 
they contradicted themselves by mentioning at different times how their fathers stood up for 
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what was right and taught them to do the same.  In order to understand this contradiction, it 
is important to recognize that social structure, in which racism is fundamentally woven, not 
only provides limited options to black working men as a whole, but it also offers them 
different opportunities at different times and in different places and thus divides them 
accordingly.  In other words, the forces that cause a division within black people, including 
an intergenerational one, often originated from without.  If they realize that structural forces 
have created conditions for their division, they could envision alternative ways to solve their 
problems together, rather than perceived the division as caused by fundamental differences 
among them.  The realization often emerges in their collective effort to fight racism and 
other forms of oppression.  To be sure, people in each generation necessarily rearticulate 
their vision for liberation on their own terms based on their own experiences.  Nevertheless, 
a connection between them could be made if they find common purposes and have a 
commitment to make society better for all. 
In the San Francisco longshoremen’s situation, what both generations did not realize 
was what a strong force the M & M was in generating conditions for their division not only 
by offering different material benefits to them but also by creating different statuses among 
them and thus making the division more compounded.  A connection could have been 
possible if the older generation had made more effort to understand the problems arising 
from the M & M Agreement and to solve the problems together with the younger men.  But 
they decided to trust Bridges and other high ranking officers rather than the younger men.  
The M & M Agreement admittedly caused intergeneration tensions not only among black 
men.  But younger black men might have expected more support from older blacks, which 
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could have been decisive to changing the entire direction of the lives of especially those who 
were deregistered. 
By the end of the 1960s, an opportunity for longshoremen to make some connections 
across different generations and statuses arose, when they saw the devastating impacts of the 
two consecutive M & M Agreements and when they rejected the continuation of the 
agreement in 1971.  The employers’ seeking their own “steady men” was a polarizing factor, 
but it also played as a conduit to unite Local 10 members against the employers, 
international union officers, and the M & M Agreements.  By the time of the strike, 70 
percent of the longshoremen were the new generation who had begun their work as B-men.  
This demographic change must have contributed to the position of the local regarding many 
issues.  For instance, the union’s concern about the B-men’s situation increased during and 
after the strike. 
The struggle between the employers and Local 10 over the steady men issue 
demonstrated what the principle conflict had been about throughout the history of the 
relations between waterfront employers and longshoremen.  After weakening the workers’ 
power on the jobsite by getting rid of their work rules through the first M & M Agreement, 
the very next thing that the employers wanted was to take back their prerogative in the 
hiring process.  The fight over the 1971 contract agreement again demonstrated where the 
employers’ key interest resided:  They refused to compromise in the steady men and 
manning scale provisions.  These were also the most important issues for Local 10 and thus 
the local and the PMA continuously clashed with each other during the entire time of the 
strike.   
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What Local 10 fought for in their struggle against the steady men provision was 
important, but how the local organized their struggle was also significant.  When local 10 
officers and members could not do away with the provision because the second M & M 
agreement had given the right to the employers, the local organized actions that put “social 
pressure” on the jobsite:  They visited the men who took a steady man position and talked 
them out of the job; and asked members at membership meetings not to take a steady man 
job.  To a certain extent and for a brief period, they succeeded in this goal and made their 
employers adjust and rethink about their plan to have a certain number of steady men.  
When Local 10 could not eliminate the entirety of the steady men section from the 1972 
contract agreement, they organized resistance by interpreting the contract language in their 
own terms.  In other words, by adding some of their creative ideas to their knowledge about 
the work, the workers turned the contract language around to their own favorable interests.  
Their actions again proved that workers often enforced their own rules on the jobsite, even 
when their contract agreement prohibited them from doing so, and that what was spelled out 
in a contract agreement did not necessarily work the way the negotiators at the bargaining 
table had intended.   
Apparently, the workers and the employers knew better than Bridges what the central 
issues were involving the steady men provision.  Bridges argued that the time had come for 
the union to let go “of that cockeyed habit” of believing that there was something wrong 
with a longshoremen working steady.
12
  He thus capitulated, at the end of the strike, to the 
demand of the PMA.  In exchange, Bridges got a wage guarantee plan with increased wage 
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rates.  For that reason, those who focused mainly on what Bridges demanded and what was 
printed on the contract agreement as the result of the strike might argue that what the 
longshoremen wanted from the strike was merely better wages.  For example, when asked in 
an interview conducted in 1985 about the relationship between container handling issues and 
the strike, Norman Leonard, the union’s lawyer, insisted that the strike was “a standard 
kind” of an “economic strike,” although the problems of containerization should have been 
an issue.
13
   
In many ways, the deregistered B-men’s legal battle was another arena of the power 
struggle between the longshoremen and the employers, although the longshoremen did not 
see it in that way because the legal system shaped their relationship as foes -- plaintiffs and 
defendants.  The employers attempted to justify the layoffs by arguing in the courts that the 
industry needed steady and highly qualified longshoremen in the wake of the mechanization 
plan and the deregistered men had failed to quality.  For the judges in the Williams case, the 
employers’ logic was reasonable enough, even though the criteria by which the B-men were 
fired had no historical and contractual grounds and had nothing to do with the ability to 
perform their jobs.   
Indeed, there was a big gap between how the B-men perceived the meaning of 
fairness and how the judges defined fairness in the courtrooms.  For the B-men,  the 
employers and the union’s placing them for several years in a second class status was 
egregiously unfair because they could not equally share work opportunities but had to take 
the most difficult work or no work at all.  Their attorney Arthur Brunwasser reflected their 
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sentiment when he argued during the trial that the union could not have possibly represented 
the B-men fairly because it had an inherent conflict of interest in representing both A-men 
and B-men equally.  By participating in creating Class B-longshoremen and keeping them in 
their current position for a long time, the union virtually benefited A-men and inevitably 
represented only the A-men’s interests.  Nevertheless, the courts were least concerned about 
the workers’ sense of fairness in this regard.  As the 1980 appellate court decision stated, 
creating and maintaining two class statuses within one workplace could not constitute a 
violation of a union’s duty.  On the contrary, creating the B-men status was necessary for the 
maritime industry and thus by doing so, the union had taken a “good faith position.”   
Undoubtedly, nothing could have been more unfair for the B-men than being fired, 
after having endured the second class position for four years, because of past infractions, the 
penalty for which had been already paid.  The employers and the union had never informed 
them that they could be fired for these infractions at the time before or after the violations 
had occurred.  But then years later, they retroactively applied new promotion standards and 
took away the workers’ jobs permanently – a logic that Cleo Love forcefully presented in his 
grievance hearing.  For Brunwasser, the employers and the union’s conduct in the process of 
changing the promotion standards and implementing them clearly fell within the legal 
definition of a violation of a contract agreement and a breach of a union’s duty of fair 
representation.  He thought that he had legal precedents to support this claim and strong 
evidence to prove it and thus he placed this argument as central to the case.  After the trial, 
many B-men felt that Brunwasser did an excellent job in revealing “the truth.”  Nevertheless, 
the trial judge and the panel of the appellate court saw nothing unfair about the employers 
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and the union’s changing the rules and implementing them whenever and however they 
wanted.   
The union and the employers focused on jurisdictional matters in their attempt to get 
the case dismissed.  But they lost their grounds for dismissal when the circuit court in 1967 
ruled that the federal court had concurrent jurisdiction over a lawsuit alleging a breach of a 
contract and when the same court in 1980 decided that the B-men’s case not only satisfied 
the “exhaustion” requirement but also was exempted from it.  Nevertheless, the court 
ultimately agreed with the union and the employers that the collective bargaining system 
that they had established was crucial for keeping undisturbed industrial peace and 
productivity increases.  Moreover, for the courts, the union’s traditional way of dealing with 
registration, such as local membership’s controlling the process and setting the promotion 
standards, must have been more peculiar and unsettling to accept than the centralized system 
after 1958 that gave more authority to the employers.   
Brunwasser pointed out decades later that Judge George B. Harris’s ruling in the trial 
demonstrated how much the ILWU had become part of the establishment.  In matter of fact, 
by 1970, Bridges became a member of the San Francisco Port Authority, Bill Chester 
became the city’s Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) director, and James Kearney became the 
president of the City Planning Commission
14
  Art Winters, one of the deregistered black B-
men, also pointed out that judges and maritime employers were in the same “social circle” 
and thus judges’ “social standing” influenced how they decided their cases.  Bridges, as he 
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opined, wanted to be part of this circle, and once he was in it, his actions also reflected his 
social positions. 
The correspondences between Brunwasser and the B-men in 1980 -- while they were 
preparing for a petition to obtain a hearing in the Supreme Court -- reveal that not all B-men 
felt the same way about the focus of their legal strategies.  Weir believed that his discharge 
had been concocted because of his position and actions against the M & M Agreement.  
Therefore, proving his innocence by showing union officers’ hostility toward him would 
help serve some justice for himself and the B-men.  Based on Weir’s accounts, Irving Thau, 
the B-men’s main litigator after they had fired Sydney Gordon, had argued the hostility 
element in the Fourth Complaint in 1965.  But when Brunwasser investigated this aspect for 
the trial in the 1970s, he could not find enough collaborating evidence required in a court of 
law and he thus had to drop this approach.  For him, proving arbitrariness of the employers 
and the union’s conduct in negotiating and administering the rules could give the B-men the 
best chance to win the case.  In this regard, Brunwasser concluded that Weir’s testimony, in 
which he insisted that he had known the rules well and had never broken any of them, was 
not helpful for the case as a whole.  Yet after losing the appeal, Weir suspected that the 
result might have been different if Brunwasser had not changed the angel of his argument.   
This incident indicated that because the legal system defined the meanings and scope 
of what constituted a union’s fair representation and a breach of a contract agreement, what 
Brunwasser could argue was already constrained.  The system created a tension between 
aggrieved workers and their lawyer who had to find a way for his clients to get remedies 
allowed within the law, although the remedies might not be complete justice that his clients 
expected to have.  To be sure, legal interpretations of what constituted a violation of a 
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contract or a union’s unfair representation were not fixed but evolved, and lawyers had to 
adjust their legal arguments accordingly.  The long journey of the Williams case also 
reflected this aspect of the law. 
Not all LJDC steering committee members might have agreed with Weir regarding 
Brunwasser’s choice in forming his legal strategy.  Before they exchanged the 
correspondences, Art Winters and Willie Jenkins had shown their deepest appreciation 
toward Brunwasser’s hard work and his effort to communicate with them about their case.  
Some B-men might have even agreed with Brunwasser’s claim that Weir’s testimony had 
hurt their case to a certain degree.  Nevertheless, they defended Weir in their letter to 
Brunwasser and stood firmly with Weir.  While organizing their struggle for the case for 
eighteen years, LJDC members experienced various internal tensions and disagreements.  
Nevertheless, as Jeremiah Richards stated, they all had “something in common” or “a linked 
interest,” in historian George Lipsitz’s words, and they needed to work together to obtain 
their common goals.
15
  They had to work out their differences by compensating for each 
one’s weaknesses in order to advance together.  They went through many twists and turns 
and ups and downs.  In the end, they built a relationship that was more than what was 
required to merely keep the court case alive.  It is most likely that for the steering committee 
members, Weir’s contribution to establishing this new relationship was greater than any 
mistakes that he might have made in the course of actions and was much more valuable than 
what Brunwasswer could notice based on his limited role as a lawyer and thus the fired B-
men stood firmly with Weir. 
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 George Lipsitz, Conversation with author, August 25, 2015, Berkeley, California. 
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After going through the long and difficult journey in their legal battle, Weir 
retrospectively admitted that the B-men could have used filing a lawsuit as merely “a back-
up” action, if they had successfully organized solidarity actions from Local 10 and had 
garnered more support from local communities and general public.
16
  Nevertheless, as Jackie 
Hughes expressed, there had been several flickering moments of victory.  The 1964 
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board decision, the 1965 NLRB trial 
examiner’s rulings in Johnson Lee’s and other four B-men’s cases, and the 1967 circuit 
court decision on the LJDC case provided them with a glimmer of hope that they could win.  
Even though the court case ended up being costly, emotionally draining, and taking so many 
years, they did not give up and took the case all the way to the Supreme Court.  Their 
struggle proves that when society offered aggrieved workers very few options in their search 
for justice, workers had to utilize whatever tools that they had.  The law and the court 
system was one of the few means that they could utilize, although in B-men’s case, it still 
did not produce the result that they wanted.  
Moreover, because it was a long and convoluted journey, the B-men necessarily 
developed knowledge by which they could make sense of their situation and the larger 
society.  From their experiences and their marginalized social positions, they analyzed the 
“function” of the legal system, the relationship between workers and employers, and the role 
of a labor union in capitalism.
17
  Although their acquired wisdom might not have been new 
to many others, the importance of it was that when people come to a conclusion on their 
                                                 
16
 Stan Weir, “New Technology,” in Singlejack Solidarity, ed. Lipsitz (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004), p. 66. 
17
 Earnest Martinez in his On Making Sense emphasizes the importance of “decolonizing politics” of 
marginalized people – knowledge that is produced from their marginalized social positions and that necessarily 
challenges the existing paradigms and dominant knowledge systems.  See Ernesto Martinez, On Making Sense:  
Queer Race Narratives of Intelligibility (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
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own through their collective struggles, their understanding about the world is much deeper 
than they could have possibly learned in abstract terms in a school room setting.  This point 
was demonstrated in Art Winters’s expression that he felt that he had learned more about 
law during past the sixteen years than any person who would have gone to a law school for a 
longer period.
18
   
Their struggle also demonstrated that regardless of what their employers, their union, 
the larger public, and the court system had said about them, not to mention Bridges’s hurtful 
statement that they were “crooks, bums, and chiselers,” their own personal sense of integrity 
could not be taken from them.  When they decided to fight for fairness and clear their names 
and continued their battle despite their financial difficulties, marital problems, and personal 
hardships, they had already proved to themselves that no one could rob them of their dignity.    
In the process, they produced a new vision for social change and how to change it.  
They asserted that the power of a union could not be sustained without rank and file power 
on the shop floor.  They believed that democracy could not be achieved when one person 
possessed too much power.  They advocated that a labor union should be restructured in 
order to guarantee every worker’s right to say what he thought the direction of the union 
should be and how their working conditions could be improved, regardless of whether his 
idea was right or wrong.  In their organizing efforts, they shared necessary labors, learned 
from each other organizing skills, developed patience to work out their differences, inspired 
each other when their spirits were down, looked for jobs for those who were in need, and 
                                                 
18
 Jenkins, Jr., with Winters, Interview Transcript, p. 9, Materials Relating to I.L.W.U. Case, 
Longshoremen – B List, 1963-84, BANC MSS 85/169 c Box 1, Folder 7, Bancroft Library, Berkeley, 
California; and see Chapter 9, above. 
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created a new community of struggle and support.  Moreover, they built a long lasting 
interracial friendship and camaraderie not only because they had a common interest but also 
because they embraced each other based on their humanity and trust. 
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